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THE

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

VOL. CI.

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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCVIII.

JULY, 1865.

ART. I. — THE FREEDMEN AT PORT ROYAL.

THE peculiarity with which slavery usually stamps its victims is effected not so much by a positive brand of its own as by simply removing him from that contact with circumstance which is the normal condition of growth. Outside of slavery, even in almost every depth of barbarism, circumstances serve to increase human power. But in slavery, not only are natural rights denied, but, what is quite as injurious, necessary wants are supplied; everything contributes to the repression of faculty. The slaveholder's institution is a nursery for perpetuating infancy; and the more enlightened the nurse, the more successful his efforts. The world has waited for the nineteenth century and republican institutions to develop slavery in its hugest and most direful proportions; and now that the man-owner's reckless pride has made its fatal mistake, the most shameful spectacle that ever saddened earth is opened for the nations to behold, — the spectacle of a race of stunted, misshapen children, writhing from the grasp of that people which, in so many respects, is the foremost of the age.

It is this immaturity that occasions the chief difficulty in analyzing the negro's nature, as we see it in the South. In each separate faculty of his mental and moral constitution we miss the effect of training. No tendency has had scope to display its direction and vigor. Careful study is required, therefore, of the specific effects of slavery, both to distinguish what is innate from what really belongs to this condition, and to estimate the qualities of those who have been slaves at their true worth under natural laws of development. It is because this is often neglected, that the negro's friends and his enemies differ so widely in describing his character.

The freedmen of Port Royal have been regarded as the lowest of their race in America. On account of their insulation from the few currents of intelligence that find their way to the plantations of the mainland, they are probably less raised from their original degradation than the majority of the blacks, — an impression that is confirmed by comparing them with the refugees who have escaped from the interior of the State. Three years we have passed with these people, knowing them intimately in all the relations of life. Our experience therefore is narrow, but at least neither distance nor the light that is most favorable lends coloring to our view.

The first inquiry in regard to them naturally concerns their intellect. Of the mental faculties, those in close connection with the outward senses are alone developed. That they observe well, is proved by their quickness in imitation; and their memory often surprises persons used to note-books and memoranda. But while they apprehend and hold detached facts easily, they are slow to comprehend them in connection, — are deficient in the more ideal operations, which require reflection and reasoning. Hence arises an appalling mental inaccuracy. Nothing reveals more strikingly this mental degradation than the confusion of ideas that blurs their common statements. It even accounts for much of their apparent dishonesty, and most curiously distorts the structure of their language. An intercourse of several months is needed thoroughly to understand their jumbled speech. Their minds are by no means inactive, however, though the range of thought is so limited; nor does their ignorance appear dulness. The impression made by a short acquaintance with the Sea Island negroes, and confirmed by a longer one, is that they have capacity, but lack ability, — the term properly applicable to the mind which by discipline has control of its powers. That the faculty exists dormantly and awaits its training is indicated by the fact that in many individuals it is already partially developed. The slight education obtained by familiarity with white people has, for instance, lifted the class of house servants to a decidedly higher grade of intelligence, and rough talent is not unfrequently met with that compels genuine respect.

Of course the instruction which the children principally have received during the last three years cannot have visibly affected this condition. It is to these children alone, and not at once to them, that we may fairly look for evidence of greater mental ability than that exhibited by their parents. Many friends of the Port Royal movement have a very exaggerated notion of the extent of the education already accomplished there. We have even been asked, how many negroes were yet qualified to take the place of teachers. Perhaps the teachers, for want of material to form definite reports, were obliged to make general statements at first, and may have colored them too warmly. Attention has been given chiefly to reading, spelling, and writing. The higher classes have gone through the multiplication table, and in many schools the cardinal operations of arithmetic, with a little geography and history, have been introduced. None can read with perfect confidence, few without frequent hesitation. The majority of the scholars are young children still in their First or Second Primer. In writing and spelling, for the length of time spent, the relative advancement has been greater than in reading. From two plantations nearly thirty men enlisted in the summer of 1864; and of the brisk correspondence which immediately ensued, three quarters of the letters came from camp in the well-known chirography of Sammy Simmons, Jerry Polite, or others of the school-boys who had learned their alphabet since emancipation. With children more ignorant at first than our most neglected street-wanderers, and amid all the difficulties which beset any new undertaking in so unsettled a place and time, the progress thus described is at least satisfactory to those engaged in the work. One who only knows what ignorance is from the worst that we see at the North, can hardly conceive the poverty of ideas which here prevails. The primers, for instance, contain few words with which a white child is not already more or less familiar; but to the learner here they introduce very many of whose sound and meaning he knows nothing. This is a deficiency which schools alone cannot at once supply. But in the mere knowledge of reading and writing, the teachers generally say that their pupils advance about as rapidly as white children. Every one is proud of a few who would anywhere be called good scholars. The statement has been made, that in some of the schools at the North for colored children, careful observation indicates that the scholars up to the age of twelve, and in the degree of attainment then usually reached, appear to be fully equal to white children ; but that beyond this point they fall behind. Experience at Port Royal has not been sufficient to test the question ; but it is more than probable that the untrained mind of generations will reveal its weakness just where the higher faculties begin to come into exercise.

Comparatively few adults attend the schools at Port Royal ; their work and their conscious stiffness of mind deter them. But books are very widely distributed, and many with good success are picking their own way through the words. Nearly every school-child is a teacher in the family. It is painful to hear how humbly the men recognize the superiority of " white sense" ; and believing, as they do, that the secret of it lies in reading and writing, they fully appreciate the advantages of education. Even where they feel too old or too busy to acquire it themselves, they are very eager to secure it for their children ; and in most places the children love the schools as white children love a holiday, often coming two, three, and four miles regularly from their homes. This is due in great part, doubtless, to the characters of the women engaged as teachers. They have brought to their work a courage and endurance, and in most cases a refinement and an enthusiasm, with which the slight salary, that barely pays their necessary expenses, has evidently no connection.

We turn to a richer part of the nature of the black race ; but not with the conviction that in the quality of their emotions we can testify to as much excellence as many of their friends are wont to claim for it. Feeling certainly predominates in their life. It gives picturesqueness to their ideas and a dramatic vividness to their conversation ; it reveals itself in their fondness for color and for music ; and, much more than reason, it prompts their action. But the act is often only a beginning, because the motive dies. The surface everywhere is springy, but the springs lack depth, and the waters subside almost as easily as they appear. In spontaneity, intenseness, and briefness, their emotion constantly suggests that of children, and can be excited and directed like theirs. Yet this weakness — the same immaturity that runs through their whole nature — has its good side. If the nobler passions are short-lived, so also are the bad. A white man marvels at the freedom from vindictiveness with which they speak of their old masters. We have never seen the man or woman who did not prefer his present state to the care of the best owner, yet we have heard of more than one "blessed master," and of many who were "very well"; while the common story of their hardness and cruelty is seldom more than a memory. It is oftener accompanied with pity for their present condition of exile and poverty, than with any expression of malignity. Life has taught the negroes to pity; and no feeling can be so easily moved or so confidently appealed to. It takes but little also to obtain their good-will and gratitude; they think much of a cordial greeting, and patient friendliness is sure to win their hearts. Their gratitude, however, is that of smiles and promises, and votive offerings of eggs, and only lasts during fair weather. It is not their fault that a general suspicion of white men lies deeper than trust in this or that individual. Accustomed to kindness only in the form of an owner's interested protection, they cannot appreciate disinterested effort in their behalf; and in the present ignorance of their own rights and real advantage, they will sometimes turn on those whom they have long regarded as benefactors. That devoted, self-forgetful attachment of which the slaveholders boast we are sure rarely lasts longer than the connection is necessary.

Contrary to our expectation, we have never seen parents more apathetic. Certainly the expression of affection is rare to any children who are old enough to get out of the way. But this is not strange. From the example hitherto always before them, their only theory of management is that of threat and force. Formerly many husbands seem to have transferred in miniature to their wives, and both parents to their children, the blows they themselves received from their masters. Wife-beating is now infrequent, but the children are not spared the most terrific language ; the whippings, as they usually involve a chase and are often given on the run, perhaps inflict less pain than the usual New England chastisement. Moreover, child-bearing was systematically encouraged by the owner, and a child who is simply "one more little nigger for Massa," and procures a yearly exemption of a month's field-work for the mother, is a very different thing from one's own son or daughter, the child of suffering and sacrifice. The women are proud of a numerous offspring ; but in the ten to twenty names which many middle-aged women will count off to you, they usually include as many dead as living. Either from their constant labor almost to the day of confinement, or from subsequent ignorance and carelessness, a vast number of infants perish before they are three years old. And this doubtless strengthens the feeling that their children are hardly their own. We have rarely seen tears shed at a funeral, and never any of the prostrating grief which a mother usually feels. The rough pressure of slavery tends especially to crush the tender expression of feeling. The daily task must be finished, and whatever sorrow exists is locked under dumb lips. The family separations — those buryings alive of slavery — may be, at the time, as heart-rending as they seem to us. But whether the sense of loss continues keen may be doubted. Of the refugees, many have left a husband or wife in slavery; yet probably the majority have again married since gaining their freedom. It is not uncommon to form a second marriage within a few weeks after death has severed the first. It should be remembered, however, that, among people of their condition in life, marriage is as much a matter of convenience and necessity as of affection. Yet with all this the duties of family relationship are admirably observed. To the negro the plantation is his country, and "the fâm'ly" his state ; but the latter is as broad in its meaning as in its pronunciation, for on many estates the whole population consists of but two or three distinct families. Every one is aunt or uncle or cousin to every one else. The latter titles are so common that abbreviations are necessary ; at "'Cl'Arklis!" Uncle Hercules will turn his head ; and even in a quarrel with "Co' Ranty," the cousinship is not denied. Hospitality, which is ever ready, may be taxed as a right by all the kin. We have seen a strapping young fellow fighting off a band of devoted relatives, who wished to tie and whip him because he would not hoe his corn; they feared that they would have to support him the next winter. Orphans are at once adopted by connections, and the sick are well nursed by their friends. The old are treated with great reverence, and often exercise a kind of patriarchal authority. Children are carefully taught "manners," and the common address to each other, as well as to the "buckra people," is marked by extreme courtesy.

It accords with what has been said to add that the negro temperament is one which dismisses responsibility and knows little of care. It is his armor; it receives oppression as sand receives the cannon-ball, neither casting it off nor being shattered by it. It is also the secret of his weakness, — inviting attack, and rendering conquest easy. They certainly seem to be a light-hearted, laughing race, finding far more joys than sorrows in life. To the Anglo-Saxon of this century the burden of slavery would sadden every thought and moment. With the negro, it has crushed and dwarfed his nature, — an effect which he but little realizes, — and added a certain amount of physical suffering to his lot. But unless it be very constant, it is not physical suffering which sobers a man's life. The harder masters have indeed left their private mark upon their people for the Yankees now to read. We remember one plantation where the people seemed to be still cowering under an angry hand; and the neighbors on both sides, jovial as any on the island, told us stories enough of Isaac Fripp amply to explain the fact. Many of the plantations at Port Royal can furnish for each back a tale of cruelty, and from any one island can be collected of the terrible cases enough to stock a library of "Uncle Tom" novels. Yet as the majority of owners probably preserved a kind of order in their punishments, and a profitable degree of care for their property, we doubt if the slaves, as a class, suffered as much, body and mind together, as the lowest classes in our Northern cities suffer from want, anxiety, and responsibility. This is to say nothing in the behalf of slavery. The eye that at all discerns God's plan in human nature sees nothing more damning in the institution. And yet it is a favorite stand-point of the South-side view,—as if good treatment of the brute exculpates him who takes a man for his brute. Nobody denies the heathenism that lurks in modern society and makes life a burden to the poor man; but if all its concentrated iniquity could be traced out and fastened upon one set of individuals, how the world would howl them out of existence!—and that is the case in regard to the Southern curse and its authors. As the deadened sense is beyond the reach of pain, as careless merriment is natural to children, so this ungrown and stupefied race are gay under the system for which they are nevertheless so eager to exchange the hardships of liberty.

It is a touching fact in this connection, that almost all the negro airs are plaintive and in the minor key, although the singers shout out the choruses lustily, not sadly. The music seems to come from a source deeper than the habitual laugh, as if it were the low, uninterpreted remonstrance of the soul against the wrong of which it is numbly conscious.

One cause of their resignation is allied with their faith. In some degree they are fatalists. For instance, "a man never dies before his time," they are fond of saying; and so literally do they accept the belief, that they have been known to give up exertion to save life in cases of sickness where "the time" seemed to have come. This tendency to abandon themselves to what seems the unavoidable explains much of the apathy with which they endured their lot. In questioning several of the most intelligent as to their own feeling in regard to slavery, while still in that condition, the answer was always to the same effect: "It seemed strange; but we met it so,"—that is, were born to it,—"and our masters said that the Bible made it right, so we believed it." They have no energy in front of an apparent necessity; and their servitude seemed as much a law of nature as their death.

It is encouraging, because it gives direction to future effort, to see how slavery is laid in and built up of ignorance. Pure ignorance not only keeps the slaves quiet, but the same shadow envelops the whole of Southern society; it is its very blackness that prevents the non-slaveholders from seeing the object which causes it. It is said that, whatever be the end of the war, slavery is already virtually destroyed. Possibly; but we fear that many, to whom deliverance had only been a light breaking in the North, would sink back under a heavier fate than ever, if the promise of the dawn should fail. Deliverance must come from without, directly or indirectly. We do not think a general insurrection would ever have been attempted. The Slave States wisely threw obstacles in the way of emancipation. The more completely the dark skin was identified with the position of a slave, the greater their security. The existence of an intermediate class, under the ban, but evidently possessed of power, —as in the West Indies,—could alone have started the incubus of fatal inferiority from the negro mind.

Religion contributes a large part of life's interest to the inhabitants of Port Royal; perhaps because, as the plant grows towards the light that is natural to it, they moved in the direction where alone they had free action. Not only their soul, but their mind finds here its principal exercise, and in great measure it takes the place of social entertainment and amusements. Three evenings in the week, and thrice again on Sundays, the plantation leader summons them to the "praise-meeting." And in pleasant weather the roads on the Sabbath are gay for miles with clean and brightly dressed travellers assembling at the central church. The prevailing belief is that of the Close-Communion Baptists, and nearly the whole church management is now in the hands of the blacks, who have their regular deacons and preachers. Subsidiary to the church are local "societies," to which "raw souls" are admitted after they have proved the reality of their "striving." This "striving" is a long process of self-examination and solitary prayer "in the bush," and so unremitting must be the devotion during this stage that even attendance at school is thought to interfere with the action of the Spirit. After a probation in the "society" follow baptism and church-membership. And as this is considered a necessary passport to heaven, membership is in great repute; children are often seen wearing the fillet which marks the "striver," and with the most wilful it is only a question of time when they will enter the fold. The church is therefore a real power in society. Members are rather looked up to, and stricter virtue is expected of them than of others; and the "spiritual mothers and fathers" are held in general reverence.

Their prayers are little more than earnest and touching appeals of self-abasement before a loving Saviour, the name of Jesus being repeated in nearly every clause. The preaching often exhibits real spiritual experience, and sometimes coherent thought and ingenious expression; at funerals especially we have heard pointed and telling addresses. Their minds never appear to better advantage than in conversation on religious topics. The "shout" is a peculiar service in which a dozen or twenty jog slowly round a circle behind each other with a peculiar shuffle of the feet and shake of the arms, keeping time to a droning chant and hand-clapping maintained by the by-standers. As the exercise continues, the excitement increases, and occasionally becomes hysterical. Some religious meaning is attributed to it, as "worldly dancing" is strictly prohibited, nor are the "worldly" allowed to participate in "members' shouts." The more sensible seem to distrust the institution a little, but, if asked for an explanation, find a license in the Bible, which records, they say, that "the angels *shout* in heaven"! A few slight traces of superstition — nothing that influences their life or worship — occasionally come to the surface. But an amusing sign of the thoroughness with which religion permeates the life is found in their exclamations. Till acquaintance with our soldiers had ripened, oaths were seldom uttered, though they had been constantly hurled at them by their masters. Yet their common conversation overflows with expressions which strike the educated ear as the height of irreverence. Any news they greet with a "Je-e-sus!" or "Gre-a-t King!" We have heard a deacon gape to the accompaniment of "Hebenly Marster!" opening his jaws with the first word, and bringing them down on the last. It is more the thoughtlessness of familiarity than of indifference with them. With religious ideas decidedly material, their religious feeling seems to be a real laying-hold of spiritual truths. They bear themselves like fearless children before the Unseen Presence, — with a perfect reliance mingling an easy forgetfulness or an unthinking recognition. Calling one day at a rickety cabin, with dirt floor, no chimney, and large holes in the roof, full of all dirt and wretchedness, the old woman who lived there, — all her relations were dead, — lean and bent with age, hobbled to the door. "You live here all alone, Aunt Phillis?" She answered instantly, and simply as a child, "Me and Jesus, massa." They literally have lived by faith, for by it alone they have had a sense of what other men call life. Their faith has been coincident with their hope. In it they saw the equality denied to them on earth; by it only they knew a love and a rest. Therefore, God is never far from their lips or thoughts, and yet He may be much less a restraint upon action than to those who view him at a greater distance with what we deem a higher appreciation. This leads us to speak of the influence of their piety upon their morals.

Here we again strike upon the central weakness. Under slavery, so much does man take the place of God, and his law and his care that of God's law and providence, that the will does not find its natural exercise. In speaking of the mind, capacity not developed into ability was described; the moral nature reveals the correlative fact, — the decisions of conscience not consolidated by strength of will into principles of character. They seem to have a true and even *delicate appreciation of right and wrong.* None of their vices are practised unwittingly. They fully realize also their moral responsibility, and the humble acknowledgment of the white man's mental superiority contrasts strongly with the confident judgment which they pass on the white man's sins. On this ground they feel sure of perfect equality. Hell is a very vivid and palpable horror to their imagination, and heaven has more than ordinary attractions to the oppressed. Yet, with all this, nothing is less common than that moral principle which is strong enough to set temptation at defiance. In saying this we admit the existence of those vices of which the negro is usually accused; but not only do we think the charges exaggerated, — on which head more hereafter, — but that the vices belong more properly to the slave than to the negro.

Laziness, dishonesty, and licentiousness are the very habits which it is impossible, even in conception, to dissociate from slavery. Would the Yankee have gained his reputation had the possession of a smooth back been his principal motive for industry? We admit the necessity of the lash even more fully than the Southerner; for he, after asserting it as the clear proof of sloth unequalled, will next extol the success of his institution by adducing this or that plantation on which "the whip is seldom used, and the people all work cheerfully." The more there are of such, the more they disprove his own charge. But we are willing to believe, we do believe, that the real motive which underlies *every* slave's exertion is his sense of powerlessness under a master's will. It may be the master's own whip, or his neighbor's, which keeps the fact before him. As to dishonesty, it is the slave's only weapon of self-defence against abuse which must approach murder before the law furnishes him any protection, and it is the implement by which he ekes out the necessities of life with which his owner supplies him. The ration among the Sea Islands was a peck of corn per week during seven months of the year, and a bushel of sweet potatoes in the remaining five. A quart of salt came once a month, and during the hardest work a little pork or beef and molasses was added weekly. Of clothing, scant materials for one winter and one summer suit were given, and a blanket once in three or four years. The houses are cabins twenty feet by twelve, usually, but not always, provided with a floor and a partition. A quarter of an acre of ground — the poorest — was sometimes allowed each hand for private cultivation. Three holidays in the year, at Christmas, they called their own. Medical attendance was of course secured. This is literally the average amount of provision which the slaves received; it varied above or below this mark according to the wealth and humanity, or the partiality, of the owner. For this he claimed the whole time of his slaves, while their market value swelled the schedule of his wealth. The slave pilfers his orange-trees — and is by nature a thief! The master and mistress sit in the house; he toils not, neither does she spin; — the slave shirks his work in the sun, and lies to escape the whipping. In the name of justice, whom are we to call to account for want of energy and honesty? Licentiousness also was not only encouraged by the example, but often by the regulations, of the master. On the Sea Islands the plantation is a rare exception on which the white family has not contributed to populate the negro houses. The practice pursued with so much publicity, and often with violence, was in itself sufficient to reduce public opinion among the negroes to the lowest ebb. The wedding service was very infrequent; a husband or wife could be sold; reluctant marriages were sometimes compelled. As the children go with the mother, it is to the owner's advantage to have all his men marry on his own plantation, a practice fruitful of the evils both of intermarriage and unlawful indulgence, and one which, by furnishing husbands for all, prevents the penalty which attaches to a bad reputation. Thus all the props which society usually affords to chastity are changed under slavery into stumbling-blocks.

Apart, therefore, from any natural tendency, the *condition* alone of the slave amply accounts for the existence of the main defects of his character and his bad habits. And yet it is upon the ground of their existence that the Northerner points his sneer or excuses his indifference, and that the Southerner justifies his institution, — nay, seriously calls it God's appointed means of civilization. Ignorance and vice necessitate servitude, he argues, but he omits the other half of the circle, — slavery produces vice and maintains ignorance. In fairness, the severest inference from these facts is the admission already made, that the negro's will is weak and his nature plastic, — weak and plastic to that degree that pressure has forced these vices into pecular prominence. Till we know him under natural conditions of growth, it is illogical as well as unjust to call the vice itself inherent. And it becomes hard to repress our indignation when we try to *lift* our thoughts to the purity and disinterestedness of those men, North and South, who are most apt to abuse this race of slaves for their original sin. Under the most favorable circumstances, it will be very long before the negro enjoys the same conditions of success as those which determine the character and prosperity of the white man; yet it is always with ourselves, at our present height, that we involuntarily compare him. The latest, fullest, and most accurate work on the subject, that of Cochin, would relieve emancipation from the stigma which ignorance has always attached to the experiment in the West Indies, were it not for the prejudice which usually lies behind such ignorance. Our national experience of emancipation is limited to the three years of the war, a period only adequate to give to expectation the cast either of fear or of hope. Still, if those faults which flourished under the old system have acquired a new and sudden growth since restraint has been removed, we may already with good reason conclude that the principal cause is not that which we have shown to be a sufficient cause; but if the opposite process of withering and decay at once begins, the inference is as strong that that sufficient is also the actual cause.

Let us first call to mind the circumstances amidst which freedom found these people. For four or five generations black men, in these islands, had bent their backs and dropped their sweat under the southern sun, in obedience to a white man whom they called master. For a year, like other infants, each had enjoyed existence unconscious of God's coloring, and all it meant; but as instinct changed to sense, there came a recognition of the truth of things. God's sky was blue, his grass was green; — God's "massa" was white, God's "nigger" black. As a child he learned to fetch and carry; but when strength and stature made him fit, he followed his parents to the field, and for fifty years, with hoe in hand, he passed between his cabin and the cotton-rows. Then, if he had worked hard and well, he spent a few years sitting in the sun, and died; and once again he gained fellowship in the human race. Death granted him six feet of earth as well as his master. He had loved a woman whom he called wife — as long as that master pleased; and the children that had played around his door had his blood in their veins; but that — nay, possibly not even that — was his only claim to them. He had known what it was to suffer both the natural pains which God's love and providence ordain, and also those which man invents and applies in wanton anger. And this race had its Land of Promise, the North. It was prophesied in their master's curses; the vision of it lay in their own despair. Of late, those curses had been growing more bitter and more frequent; and the negroes felt that something, they knew not what, was approaching. One day, in cotton-planting time, they heard the dull booming of guns at Charleston. All day it lasted, and the next morning; and then their owners were jubilant and boasting; and these people learned a new word, "Secession." Amid the stir and confusion that followed, they went to and from the field as usual, save that the daily task was a little increased. That summer they tended the largest crop ever planted on the Sea Islands. But when the crop was thrown by for the season, instead of cutting marsh-grass, as usual, the men were sent to Hilton Head and Bay Point, and helped to build two forts there, and returned. At length, one morning in late autumn, — they were storing corn and picking cotton that day, — again they heard guns, "nearer, clearer, deadlier than before." Admiral Dupont was proclaiming liberty at Hilton Head! They dropped the work, never again to be resumed by the hands of slaves, and went home freedmen. For two days there was a scene of hurried flight, with wringing of hands and wailing voices, — so they tell us; and in those two days the white population vanished, leaving the furniture in the rooms, clothes in the press, and in most cases the people in their houses. A few blacks, chiefly house-servants, drivers, or boatmen, went with their masters, but most of these escaped within a month; and of the five thousand slaves living on the Port Royal Islands "when the guns fired at Bay Point," — which has become the popular era, the year of the Lord indeed to the Sea Island negroes, — we doubt if half as many hundreds are now absent from their homes. Thus, without one moment's preparation, no debating on the part of friends, no opposition from enemies, with no exertion and no anticipation of their own, at the boom of a gun, five thousand slaves lifted their heads and were free!

Very soon the Yankee soldiers appeared, picketed the islands, and established camps at Beaufort and Hilton Head. Not far in their wake followed Yankee traders; and soon agents were appointed to collect and ship the cotton crop, of which a large part had already been picked. This gave temporary employment to the plantation hands, while many entered the service of their protectors in the camps. In March of 1862, before the cotton agents had finished their operations, a motley group of men and women, teachers from the North, made its appearance in Beaufort, and was soon scattered over the plantations. They found the people everywhere excited and unsettled, like lost children. Always accustomed to dependence, they still needed the word of direction. In many cases, however, they had already begun to prepare corn land for the next year's subsistence; and the teachers, who at once saw that their province covered wider ground than that of letters, encouraged them to plant all the corn and cotton possible, to secure a basis of industry throughout the year. To cultivate independence, the old gang system was generally abandoned, and to each family was allotted land, for which it was alone responsible. Schools also were immediately established, and more than anything else they served to obtain interest and confidence. The new-comers worked under great disadvantages. The army officers in sympathy with their undertaking, at its outset, were very few; and the general bearing of the soldiers and cotton agents who had visited the islands before them had contributed but little to allay distrust of the white man. It was only by the greatest patience and tact that this latter obstacle was successfully encountered. Moreover, the teachers, many of whom were soon accepted as government superintendents, were themselves hurriedly selected; most of them sincerely interested, but nearly all young, and with no experience to fit them for such work. In every sense it was an experiment, — the object indefinite, the method and means untried; it was simply a generous and ready response to a cry for help.

On the other hand, the people were all unused to their new condition. Their chosen word to describe that first year of emancipation testifies to the "confusion" of the time. Were they even free, — or were they not? And not till the next January could we answer with a hearty "Yes." The prevailing idea was that "Uncle Sam" owned them; if so, "Uncle Sam" would support them. And this impression was sustained by the presents of clothing, which, for that locality, a too abundant liberality furnished from the North, and by the necessary distribution of rations on those plantations where the owners had been accustomed to buy corn. To steady industry on the plantation there was but slight inducement. The want of proper tools and animals rendered the preparatory work late and imperfect, and thus destroyed at the beginning the laborer's animation for the season. The wages were very small, and the payment long delayed, while the camps offered a high-priced market both for labor and the products of labor. The natural restlessness incident to so great a change also tended to divert their attention from the old routine with the hoe. Of course, amid such circumstances, mistakes were made and ridicule incurred, and the results were small compared with the hope excited by the enthusiasm of a noble cause. The plantations most favorably situated more than paid for themselves; but, as a whole, the crop of 1862 was not sufficient to cover the year's expenses. The "Contraband Fund," however, derived from the sale of the previous year's cotton, prevented any outlay on the part of the government. From the time when the early potatoes were ripe, the system of rationing was abandoned; and pauperism had ceased, except in the case of recent refugees and a few aged folk. The best proof that the ridicule, and not the effort, was misdirected, was the growing favor with which the movement was viewed as the year went by, and the real gain which the next spring made evident. The appointment of General Saxton as Military Governor of South Carolina had removed many local impediments. Few have deserved better of the Republic for true service at a time of need, than he whose manly faith in the negro has directed the course of Port Royal emancipation.

At planting time of 1863, the people showed that they had already learned one lesson. They were prompt in taking measures to insure an ample provision-crop for themselves. As before, the attention given to cotton culture varied in almost precise ratio to the distance of the plantations from the camps. The negroes remote from the soldiers planted more, and took better care of it, than in the preceding year; while those within carrying distance, who had found their poultry, gardens, and fishing far more remunerative, devoted themselves to the markets, and did little or nothing in cotton. They had become so much like white men as to go where they could get the most money, with the least labor, in the shortest time. With their prosperity, their confidence increased, — confidence in the reality of their freedom and in their ability to support themselves. Complaints of "confusion" were seldom on their lips; the flesh-pots of Egypt, which many fondly referred to amid the first year's anxiety, — though this regret never seemed to reach the point of willingness to return to them, — no longer suggested pleasant images. Then from this consciousness of power started a general ambition to win higher prosperity. The success of the more intelligent and energetic shamed and stimulated the laggards. By the end of the second year it was evident that all stagnancy was broken up, and that a great and increasing momentum had been communicated to the impulse toward improvement. The cotton crop probably paid, besides its own expenses, the deficit in the previous year's income.

The third year came, and brought to many new responsibilities. Without stopping to discuss the policy which directed the final disposal of the lands at Port Royal, it is enough to say that in the previous spring all the abandoned lands had been put up at auction by the United States Direct Tax Commissioners for non-payment of taxes, and that almost all had been bought in by them in behalf of the government. In the course of the spring of 1864, at a second auction sale, about one half of the whole number of plantations became the property of white, and a few that of negro purchasers, under titles given by the United States government. Of the remainder, several were leased as "school farms," of which the rent was designed to secure education for different districts, while many others were roughly divided into twenty and forty acre lots and pre-empted by negroes, in accordance with instructions received from Washington. As these instructions were afterwards recalled, few of the claims have been acknowledged. But the months passed on, the people were obliged to begin planting, and in many cases they have thus far had uninterrupted possession. The superintendents were dismissed in the course of the season; and for the last few months the negroes have either been working as hired laborers for white proprietors, or cultivating little farms for themselves, without direction or assistance. One or two agents on each island have sufficed to maintain the necessary connection between the people and the government. All the proprietors were required to make contracts with their workmen, subject to General Saxton's supervision. Some preferred to give a share of the crop, usually a third to a half, to the laborer; others offered wages which would probably average ten cents per hour; in both cases provision, land, and houses being furnished, either rent free or for a nominal rent of perhaps a bushel of corn to the acre. The latter method is found to be much the more effectual in securing constant and faithful care. Where the people had confidence in their employer, they worked more diligently than during the preceding year; but the caterpillar so ravaged the fields in September and October as to leave in most localities less than a two-thirds crop. On most of the negro lots the yield was still less. Each family had planted its three or four acres with much zeal, but little manure; and in the summer, other more immediate interests — their eggs and watermelons — obtained the earliest attention. In spite of this neglect, the present price of cotton remunerates them tenfold; and the more provident and intelligent, who did not slack their care, are just now rolling in comparative wealth. To the majority, such success will prove a stimulant to more continued exertion; to a few, the ease with which it was acquired will doubtless be an injury.

Now, has emancipation been a success? Has freedom found these slaves, or made them, men? If it be too soon to bring in a verdict upon the scanty testimony which these three years afford, a longer delay will only render the final decision more emphatically favorable to the negro. A fact before alluded to must be remembered, that we have had here upon trial the lowest and most degraded of the race. A visit to Savannah is a trip from the tenth to the fifteenth century, — so different are the people whom Sherman has delivered. From the West, the Southwest, and the Border States, wherever else emancipation has followed the track of our armies, men who are acquainted with the Port-Royalists express a similar opinion in regard to their native intelligence. The evidence is so striking on this point, that in itself it almost warrants the assumption that only common contact with common circumstances is needed to produce with the black the same results as with the white man in America. Let the decision for Port Royal, therefore, be what it may, under equal advantages better results may be expected everywhere else. For ourselves, we are satisfied with the progress made here. Yet, as the sympathy which overlooks facts only prepares a triumph for the prejudice which arms itself with those facts, it is wise to estimate the obstacles in the path at their full size. In movements to which national attention is directed, this is especially important; for where all are watching and judging, there are many adversaries ready to pick up every stone. Duty did not free the blacks, nor will enthusiasm educate them. When the war is finished on our own terms, we have then merely got possession of the broken piece; we have still to make it stick. The South must be made a loyal, not a captured people, if we are to be United States in any sense that is worth the blood that has been shed. And the cement is ready in the form of the four million freedmen, if the North be wise enough to use it. If we see aright, it is our treatment of the negro on which depends all that the historian of the next century will sum up as the permanent result of the war. Believing, therefore, that the subject calls for all the wisdom and devotion which the best men of the country can furnish, we think it should be with slow earnestness, with caution, with the fullest appreciation of reality, rather than with short-sighted enthusiasm, that both discussion and action should be approached. It is the sober judgment which traces the present degradation to its specific sources in the past, that will prove most patient and skilful in removing it; and it is to such judgment that the signs at Port Royal will richly suggest the hope that lies in the future.

Indolence, dishonesty, and licentiousness were the principal charges against the negro. We did not deny them in regard to the slave, though we have little doubt that his vice, and even his virtue, has been exaggerated; that from both sides additional weight has been thrown into the scale which tends to raise the respectability of slavery. Gratitude and affection, by implying content, and thriftless dishonesty, by necessitating guardianship, equally reflect honor on the institution. But if the charges apply to the *negro*, the question at once springs to the lips, What would his indolence under the lash become in three years under freedom? What extreme would license and trickery attain, when the severity which could not restrain them is removed? But the answer of emancipation is very distinct, though low. It gives the lie to the negro-owner, and confirms the theory which makes himself accountable for the degradation that he slanders. The roots of self-respect, that could never break the clod hardened and blasted by slavery, have already felt the spring-like influence of freedom, and to-day the wilderness is glad with green things.

The *quality* of industry is far more affected by circumstances than the quantity, and is therefore that which we may expect to find inferior in the new freedmen. In the absence of personal motive, industry must needs lack the element of persistence; in the absence of responsibility, it lacks forethought and finish; and with little or no education, it wants the contrivance and skill which turn the white man's industry to account. The freeman works to accomplish his ends; the slave, to end what he is obliged to accomplish. The best that can be looked for in his exertion is a fair degree of energy; and that we find. In the beginning of the day's work or the year's, the hoe flies and the excitement is real; but the interest becomes distracted, and the hands falter. Although complaints are frequent about the work that used to be required, the hardship seems to have fallen principally upon the women, and then to have been exceptional. The steady ten-hours toil of the Northern laborer is a thing almost unknown to the negro of the Sea Islands. Considering the short time spent, the small skill required, and the degree of care that can be relied on, the so-called "day's work" there is really worth less than half the wages to which the Northern farm-laborer is entitled. The price of the peculiar staple on which it is expended, and the temporary demand for labor at the camps, give it its principal value. Doubtless the negroes worked with less animation under slavery, for now in most operations the old master's task is finished in six or seven hours. Where they are paid by the job, the stronger and smarter men habitually exceed the old amount; and of course there are many exceptional cases of skill and forethought. The freedmen are said by those who have employed them in large gangs, by quartermasters, for instance, on the docks, to exhibit much greater aptitude and efficiency now than when they first entered the service. The old routine with the hoe furnished little exercise for the brain, and only accustomed them to a dull mechanical stroke. The physical conditions necessary to develop habits of thrift and steady industry do not yet exist. In the neighborhood of military camps and excited markets, desultory effort will continue as long as camps and markets remain, because it is the most speedily profitable. In certain other districts the people's natural ignorance of the mutual rights of employer and employed, and of the true value of their labor, has produced unwillingness to plant cotton for the recent purchasers; and both policy and humanity have usually deterred such proprietors from asserting their legal claims. When peace and order return, competition and civil law will provide these necessary conditions, and experience teach the needed lessons. Indeed, they are already exerting a visible influence.

But these faults, which affect the quality and worth of the negro's industry, by no means prove his absolute supineness. Lively energy and bustling enterprise he has not; but that the desire to work for fair and *prompt* pay is almost universal has been abundantly proved. *Every* one is busy. Nearly all the able-bodied men have now enlisted on the gunboats or in the army; and of those who remain, many prefer the novelty of life at the posts, in the service of officers and quartermasters. On the plantation, house-servants, both men and women, who had never before handled a hoe, now go to the field without a murmur; and to many a gray head who had "got his freedom," i. e. been released from work by his master five years ago, the "Yankee" freedom has given a second youth. The small farmers who have neglected their cotton crops have not spent the time basking in the sun. Those who have made the most money during the last three years are usually not they who have devoted themselves to the plantation.

It should be remembered that there is essential injustice in gauging the success of emancipation by the same measure that one applies to slavery. Yet nothing is more common. Under slavery, the end of life was to raise cotton or sugar; in freedom, it is something very different, even for the negro. Then the plantation represented so many man-power, all directed to one object; the machine was simply kept in running order. Now it stands for so many living agents, with the interests, the responsibilities, and the choice of employments which freedom brings with it. It would be strange, and argue fixed degradation, if mere negro muscle ever again makes crops equal to those raised under the organized system of slave labor. It must still furnish the great supply of labor; but it will be due to an influx of white workmen, the impulse of Northern energy and skill, and the introduction of better implements and more machinery, if our Western cotton is still to be king over its Eastern rivals.

After all, the doubt in regard to the negro's industry is expressed with more point in the form, Will his wants probably multiply as fast as the means of supplying them, — his ambition keep pace with his attainment? This is the practical question which will determine his place in society and his acceptability as a citizen; in other words, the success of emancipation. It is evident at a glance how much depends upon the position which the national policy shall assign to him. To this question no answer more emphatic and encouraging could be given at the present time, than by pointing to the evidences of prosperity that have accumulated in the homes of Port Royal. Many new houses have been built, and old ones repaired and enlarged; and, save where the soldiers are sure to volunteer as harvest hands, each has its fenced garden in the rear. Wooden chimneys have been replaced by brick. Horses, mules, and cows have gradually been purchased at no trifling price, and many a couple now ride to church in their own wagon. Inside the house there is decided improvement in cleanliness and comfort. The family hominy-pot no longer holds solitary state in the chimney-place; plates, knives, and forks are in the cupboard, and a chair or two before the fire. The common dress of both men and women is neater and more abundant, and the display on a Sunday is surprisingly bright. Their food, too, has greater variety. The corn, potatoes, and fish of their former fare is now enriched by pork, molasses, bread, sugar, and coffee. For all the more necessary groceries and cheap dry goods the demand never ceases. Flour is very frequently bought by the barrel; cloth occasionally by the piece, to cover the "fifteen in fâm'ly." The amount of money spent by these lazy people is so great, that the Provost Marshal of Hilton Head lately interdicted several plantation stores, through mere disbelief that the large supplies brought from the North to stock them could be intended for the purpose of legitimate trade with negroes. And no one spends his whole money. Every family has its private "nest-egg" laid by for a land sale or a horse auction. At the sale of abandoned chattels in the spring of 1864, the negroes carried off nearly the whole stock of some estates, bidding against white men. On a single plantation three men paid each upwards of two hundred dollars for the horse that was to "call him massa"; and of the three, two have since bought new horses at a still higher price. In one of the earlier publications of the Boston Educational Commission, an active old man named Limus was spoken of, who is now on the high road to a fortune. Though he lives twenty miles from Hilton Head, by his guns and dogs, his boats and seines and hired hands, he makes himself the great market-man of that post. Besides this, he jockeys in horses with enormous profits, and plants cotton on a large scale. For the coming four years he has leased a tract of land for an annual rent of three hundred dollars. He keeps a cart for his work, a sulky for himself, a buggy for his family, and a span of better horses than are owned by most white men on St. Helena. In conversation, his ideas show the shrewdness of insight and the truth of conception which only accompany native strength of intellect. He has not a drop of white blood, nor had he ever received the slightest education. His enterprise and talent are all to the credit of the uncombed woolly head.

Next in importance to the question of self-support, thus satisfactorily answered, is that which inquires concerning the freedman's respect for law. Little is to be feared on this account. There has been none of the reaction which might naturally be expected after a bond so tight has been suddenly severed. Crimes against the person are rare; against property, they consist usually of petty larcenies, and are pretty numerous, but much less so than the common reputation of the slave would lead one to suppose. It would seem by no means difficult to bridge the gap between the old subservience to a master's will and a ready obedience to civil authority. The black man's nature, his habits, and his increasing participation in the wants, all tend to make him a willing subject to the restraints, of civilization.

But there is a lesson to be learned first. Heretofore law, "massa's law," has only represented *restraint* and *punishment.* As soon as the negro has come to feel that its real object is *protection*, he will warmly turn to it. And it is therefore specially desirable that his first impressions of civil courts should be connected with prompt and vigorous justice. Any feeble-handed power will not be recognized as a power at all. To supply for the time an evident need, an informal court, styled "The Plantation Commission," and composed of superintendents, was instituted by General Saxton, and has proved of much service in introducing to the people the ideas of civil appeal and control.

But it is far less to the negroes' sense of fear, than to their real appreciation of right and their growing self-respect, that we look for their good citizenship. Their progress has not been confined to material concerns, though in that direction it can of course be best discerned and described. Family feeling appears to have gained strength and purity. We think the evidences of unchastity on the part of the young are somewhat less frequent. The fearful stories told of West Indian immorality have not the remotest application to these islands. Many weddings have been celebrated in church, and for a separation and second marriage an appeal to the law is necessary. Quarrels between husband and wife are more seldom than at first referred for adjudication, and there seems to be with each a growing pride in the faithful discharge of reciprocal duties. The women, being no longer mere field-laborers, spend much more time in household employments and with their children. Both parents are gentler and more apt to caress the young ones than we remember them to have been in the first year. A more radical change in their occupations must take place than is at present possible, before the family meal and similar domestic customs can prevail; but, on the whole, dignity and responsibility have certainly been added to the relations of the house.

Nothing is more remarkable than the rapidity with which the old habits of dependence have been cast off. If a people were really unfit for freedom, it seems likely that emancipation would render them not only paupers, but a race of beggars; for in old times they were wont to rely for everything on a white man's care. It was not strange, therefore, that during the first year complaints of wants and petitions for help were constantly brought to us. The negroes are now always willing to accept a gift, but it is rare to hear a request that takes the form of beggary. After testing the possibility, they seemed to recognize the manliness of self-support, and in many instances of word and deed have shown pride in standing alone. The same feeling is tending to check dishonesty. It is no longer the only refuge from injustice, the only means of obtaining luxuries. In those circumstances, however, which are most akin to their old position, where they expect punishment or distrust promises, they still instinctively turn to their old resource; and so strongly are they united, as of old, to shield an offender, that the oath before a court of justice often proves no barrier to falsehood. Till law is recognized as the strong power in society, the righteous man fears the consequences of his own virtue, fights baseness with its own weapon, and becomes a coward before a stronger force than his own. In like manner, Cuffy, who, though a "member," is not a moral hero or martyr, tells a lie even on the Bible, rather than send his friend to jail by his evidence, and live in plantation odium for six months afterwards. In our own experience we have found few who could not usually, only one who could always, be relied on. An open-eyed trust is usually a sufficient guard against cheating, though it is expedient to scrutinize all work before accepting it. With the majority it seems to be more a matter of good feeling than of principle. If they do not like you, or, which is the same thing, if they think you are taking advantage of them, they are ready to take advantage of you in self-defence; if you treat them honorably and win their confidence, they will be found to deserve yours. This latter fact leaves the bitterness of the master's charge on his own lips, and implies with every accession of knowledge an increase of manliness. Already we discern such a growth, and would each year trust them more. In the character of the more thoughtful and responsible, it is very curious at present to watch the honesty thus hardening into principle.

Greater courage also is manifested, — both that which overcomes obstacles and that which faces danger. The slavish servility to the white man is fast dropping out even of the forms of courtesy. The negroes have a kind of daring which requires excitement and support from some extraneous source. Implicit faith in able officers, combined with willingness to give unthinking obedience and throw off all responsibility, fit them to display the fierce gallantry which is now unquestioned; but under officers whom they distrusted, or circumstances which involved a prolonged strain on their moral endurance, they might prove, we fear, more dangerous to friends than to enemies. The truth must be owned that the Port-Royalists have shown great apathy in sacrificing anything to secure their liberty. The real volunteers have been comparatively few. By far the larger part of the native regiments have been filled by wholesale conscription; and the conscription has been carried out by hunting, and in several instances shooting down the fugitives. The antipathy to military service began with General Hunter's attempt in 1862, the first of the war, which proved a failure only because government would not then accept the policy of enrolling black soldiers. The men were taken by his soldiers from the field, leaving the hoe standing in the unfinished row, hurried down to Hilton Head, and detained there for three months, subjected to the hostility and insults of all the white regiments, and apparently befriended by the commanding general alone. At the end of that time, those who had not already deserted were dismissed without a cent of pay. From that time the matter has been reagitated at intervals with little judgment or energy, and has kept the island families in a constant state of dread. But the late measures originated by the presence of recruiting agents from the North have proved more successful. Their large bounties have induced many to enlist, who had hitherto set the order at defiance by retreating to the woods at the first alarm. Nearly every able-bodied man is now in uniform; and the letters of those who were most reluctant to go indicate cheerful content and a soldierly pride in the service. No training could be better adapted to stamp out the past, and to lay a solid foundation for the qualities and habits of their new character, — that of the free Southern laborer.

Such are the signs at Port Royal. To ourselves they give a hope so confident, that we have had no fear in representing facts in the soberest light. Judging from the activity already shown, the improvement already made, we feel certain that the "institution" of freedom will at once be far more than self-supporting, and that, with the paralysis of slavery fairly thrown off, the negro will eventually contribute to the strength and honor of the country in relations far more important than that of simply furnishing its cotton, sugar, and rice. Yet it is no light or short task to which our nation is approaching. Not only do their old habits cling to the freedmen as they rise, but their ignorance will betray them into new and perilous mistakes. We look for slow progress and much disappointment. Emancipation from slavery is a convulsion in the moral and social being of a race. The very conditions of existence are changed; principles once powerful are subverted and disappear, and new ones take their place. For a time discouragement and failure await the eager restorer. Let no one expect, then, as he glances at Port Royal, to find that every prospect pleases. It is a waste place occupied by a bewildered people. We only claim at present that nature has begun its adoption, — that the long disinherited are showing proof that manhood is their rightful possession.

Art. II. — *Rélations des Jésuites contenant ce qui s'est passé de plus remarquable dans les Missions des Pères de la Compagnie de Jésus dans la Nouvelle France. Ouvrage publié sous les Auspices du Gouvernement Canadien.* Quebec. 1858. 3 vols. 8vo.

We place at the head of this article the name of the above work, or rather collection of many works, because, in respect to the early Indian tribes, the Relations of the Jesuits are by far the most full and trustworthy authority. With the aid of these and the other writers, old and recent, who have entered or touched upon the subject, we propose to examine the primitive condition of these communities, choosing the period between the years 1620 and 1640, and limiting our inquiry in the main to tribes in Canada and the northern section of the United States. Among these were to be found the most distinctive and striking examples of Indian political and social organization; and our sources of information concerning them are clear and copious.

America, when it became known to Europeans, was, as it had long been, a scene of wide-spread revolution. In North and South, tribe was giving place to tribe, language to language; for the Indian, hopelessly unchanging as respects individual and social development, was, as respects tribal relations and local haunts, mutable as the wind. In Canada and the northern section of the United States, the elements of change were especially active. The Indian population which, in 1635, Cartier found at Montreal and Quebec, had disappeared at the opening of the next century, and another race had succeeded, of language and customs widely different; while in the region now forming the State of New York a power was rising to a ferocious vitality which, but for the presence of Europeans, would probably have subjected, absorbed, or exterminated every other Indian community east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio.

The vast tract of wilderness from the Mississippi to the Atlantic and from the Carolinas to Hudson's Bay was divided between two great families of tribes, distinguished by a radical difference of language. Virginia, New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Southeastern New York, New England, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Lower Canada were occupied, so far as occupied at all, by tribes speaking various dialects of the Algonquin tongue. They extended, too, far along the borders of the upper lakes, and into the dreary northern wastes beyond. They occupied Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana, and their detached bands ranged the lonely hunting-ground of Kentucky.

Like a great island in the midst of the Algonquins lay the country of tribes speaking the generic tongue of the Iroquois. The true Iroquois, or Five Nations, extended through Central New York from the Hudson to the Genesee. Southward lay the Andastes, on and near the Susquehanna; westward, the

Eries, stretching from the Genesee along the southern shore of Lake Erie; and the Neutral Nation, along its northern shore from Niagara towards the Detroit; while the towns of the Hurons lay near the lake to which they have left their name.* Against all these kindred tribes, except, for a time, the Neuters, and against all Algonquins within reach of their restless war-parties, the Iroquois of New York waged war to the knife.

Of the Algonquin populations, the densest, despite a recent epidemic which had swept them off by thousands, was in New England. Here were Mohegans, Pequots, Narragansetts, Wampanoags, Massachusetts, Penacooks, long a thorn in the side of the Puritan. On the whole, these savages were favorable examples of the Algonquin stock, belonging to that section of it which tilled the soil, and was thus in some measure spared the extremes of misery and degradation to which the wandering hunter tribes were often reduced. They owed much, also, to the bounty of the sea, and hence they tended towards the coast; which, before the epidemic, Champlain and Smith had seen at many points studded with wigwams and waving with harvests of maize. Fear, too, drove them eastward, for the Iroquois pursued them with an inveterate enmity. Some paid yearly tribute to their tyrants, while others were still subject to their inroads, flying in terror at the sound of the Mohawk war-cry. Westward, the population thinned rapidly; northward, it soon disappeared. Northern New Hampshire, the whole of Vermont, and Western Massachusetts had no human tenants but the roving hunter or prowling warrior.

We have said that this group of tribes was relatively very populous; yet it is more than doubtful whether all of them united, had union been possible, could have mustered eight thousand fighting men. To speak further of them is needless, for they were not within the scope of the Jesuit labors. The heresy of heresies had planted itself among them; and it was for the apostle Eliot, not the Jesuit, to essay their conversion.[*]

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* To the above general statements there was, in the first half of the seventeenth century, but one exception worth notice. A detached branch of the Dahcotah stock, the Winnebago, was established south of Green Bay, on Lake Michigan, in the midst of Algonquins; and small Dahcotah bands had also planted themselves on the eastern side of the Mississippi, nearly in the same latitude.

There was another branch of the Iroquois in the Carolinas, consisting of the Tuscaroras and kindred bands. In 1715 they were joined to the Five Nations.

Landing at Boston, three years before a solitude, let the traveller push northward, pass the river Piscataqua and the Penacooks, and cross the river Saco. Here, a change of dialect would indicate a different tribe, or group of tribes. These were the Abenakis, found chiefly along the course of the Kennebec and other rivers, on whose banks they raised their rude harvest, and whose streams they ascended to hunt the moose and bear in the forest desert of Northern Maine, or descended to fish in the neighboring sea.[†]

Crossing the Penobscot, one found a visible descent in the scale of humanity. Eastern Maine and the whole of New Brunswick were occupied by a race called Etechemins, to whom agriculture was unknown, though the sea, prolific of fish, lobsters, and seals, greatly lightened their miseries. The Souriquois, or Micmacs, of Nova Scotia, closely resembled them in habits and condition. From Nova Scotia to the St. Lawrence, there was no population worthy of the name. From the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, the southern borders of the great river had no tenants but hunters. Northward, between the St. Lawrence and Hudson's Bay, roamed the scattered hordes of the Papinachois, Bersiamites, and others, included by the French under the general name of Montagnais. When, in spring, the French trading-ships arrived and anchored in the port of Tadoussac, they gathered from far and near, toiling painfully through the desolation of forests, mustering by hundreds at the point of traffic, and pitching their bark wigwams along the strand of that wild harborage. They were of the lowest Algonquin type. Their only subsistence was derived from the chase; and often, goaded by deadly famine, they would subsist on roots, the bark and buds of trees, or the foulest offal. Nor, in their extremity, was cannibalism rare among them.

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[*] These Indians, the Armouchiquois of the old French writers, were in a state of chronic war with the tribes of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Champlain, on his voyage of 1603, heard strange accounts of them. The following is literally rendered from the first narrative of that heroic but credulous explorer: —

"They are savages of shape altogether monstrous, for their heads are small, their bodies short, and their arms thin as a skeleton, as are also their thighs; but their legs are stout and long, and all of one size, and when they are seated on their heels, their knees rise more than half a foot above their heads, which seems a thing strange and against nature. Nevertheless they are active and bold, and they have the best country on all the coast towards Acadia." — *Des Sauvages*, f. 34.

The story may match that of the great city of Norembega, on the Penobscot, with its population of dwarfs, as related by Jean Alphonse.

[*] The Tarratines of New England writers were the Abenakis, or a portion of them.

Ascending the St. Lawrence, it was rarely that a sight of human shape gave relief to the loneliness, until, at Quebec, the throats of Champlain's cannon from the verge of the cliff betokened that the savage prologue of the American drama was drawing to a close, and the civilization of Europe advancing on the scene. Again ascending, all again was solitude except at Three Rivers, a noted place of trade, where a few Algonquins would perhaps be seen. The fear of the Iroquois was everywhere; and as the voyager passed some wooded point, or thicket-covered island, the whistling of a stone-headed arrow proclaimed, perhaps, the presence of these fierce marauders. At Montreal there was no human life, save during a brief space in early summer, when the shore swarmed with savages, who had come to the yearly trade from the great communities of the interior. To-day there were dances, songs, and feastings; to-morrow, all again was solitude, and the Ottawa was covered with the canoes of the returning warriors.

Along this stream, a main route of traffic, the silence of the wilderness was broken only by the splash of the passing paddle. To the north of the river there was indeed a small Algonquin band called *La Petite Nation;* but they dwelt far from the banks, through fear of the ubiquitous Iroquois. It was nearly three hundred miles, by the windings of the stream, before one reached that Algonquin tribe, *La Nation de l'Isle*, ancestors of the modern Ottawas, who occupied the great island of the Allumettes. Then, after many a day of lonely travel, the voyager found a savage welcome among the Nipissings, on the lake which bears their name; and then, circling west and south for a hundred and fifty solitary miles, he reached for the first time a people speaking a dialect of the Iroquois tongue. Here all was changed. Populous towns, rude fortifications, and an extensive though barbarous tillage, indicated a people far in advance of the famished wanderers of the Saguenay or their less abject kindred of New England. These were the Hurons, of whom the modern Wyandots are a remnant. Both in themselves and as a type of their generic stock, they demand more than a passing notice.*

More than two centuries have passed since the Hurons vanished from their ancient seats, and the settlers of this rude solitude stand perplexed and wondering over the relics of a lost people. In the moist shadow of what seems a virgin forest the axe and plough bring strange secrets to light; huge pits, close packed with skeletons and disjointed bones, mixed with weapons, copper kettles, beads, and trinkets. Not even the straggling Algonquins, who linger about the scene of Huron prosperity, can tell their origin. Yet on ancient worm-eaten pages, between covers of begrimed parchment, the daily life of this ruined community, its funeral rites, its festivals, its firesides, are painted with a minute and vivid fidelity.

The ancient country of the Hurons is now the northern and eastern portion of Simcoe County, Canada West, and is embraced within the peninsula formed by the Nottawasaga and Matchedash Bays of Lake Huron, the River Severn, and Lake Simcoe. Its area was small, and its population comparatively large. In the year 1639, the Jesuits made an enumeration of all its villages, dwellings, and families. The result showed thirty-two villages and hamlets, with seven hundred dwellings, about two thousand fires, and twelve thousand souls.†

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* The usual confusion of Indian tribal names prevails in the case of the Hurons. The following are their synonymes : —

Hurons (of French origin) ; Ochateguins (Champlain) ; Attigouantans (the name of one of their clans, used by Champlain for the whole nation) ; Ouendat (their true name, according to Lalemant) ; Yendat, Wyandot, Guyandot (corruptions of the preceding); Ouaouakecinatouek (Potier) ; Quatogies (Colden).

† Lalemant, Rel. 1640, 38 (Cramoisy, 1641). The number of the Huron towns changed from year to year. Champlain and Le Clerc, in 1615, reckoned them at seventeen or eighteen, with a population of about ten thousand souls. Brebeuf, in 1635, found twenty villages, and, as he thinks, thirty thousand souls. Both Le Mercier and De Quen state the population at not less than thirty thousand, but the last two had never visited the country. The estimate of Lalemant is no doubt approximately correct. It includes a neighboring allied tribe, the "Nation du Petun." Since the time of Champlain's visit, various kindred tribes or fragments of tribes had been incorporated with the Hurons, thus more than balancing the ravages of a pestilence which had decimated them.

The region whose boundaries we have given was an alternation of meadows and deep forests, interlaced with footpaths leading from town to town. Of these towns, some were fortified, but the greater number were open and defenceless. They were of a construction common to all tribes of Iroquois lineage, and peculiar to them. Nothing similar exists at the present day.* They covered a space of from one to ten acres, the dwellings clustering together with little or no attempt at order. In general, these singular structures were of about thirty or thirty-five feet in length, breadth, and height, but many were much larger and a few were of prodigious length. In some of the villages were dwellings two hundred and forty feet long, though in breadth and height they did not much exceed the others.† In shape they were much like an arbor overarching a garden walk. Their frame was of tall and strong saplings, planted in a double row to form the two sides of the house, bent till they met, and lashed together at the top. To these other poles were lashed transversely, and the whole was covered with large sheets of the bark of the oak, elm, spruce, or white cedar, overlapping like the shingles of a roof, over which, for their better security, split poles were lashed with cords of linden bark. At the crown of the arch, along the entire length of the house, a crevice a foot wide was left for the admission of light and the escape of smoke. At each end was a closed porch of similar workmanship; and here were stowed casks of bark, filled with smoked fish, Indian corn, and other stores not liable to injury from frost. Within, on both sides of the house, were wide scaffolds, four feet from the floor, and extending along the sides of the building from end to end, like the seats of a colossal omnibus.‡ They were formed of thick sheets of bark, supported by posts and transverse poles, and covered with mats and skins. Here, in summer, was the sleeping-place of the inmates, and the space beneath served for storage of their firewood. The fires were on the earth, in a line down the centre of the house. Each sufficed for two families, who, in winter, slept closely packed around them. Above, beneath the vaulted roof, were placed a great number of poles, like perches of a hen-roost, and here were hung weapons, clothing, skins, and ornaments. Here, too, in harvest time, the squaws hung the ears of unshelled corn, till the rude abode, through all its length, seemed decked with a golden tapestry. In general, however, its only lining was a thick coating of soot from the smoke of fires, with neither draught, chimney, nor window. So pungent was the smoke that it produced inflammation of the eyes, attended in old age with frequent blindness. Another annoyance was the fleas, and a third, the unbridled and unruly children. Privacy there was none. The house was one chamber, sometimes lodging more than twenty families.*

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* The permanent bark villages of the Dahcotah of the St. Peter's are the nearest modern approach to the Huron town.

† Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1635, 31 (Quebec, 1858). Champlain says that he saw them, in 1615, more than thirty fathoms long; while Vanderdonck reports the length, from actual measurement, of an Iroquois house, at a hundred and eighty yards, or five hundred and forty feet!

‡ Often, especially among the Iroquois, the internal arrangement was different. The scaffolds or platforms were raised only a foot from the earthen floor, and were only twelve or thirteen feet long, with spaces intervening, where the family which occupied them stored provision, etc. Five or six feet above was another platform, often occupied by children. One pair of platforms sufficed for a family, and here

He who entered on a winter night beheld a strange spectacle: the vista of fires lighting the smoky concave; the bronzed groups encircling each, cooking, eating, gambling, or amusing themselves with an idle badinage; shrivelled squaws, hideous with threescore years of hardship; grisly old warriors, scarred with Iroquois war-clubs; young aspirants, whose honors were yet to be won; damsels gay with ochre and wampum; restless

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during summer they slept pellmell, in the clothes they wore by day, and without pillows.

* One of the best descriptions of the Huron and Iroquois houses is that of Sagard, Voyage des Hurons, 118; see also Champlain (1627), 78; Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1635, 31 (Quebec, 1858); Vanderdonck, New Netherlands, in N. Y. Hist. Coll., Second Ser., I. 196; Lafitan, Mœurs des Sauvages, II. 10. The account given by Cartier of the houses he saw at Montreal corresponds with the above. He describes them as about fifty yards long. In this case, there were partial partitions for the several families, and a sort of loft above. Many of the Iroquois and Huron houses were of similar construction, the partitions being at the sides only, leaving a wide passage down the middle of the house. Bartram, Observations on a Journey from Pennsylvania to Canada, gives a description and plan of the Iroquois Council-House in 1751, which was of this construction. Indeed, the Iroquois preserved this mode of building, in essential points, to a recent period. They usually framed the sides of their houses on rows of upright posts, arched with separate poles for the roof. The Hurons no doubt also did so in their larger structures. For a door there was a sheet of bark hung on wooden hinges, or suspended by cords from above.

children pellmell with restless dogs. Now some tongue of resinous flame painted each wild feature in vivid light; now the fitful gleam expired, and the group vanished from sight, as their nation has vanished from history.

The fortified towns of the Hurons were all on the side exposed to Iroquois incursions. The fortifications of all this family of tribes were, like their dwellings, in essential points, alike. A situation was chosen favorable to defence, — the bank of a lake, the crown of a difficult hill, or a high point of land in the fork of uniting rivers. A ditch, several feet in depth, was dug around the village, and the earth thrown up on the inside. Trees were then felled by an alternate process of burning and hacking the burnt part with stone hatchets. By similar means they were cut into lengths to form palisades. These were planted on the embankment, in one, two, three, or four concentric rows, those of each row inclining towards those of the other rows until they intersected. The whole was lined within, to the height of a man, with heavy sheets of bark; and at the top, where the palisades crossed, was a gallery of timber for the defenders, together with wooden gutters, by which streams of water could be poured down on fires kindled by the enemy. Magazines of stones and rude ladders for mounting the rampart completed the provision for defence. The forts of the Iroquois were stronger and more elaborate than those of the Hurons, and to this day large districts of New York are marked with frequent remains of their ditches and embankments.*

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* There is no mathematical regularity in these works. In their form the builders were guided merely by the nature of the ground. Frequently a precipice or river sufficed for partial defence, and the line of embankment occurs only on one or two sides. In one instance, distinct traces of a double line of palisades are visible along the embankment. See Squier, Aboriginal Monuments of New York, p. 38. It is probable that the palisade was planted first, and the earth heaped around it. Indeed, this is stated by the Tuscarora Indian, Cusick, in his curious History of the Six Nations (Iroquois). Brebeuf says, that as early as 1636 the Jesuits taught the Hurons to build rectangular palisaded works, with bastions. The Iroquois adopted the same practice at an early period, omitting the ditch and embankment; and it is probable that, even in their primitive defences, the palisades, where the ground was such as to yield easily to their rude implements, were planted simply in holes dug for the purpose. Such seems to have been the Iroquois fortress attacked by Champlain in 1615.

The Muscogees, with other Southern tribes, and occasionally the Algonquins, had palisaded towns; but, so far as known, the palisades were but a single row, planted upright.

Among these tribes there was no personal ownership of land, but each family had for the time exclusive right to as much as it saw fit to cultivate. The clearing process — a most toilsome one — consisted in hacking off branches, piling them together with brushwood around the foot of the standing trunks, and setting fire to the whole. The squaws, working with their hoes of wood and bone among the charred stumps, sowed their corn, beans, pumpkins, tobacco, sunflowers, and hemp. No manure was used, and, at intervals of from ten to thirty years, when the soil was exhausted and firewood distant, the village was abandoned and a new one built.

There was little game in the Huron country; and here, as among the Iroquois, the staple of food was Indian corn, cooked without salt in a variety of forms, each more odious than the last. Venison was a luxury used only at feasts; dog-flesh was in high esteem; and in some of the towns captive bears were fattened for festive occasions. These tribes were far less improvident than the roving Algonquins, and stores of provision were laid up against a season of want. Their main stock of corn was buried in *caches*, or deep holes in the earth, either within or without the houses.

In respect to the arts of life, all these stationary tribes were in advance of the wandering hunters of the North. The women made a species of earthern pot for cooking, though of late the copper kettles of the French traders had supplanted them. They wove rush mats with no little skill. They spun twine from hemp by the primitive process of rolling it on their thighs, and of this twine they made nets. They made oil from fish and from the seeds of the sunflower, of which the last seems to have been used only for purposes of the toilet. They pounded their maize in huge mortars of wood, hollowed by alternate burnings and scrapings. Their stone axes, spear and arrow heads, and their bone fish-hooks, were fast giving place to the iron of the French; but they had not laid aside their shields of raw bison-hide, or of wood overlaid with plaited and twisted thongs of skin. They still used, too, their primitive breastplates and greaves of twigs interwoven with cordage.* The masterpiece of Huron handiwork was, however, the birch canoe, in the construction of which the Algonquins were no less skilful. The Iroquois, in the absence of the birch, were forced to use the bark of the elm, greatly inferior both in lightness and strength. Of pipes, than which nothing was more important in their eyes, the Hurons made a great variety, some of baked clay, others of various kinds of stone, carved by the men, during their long periods of monotonous leisure, often with great skill and ingenuity. But their most mysterious fabric was wampum. This was at once their currency, their ornament, their pen, ink, and parchment, and its use was by no means confined to tribes of the Iroquois stock. It consisted of elongated beads, white and purple, made from the inner part of certain shells. It is not easy to conceive how, with their rude implements, the Indians contrived to shape and perforate this intractable material. The art soon fell into disuse; for wampum better than their own was brought them by the traders, besides abundant imitations in glass and porcelain. Strung into necklaces, or wrought into collars, belts, and bracelets, it was the favorite decoration of the Indian girls at festivals and dances. It served also a graver purpose. No compact, no speech, or clause of a speech, to the representative of another nation, had any force unless confirmed by the delivery of a string or belt of wampum.* The belts, on occasions of importance, were wrought into significant devices, suggestive of the substance of the compact or speech, and designed to act as aids to memory. To one or more old men of the nation was assigned the honorable but very onerous charge of keepers of the wampum, in other words of the national records; and it was for them to remember and interpret the meaning of the belts.

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* Some of the northern tribes of California, at the present day, wear a sort of breastplate "composed of thin parallel battens of very tough wood, woven together with a small cord."

The figures on wampum-belts were, for the most part, simply mnemonic. So also were the figures carved on wooden tablets, or painted on bark and skin, to preserve in memory the songs of war, hunting, or magic.† The Hurons had, however, in common with other tribes, a system of rude pictures and arbitrary signs, by which they could convey to each other, with tolerable precision, information touching the ordinary subjects of Indian interest.

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* Beaver-skins and other valuable furs were sometimes on such occasions used as a substitute.

† Many specimens of these figured songs are engraved in the voluminous reports on the condition of the Indians published by government under the editorship of Mr. Schoolcraft. The specimens are chiefly Algonquin.

Their dress was chiefly of skins, cured with smoke after the well-known Indian mode. That of the women was, according to the Jesuits, more modest than that "of our most pious ladies of France." The young girls on festal occasions must be excepted from this commendation, as they wore merely a kilt from the waist to the knee, besides the wampum decorations of the breast and arms. Their long black hair, gathered behind the neck, was decorated with disks of native copper or gay pendants made in France, and now occasionally unearthed in numbers from their graves. The men, in summer, were nearly naked; those of a kindred tribe wholly so, with the sole exception of their moccasons. In winter they were clad in tunics and leggins of skin; and at all seasons, on occasions of ceremony, they were wrapped from head to foot in robes of beaver or otter furs, sometimes of the greatest value. On the inner side, these robes were decorated with painted figures and devices, or embroidered with the dyed quills of the Canada hedgehog. In this art of embroidery, however, the Hurons were equalled or surpassed by some of the Algonquin tribes. They wore their hair after a variety of grotesque and startling fashions. With some it was loose on one side and tight braided on the other; with others, close shaved, leaving one or more long and cherished locks; while with others again, it bristled in a ridge across the crown, like the back of a hyena.* When in full dress they were painted with ochre, white clay, soot, and the red juice of certain berries. They practised tattooing, sometimes covering the whole body with indelible devices.† The process, when of such extent, was very severe; and though no murmur escaped the sufferer, he sometimes died from its effects.

Female life among the Hurons had no bright side. It was a youth of license, an age of drudgery. Despite an organization which, while it perhaps made them less sensible of pain, certainly made them less susceptible of passion than the higher races of men, the Hurons were notoriously dissolute, far exceeding in this respect the wandering and starving Algonquins.* Marriage existed among them, and polygamy was exceptional; but divorce took place at the will or caprice of either party. A practice also prevailed of temporary or experimental marriage, lasting a day, a week, or more. The seal of the compact was merely the acceptance of a gift of wampum made by the suitor to the object of his wishes or his whim. These gifts were never returned on dissolving the connection, and, as an attractive and enterprising damsel might, and often did, make twenty such marriages before her final establishment, she thus collected a wealth of wampum with which to adorn herself for the village dances.† This provisional matrimony was no bar to a license boundless and apparently universal, unattended with loss of reputation on either side. Every instinct of native delicacy quickly vanished under the influences of Huron domestic life; — eight or ten families, and often more, crowded into one undivided house, where privacy was impossible, and where strangers were free to enter at all hours of day or night.

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* See Le Jeune, Rel. 1633, 35 (Quebec, 1858). "Quelles hures!" exclaimed some astonished Frenchman. Hence the name, *Hurons*.

† Bressani, Relation Abrégée, 72. Champlain has a picture of a warrior thus tattooed.

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* Among the Iroquois there were more favorable features in the condition of women. The matrons had often a considerable influence on the decisions of the councils. Lafitau, whose book appeared in 1724, says that the nation was corrupt in his time, but that this was a degeneracy from their ancient manners. La Potherie and Charlevoix make a similar statement. Megapolensis, however, in 1644, says that they were then exceedingly debauched; and Greenhalgh, in 1677, gives ample evidence of a shameless license. One of their most earnest advocates of the present day denies that the passion of love had among them any other than an animal existence. Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 322. There is ample evidence that the tribes of the South were equally corrupt. See Lawson, Carolina, 34, and other early writers.

The remarkable forbearance observed by Eastern and Northern tribes towards female captives was probably the result of a superstition. Notwithstanding the prevailing license, the Iroquois and other tribes had among themselves certain conventional rules which excited the admiration of the Jesuit celibates. Some of these had a superstitious origin; others were in accordance with the iron requirements of their savage etiquette. To make the Indian a hero of romance is mere nonsense.

† "Il s'en trouue telle qui passe ainsi sa ieunesse, qui aura eu plus de vingt maris, lesquels vingt maris ne sont pas seuls en la jouyssance de la beste, quelques mariez q'ils soient: car la nuict venuë, les ieunes femmes courent d'une cabane en une autre, cōme font les ieunes hommes de leur costé, qui en prennent par ou bon leur semble, toutesfois sans violance aucune, et n'en reçoiuent aucune infamie, ny injure, la coustume du pays estant telle." — Champlain (1627), 90. Compare Sagard, Voyage des Hurons, 176. Both were personal observers.

The ceremony even of the most serious marriage consisted merely in the bringing by the bride a dish of boiled maize to the bridegroom, together with an armful of fuel. There was often a feast of the relatives or of the whole village.

Once a mother, and married with a reasonable permanency, the Huron woman from a wanton became a drudge. In March and April she gathered the year's supply of firewood. Then came sowing, tilling, and gathering the harvest, dressing skins, smoking fish, making cordage and clothing, preparing food. On the march it was she who bore the burden; for, in the words of Champlain, "their women were their mules." The natural effect followed. In every Huron town were shrivelled hags, hideous and despised, who in vindictiveness, ferocity, and cruelty far outdid the men.

To the men fell the task of building the houses, making weapons, pipes, and canoes. For the rest, their home-life was a life of leisure and amusement. The summer and autumn were their seasons of serious employment, of war, hunting, fishing, and trade. There was an established system of traffic between the Hurons and the Algonquins of the Ottawa and Lake Nipissing; the Hurons exchanging wampum, fishing-nets, and corn for fish and furs.* From various relics found in their graves, it may be inferred that they also traded with tribes of the Upper Lakes. Each branch of traffic was the monopoly of the family or clan by whom it was opened. They might, if they could, punish interlopers by stripping them of all they possessed, unless the latter had succeeded in reaching home with the results of their trade, in which case the outraged monopolists had no further right of redress, and could not attempt it without a breaking of the public peace, and exposure to the authorized vengeance of the other party.† Their fisheries, too, were regulated by customs, having the force of laws. These pursuits, with their hunting, — in which they were aided by a wolfish breed of dogs unable to bark, — consumed the autumn and early winter; but before the new year the greater part of the men were gathered in their villages.

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* Champlain (1627), 84.

† Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1636, 156 (Cramoisy, 1637).

Now followed their festal season, for it was the season of idleness for the men and leisure for the women. Feasts, gambling, smoking, and dancing filled the empty hours. Like other Indians, the Hurons were desperate gamblers, staking their all, — ornaments, clothing, canoes, pipes, weapons, and wives. One of their principal games was played with plum-stones, or wooden lozenges, black on one side and white on the other. These were thrown up in a wooden bowl by sharply striking it against the earth, and the players betted on the black or white. Sometimes a village challenged a neighboring village. The game was in one of the houses. Strong poles were secured from side to side, and on these sat or perched the company, party opposite party, while two players struck the bowl on the earth between. Bets ran high; and Brebeuf relates that once, in the midst of winter, the snow two feet in depth, the men of his village returned from a gambling visit bereft of everything, totally naked, yet in excellent humor and high spirits.* Ludicrous as it may appear, these games were often the result of medical prescription, and designed as a cure of the sick.

Their feasts and their dances were of a various character, social, medical, and mystical or religious. Some of their feasts were on a scale of extravagant profusion. A vain or ambitious host threw all his substance into one entertainment, inviting all the village, and perhaps several neighboring villages also. In the winter of 1635 there was a feast at the village of Contarrea, where thirty kettles were on the fires, and twenty deer and four bears were served up.† The invitation was simple. The messenger addressed the desired guest with the concise summons, "Come and eat," ‡ and to refuse was a deep offence. He took his dish and spoon, and repaired to the scene of festivity. Each, as he entered, greeted his host with the guttural ejaculation, *Ho!* and ranged himself with the rest, squatted on the earthen floor or on the platform along the sides of the house. The kettles were slung over the fires in the midst. There was a long interval of lugubrious singing. Then the host, who took no share in the feast, proclaimed in a loud voice the contents of each kettle in turn, and at each announcement the company responded in unison, *Ho!* The attendant squaws filled with their ladles the bowl of every guest in turn. There were talking, laughing, jesting, singing, and smoking, and at times the entertainment was protracted throughout the day.

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* Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1636, 113 (Quebec, 1858). This game is still a favorite among the Iroquois, some of whom hold to the belief that they will play it after death in the realms of bliss.

† Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1636, 111 (Quebec, 1858).

‡ The writer repeatedly received precisely the same invitation among the Ogillalahs of the Rocky Mountains.

Whenever the feast had a medical or mystic character, it was indispensable that each guest should devour the whole of the portion given him, however enormous. Should he fail, the host would be outraged, the community shocked, and the spirits roused to vengeance. Disaster would befall the nation; death, perhaps, the individual. In some cases the imagined efficacy of the feast was proportioned to the rapidity with which the viands were despatched. Prizes of tobacco were offered to the most rapid feeder, and the spectacle then became truly porcine.* These *festins à manger tout* were much dreaded by many of the Hurons, who, however, were never known to refuse them.

Invitation to a dance was no less concise than that to a feast. Sometimes a crier proclaimed the approaching festivity through the village. The house was crowded. Old men, old women, and children thronged the platforms, or clung to the poles which supported the sides and roof. Fires were raked out, and the earthen floor cleared. Two chiefs sang at the top of their voices, keeping time to their song with tortoise-shell rattles.†

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* This superstition was not confined to the Hurons, but extended to many tribes, including, probably, all the Algonquins, with many of whom it holds in full force to this day. A feaster unable to do his full part might, if he could, hire another to aid him. Otherwise, he must remain in his place till the work was done.

† Sagard gives specimens of their songs. In both dances and feasts there was no little variety. They were sometimes combined. It is impossible in brief space to indicate more than their general features. In the famous "war dance," — which was frequently danced, as it still is, for amusement, — speeches, exhortations, jests, personal satire, and repartee, were commonly introduced as a part of the performance, sometimes as a patriotic stimulus, sometimes as amusement. The music

The men danced with great violence and gesticulation; the women with a much more measured action. The former were nearly divested of clothing; in mystical dances, sometimes wholly so; and, from a superstitious motive, this was now and then the case with the women. Both, however, were abundantly decorated with paint, oil, beads, wampum, trinkets, and feathers.

Religious festivals, councils, the entertainment of an envoy, the inauguration of a chief, were all occasions of festivity, in which social pleasure was joined with matter of graver import, and which, at times, gathered nearly all the nation into one great and harmonious concourse. Warlike expeditions, too, were always preceded by feasting, at which the warriors vaunted the fame of their ancestors, and their own past and prospective exploits. A hideous scene of feasting followed the torture of a prisoner. Like the torture itself, it was, among the Hurons, partly an act of vengeance, and partly a religious rite. If the victim had shown courage, the heart was first roasted, cut into small pieces, and given to the young men and boys, who devoured it to increase their own courage. The body was then divided, thrown into the kettles, and eaten by the assembly, the head being the portion of the chief. Many of the Hurons joined in the feast with reluctance and horror.* This was the only form of cannibalism among them, since, unlike the wandering Algonquins, they were rarely under the desperation of extreme famine.

A great knowledge of simples for the cure of disease is popularly ascribed to the Indian. Here, however, as elsewhere, his knowledge is scanty. He rarely reasons from cause to effect, or from effect to cause. Disease, in his belief, is the result of sorcery, the agency of spirits, or supernatural influences, undefined and indefinable. The Indian doctor was a conjurer, and his remedies were to the last degree preposter-

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in this case was the drum and the war-song. Some of the other dances were also interspersed with speeches and sharp witticisms, always taken in good part, though Lafitau says that he has seen the victim so pitilessly bantered that he was forced to hide his head in his blanket.

* "Il y en a qui en mangent auec plaisir."—Brebeuf, Rel. des Hurons, 1636, 121 (Quebec, 1858). Le Mercier gives a description of one of these scenes at which he was present. Ib., 1637, 118 (Quebec, 1858).

ous, ridiculous, or revolting. The well-known Indian sweating-bath is the most prominent of the few means of cure based on agencies simply physical; and this, with all the other natural remedies, was applied, not by the professed doctor, but by the sufferer himself or his friends.*

The Indian doctor beat, shook, and pinched his patient, howled, whooped, rattled a tortoise-shell at his ear to expel the evil spirit, bit him till blood flowed, and then displayed in triumph a small piece of wood, bone, or iron, which he had hidden in his mouth, and which he affirmed was the source of the disease, now happily removed. Sometimes he prescribed a dance, feast, or game, and the whole village bestirred themselves to fulfil the injunction to the letter. They gambled away their all; they gorged themselves like vultures; they danced or played ball naked among the snow-drifts from morning till night. At a medical feast, some strange or unusual act was commonly enjoined as vital to the patient's cure; as, for example, the departing guest, in place of the customary monosyllable of thanks, was required to greet his host with an ugly grimace. Sometimes, by prescription, half the village would throng into the house where the patient lay, led by old women disguised with the heads and skins of bears, and beating with sticks on sheets of dry bark. Here the assembly danced and whooped for hours together, with a din to which a civilized patient would promptly have succumbed. Sometimes the doctor wrought himself into a prophetic fury, raving through the length and breadth of the dwelling, snatching firebrands and flinging them about him, to the terror of the squaws, with whom, in their combustible tenements, fire was a constant bugbear.

Among the Hurons and kindred tribes disease was frequently ascribed to some hidden wish unaccomplished. Hence the patient was overwhelmed with gifts, in the hope that in their multiplicity the desideratum might be supplied. Kettles, skins, awls, pipes, wampum, fish-hooks, weapons, objects of every conceivable variety, were piled before him by a host of charitable contributors; and if, as often happened, a dream, the Indian oracle, had revealed to the sick man the secret of his cure, his demands were never refused, however extravagant, idle, nauseous, or abominable.* Hence it is no matter of wonder that sudden illness and sudden cures were frequent among the Hurons. The patient reaped profit, and the doctor both profit and honor.

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* The Indians had many simple applications for wounds, said to have been very efficacious; but the purity of their blood, owing to the absence from their diet of condiments and stimulants, as well as to their active habits, aided the remedy. In general, they were remarkably exempt from disease or deformity, though often seriously injured by alternations of hunger and excess. The Hurons sometimes died from the effects of their *festins à manger tout.*

And now, before entering upon the very curious subject of Indian social and tribal organization, it may be well briefly to observe the position and prominent distinctive features of the various communities speaking dialects of the generic tongue of the Iroquois. In this remarkable family of tribes are to be found the most salient development of Indian character, and the most conspicuous examples of Indian capacity. If the higher traits popularly ascribed to the race are not here to be found, they are to be found nowhere. A palpable evidence of the superiority of this stock is afforded in the relative size of the Iroquois and Huron brains. In average internal capacity of the cranium they surpass, with few and doubtful exceptions, all other aborigines of North and South America, not excepting the civilized races of Mexico and Peru.†

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* "Dans le pays de nos Hurons, il se faict aussi des assemblées de toutes les filles d'vn bourg aupres d'vne malade, tant à sa priere, suyuant la resuerie ou le songe qu'elle en aura euë, que par l'ordonnance de Loki (*the doctor*), pour sa santé et guerison. Les filles ainsi assemblées, on leur demande à toutes, les vnes apres les autres, celuy qu'elles veulent des ieunes hommes du bourg pour dormir auec elles la nuict prochaine: elles en nomment chacune vn qui sont aussi-tost aduertis par les Maistres de la ceremonie, lesquels viennent tous au soir en la presence de la malade dormir chacun auec celle qui l'a choysi, d'vn bout à l'autre de la Cabane, & passent ainsi toute la nuict, pendant que deux Capitaines aux deux bouts du logis chantent & sonnent de leur Tortuë du soir au lendemain matin, que la ceremonie cesse. Dieu vueille abolir vne si damnable & malheureuse ceremonie." — Sagard, Voyage des Hurons, 158.

For the medical practices of the Hurons, see also Champlain, Brebeuf, Lafitau, Charlevoix, and other early writers. Those of the Algonquins were in some points different. The doctor often consulted the spirits to learn the cause and cure of the disease by a method peculiar to that family of tribes. He shut himself in a small conical lodge, and the spirits here visited him, manifesting their presence by a violent shaking of the whole structure. This superstition will be described in another connection.

† "On comparing five Iroquois heads, I find that they give an average internal capacity of eighty-eight cubic inches, which is within two inches of the Caucasian mean."— Morton, Crania Americana, 195. It is remarkable that the internal capacity

In the woody valleys of the Blue Mountains, south of the Nottawasaga Bay of Lake Huron, and two days' journey west of the frontier Huron towns, lay the nine villages of the Tobacco Nation, or Tionnontates.* In manners, as in language, they closely resembled the Hurons. Of old, they were their enemies, but were now at peace with them, and about the year 1640 became their close confederates. Indeed, in the ruin which befell that hapless people, the Tionnontates alone retained a tribal organization; and their descendants to this day are, with a trifling exception, the sole inheritors of the Huron or Wyandot name. Expatriated and wandering, they held for generations a paramount influence among the Western tribes.† In their original seats among the Blue Mountains, they offer an example extremely rare among Indians, of a tribe raising a crop for the market; for they traded in tobacco largely with other tribes. Their Huron confederates, keen traders, would not suffer them to pass through their country to traffic with the French, preferring to secure for themselves the advantage of bartering to them French goods at an enormous profit.‡

Journeying southward five days from the Tionnontate towns, the forest traveller reached the border villages of the Attiwandarons, or Neutral Nation.§ As early as 1626, they were visited by the Franciscan friar La Roche Dallion, who reports a numerous population in twenty-eight towns, besides many small hamlets. Their country, about forty leagues in extent, embraced wide and fertile districts on the north shore of Lake Erie, and their frontier extended eastward across the Niagara,

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of the skulls of the barbarous American tribes is greater than that of either Mexicans or Peruvians. "The difference in volume is chiefly confined to the occipital and basal portions," — in other words, to the region of the animal propensities; and hence, it is argued, the ferocious, brutal, and uncivilizable character of the wild tribes. See J. S. Phillips, Admeasurements of Crania of the Principal Groups of Indians in the United States.

* *Synonymes*, Tionnontates, Etionontates, Tuinontatek, Dionondadies, Khionontaterrhonons, Petuneux or Nation du Petun (tobacco).

† ". . . . l'ame de tous les Conseils." — Charlevoix, Voyage, 199. In 1763 they were Pontiac's best warriors.

‡ On the Tionnontates, see Le Mercier, Rel. 1637, 163; Lalemant, Rel. 1641, 69; Ragueneau, Rel. 1648, 61 (Quebec, 1858). An excellent summary of their character and history, by Mr. Shea, will be found in Hist. Mag., V. 262.

§ Attiwandarons, Attiwendaronk, Atirhagenrenrets, Rhagenratka (*Jesuit Relations*), Attionidarons (*Sagard*).

where they had three or four outlying towns.[*] Their name of Neuters was due to their neutrality in the war between the Hurons and the Iroquois proper. The hostile warriors, meeting in a Neuter cabin, were forced to keep the peace, though once in the open air the truce was at an end. Yet this people were abundantly ferocious, and, while holding a pacific attitude betwixt their warring kindred, waged deadly strife with the Mascontens, an Algonquin horde beyond Lake Michigan. Indeed, it was but recently that they had been at blows with seventeen Algonquin tribes.[†] They burned female prisoners, a practice unknown to the Hurons. Their country was full of game, and they were bold and active hunters. In form and stature they surpassed even the Hurons, whom they resembled in their mode of life, and from whose language their own, though radically similar, was dialectically distinct. Their licentiousness was even more open and shameless, and they stood alone in the extravagance of some of their usages. They kept their dead in their houses till they became insupportable; then scraped the flesh from the bones, and displayed them in rows along the walls, there to remain till the periodical Feast of the Dead, or general burial. In summer, the men wore no clothing whatever, but were usually tattooed from head to foot with powdered charcoal.

The sagacious Hurons refused them a passage through their country to the French; and the Neuters apparently had not sense or reflection enough to take the easy and direct route of Lake Ontario, which was probably open to them, though closed against the Hurons by Iroquois enmity. Thus the former made excellent profit by exchanging French goods at high rates for the valuable furs of the Neuters.[‡]

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[*] Lalemant, Rel. des Hurons, 1641, 71 (Quebec, 1858). The Niagara was then called the River of the Neuters, or the Onguiaahra. Lalemant estimates the Neuter population in 1640 at twelve thousand, in forty villages.

[†] Lettre du Père La Roche Dallion, 8 Juillet, 1627, in Le Clerc, Établissement de la Foy, I. 346.

[‡] The Hurons became very jealous, when La Roche Dallion visited the Neuters, lest a direct trade should be opened between the latter and the French, against whom they at once put in circulation a variety of slanders, — that they were a people who lived on snakes and venom, that they were furnished with tails, and that French women, though having but one breast, bore six children at a birth. The missionary nearly lost his life in consequence, the Neuters conceiving the idea that he would infect their country with a pestilence. La Roche Dallion in Le Clerc, I. 346.

Southward and eastward of Lake Erie dwelt a kindred people, the Eries, or Nation of the Cat. Little besides their existence is known of them. They seem to have occupied Southwestern New York, as far east as the Genesee, the frontier of the Senecas, and in habits and language to have resembled the Hurons.* They were noted warriors, fought with poisoned arrows, and were long a terror to the neighboring Iroquois.†

On the Lower Susquehanna dwelt the formidable people called by the French Andastes. Little is known of them beyond their general resemblance to their kindred in language, habits, and character. Fierce and resolute warriors, they long made head against the Iroquois of New York, and were vanquished at last more by disease than by the tomahawk.‡

In Central New York, stretching east and west from the Hudson to the Genesee, lay that redoubted people who have lent their name to the tribal family of the Iroquois, and stamped it indelibly on the early pages of American history. Among all the barbarous nations of the continent, the Iroquois of New York stand paramount. Elements which among other tribes were crude, confused, and embryotic, were among them systematized and concreted into an established polity. The Iroquois was the Indian of Indians. A thorough savage, yet a finished and developed savage, he is perhaps an example of the highest progress which man can reach without emerging from his primitive condition of the hunter. A geographical position commanding on one hand the portal of the Great Lakes, and, on the other, the sources of the streams flowing both to the Atlantic and the Mississippi, gave the ambitious and aggressive confederates advantages which they perfectly understood, and which they used to the utmost. Patient and politic as they were ferocious, they were not only conquerors of their own race, but the powerful ally and the dreaded foe of the French and English colonies, flattered and caressed by both, yet too sagacious to give themselves without reserve to either. Their organization and their history evince their intrinsic superiority. Even their traditionary lore, amid its wild puerilities, shows at times the stamp of an energy and force, in striking contrast with the flimsy creations of Algonquin fancy. That the Iroquois, left under their institutions to work out their destiny undisturbed, would ever have developed a civilization of their own, we are not prepared to maintain. These institutions, however, are sufficiently characteristic and curious, and we shall soon have occasion to observe them.*

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* Ragueneau, Rel. des Hurons, 1648, 46 (Quebec, 1858).

† Le Mercier, Rel. 1654, 10 (Quebec, 1858). "Nous les appellons la Nation du Chat à cause qu'il y a dans leur pais vne quantité prodigieuse de Chats sauvages." — Ib. The Iroquois are said to have given the same name, *Jegosasa, Cat Nation*, to the Neuters. Morgan, League of the Iroquois, 41.

Synonymes, Eriés, Erigas, Eriehronon, Riguehronon. Possibly they are the Kahquahs of Iroquois tradition. The Jesuits never had a mission among them, though they seem to have been visited by Champlain's adventurous interpreter, Etienne Brulé, in the summer of 1615. They are probably the Carantoüans of Champlain.

‡ Gallatin erroneously places the Andastes on the Alleghany, Bancroft and others adopting the error. The research of Mr. Shea has shown their identity with the *Susquehannocks* of the English, and the *Minquas* of the Dutch. See Hist. Mag., II. 294.

Synonymes, Andastes, Andastracronnons, Andastaeronnons, Andastaguez, Antastoui (French), Susquehannocks (English), Mengwe, Minquas (Dutch), Conestogas, Conessetagoes (English).

In Indian social organization, a problem at once suggests itself. In these communities, comparatively populous, how could spirits so fierce, and in many respects so ungoverned, live together in peace, without law and without enforced authority?

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* The name *Iroquois* is French. Charlevoix says: "Il a été formé du terme *Hiro*, ou *Hero*, qui signifie *J'ai dit*, et par lequel ces sauvages finissent tous leur discours, comme les Latins faisoient autrefois par leur *Dixi;* et de *Koué*, qui est un cri tantôt de tristesse, lorsqu'on le prononce en traînant, et tantôt de joye, quand on le prononce plus court." — Hist. de la N. F., I. 271. Their true name is *Hodenosaunee*, or People of the Long House, because their confederacy of five distinct nations, ranged in a line along Central New York, was likened to one of the long bark houses already described, with five fires and five families. The name *Agonnonsionni*, or *Aquanuscioni*, ascribed to them by Lafitau and Charlevoix, who translated it "House Makers," *Faiseurs de Cabannes*, may be a conversion of the true name with an erroneous rendering. The following are the true names of the five nations severally, with their French and English synonymes. For other synonymes, see History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac, 8, *note.*

	English.	French.
Ganeagaono,	Mohawk,	Agnier.
Onayotekaono,	Oneida,	Onneyut.
Onundagaono,	Onondaga,	Onnontagué.
Gweugwehono,	Cayuga,	Goyogouin.
Nundawaono,	Seneca,	Tsonnontouans.

The Iroquois termination in *ono*, or *onon*, as the French write it, simply means *people.*

Yet there were towns where savages lived together in thousands with a harmony which civilization might envy. This was in good measure due to peculiarities of Indian character and habits. This intractable race were, in certain external respects, the most pliant and complaisant of mankind. The early missionaries were charmed by the docile acquiescence with which their dogmas were received, but they soon discovered that their facile auditors neither believed nor understood that to which they had so promptly assented. They assented out of a kind of courtesy, which, while it vexed the priests, tended greatly to keep the Indians in mutual accord. That well-known self-control, which, originating in a form of pride, covered the savage nature of the man with a veil, opaque though thin, contributed not a little to the same end. Though vain, arrogant, boastful, and vindictive, the Indian bore abuse and sarcasm with an astonishing patience. Though greedy and grasping, he was lavish without stint, and would give away his all to soothe the manes of a departed relative, gain influence and applause, or ingratiate himself with his neighbors. In his dread of public opinion he rivalled some of his civilized successors.

All Indians, and especially these populous and sedentary tribes, had their code of courtesy, whose requirements were rigid and exact; nor might any infringe them without the ban of public censure. Indian nature, inflexible and unmalleable, was peculiarly under the control of custom. Established usage took the place of law,—was, in fact, a sort of common law with no tribunal to expound or enforce it. In these wild democracies—democracies in spirit though not in form—a respect for native superiority, and a willingness to yield to it, were always conspicuous. All were prompt to aid each other in distress, and a neighborly spirit was often exhibited among them. When a young woman was permanently married, the other women of the village supplied her with fire-wood for the year, each contributing an armful. When one or more families were without shelter, the men of the village joined in building them a house. In return, the recipients of the favor gave a feast, if they could; if not, their thanks were sufficient. Among the Iroquois and Hurons—and doubtless among their kindred tribes — there were marked distinctions of noble and base, prosperous and poor; yet while there was food in the village, the meanest and the poorest need not suffer want. He had but to enter the nearest house, and seat himself by the fire; when, without a word on either side, food was placed before him by the women.*

Contrary to received opinion, these Indians, like others of their race when living in communities, were of a very social disposition. Besides their incessant dances and feasts, great and small, they were continually visiting each other, spending the most of their time in their neighbors' houses, chatting, joking, bantering each other with witticisms sharp, broad, and in no sense delicate, yet always taken in good part. Every village had its adepts in these wordy tournaments, while the shrill laugh of young squaws, untaught to blush, echoed each hardy jest or rough sarcasm.

In the organization of the savage communities of the continent, one feature, more or less conspicuous, continually appears. Each nation or tribe — to adopt the names by which these communities are usually known — is subdivided into several clans. These clans are not locally separate, but are mingled throughout the nation. All the members of each clan are, or are assumed to be, intimately joined in consanguinity. Hence it is held an abomination for two persons of the same clan to intermarry; and hence, again, it follows that every family must contain members of at least two clans. Each clan has its name, as the clan of the Hawk, of the Wolf, or of the Tortoise; and each has for its emblem the figure of the beast, bird, reptile, plant, or other object from which its name is derived. This emblem, called *totem* by the Algonquins, is often tattooed on the clansman's body, or rudely painted over the entrance of his lodge. The child belongs to the clan, not of the father, but of the mother. In other words, descent is through the female, not of the totem alone, but of all rank, titles, and possessions. The son of a chief can never be a chief by hereditary title, though he may become so by force of personal influence or achievement. Neither can he inherit from his father so much as a tobacco-pipe. All possessions alike pass of right to the brothers of the chief or to the sons of his sisters, since these are all sprung from a common mother. This rule of descent was first noticed by Champlain among the Hurons in 1615. That excellent observer refers it to an origin which is doubtless its true one. The child may not be the son of his reputed father, but must be the son of his mother, — a consideration of more than ordinary force in an Indian community.*

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* The Jesuit Brebeuf, than whom no one better knew the Hurons, is very emphatic in praise of their harmony and social spirit. Speaking of one of the four nations of which the Hurons were composed, he says: "Ils ont vne douceur et vne affabilité quasi incroyable pour des Sauvages; ils ne se picquent pas aisément. . . . . Ils se maintiennent dans cette si par faite intelligence par les frequentes visites, les secours qu'ils se donnent mutuellement dans leurs maladies, par les festins et les alliances. . . . . Ils sont moins en leurs Cabanes que chez leurs amis. . . . . S'ils ont un bon morceau ils en font festin à leurs amis, et ne le mangent quasi jamais en leur particulier," etc. — Rel. des Hurons, 1636, 118 (Quebec, 1858).

This system of clanship, with the rule of descent inseparable from it, was of very wide prevalence. Indeed, it is more than probable that close observation would have detected it in every tribe east of the Mississippi, while there is positive evidence of its existence in by far the greater number. It is found also among the Dahcotah and other tribes west of the Mississippi, and there is reason to believe it universally prevalent as far as the Rocky Mountains, and even beyond them. The fact that with most of these hordes there is little property worth transmission, and that the most influential becomes chief, with little regard to inheritance, has blinded casual observers to the existence of this curious system.

It was found in full development among the Creeks, Choctaws, Cherokees, and other Southern tribes, including that remarkable people, the Natchez, who, judged by their religious and political institutions, seem a detached offshoot of the Toltec family. It is no less conspicuous among the roving Algonquins of the extreme North, where the number of totems is almost countless. Everywhere it formed the foundation of the polity of all the tribes, where a polity could be said to exist.

The Franciscans and Jesuits, close students of the languages and superstitions of the Indians, were by no means so zealous to analyze their organization and government. At the middle of the seventeenth century, the Hurons as a nation had ceased to exist, and their political portraiture as handed down to us is careless and unfinished. Yet some decisive features are plainly shown. The Huron nation was a confederacy of four distinct contiguous nations, afterwards increased to five by the addition of the Tionnontates; — it was divided into clans; — it was governed by chiefs, whose office was hereditary through the female; — the power of these chiefs, though great, was wholly of a persuasive or advisory character; — there were two principal chiefs, one for peace, the other for war; — there were numerous other chiefs, equal in rank but very unequal in influence, since the measure of their influence depended on the measure of their personal ability; — each nation of the confederacy had a distinct and separate organization, but at certain periods grand councils of the united nations were held, at which were present, not chiefs only, but also a great concourse of the people; — and at these and other councils the chiefs and principal men voted on proposed measures by means of small sticks or reeds, the opinion of the plurality ruling.*

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* " . . . . les enfans ne succedent iamais aux biens, & dignitez, de leurs peres, doubtant comme i'ay dit de leur geniteur, mais bien font-ils leurs successeurs, & heritiers, les enfans de leurs sœurs, & desquels ils sont asseurez d'estre yssus, & sortis." — Champlain (1627), 91.

The Iroquois were a people far more conspicuous in history, and their institutions are not yet extinct. In early and recent times they have been closely studied, and no little light has been cast upon a subject difficult and obscure as it is curious. By comparing the statements of observers old and recent, the character of their singular organization becomes sufficiently clear.†

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* These facts are gathered here and there from Champlain, Sagard, Bressani, and the Jesuit Relations prior to 1650. Of the Jesuits, Brebeuf is the most full and satisfactory. Lafitau and Charlevoix knew the Huron institutions only through others.

The names of the four confederate Huron nations were the Ataronchronons, Attinquenongnahac, Attignaouentan, and Ahrendaronons. They all bore also the name of some animal: thus the Ahrendaronons were the Nation of the Bear. As the clans are usually named after animals, this makes confusion, and may easily lead to error. The Bear Nation was the principal member of the league.

† Among modern students of Iroquois institutions, a place far in advance of all others is due to Lewis H. Morgan, Esq., himself an Iroquois by adoption, and intimate with the race from boyhood. His work, the "League of the Iroquois," is a production of most thorough and able research, conducted under peculiar advantages, and with the aid of an efficient co-laborer, Hasanoanda (Ely S. Parker), an educated and highly intelligent Iroquois of the Seneca nation. Though often differ-

Both reason and tradition point to the conclusion that the Iroquois formed originally one undivided people. Sundered, like countless other tribes, by dissension, caprice, or the necessities of the hunter life, they separated into five distinct nations, cantoned from east to west along the centre of New York, in the following order: Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Senecas. There was discord among them; wars followed, and they lived in mutual fear, each ensconced in its palisaded villages. At length, says tradition, a celestial being, incarnate on earth, counselled them to compose their strife and unite in a league of defence and aggression. Another personage, wholly mortal, yet wonderfully endowed, a renowned warrior and a mighty magician, stands, with his hair of writhing snakes, grotesquely conspicuous through the dim light of tradition at this birth of Iroquois nationality. He was Atotarho, a chief of the Onondagas; and from this honored source has sprung a long line of chieftains, heirs not to the blood alone, but to the name of their great precursor. A few years since there lived in Onondaga Hollow a handsome Indian boy, on whom the dwindled remnant of the nation looked with pride as their destined Atotarho. With earthly and celestial aid, the league was consummated, and through all the land the forests trembled at the name of the Iroquois.

The Iroquois people was divided into eight clans. When the original stock was sundered into five parts, each of these clans was also sundered into five parts; and as, by the principle already indicated, the clans were intimately mingled in every village, hamlet, and cabin, each one of the five divided nations had its portion of each of the eight clans.* When the league

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ing widely from Mr. Morgan's conclusions, we cannot bear a too emphatic testimony to the value of his researches. The "Notes on the Iroquois" of Mr. H. R. Schoolcraft also contains some interesting facts; but here, as in all Mr. Schoolcraft's productions, the reader must scrupulously reserve his right of private judgment. None of the old writers are so satisfactory as Lafitau. His work, "Mœurs des Sauvages Ameriquains comparées aux Mœurs des Premiers Temps," relates chiefly to the Iroquois and Hurons; the basis for his account of the former being his own observations and those of Father Julien Garnier, who was a missionary among them more than sixty years, from his novitiate to his death.

* With a view to clearness, the above statement is made categorical. It requires, however, to be qualified. It is not quite certain that, at the formation of the confederacy, there were eight clans, though there is positive proof of the existence of

took place, these separated portions readily resumed their ancient tie of fraternity. Thus, of the Turtle clan, all its members became brothers again, nominal members of one family, whether Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, or Senecas; and so, too, of the remaining clans. All the Iroquois, irrespective of nationality, were therefore divided into eight families, each tracing its descent to a common mother, and each designated by its distinctive emblem or *totem.* This tie of clan or family was exceedingly strong, and by it the five nations of the league were linked together as by an eightfold cable.

The clans were by no means equal in numbers, influence, or honor. So marked were the distinctions among them that some of the early writers recognize only the three most conspicuous, — those of the Turtle, the Bear, and the Wolf. To some of the clans, in each nation, belonged the right of giving a chief to the nation and to the league. Others had the right of giving three, or, in one case, four chiefs, while others could give none. As Indian clanship was but an extension of the family relation, these chiefs were, in a certain sense, hereditary; but the law of inheritance, though binding, was extremely elastic, and capable of stretching to the farthest limits of the clan. The chief was almost invariably succeeded by a

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seven. Neither is it certain that, at the separation, every clan was represented in every nation. Among the Mohawks and Oneidas there is no positive proof of the existence of more than three, the Wolf, Bear, and Turtle, though there is presumptive evidence of the existence of several others. See Morgan, 81, note.

The eight clans of the Iroquois were as follows: Wolf, Bear, Beaver, Turtle, Deer, Snipe, Heron, Hawk. Morgan, 79. The clans of the Snipe and the Heron are the same designated in an early French document as *La famille du Petit Pluvier,* and *La famille du Grand Pluvier.* New York Colonial Documents, IX. 47. The anonymous author of this document adds a ninth clan, that of the Potato, meaning the wild Indian potato, *Glycine apios.* This clan, if it existed, was very inconspicuous and of little importance.

Remarkable analogies exist between Iroquois clanship and that of other tribes. The eight clans of the Iroquois were separated into two divisions, four in each. Originally, marriage was interdicted between all the members of the same division, but in time the interdict was limited to the members of the individual clans. Another tribe, the Choctaws, remote from the Iroquois, and radically different in language, had also eight clans, similarly divided, with a similar interdict of marriage. Gallatin, Synopsis, 109.

The Creeks, according to the account given by their old chief, Sekopechi, to Mr. D. W. Eakins, were divided into nine clans, named in most cases from animals; clanship being transmitted, as usual, through the female.

near relative, always through the female, as a brother by the same mother, or a nephew by the sister's side. But if these were manifestly unfit, they were passed over and a chief chosen at a council of the clan from among remoter kindred. In these cases the successor is said to have been nominated by the matron of the late chief's household.* Be this as it may, the choice was never adverse to the popular inclination. The new chief was "raised up," or installed, by a formal council of the sachems of the league; and on entering upon his office he dropped his own name and assumed that which, since the formation of the league, had belonged to this especial chieftainship.

The number of these principal chiefs, or, as they have been called by way of distinction, sachems, varied in the several nations from eight to fourteen. The sachems of the five nations, fifty in all, assembled in council, formed the government of the confederacy. All met as equals, but a peculiar dignity was ever attached to the Atotarho of the Onondagas.

There was a class of subordinate chiefs, in no sense hereditary, but rising to office by address, ability, or valor. Yet the rank was clearly defined, and the new chief installed at a formal council. This class embodied, as might be supposed, the best talent of the nation, and the most prominent warriors and orators of the Iroquois have belonged to it. In its character and functions, however, it was purely civil. Like the sachems, these chiefs held their councils and exercised an influence proportioned to their number and abilities.

There was another council, between which and that of the subordinate chiefs the line of demarcation seems not to have been very definite. The Jesuit Lafitau calls it "the senate." Familiar with the Iroquois at the height of their prosperity, he describes it as the central and controlling power, so far, at least, as the separate nations were concerned. In its character it was essentially popular, but popular in the best sense, and one which can find its application only in a small community. Any man took part in it whose age and experience qualified him to do so. It was merely the gathered wisdom of the nation. Lafitau compares it to the Roman Senate in the early and rude age of the Republic, and affirms that it loses nothing by the comparison. He thus describes it. "It is a greasy assemblage, sitting *sur leur derrière*, crouched like apes, their knees as high as their ears, or lying, some on their bellies, some on their backs, each with a pipe in his mouth, discussing affairs of state with as much coolness and gravity as the Spanish Junta or the Grand Council of Venice."*

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* Lafitau, I. 471.

The young warriors had also their councils; so too had the women, and the opinions and wishes of each were represented by means of deputies before the "senate" or council of the old men, as well as before the grand confederate council of the sachems.

The government of this unique republic resided wholly in councils. By councils all questions were settled, all regulations established, social, political, military, or religious. The war-path, the chase, the council fire, — in these were the life of the Iroquois, and it is hard to say to which of the three he was most devoted.

The great council of the fifty sachems formed, as we have seen, the government of the league. Whenever a subject arose before any of the nations of importance enough to demand its assembling, the sachems of that nation might summon their colleagues by means of runners, bearing messages and belts of wampum. The usual place of meeting was the valley of Onondaga, the political as well as geographical centre of the confederacy. Thither, if the matter were one of deep and general interest, not the sachems alone, but the greater part of the population, gathered from east and west, swarming in the hospitable lodges of the town, or bivouacked by thousands in the surrounding fields and forests. While the sachems deliberated in the council-house, the chiefs and old men, the warriors, and often the women, were holding their respective councils apart; and their opinions, laid by their deputies before the council of sachems, were never without influence on its decisions.

The utmost order and deliberation reigned in the council, with rigorous adherence to the Indian notions of parliamentary propriety. The conference opened with an address to the spirits, or the chief of all the spirits. There was no heat in debate. No speaker interrupted another. Each gave his opinion in turn, supporting it with what reason or rhetoric he could command; but not until he had stated the subject of discussion in full, to prove that he understood it, repeating also the arguments *pro* and *con* of previous speakers. Thus their debates were excessively prolix, and the consumption of tobacco was immoderate. The result, however, was a thorough sifting of the matter in hand, while the practised astuteness of these savage politicians was a marvel to their civilized contemporaries. "It is by a most subtle policy," says Lafitau, "that they have taken the ascendant over the other nations, divided and overcome the most warlike, made themselves a terror to the most remote, and now hold a peaceful neutrality between the French and English, courted and feared by both."[*]

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* Lafitau, I. 478.

Unlike the Hurons, they required an entire unanimity in their decisions. The ease and frequency with which a requisition seemingly so difficult was fulfilled, affords a striking illustration of Indian nature, on one side so stubborn, tenacious, and impracticable; on another, so pliant and acquiescent. An explanation is also to be found in an intense spirit of nationality, for never since the days of Sparta were individual and national life more completely fused into one.

The sachems of the league were also, as we have seen, sachems of their respective nations; yet they rarely spoke in the councils of the subordinate chiefs and old men, except to present subjects of discussion.[†] Their influence in these councils was, however, great, and even paramount; for they commonly succeeded in securing to their interests some of the most dexterous and influential of the conclave, through whom, while they themselves remained in the background, they managed the debates.[‡]

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[*] Lafitau, I. 480. Many other French writers speak to the same effect. The following are the words of the soldier historian La Potherie, after describing the organization of the league:—"C'est donc là cette politique qui les unit si bien, à peu près comme tous les ressorts d'une horloge, qui par une liaison admirable de toutes les parties que les composent, contribuent toutes unanimement au merveilleux effet qui en resulte."—Hist. de l'Amérique Septentrionale, III. 32. He adds: "Les François ont avoüé eux-mêmes qu'ils étoient nez pour la guerre, & quelques maux qu'ils nous ayent faits nous les avons toujours estimez."—Ib. 2. La Potherie's book was published in 1722.

[†] Lafitau, I. 479.

[‡] The following from Lafitau is very characteristic:—"Ce que je dis de leur zèle pour le bien public n'est cependant pas si universel, que plusieurs ne pensent à

There was a class of men among the Iroquois always put forward on public occasions to speak the mind of the nation or defend its interests. Nearly all of them were of the number of the subordinate chiefs. Nature and training had fitted them for public speaking, and they were deeply versed in the history and traditions of the league. They were in fact professed orators, high in honor and influence among the people. To a huge stock of conventional metaphors, the use of which required nothing but practice, they often added an astute intellect, an astonishing memory, and an eloquence which deserved the name.

In one particular, the training of these savage politicians was never surpassed. In relations numerous and complicated with other tribes and with the rising European colonies, they had no art of writing to record events or preserve the stipulations of treaties. Memory, therefore, was tasked to the utmost, and developed to an extraordinary degree. They had various devices for aiding it, such as bundles of sticks, and that system of signs, emblems, and rude pictures which they shared with other tribes. Their famous wampum-belts were so many mnemonic signs, each standing for some act, speech, treaty, or clause of a treaty. They represented the public archives, and were divided among various custodians, each charged with the memory and interpretation of those assigned to him. The meaning of the belts was from time to time expounded in their councils. In conferences with them, nothing more astonished the French, Dutch, or English officials than the precision with which, before replying to their addresses, the Indian orators repeated them point by point.

It was only in rare cases that crime among the Iroquois or Hurons was punished by public authority. Murder, the most

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leur interêts particuliers, & que les Chefs (*sachems*) principalement, ne fassent joüer plusieurs ressorts pour venir à bout de leurs intrigues. Il y en a tel, dont l'addresse joüë si bien à coup sûr, qu'il fait déliberer le Conseil plusieurs jours de suite, sur une matiere dont la détermination est arrêtée entre lui & les principales têtes avant d'avoir été mise sur le tapis. Cependant comme les Chefs s'entre-regardent, & q'aucun ne veut paroître se donner une superiorité que puisse piquer la jalousie, ils se ménagent dans les Conseils plus que les autres; & quoiqu'ils en soient l'ame, leur politique les oblige à y parler peu, & à ecouter plûtôt le sentiment d'autrui, qu'à y dire le leur; mais chacun a un homme à sa main, qui est comme une espèce de Brûlot, & qui étant sans consequence pour sa personne, hazarde en pleine liberté tout ce qu'il juge à propos, selon qu'il l'a concerté avec le Chef même pour qui il agit." — Vol. I. p. 481.

heinous offence except witchcraft recognized among them, was rare. If the slayer and the slain were of the same household or clan, the affair was regarded as a family quarrel, to be settled by the immediate kin on both sides. This, under the pressure of public opinion, was commonly effected without bloodshed, by presents given in atonement. But if the murderer and his victim were of different clans or different nations, — still more, if the slain was a foreigner, — the whole community became interested to prevent the discord or the war which might arise. All directed their efforts, not to bring the murderer to punishment, but to satisfy the injured parties by a vicarious atonement. To this end, contributions were made and presents collected. Their number and value were determined by established usage. Among the Hurons, thirty presents of very considerable value were the price of a man's life. That of a woman's was fixed at forty, by reason of her weakness, and because on her depended the continuance and increase of the population. This was when the slain belonged to the nation. If of a foreign tribe, his death demanded a higher compensation, since it involved the danger of war.* These presents were offered in solemn council, with prescribed formalities. The relatives of the slain might refuse them if they chose, and in this case the murderer was given them as a slave; but they might by no means kill him, since in so doing they would incur public censure, and be compelled in their turn to make atonement. Besides the principal gifts, there were a great number of less value, all symbolical, and each delivered with a set form of words; as, "By this we wash out the blood of the slain. By this we cleanse his wound. By this we clothe his corpse with a new shirt. By this we place food on his grave," — and so in endless prolixity through particulars without number.†

The Hurons were notorious thieves, and perhaps the Iroquois were not much better, though the contrary has been asserted. Among both, the robbed was permitted, not only to retake his property by force, if he could, from the robber, but to strip the latter of all he had. This apparently acted as a restraint only in behalf of the strong, leaving the weak a prey of the plunderer; but here the tie of family and clan intervened to aid him. Relatives and clansmen espoused the quarrel of him who could not right himself.*

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* Ragueneau, Rel. des Hurons, 1648, 80 (Quebec, 1858).

† Ragueneau, Rel. des Hurons, 1648, gives a description of one of these ceremonies at length. Those of the Iroquois on such occasions were similar. Many other tribes had the same custom, but attended with much less form and ceremony. Compare Perrot, 73 – 76.

Witches, with whom the Hurons and Iroquois were grievously infested, were to both objects of utter abomination, and any one might kill them at any time. If any person was guilty of treason, or by his character and conduct made himself a danger or nuisance to the public, the council of chiefs and old men held secret session on his case, condemned him to death, and appointed some young man to kill him. The executioner, watching his opportunity, brained or stabbed him unawares, usually in the dark porch of one of the houses. Acting by authority, he could not be held answerable, and the relatives of the slain had no redress even if they desired it. The council, however, commonly obviated all difficulty in advance by charging the culprit with witchcraft, thus alienating his best friends.

The military organization of the Iroquois was exceedingly imperfect, and derived all its efficiency from their civil union and their personal prowess. There were two hereditary war-chiefs, both belonging to the Senecas; but, except on occasions of unusual importance, it does not appear that they took a very active part in the conduct of wars. The Iroquois lived in a state of chronic warfare with nearly all surrounding tribes, except a few from whom they exacted tribute. Any man of sufficient personal credit might raise a war-party when he chose. He proclaimed his purpose through the village, sang his war-songs, struck his hatchet in the war-post, and began the war-dance. Any who chose joined him; and the party usually took up the march at once, with a little parched corn-meal and maple sugar as their sole provision. On great occasions there was concert of action, the various parties meeting at a rendezvous and pursuing the march together. The leaders of war-parties, like the orators, belonged, in nearly all cases, to the class of subordinate chiefs. The Iroquois had a discipline suited to the dark and tangled forests where they fought. Here they were a terrible foe; in an open country, against a trained European force, they were, despite their ferocious valor, far less formidable.

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* The proceedings for detecting thieves were regular and methodical, after established customs. According to Bressani, no thief ever inculpated the innocent.

In observing this singular organization one is struck by the incongruity of its spirit and its form. A body of hereditary oligarchs was the head of the nation, yet the nation was essentially democratic. Not that the Iroquois was a leveller. None were more prompt to acknowledge superiority and defer to it, whether established by usage and prescription, or growing by the force of personal endowment. Yet each man, of high or low degree, had his voice in the conduct of affairs, and was never for a moment divorced from his wild spirit of independence. Where there was no property worth the name, authority had no fulcrum and no hold. The constant aim of sachems and chiefs was to exercise it without seeming to do so. They had no insignia of office. They were no richer than others; indeed, they were often poorer, spending their substance in largesses and bribes to strengthen their influence. They hunted and fished for subsistence; they were as foul, greasy, and unsavory as the rest; yet in them, withal, was often seen a native dignity of bearing which ochre and bear's-grease could not hide, and which comported well with their strong, symmetrical, and sometimes majestic proportions.

To the institutions, traditions, rites, usages, and festivals of the league, the Iroquois was inseparably wedded. He clung to them with Indian tenacity, and he clings to them still. His political fabric was one of ancient ideas and practices crystallized into regular and enduring forms. In its component parts it has nothing peculiar to itself. All its elements are found in other tribes; most of them belong to the whole Indian race. Undoubtedly there was a distinct and definite effort of legislation; but Iroquois legislation invented nothing. Like all sound legislation, it built of materials already prepared. It organized the chaotic past and gave concrete forms to Indian nature itself. The people have dwindled and decayed, but, banded by its ties of clan and kin, the league, in feeble miniature, still subsists, and the degenerate Iroquois looks back, with a mournful pride, to the glory of the past.

Would the Iroquois, left undisturbed to work out their own destiny, ever have emerged from the savage state? Advanced as they were beyond most other American tribes, there is no indication of a tendency to overpass the confines of a wild hunter and warrior life. They were inveterately attached to it,—impracticable conservatists of barbarism. Nor did the power of expansion apparently belonging to their system ever produce much result. Between the years 1712 and 1715, the Tuscaroras, a kindred people, were admitted into the league as a sixth nation, but they were never admitted on equal terms. Long after, in the day of their decline, several other tribes were announced as new members of the league; but these admissions never took effect. The Iroquois were always reluctant to admit other tribes, or parts of tribes, collectively into the precincts of the "Long House." Yet they constantly practised a system of adoptions, from which, though cruel and savage, they drew great advantages. Their prisoners of war, when they had burned and butchered as many of them as would serve to sate their own ire and that of their women, were divided man by man, woman by woman, and child by child, adopted into different families and clans, and thus incorporated into the nation. It was by this means, and this alone, that they could offset the losses of their incessant wars. Early in the eighteenth century a vast proportion of their diminished population consisted of adopted prisoners.*

A description of the social and political features of Indian tribes may fitly close with a sketch of the people in whom these features were most salient and decisive. It remains for us hereafter to speak of the religious and superstitious ideas which so deeply influenced Indian life.

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* It is impossible to fix with any precision the numbers of the Iroquois at the time of their greatest prosperity, that is, about the year 1650. Morgan places them at 25,000 souls, but this is probably too high an estimate. In the Journal of Greenhalgh, an Englishman who visited them in 1677, after they had been reduced by wars, they are set down at 2,150 warriors. Du Chesneau, in 1681, estimates them at 2,000 warriors. De la Barre, in 1684, at 2,600, they having been strengthened by adoptions. A memoir addressed to the Marquis de Seignelay, in 1687, again makes them 2,000. See N. Y. Col. Docs., IX. 162, 196, 321. These estimates imply a total population of ten or twelve thousand.

Art. III. — 1. *Gum-Elastic and its Varieties, with a Detailed Account of its Applications and Uses, and of the Discovery of Vulcanization.* By Charles Goodyear. New Haven: Published for the Author. 1853. 8vo. 2 vols. in one.

2. *Testimony in the Case of Charles Goodyear.* By Horace H. Day. Trenton, N. J. 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.

3. *Speech of the* Hon. Daniel Webster *in the great India-Rubber Suit, heard at Trenton in March,* 1852. Reported by Arthur Cannon. New York: Arthur and Burnett. 1852.

4. *Decision of the* Hon. Joseph Holt, *Commissioner of Patents, in the Matter of the Application of Charles Goodyear for the Extension of Letters Patent.* Washington. 1858.

5. *The Application of Charles Goodyear, Jun., Executor, etc., for the Extension of Goodyear's Vulcanizing Patent. Arguments in behalf of Applicant, by* A. Pollok, C. A. Seward, *and* J. T. Brady. Washington. 1864.

6. *The Petition of Charles Goodyear, Jr., Executor, for the Extension of Letters Patent granted to Charles Goodyear, deceased, for the Invention of Vulcanized India-Rubber.* New York. 1864.

7. *Discourse commemorative of the Life of Charles Goodyear, the Inventor, preached in the North Church, New Haven, July 8th,* 1860. By Rev. S. W. S. Dutton, D. D. New Haven. 1860.

The work first named at the head of this article presents at least something unique in the art of book-making. It is self-illustrating; inasmuch as, treating of India-rubber, it is made of India-rubber. An unobservant reader, however, would scarcely suspect the fact before reading the Preface, for the India-rubber covers resemble highly polished ebony, and the leaves have the appearance of ancient paper worn soft, thin, and dingy by numberless perusals. The volume contains six hundred and twenty pages; but it is not as thick as copies of the same work printed on paper, though it is a little heavier. It is evident that the substance of which this book is composed cannot be India-rubber in its natural state. Those leaves, thinner than paper, can be stretched only by a strong pull, and resume their shape perfectly when they are let go. There is no smell of India-rubber about them. We first saw this book in a cold room last January, but the leaves were then as flexible as old paper; and when, since, we have handled it in warm weather, they had grown no softer.

Some of our readers may have heard Daniel Webster relate the story of the India-rubber cloak and hat which one of his New York friends sent him at Marshfield in the infancy of the manufacture. He took the cloak to the piazza one cold morning, when it instantly became as rigid as sheet-iron. Finding that it stood alone, he placed the hat upon it, and left the articles standing near the front door. Several of his neighbors who passed, seeing a dark and portly figure there, took it for the lord of the mansion, and gave it respectful salutation. The same articles were liable to an objection still more serious. In the sun, even in cool weather, they became sticky, while on a hot day they would melt entirely away to the consistency of molasses. Every one remembers the thick and ill-shaped India-rubber shoes of twenty years ago, which had to be thawed out under the stove before they could be put on, and which, if left under the stove too long, would dissolve into gum that no household art could ever harden again. Some decorous gentlemen among us can also remember that, in the nocturnal combats of their college days, a flinty India-rubber shoe, in cold weather, was a missive weapon of a highly effective character.

This curious volume, therefore, cannot be made of the unmanageable stuff which Daniel Webster set up at his front door. So much is evident at a glance. But the book itself tells us that it can be subjected, without injury, to tests more severe than summer's sun and winter's cold. It can be soaked six months in a pail of water, and still be as good a book as ever. It can be boiled; it can be baked in an oven hot enough to cook a turkey; it can be soaked in brine, lye, camphene, turpentine, or oil; it can be dipped into oil of vitriol, and still no harm done. To crown its merits, no rat, mouse, worm, or moth has ever shown the slightest inclination to make acquaintance with it. The office of a Review is not usually provided with the means of subjecting literature to such critical tests as lye, vitriol, boilers, and hot ovens. But we have seen enough elsewhere of the ordeals to which India-rubber is now subjected to believe Mr. Goodyear's statements. Remote posterity will enjoy the fruit of his labors, unless some one takes particular pains to destroy this book; for it seems that time itself produces no effect upon the India-rubber which bears the familiar stamp, "GOODYEAR'S PATENT." In the dampest corner of the dampest cellar, no mould gathers upon it, no decay penetrates it. In the hottest garret, it never warps or cracks.

The principal object of the work is to relate how this remarkable change was effected in the nature of the substance of which it treats. It cost more than two millions of dollars to do it. It cost Charles Goodyear eleven most laborious and painful years. His book is written without art or skill, but also without guile. He was evidently a laborious, conscientious, modest man, neither learned nor highly gifted, but making no pretence to learning or gifts, doing the work which fell to him with all his might, and with a perseverance never surpassed in all the history of invention and discovery. Who would have thought to find a romance in the history of India-rubber? We are familiar with the stories of poor and friendless men, possessed with an idea and pursuing their object, amid obloquy, neglect, and suffering, to the final triumph; of which final triumph other men reaped the substantial reward, leaving to the discoverer the barren glory of his achievement,—and that glory obscured by detraction. Columbus is the representative man of that illustrious order. We trust to be able to show that Charles Goodyear is entitled to a place in it. Whether we consider the prodigious and unforeseen importance of his discovery, or his scarcely paralleled devotion to his object, in the face of the most disheartening obstacles, we feel it to be due to his memory, to his descendants, and to the public, that his story should be told. Few persons will ever see his book, of which only a small number of copies were printed for private circulation. Still fewer will be at the pains to pick out the material facts from the confused mass of matter in which they are hidden. Happily for our purpose, no one now has an interest to call his merits in question. He rests from his labors, and the patent, which was the glory and misery of his life, has expired.

Our great-grandfathers knew India-rubber only as a curiosity, and our grandfathers only as a means of erasing pencil-marks. The first specimens were brought to Europe in 1730; and as late as 1770 it was still so scarce an article, that in London it was only to be found in one shop, where a piece containing half a cubic inch was sold for three shillings. Dr. Priestley, in his work on perspective, published in 1770, speaks of it as a new article, and recommends its use to draughtsmen. This substance, however, being one of those of which nature has provided an inexhaustible supply, greater quantities found their way into the commerce of the world; until, in 1820, it was a drug in all markets, and was frequently brought as ballast merely. About this time it began to be subjected to experiments with a view to rendering it available in the arts. It was found useful as an ingredient of blacking and varnish. Its elasticity was turned to account in France in the manufacture of suspenders and garters, — threads of India-rubber being inserted in the web. In England, Mackintosh invented his still celebrated water-proof coats, which are made of two thin cloths with a paste of India-rubber between them. In chemistry, the substance was used to some extent, and its singular properties were much considered. In England and France, the India-rubber manufacture had attained considerable importance before the material had attracted the attention of American experimenters. The Europeans succeeded in rendering it useful because they did not attempt too much. The French cut the imported sheets of gum into shreds, without ever attempting to produce the sheets themselves. Mackintosh exposed no surface of India-rubber to the air, and brought no surfaces of India-rubber into contact. No one had discovered any process by which India-rubber once dissolved could be restored to its original consistency. Some of our readers may have attempted, twenty years ago, to fill up the holes in the sole of an India-rubber shoe. Nothing was easier than to melt a piece of India-rubber for the purpose; but, when applied to the shoe, it would not harden. There was the grand difficulty, the complete removal of which cost so much money and so many years.

The ruinous failure of the first American manufacturers arose from the fact that they began their costly operations in ignorance of the existence of this difficulty. They were too fast. They proceeded in the manner of the inventor of the caloric engine, who began by placing one in a ship of great magnitude, involving an expenditure which ruined the owners.

It was in the year 1820 that a pair of India-rubber shoes was seen for the first time in the United States. They were covered with gilding, and resembled in shape the shoes of a Chinaman. They were handed about in Boston only as a curiosity. Two or three years after, a ship from South America brought to Boston five hundred pairs of shoes, thick, heavy, and ill-shaped, which sold so readily as to invite further importations. The business increased until the annual importation reached half a million pairs, and India-rubber shoes had become an article of general use. The manner in which these shoes were made by the natives of South America was frequently described in the newspapers, and seemed to present no difficulty. They were made much as farmers' wives made candles. The sap being collected from the trees, clay lasts were dipped into the liquid twenty or thirty times, each layer being smoked a little. The shoes were then hung up to harden for a few days; after which the clay was removed, and the shoes were stored for some months to harden them still more. Nothing was more natural than to suppose that Yankees could do this as well as Indians, if not far better. The raw India-rubber could then be bought in Boston for five cents a pound, and a pair of shoes made of it brought from three to five dollars. Surely here was a promising basis for a new branch of manufacture in New England. It happened too, in 1830, that vast quantities of the raw gum reached the United States. It came covered with hides, in masses, of which no use could be made in America; and it remained unsold, or was sent to Europe.

Patent-leather suggested the first American attempt to turn India-rubber to account. Mr. E. M. Chaffee, foreman of a

Boston patent-leather factory, conceived the idea, in 1830, of spreading India-rubber upon cloth, hoping to produce an article which should possess the good qualities of patent-leather, with the additional one of being water-proof. In the deepest secrecy he experimented for several months. By dissolving a pound of India-rubber in three quarts of spirits of turpentine, and adding lampblack enough to give it the desired color, he produced a composition which he supposed would perfectly answer the purpose. He invented a machine for spreading it, and made some specimens of cloth, which had every appearance of being a very useful article. The surface, after being dried in the sun, was firm and smooth; and Mr. Chaffee supposed, and his friends agreed with him, that he had made an invention of the utmost value. At this point he invited a few of the solid men of Roxbury to look at his specimens and listen to his statements. He convinced them. The result of the conference was the Roxbury India-rubber Company, incorporated in February, 1833, with a capital of thirty thousand dollars.

The progress of this Company was amazing. Within a year its capital was increased to two hundred and forty thousand dollars. Before another year had expired, this was increased to three hundred thousand; and in the year following, to four hundred thousand. The Company manufactured the cloth invented by Mr. Chaffee, and many articles made of that cloth, such as coats, caps, wagon curtains and coverings. Shoes, made without fibre, were soon introduced. Nothing could be better than the appearance of these articles when they were new. They were in the highest favor, and were sold more rapidly than the company could manufacture them. The astonishing prosperity of the Roxbury Company had its natural effect in calling into existence similar establishments in other towns. Manufactories were started at Boston, Framingham, Salem, Lynn, Chelsea, Troy, and Staten Island, with capitals ranging from one hundred thousand dollars to half a million; and all of them appeared to prosper. There was an India-rubber mania in those years similar to that of petroleum in 1864. Not to invest in India-rubber stock was regarded by some shrewd men as indicative of inferior business talents and general dulness of comprehension. The exterior facts were certainly well calculated to lure even the most wary. Here was a material worth only a few cents a pound, out of which shoes were quickly made, which brought two dollars a pair! It was a plain case. Besides, there were the India-rubber Companies, all working to their extreme capacity, and selling all they could make.

It was when the business had reached this flourishing stage that Charles Goodyear, a bankrupt hardware merchant of Philadelphia, first had his attention directed to the material upon which it was founded. In 1834, being in New York on business, he chanced to observe the sign of the Roxbury Company, which then had a depot in that city. He had been reading in the newspapers, not long before, descriptions of the new life-preservers made of India-rubber, an application of the gum that was much extolled. Curiosity induced him to enter the store to examine the life-preservers. He bought one and took it home with him. A native of Connecticut, he possessed in full measure the Yankee propensity to look at a new contrivance, first with a view to understand its principle, and next to see if it cannot be improved. Already he had had some experience both of the difficulty of introducing an improved implement, and of the profit to be derived from its introduction. His father, the head of the firm of A. Goodyear and Sons, of which he was a member, was the first to manufacture hay-forks of spring steel, instead of the heavy, wrought-iron forks made by the village blacksmith; and Charles Goodyear could remember the time when his father reckoned it a happy day on which he had persuaded a farmer to accept a few of the new forks as a gift, on the condition of giving them a trial. But it was also very fresh in his recollection that those same forks had made their way to almost universal use, had yielded large profits to his firm, and were still a leading article of its trade, when, in 1830, the failure of Southern houses had compelled it to suspend. He was aware, too, that, if anything could extricate the house of A. Goodyear and Sons from embarrassment, it was their possession of superior methods of manufacturing and their sale of articles improved by their own ingenuity.

Upon examining his life-preserver, an improvement in the inflating apparatus occurred to him. When he was next in

New York he explained his improvement to the agent of the Roxbury Company, and offered to sell it. The agent, struck with the ingenuity displayed in the new contrivance, took the inventor into his confidence, partly by way of explaining why the Company could not then buy the improved tube, but principally with a view to enlist the aid of an ingenious mind in overcoming a difficulty that threatened the company with ruin. He told him that the prosperity of the India-rubber Companies in the United States was wholly fallacious. The Roxbury Company had manufactured vast quantities of shoes and fabrics in the cool months of 1833 and 1834, which had been readily sold at high prices; but during the following summer, the greater part of them had melted. Twenty thousand dollars' worth had been returned, reduced to the consistency of common gum, and emitting an odor so offensive that they had been obliged to bury it. New ingredients had been employed, new machinery applied, but still the articles would dissolve. In some cases, shoes had borne the heat of one summer, and melted the next. The wagon-covers became sticky in the sun, and rigid in the cold. The directors were at their wit's end; — since it required two years to test a new process, and meanwhile they knew not whether the articles made by it were valuable or worthless. If they stopped manufacturing, that was certain ruin. If they went on, they might find the product of a whole winter dissolving on their hands. The capital of the Company was already so far exhausted, that, unless the true method were speedily discovered, it would be compelled to wind up its affairs. The agent urged Mr. Goodyear not to waste time upon minor improvements, but to direct all his efforts to finding out the secret of successfully working the material itself. The Company could not buy his improved inflator; but let him learn how to make an India-rubber that would stand the summer's heat, and there was scarcely any price which it would not gladly give for the secret.

The worst apprehensions of the directors of this Company were realized. The public soon became tired of buying India-rubber shoes that could only be saved during the summer by putting them into a refrigerator. In the third year of the mania, India-rubber stock began to decline, and Roxbury itself finally fell to two dollars and a half. Before the close of 1836, all the Companies had ceased to exist, their fall involving many hundreds of families in heavy loss. The clumsy, shapeless shoes from South America were the only ones which the people would buy. It was generally supposed that the secret of their resisting heat was that they were smoked with the leaves of a certain tree, peculiar to South America, and that nothing else in nature would answer the purpose.

The two millions of dollars lost by these Companies had one result which has proved to be worth many times that sum; it led Charles Goodyear to undertake the investigation of India-rubber. That chance conversation with the agent of the Roxbury Company fixed his destiny. If he were alive to read these lines, he would, however, protest against the use of such a word as *chance* in this connection. He really appears to have felt himself "called" to study India-rubber. He says himself: —

> "From the time that his attention was first given to the subject, a strong and abiding impression was made upon his mind, that an object so desirable and important, and so necessary to man's comfort, as the making of gum-elastic available to his use, was most certainly placed within his reach. Having this presentiment, of which he could not divest himself under the most trying adversity, he was stimulated with the hope of ultimately attaining this object.
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> "Beyond this he would refer the whole to the great Creator, who directs the operations of mind to the development of the properties of matter, in his own way, at the time when they are specially needed, influencing some mind for every work or calling. . . . . Were he to refrain from expressing his views thus briefly, he would ever feel that he had done violence to his sentiments."

This is modestly said, but his friends assure us that he felt it earnestly and habitually. It was, indeed, this steadfast conviction of the possibility of attaining his object, and his religious devotion to it, that constituted his capital in his new business. He had little knowledge of chemistry, and an aversion to complicated calculations. He was a ruined man; for after a long struggle with misfortune the firm of A. Goodyear and Sons had surrendered their all to their creditors, and still owed thirty thousand dollars. He had a family, and his health was not robust. Upon returning home after conversing with the agent of the Roxbury Company, he was arrested for debt, and compelled to reside within the prison limits. He melted his first pound of India-rubber while he was living within those limits, and struggling to keep out of the jail itself. Thus he began his experiments in circumstances as little favorable as can be imagined. There were only two things in his favor. One was his conviction that India-rubber *could* be subjugated, and that he was the man destined to subjugate it. The other was, that, India-rubber having fallen to its old price, he could continue his labors as long as he could raise five cents and procure access to a fire. The very odium in which business-men held India-rubber, though it long retarded his final triumph, placed an abundance of the native gum within the means even of an inmate of the debtor's prison, in which he often was during the whole period of his experimenting. He was seldom out of jail a whole year from 1835 to 1841, and never out of danger of arrest.

In a small house in Philadelphia, in the winter of 1834–35, he began his investigations. He melted his gum by the domestic fire, kneaded it with his own hands, spread it upon a marble slab, and rolled it with a rolling-pin. A prospect of success flattered him from the first and lured him on. He was soon able to produce sheets of India-rubber which appeared as firm as those imported, and which tempted a friend to advance him a sum of money sufficient to enable him to manufacture several hundred pairs of shoes. He succeeded in embossing his shoes in various patterns, which gave them a novel and elegant appearance. Mindful, however, of the disasters of the Roxbury Company, he had the prudence to store his shoes until the summer. The hot days of June reduced them all to soft and stinking paste. His friend was discouraged, and refused him further aid. For his own part, such experiences as this, though they dashed his spirits for a while, stimulated him to new efforts.

It now occurred to him, that perhaps it was the turpentine used in dissolving the gum, or the lampblack employed to color it, that spoiled his product. He esteemed it a rare piece of luck to procure some barrels of the sap, not smoked, and still liquid. On going to the shed where the precious sap was deposited, he was accosted by an Irishman in his employ, who, in high glee, informed him that he had discovered the secret, pointing to his overalls, which he had dipped into the sap, and which were nicely coated with firm India-rubber. For a moment he thought that Jerry might have blundered into the secret. The man, however, sat down on a barrel near the fire, and, on attempting to rise, found himself glued to his seat and his legs stuck together. He had to be cut out of his overalls. The master proceeded to experiment with the sap, but soon discovered that the handsome white cloth made of it bore the heat no better than that which was produced in the usual manner.

It is remarkable, that inventors seldom derive direct aid from the science of their day. James Watt modestly ascribes to Professor Black part of the glory of his improvements in the steam-engine; but it seems plain from his own narrative, that he made his great invention of the condenser without any assistance. Professor Black assisted to instruct and form him; but the flash of genius, which made the steam-engine what we now see it, was wholly his own. The science of Glasgow was diligently questioned by him upon the defects of the old engine, but it gave him no hint of the remedy. It was James Watt, mathematical-instrument maker, earning fourteen shillings a week, who brooded over his little model until the conception of the condenser burst upon him, as he was taking his Sunday afternoon stroll on Glasgow Green. Goodyear had a similar experience. Philadelphia has always been noted for its chemists and its chemical works, and that city still supplies the greater part of the country with manufactured drugs and chemists' materials. Nevertheless, though Goodyear explained his difficulties to professors, physicians, and chemists, none of them could give him valuable information; none suggested an experiment that produced a useful result. We know not, indeed, whether science has ever explained his final success.

Satisfied that nothing could be done with India-rubber pure and simple, he concluded that a compound of some substance with India-rubber could alone render the gum available. He was correct in this conjecture, but it remained to be discovered whether there was such a substance in nature. He tried everything he could think of. For a short time he was elated with the result of his experiments with magnesia, mixing half a pound of magnesia with a pound of gum. This compound had the advantage of being whiter than the pure sap. It was so firm that he used it as leather in the binding of a book. In a few weeks, however, he had the mortification of seeing his elegant white book-covers fermenting and softening. Afterwards, they grew as hard and brittle as shell, and so they remain to this day.

By this time, the patience of his friends and his own little fund of money were both exhausted; and, one by one, the relics of his former prosperity, even to his wife's trinkets, found their way to the pawnbroker. He was a sanguine man, as inventors need to be, always feeling that he was on the point of succeeding. The very confidence with which he announced a new conception served at length to close all ears to his solicitations. In the second year of his investigation he removed his family to the country, and went to New York, in quest of some one who had still a little faith in India-rubber. His credit was then at so low an ebb that he was obliged to deposit with the landlord a quantity of linen, spun by his excellent wife. It was never redeemed. It was sold at auction to pay the first quarter's rent; and his furniture also would have been seized, but that he had taken the precaution to sell it himself in Philadelphia, and had placed in his cottage articles of too little value to tempt the hardest creditor.

In New York, — the first resort of the enterprising and the last refuge of the unfortunate, — he found two old friends; one of whom lent him a room in Gold Street for a laboratory, and the other, a druggist, supplied him with materials on credit. Again his hopes were flattered by an apparent success. By boiling his compound of gum and magnesia in quicklime and water, an article was produced which seemed to be all that he could desire. Some sheets of India-rubber made by this process drew a medal at the fair of the American Institute in 1835, and were much commended in the newspapers. Nothing could exceed the smoothness and firmness of the surface of these sheets; nor have they to this day been surpassed in these particulars. He obtained a patent for the process, manufactured a considerable quantity, sold his product readily, and thought his difficulties were at an end. In a few weeks his hopes were dashed to the ground. He found that a drop of weak acid, such as apple juice or vinegar and water, instantly annihilated the effect of the lime, and made the beautiful surface of his cloth sticky.

Undaunted, he next tried the experiment of mixing quicklime with pure gum. He tells us that, at this time, he used to prepare a gallon jug of quicklime at his room in Gold Street, and carry it on his shoulder to Greenwich Village, distant three miles, where he had access to horse-power for working his compound. This experiment, too, was a failure. The lime in a short time appeared to consume the gum with which it was mixed, leaving a substance that crumbled to pieces.

Accident suggested his next process, which, though he knew it not, was a step toward his final success. Except his almost unparalleled perseverance, the most marked trait in the character of this singular man was his love for beautiful forms and colors. An incongruous garment or decoration upon a member of his family, or anything tawdry or ill-arranged in a room, gave him positive distress. Accordingly, we always find him endeavoring to decorate his India-rubber fabrics. It was in bronzing the surface of some India-rubber drapery that the accident happened to which we have referred. Desiring to remove the bronze from a piece of the drapery, he applied aquafortis for the purpose, which did indeed have the effect desired, but it also discolored the fabric and appeared to spoil it. He threw away the piece as useless. Several days after, it occurred to him that he had not sufficiently examined the effect of the aquafortis, and, hurrying to his room, he was fortunate enough to find it again. A remarkable change appeared to have been made in the India-rubber. He does not seem to have been aware that aquafortis is two fifths sulphuric acid. Still less did he ever suspect that the surface of his drapery had really been "vulcanized." All he knew was, that India-rubber cloth "cured," as he termed it, by aquafortis, was incomparably superior to any previously made, and bore a degree of heat that rendered it available for many valuable purposes.

He was again a happy man. A partner, with ample capital, joined him. He went to Washington and patented his process. He showed his specimens to President Jackson, who expressed in writing his approval of them. Returning to New York, he prepared to manufacture on a great scale, hired the abandoned India-rubber works on Staten Island, and engaged a store in Broadway for the sale of his fabrics. In the midst of these grand preparations, his zeal in experimenting almost cost him his life. Having generated a large quantity of poisonous gas in his close room, he was so nearly suffocated that it was six weeks before he recovered his health. Before he had begun to produce his fabrics in any considerable quantity, the commercial storm of 1836 swept away the entire property of his partner, which put a complete stop to the operations in India-rubber, and reduced poor Goodyear to his normal condition of beggary. Beggary it literally was; for he was absolutely dependent upon others for the means of sustaining life. He mentions that, soon after this crushing blow, his family having previously joined him in New York, he awoke one morning to discover that he had neither an atom of food for them, nor a cent to buy it with. Putting in his pocket an article that he supposed a pawnbroker would value, he set out in the hope of procuring enough money to sustain them for one day. Before reaching the sign, so familiar to him, of the three golden balls, he met a terrible being to a man in his situation, — a creditor! Hungry and dejected, he prepared his mind for a torrent of bitter reproaches; for this gentleman was one whose patience he felt he had abused. What was his relief when his creditor accosted him gayly with, "Well, Mr. Goodyear, what can I do for you to-day?" His first thought was, that an insult was intended, so preposterous did it seem that this man could really desire to aid him further. Satisfied that the offer was well meant, he told his friend that he had come out that morning in search of food for his family, and that a loan of fifteen dollars would greatly oblige him. The money was instantly produced, which enabled him to postpone his visit to the pawnbroker for several days. The pawnbroker was still, however, his frequent resource all that year, until the few remains of his late brief prosperity had all disappeared.

But he never for a moment let go his hold upon India-rubber. A timely loan of a hundred dollars from an old friend enabled him to remove his family to Staten Island, near the abandoned India-rubber factory. Having free access to the works, he and his wife contrived to manufacture a few articles of his improved cloth, and to sell enough to provide daily bread. His great object there was to induce the directors of the suspended Company to recommence operations upon his new process. But so completely sickened were they of the very name of a material which had involved them in so much loss and discredit, that during the six months of his residence on the island he never succeeded in persuading one man to do so much as come to the factory and look at his specimens. There were thousands of dollars' worth of machinery there, but not a single shareholder cared even to know the condition of the property. This was the more remarkable, since he was unusually endowed by nature with the power to inspire other men with his own confidence. The magnates of Staten Island, however, involved as they were in the general shipwreck of property and credit, were inexorably deaf to his eloquence.

As he had formerly exhausted Philadelphia, so now New York seemed exhausted. He became even an object of ridicule. He was regarded as an India-rubber monomaniac. One of his New York friends having been asked how Mr. Goodyear could be recognized in the street, replied: "If you see a man with an India-rubber coat on, India-rubber-shoes, an India-rubber cap, and in his pocket an India-rubber purse with not a cent in it, that is he." He was in the habit then of wearing his material in every form, with the twofold view of testing and advertising it.

In September, 1836, aided again by a small loan, he packed a few of his best specimens in his carpet-bag, and set out alone for the cradle of the India-rubber manufacture, — Roxbury. The ruin of the great Company there was then complete, and the factory was abandoned. All that part of Massachusetts was suffering from the total depreciation of the India-rubber stocks. There were still, however, two or three persons who could not quite give up India-rubber. Mr. Chaffee, the originator of the manufacture in America, welcomed warmly a brother experimenter, admired his specimens, encouraged him to persevere, procured him friends, and, what was more important, gave him the use of the enormous machinery standing idle in the factory. A brief, delusive prosperity again relieved the monotony of misfortune. By his new process, he made shoes, piano-covers, and carriage-cloths, so superior to any previously produced in the United States as to cause a temporary revival of the business, which enabled him to sell rights to manufacture under his patents. His profits in a single year amounted to four or five thousand dollars. Again he had his family around him, and felt a boundless confidence in the future.

An event upon which he had depended for the completeness of his triumph plunged him again into ruin. He received an order from the government for a hundred and fifty India-rubber mail-bags. Having perfect confidence in his ability to execute this order, he gave the greatest possible publicity to it. All the world should now see that Goodyear's India-rubber was all that Goodyear had represented it. The bags were finished; and beautiful bags they were, — smooth, firm, highly polished, well-shaped, and indubitably water-proof. He had them hung up all round the factory, and invited every one to come and inspect them. They were universally admired, and the maker was congratulated upon his success. It was in the summer that these fatal bags were finished. Having occasion to be absent for a month, he left them hanging in the factory. Judge of his consternation when, on his return, he found them softening, fermenting, and dropping off their handles. The aquafortis did indeed "cure" the surface of his India-rubber, but only the surface. Very thin cloth made by this process was a useful and somewhat durable article; but for any other purpose, it was valueless. The public and signal failure of the mail-bags, together with the imperfection of all his products except his thinnest cloth, suddenly and totally destroyed his rising business. Everything he possessed that was salable was sold at auction to pay his debts. He was again penniless and destitute, with an increased family and an aged father dependent upon him.

His friends, his brothers, and his wife now joined in dissuading him from further experiments. Were not four years of such vicissitude enough? Who had ever touched India-rubber without loss? Could he hope to succeed, when so many able and enterprising men had failed? Had he a right to keep his family in a condition so humiliating and painful? He had succeeded in the hardware business; why not return to it? There were those who would join him in any rational undertaking; but how could he expect that any one would be willing to throw more money into a bottomless pit that had already engulfed millions without result? These arguments he could not answer, and we cannot; the friends of all the great inventors have had occasion to use the same. It seemed highly absurd to the friends of Fitch, Watt, Fulton, Wedgewood, Whitney, Arkwright, that they should forsake the beaten track of business to pursue a path that led through the wilderness to nothing but wilderness. Not one of these men, perhaps, could have made a reasonable reply to the remonstrances of their friends. They only felt, as poor Goodyear felt, that the steep and thorny path which they were treading was the path they *must* pursue. A power of which they could give no satisfactory account urged them on. And when we look closely into the lives of such men, we observe that, in their dark days, some trifling circumstance was always occurring that set them upon new inquiries and gave them new hopes. It might be an *ignis fatuus* that led them farther astray, or it might be genuine light which brought them into the true path.

Goodyear might have yielded to his friends on this occasion, for he was an affectionate man, devoted to his family, had not one of those trifling events occurred which inflamed his curiosity anew. During his late transient prosperity, he had employed a man, Nathaniel Hayward by name, who had been foreman of one of the extinct India-rubber companies. He found him in charge of the abandoned factory, and still making a few articles on his own account by a new process. To harden his India-rubber, he put a very small quantity of sulphur into it, or sprinkled sulphur upon the surface and dried it in the sun. Mr. Goodyear was surprised to observe that this process seemed to produce the same effect as the application of aquafortis. It does not appear to have occurred to him that Hayward's process and his own were essentially the same. A chemical dictionary would have informed him that sulphuric acid enters largely into the composition of aquafortis, from which he might have inferred that the only difference between the two methods was, that Hayward employed the sun, and Goodyear nitric acid, to give the sulphur effect. Hayward's goods, however, were liable to a serious objection: the smell of the sulphur, in warm weather, was intolerable. Hayward, it appears, was a very illiterate man; and the only account he could give of his invention was, that it was revealed to him in a dream. His process was of so little use to him, that Goodyear bought his patent for a small sum, and gave him employment at monthly wages until the mail-bag disaster deprived him of the means of doing so.

In combining sulphur with India-rubber, Goodyear had approached so near his final success that one step more brought him to it. He was certain that he was very close to the secret. He saw that sulphur had a mysterious power over India-rubber when a union could be effected between the two substances. True, there was an infinitesimal quantity of sulphur in his mail-bags, and they had melted in the shade; but the surface of his cloth, powdered with the sulphur and dried in the sun, bore the sun's heat. Here was a mystery. The problem was, how to produce in a *mass* of India-rubber the change effected on the surface by sulphur and sun? He made numberless experiments. He mixed with the gum large quantities of sulphur, and small quantities. He exposed his compound to the sun, and held it near a fire. He felt that he had the secret in his hands; but for many weary months it eluded him.

And, after all, it was an accident that revealed it; but an accident that no man in the world but Charles Goodyear could have interpreted, nor he, but for his five years' previous investigation. At Woburn one day, in the spring of 1839, he was standing with his brother and several other persons near a very hot stove. He held in his hand a mass of his compound of sulphur and gum, upon which he was expatiating in his usual vehement manner, — the company exhibiting the indifference to which he was accustomed. In the crisis of his argument he made a violent gesture, which brought the mass in contact with the stove, which was hot enough to melt India-rubber instantly; upon looking at it a moment after, he perceived that his compound had not melted in the least degree! It had charred as leather chars, but no part of the surface had dissolved. There was not a sticky place upon it. To say that he was astonished at this would but faintly express his ecstasy of amazement. The result was absolutely new to all experience, — India-rubber not melting in contact with red-hot iron! A man must have been five years absorbed in the pursuit of an object to comprehend his emotions. He felt as Columbus felt when he saw the land-bird alighting upon his ship, and the drift-wood floating by. But, like Columbus, he was surrounded with an unbelieving crew. Eagerly he showed his charred India-rubber to his brother, and to the other by-standers, and dwelt upon the novelty and marvellousness of his fact. They regarded it with complete indifference. The good man had worn them all out. Fifty times before, he had run to them, exulting in some new discovery, and they supposed, of course, that this was another of his chimeras.

He followed the new clew with an enthusiasm which his friends would have been justified in calling frenzy, if success had not finally vindicated him. He soon discovered that his compound would not melt at any degree of heat. It next occurred to him to ascertain at how low a temperature it would char, and whether it was not possible to *arrest* the combustion at a point that would leave the India-rubber elastic, but deprived of its adhesiveness. A single experiment proved that this was possible. After toasting a piece of his compound before an open fire, he found that, while part of it was charred, a rim of India-rubber round the charred portion was elastic still, and even more elastic than pure gum. In a few days he had established three facts; — first, that this rim of India-rubber would bear a temperature of two hundred and seventy-eight degrees without charring; second, that it would not melt or soften at any heat; third, that, placed between blocks of ice and left out of doors all night, it would not stiffen in the least degree. He had triumphed, and he knew it. He tells us that he now "felt himself amply repaid for the past, and quite indifferent as to the trials of the future." It was well he was so, for his darkest days were before him, and he was still six years from a practicable success. He had, indeed, proved that a compound of sulphur and India-rubber, in proper proportions and in certain conditions, being subjected for a certain time to a certain degree of heat, undergoes a change which renders it perfectly available for all the uses to which he had before attempted in vain to apply it. But it remained to be ascertained what were those proper proportions, what were those conditions, what was that degree of heat, what was that certain time, and by what means the heat could be best applied.

The difficulty of all this may be inferred when we state that at the present time it takes an intelligent man a year to learn how to conduct the process with certainty, though he is provided, from the start, with the best implements and appliances which twenty years' experience has suggested. And poor Goodyear had now reduced himself, not merely to poverty, but to isolation. No friend of his could conceal his impatience when he heard him pronounce the word India-rubber. Business-men recoiled from the name of it. He tells us that two entire years passed, after he had made his discovery, before he had convinced one human being of its value. Now, too, his experiments could no longer be carried on with a few pounds of India-rubber, a quart of turpentine, a phial of aquafortis, and a little lampblack. He wanted the means of producing a high, uniform, and controllable degree of heat,—a matter of much greater difficulty than he anticipated. We catch brief glimpses of him at this time in the volumes of testimony. We see him waiting for his wife to draw the loaves from her oven, that he might put into it a batch of India-rubber to bake, and watching it all the evening, far into the night, to see what effect was produced by one hour's, two hours', three hours', six hours' baking. We see him boiling it in his wife's saucepans, suspending it before the nose of her teakettle, and hanging it from the handle of that vessel to within an inch of the boiling water. We see him roasting it in the ashes and in hot sand, toasting it before a slow fire and before a quick fire, cooking it for one hour and for twenty-four hours, changing the proportions of his compound and mixing them in different ways. No success rewarded him while he employed only domestic utensils. Occasionally, it is true, he produced a small piece of perfectly vulcanized India-rubber; but upon subjecting other pieces to precisely the same process, they would blister or char.

Then we see him resorting to the shops and factories in the neighborhood of Woburn, asking the privilege of using an oven after working hours, or of hanging a piece of India-rubber in the "man-hole" of the boiler. The foremen testify that he was a great plague to them, and smeared their works with his sticky compound; but, though they regarded him as little better than a troublesome lunatic, they all appear to have helped him very willingly. He frankly confesses that he lived at this time on charity; for, although *he* felt confident of being able to repay the small sums which pity for his family enabled him to borrow, his neighbors who lent him the money were as far as possible from expecting payment. Pretending to lend, they meant to give. One would pay his butcher's bill or his milk bill; another would send in a barrel of flour; another would take in payment some articles of the old stock of India-rubber; and some of the farmers allowed his children to gather sticks in their fields to heat his hillocks of sand containing masses of sulphurized India-rubber. If the people of New England were not the most "neighborly" people in the world, his family must have starved, or he must have given up his experiments. But, with all the generosity of his neighbors, his children were often sick, hungry, and cold, without medicine, food, or fuel. One witness testifies: "I found (in 1839) that they had not fuel to burn nor food to eat, and did not know where to get a morsel of food from one day to another, unless it was sent in to them." We can neither justify nor condemn their father. Imagine Columbus within sight of the new world, and his obstinate crew declaring it was only a mirage, and refusing to row him ashore! Never was mortal man surer that he had a fortune in his hand, than Charles Goodyear was when he would take a piece of scorched and dingy India-rubber from his pocket and expound its marvellous properties to a group of incredulous villagers. Sure also was he that he was just upon the point of a practicable success. Give him but an oven, and would he not turn you out fire-proof and cold-proof India-rubber, as fast as a baker can produce loaves of bread? Nor was it merely the hope of deliverance from his pecuniary straits that urged him on. In all the records of his career, we perceive traces of something nobler than this. His health being always infirm, he was haunted with the dread of dying before he had reached a point in his discoveries where other men, influenced by ordinary motives, could render them available.

By the time that he had exhausted the patience of the foremen of the works near Woburn, he had come to the conclusion that an oven was the proper means of applying heat to his compound. An oven he forthwith determined to build. Having obtained the use of a corner of a factory yard, his aged father, two of his brothers, his little son, and himself sallied forth, with pickaxe and shovels, to begin the work; and when they had done all that unskilled labor could effect towards it, he induced a mason to complete it, and paid him in bricklayers' aprons made of aquafortized India-rubber. This first oven was a tantalizing failure. The heat was neither uniform nor controllable. Some of the pieces of India-rubber would come out so perfectly "cured" as to demonstrate the utility of his discovery; but others, prepared in precisely the same manner, as far as he could discern, were spoiled, either by blistering or charring. He was puzzled and distressed beyond description; and no single voice consoled or encouraged him. Out of the first piece of cloth which he succeeded in vulcanizing he had a coat made for himself, which was not an ornamental garment in its best estate; but, to prove to the unbelievers that it would stand fire, he brought it so often in contact with hot stoves, that at last it presented an exceedingly dingy appearance. His coat did not impress the public favorably, and it served to confirm the opinion that he was laboring under a mania.

In the midst of his first disheartening experiments with sulphur, he had an opportunity of escaping at once from his troubles. A house in Paris made him an advantageous offer for the use of his aquafortis process. From the abyss of his misery the honest man promptly replied, that that process, valuable as it was, was about to be superseded by a new method, which he was then perfecting, and as soon as he had developed it sufficiently he should be glad to close with their offers. Can we wonder that his neighbors thought him mad?

It was just after declining the French proposal that he endured his worst extremity of want and humiliation. It was in the winter of 1839–40. One of those long and terrible snowstorms for which New England is noted had been raging for many hours, and he awoke one morning to find his little cottage half buried in snow, the storm still continuing, and in his house not an atom of fuel nor a morsel of food. His children were very young, and he was himself sick and feeble. The charity of his neighbors was exhausted, and he had not the courage to face their reproaches. As he looked out of the window upon the dreary and tumultuous scene, "fit emblem of his condition," he remarks, he called to mind that, a few days before, an acquaintance, a mere acquaintance, who lived some miles off, had given him upon the road a more friendly greeting than he was then accustomed to receive. It had cheered his heart as he trudged sadly by, and it now returned vividly to his mind. To this gentleman he determined to apply for relief, if he could reach his house. Terrible was his struggle with the wind and the deep drifts. Often he was ready to faint with fatigue, sickness, and hunger, and he would be obliged to sit down upon a bank of snow to rest. He reached the house and told his story, not omitting the oft-told tale of his new discovery, — that mine of wealth, if only he could procure the means of working it! The eager eloquence of the inventor was seconded by the gaunt and yellow face of the man. His generous acquaintance entertained him cordially, and lent him a sum of money, which not only carried his family through the worst of the winter, but enabled him to continue his experiments on a small scale. O. B. Coolidge, of Woburn, was the name of this benefactor.

On another occasion, when he was in the most urgent need of materials, he looked about his house to see if there was left one relic of better days upon which a little money could be borrowed. There was nothing except his children's school-books, — the last things from which a New-Englander is willing to part. There was no other resource. He gathered them up and sold them for five dollars, with which he laid in a fresh stock of gum and sulphur, and kept on experimenting.

Seeing no prospect of success in Massachusetts, he now resolved to make a desperate effort to get to New York, feeling confident that the specimens he could take with him would convince some one of the superiority of his new method. He was beginning to understand the causes of his many failures, but he saw clearly that his compound could not be worked with certainty without expensive apparatus. It was a very delicate operation, requiring exactness and promptitude. The conditions upon which success depended were numerous, and the failure of one spoiled all. To vulcanize India-rubber is about as difficult as to make perfect bread; but the art of bread-making was the growth of ages, and Charles Goodyear was only ten years and a half in perfecting his process. Thousands of ingenious men and women, aided by many happy accidents, must have contributed to the successive invention of bread; but he was only one man, poor and sick. It cost him thousands of failures to learn that a little acid in his sulphur caused the blistering; that his compound must be heated almost immediately after being mixed, or it would never vulcanize; that a portion of white lead in the compound greatly facilitated the operation and improved the result; and when he had learned these facts, it still required costly and laborious experiments to devise the best methods of compounding his ingredients, the best proportions, the best mode of heating, the proper duration of the heating, and the various useful effects that could be produced by varying the proportions and the degree of heat. He tells us that many times, when, by exhausting every resource, he had prepared a quantity of his compound for heating, it was spoiled because he could not, with his inadequate apparatus, apply the heat soon enough.

To New York, then, he directed his thoughts. Merely to get there cost him a severer and a longer effort than men in general are capable of making. First he walked to Boston, ten miles distant, where he hoped to be able to borrow from an old acquaintance fifty dollars, with which to provide for his family and pay his fare to New York. He not only failed in this, but he was arrested for debt and thrown into prison.

Even in prison, while his father was negotiating to secure his release, he labored to interest men of capital in his discovery, and made proposals for founding a factory in Boston. Having obtained his liberty, he went to a hotel, and spent a week in vain efforts to effect a small loan. Saturday night came, and with it his hotel bill, which he had no means of discharging. In an agony of shame and anxiety, he went to a friend, and entreated the sum of five dollars to enable him to return home. He was met with a point-blank refusal. In the deepest dejection, he walked the streets till late in the night, and strayed at length, almost beside himself, to Cambridge, where he ventured to call upon a friend and ask shelter for the night. He was hospitably entertained, and the next morning walked wearily home, penniless and despairing. At the door of his house a member of his family met him with the news that his youngest child, two years of age, whom he had left in perfect health, was dying. In a few hours he had in his house a dead child, but not the means of burying it, and five living dependents without a morsel of food to give them. A storekeeper near by had promised to supply the family, but, discouraged by the unforeseen length of the father's absence, he had that day refused to trust them further. In these terrible circumstances, he applied to a friend upon whose generosity he knew he could rely, one who had never failed him. He received in reply a letter of severe and cutting reproach, enclosing seven dollars, which his friend explained was given only out of pity for his innocent and suffering family. A stranger, who chanced to be present when this letter arrived, sent them a barrel of flour, — a timely and blessed relief. The next day the family followed on foot the remains of the little child to the grave.

A relation in a distant part of the country, to whom Goodyear revealed his condition, sent him fifty dollars, which enabled him to get to New York. He had touched bottom. The worst of his trials were over. In New York, he had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of two brothers, William Rider and Emory Rider, men of some property and great intelligence, who examined his specimens, listened to his story, believed in him, and agreed to aid him to continue his experiments, and to supply his family until he had rendered his discovery available. From that time, though he was generally embarrassed in his circumstances, his family never wanted bread, and he was never obliged to suspend his experiments. Aided by the capital, the sympathy, and the ingenuity of the brothers Rider, he spent a year in New York in the most patient endeavors to overcome the difficulties in heating his compound. Before he had succeeded, their resources failed. But he had made such progress in demonstrating the practicability of his process, that his brother-in-law, William De Forrest, a noted woollen manufacturer, took hold of the project in earnest, and aided him to bring it to perfection. Once more, however, he was imprisoned for debt. This event conquered his scruples against availing himself of the benefit of the bankrupt act, which finally delivered him from the danger of arrest. We should add, however, that, as soon as he began to derive income from his invention, he reassumed his obligations to his old creditors, and discharged them gradually.

It was not till the year 1844, more than ten years after he began to experiment, and more than five years after discovering the secret of vulcanization, that he was able to conduct his process with absolute certainty, and to produce vulcanized India-rubber with the requisite expedition and economy. We can form some conception of the difficulties overcome by the fact, that the advances of Mr. De Forrest in aid of the experiments reached the sum of forty-six thousand dollars, — an amount the inventor did not live long enough to repay.

His triumph had been long deferred, and we have seen in part how much it had cost him. But his success proved to be richly worth its cost. He had added to the arts, not a new material merely, but a new class of materials, applicable to a thousand diverse uses. His product had more than the elasticity of India-rubber, while it was divested of all those properties which had lessened its utility. It was still India-rubber, but its surfaces would not adhere, nor would it harden at any degree of cold, nor soften at any degree of heat. It was a cloth impervious to water. It was paper that would not tear. It was parchment that would not crease. It was leather which neither rain nor sun would injure. It was ebony that could be run into a mould. It was ivory that could be worked like wax. It was wood that never cracked, shrunk, nor decayed. It was metal, "elastic metal," as Daniel Webster termed it, that could be wound round the finger or tied into a knot, and which preserved its elasticity almost like steel. Trifling variations in the ingredients, in the proportions, and in the heating, made it either as pliable as kid, tougher than ox-hide, as elastic as whale-bone, or as rigid as flint.

All this is stated in a moment, but each of these variations in the material, as well as every article made from them, cost this indefatigable man days, weeks, months, or years of experiment. It cost him, for example, several years of most expensive trial to obviate the objection to India-rubber fabrics caused by the liability of the gum to peel from the cloth. He tried every known textile fabric and every conceivable process before arriving at the simple expedient of mixing fibre with the gum, by which, at length, the perfect India-rubber cloth was produced. This invention he considered only second in value to the discovery of vulcanization. The India-rubber shoe, as we now have it, is an admirable article, — light, strong, elegant in shape, with a fibrous sole that does not readily wear, cut, or slip. As the shoe is made and joined before vulcanization, a girl can make twenty-five pairs in a day. They are cut from the soft sheets of gum and joined by a slight pressure of the hand. But almost every step of this process, now so simple and easy, was patiently elaborated by Charles Goodyear. A million and a half of pairs per annum is now the average number made in the United States by his process, though the business languishes somewhat from the high price of the raw materials. The gum, which, when Goodyear began his experiments, was a drug at five cents a pound, has recently been sold at one dollar and twenty cents a pound, with all its impurities. Even at this high price the annual import ranges at from four to five millions of pounds.

Poor Richard informs us that Necessity never makes a good bargain. Mr. Goodyear was always a prey to necessity. Nor was he ever a good man of business. He was too entirely an inventor to know how to dispose of his inventions to advantage; and he could never feel that he had accomplished his mission with regard to India-rubber. As soon as he had brought his shoemaking process to the point where other men could make it profitable, he withdrew from manufacturing, and sold rights to manufacture for the consideration of half a cent per pair. Five cents had been reasonable enough, and would have given him ample means to continue his labors. Half a cent kept him subject to necessity, which seemed to compel him to dispose of other rights at rates equally low. Thus it happened that, when the whole India-rubber business of the country paid him tribute, or ought to have paid it, he remained an embarrassed man. He had, too, the usual fate of inventors, in having to contend with the infringers of his rights, — men who owed their all to his ingenuity and perseverance. We may judge, however, of the rapidity with which the business grew, by the fact that, six years after the completion of his vulcanizing process, the holders of rights to manufacture shoes by that process deemed it worth while to employ Daniel Webster to plead their cause, and to stimulate his mind by a fee of twenty-five thousand dollars. It is questionable if Charles Goodyear ever derived that amount from his patents, if we deduct from his receipts the money spent in further developing his discovery. His ill-health obliged him to be abstemious, and he had no expensive tastes. It was only in his laboratory that he was lavish, and there he was lavish indeed.

His friends still smiled at his zeal, or reproached him for it. It has been only since the mighty growth of the business in his products that they have acknowledged that he was right and that they were wrong. They remember him, sick, meagre, and yellow, now coming to them with a walking-stick of India-rubber, exulting in the new application of his material, and predicting its general use, while they objected that his stick had cost him fifty dollars; now running about among the comb factories, trying to get reluctant men to try their tools upon hard India-rubber, and producing at length a set of combs that cost twenty times the price of ivory ones; now shutting himself up for months, endeavoring to make a sail of India-rubber fabric, impervious to water, that should never freeze, and to which no sleet or ice should ever cling; now exhibiting a set of cutlery with India-rubber handles, or a picture set in an India-rubber frame, or a book with India-rubber covers, or a watch with an India-rubber case; now experimenting with India-rubber tiles for floors, which he hoped to make as brilliant in color as those of mineral, as agreeable to the tread as carpet, and as durable as an ancient floor of oak. There is nothing in the history of invention more remarkable than the devotion of this man to his object. No crusader was ever so devoted to his vow, no lover to his mistress, as he was to his purpose of showing mankind what to do with India-rubber. The doorplate of his office was made of it; his portrait was painted upon and framed with it; his book, as we have seen, was wholly composed of it; and his mind, by night and day, was surcharged with it. He never went to sleep without having within reach writing materials and the means of making a light, so that, if he should have an idea in the night, he might be able to secure it. Some of his best ideas, he used to say, were saved to mankind by this precaution.

It is not well for any man to be thus absorbed in his object. To Goodyear, whose infirm constitution peculiarly needed repose and recreation, it was disastrous, and at length fatal. It is well with no man who does not play as well as work. Fortunately, we are all beginning to understand this. We are beginning to see that a devotion to the business of life which leaves no reserve of force and time for social pleasures and the pursuit of knowledge, diminishes even our power to conduct business with the sustained and intelligent energy requisite for a safe success. That is a melancholy passage in one of Theodore Parker's letters, written in the premature decline of his powers, in which he laments that he had not, like Franklin, joined a club, and taken an occasional ramble with young companions in the country, and played billiards with them in the evening. He added, that he intended to lead a better life in these particulars for the future; but who can reform at forty-seven? And the worst of it is, that ill-health, the natural ally of all evil, favors intensity, lessening both our power and our inclination to get out of the routine that is destroying us. Goodyear, always sick, had been for so many years the slave of his pursuit, he had been so spurred on by necessity, and lured by partial success, that, when at last he might have rested, he could not.

It does not become us, however, who reap the harvest, to censure him who wore himself out in sowing the seed. The harvest is great, — greater than any but he anticipated. His friends know now that he never over-estimated the value of his invention. They know now what he meant when he said that no one but himself would take the trouble to apply his material to the thousand uses of which it was capable, because each new application demanded a course of experiments that would discourage any one who entered upon it only with a view to profit. The India-rubber manufacture, since his death, has increased greatly in extent, but not much in other respects, and some of the ideas which he valued most remain undeveloped. He died, for example, in the conviction that sails of India-rubber cloth would finally supersede all others. He spent six months and five thousand dollars in producing one or two specimens, which were tried and answered their purpose well; but he was unable to bring his sail-making process to an available perfection. The sole difficulty was to make his sails as light as those of cloth. He felt certain of being able to accomplish this; but in the multiplicity of his objects and the pressure of his embarrassments, he was compelled to defer the completion of his plans to a day that never came.

The catalogue of his successful efforts is long and striking. The second volume of his book is wholly occupied with that catalogue. He lived to see his material applied to nearly five hundred uses, to give employment in England, France, Germany, and the United States to sixty thousand persons, who anually produced merchandise of the value of eight millions of dollars. A man does much who only founds a new kind of industry; and he does more when that industry gives value to a commodity that before was nearly valueless. But we should greatly undervalue the labors of Charles Goodyear, if we regarded them only as opening a new source of wealth; for there have been found many uses of India-rubber, as prepared by him, which have an importance far superior to their commercial value. Art, science, and humanity are indebted to him for a material which serves the purposes of them all, and serves them as no other known material could.

Some of our readers have been out on the picket-line during the war. They know what it is to stand motionless in a wet and miry rifle-pit, in the chilling rain of a Southern winter's night. Protected by India-rubber boots, blanket, and cap, the picket-man performs in comparative comfort a duty which, without that protection, would make him a cowering and shivering wretch, and plant in his bones a latent rheumatism to be the torment of his old age. Goodyear's India-rubber enables him to come in from his pit as dry as he was when he went into it, and he comes in to lie down with an India-rubber blanket between him and the damp earth. If he is wounded, it is an India-rubber stretcher, or an ambulance provided with India-rubber springs, that gives him least pain on his way to the hospital, where, if his wound is serious, a water-bed of India-rubber gives ease to his mangled frame, and enables him to endure the wearing tedium of an unchanged posture. Bandages and supporters of India-rubber avail him much when first he begins to hobble about his ward. A piece of India-rubber at the end of his crutch lessens the jar and the noise of his motions, and a cushion of India-rubber is comfortable to his armpit. The springs which close the hospital door, the bands which exclude the drafts from doors and windows, his pocket-comb and cup and thimble, are of the same material. From jars hermetically closed with India-rubber he receives the fresh fruit that is so exquisitely delicious to a fevered mouth. The instrument-case of his surgeon and the store-room of his matron contain many articles whose utility is increased by the use of it, and some that could be made of nothing else. His shirts and sheets pass through an India-rubber clothes-wringer, which saves the strength of the washerwoman and the fibre of the fabric. When the government presents him with an artificial leg, a thick heel and elastic sole of India-rubber give him comfort every time he puts it to the ground. An India-rubber pipe with an inserted bowl of clay, a billiard-table provided with India-rubber cushions and balls, can solace his long convalescence.

In the field, this material is not less strikingly useful. During this war, armies have marched through ten days of rain, and slept through as many rainy nights, and come out dry into the returning sunshine, with its artillery untarnished and its amunition uninjured, because men and munitions were all under India-rubber. When Goodyear's ideas are carried out, it will be by pontoons of inflated India-rubber that rivers will be crossed. A pontoon-train will then consist of one wagon drawn by two mules; and if the march is through a country that furnishes the wooden part of the bridge, a man may carry a pontoon on his back in addition to his knapsack and blanket.

In the naval service we meet this material in a form that attracts little attention, though it serves a purpose of perhaps unequalled utility. Mechanics are aware, that, from the time of James Watt to the year 1850, the grand desideratum of the engine-builder was a perfect joint, — a joint that would not admit the escape of steam. A steam-engine is all over joints and valves, from most of which some steam sooner or later would escape, since an engine in motion produces a continual jar that finally impaired the best joint that art could make. The old joint-making process was exceedingly expensive. The two surfaces of iron had to be most carefully ground and polished, then screwed together, and the edges closed with white lead. By the use of a thin sheet of vulcanized India-rubber, placed between the iron surfaces, not only is all this expense saved, but a joint is produced that is absolutely and permanently perfect. It is not even necessary to rub off the roughness of the casting, for the rougher the surface, the better the joint. Goodyear's invention supplies an article that Watt and Fulton sought in vain, and which would seem to put the finishing touch to the steam-engine, — if, in these days of improvement, anything whatever could be considered finished. At present, all engines are provided with these joints and valves, which save steam, diminish jar, and facilitate the separation of the parts. It is difficult to compute the value of this improvement in money. We are informed, however, by competent authority, that a steamer of two thousand tons saves ten thousand dollars a year by its use. Such is the demand for the engine-packing, as it is termed, that the owners of the factory where it is chiefly made, after constructing the largest water-wheel in the world, found it insufficient for their growing business, and were obliged to add to it a steam-engine of two hundred horse-power. The New York agent of this company sells about a million dollars' worth of packing per annum.

Belting for engines is another article for which Goodyear's compound is superior to any other, inasmuch as the surface of the India-rubber clings to the iron wheel better than leather or fabric. Leather polishes and slips; India-rubber does not polish, and holds to the iron so firmly as to save a large percentage of power. It is no small advantage merely to save leather for other uses, since leather is an article of which the supply is strictly limited. It is not uncommon for India-rubber belts to be furnished, which, if made of leather, would require more than a hundred hides. Emery-wheels of this material have been recently introduced. They were formerly made of wood coated with emery, which soon wore off. In the new manufacture, the emery is kneaded into the entire mass of the wheel, which can be worn down till it is all consumed. On the same principle the instruments used to sharpen scythes are also made. Of late we hear excellent accounts of India-rubber as a basis for artificial teeth. It is said to be lighter, more agreeable, less expensive, than gold or platina, and not less durable. We have seen also some very pretty watch-cases of this material, elegantly inlaid with gold.

It thus appears, that the result of Mr. Goodyear's long and painful struggles was the production of a material which now ranks with the leading compounds of commerce and manufacture, such as glass, brass, steel, paper, porcelain, paint. Considering its peculiar and varied utility, it is perhaps inferior in value only to paper, steel, and glass. We see, also, that the use of the new compound lessens the consumption of several commodities, such as ivory, bone, ebony, and leather, which it is desirable to save, because the demand for them tends to increase faster than the supply. When a set of ivory billiard-balls costs fifty dollars, and civilization presses upon the domain of the elephant, it is well to make our combs and our paper-knives of something else.

That inventions so valuable should be disputed and pirated was something which the history of all the great inventions might have taught Mr. Goodyear to expect. We need not revive those disputes which embittered his life and wasted his substance and his time. The Honorable Joseph Holt, the Commissioner who granted an extension of the vulcanizing patent in 1858, has sufficiently characterized them in one of the most eloquent papers ever issued from the Patent Office: —

> "No inventor probably has ever been so harassed, so trampled upon, so plundered by that sordid and licentious class of infringers known in the parlance of the world, with no exaggeration of phrase, as 'pirates.' The spoliations of their incessant guerilla warfare upon his defenceless rights have unquestionably amounted to millions. In the very front rank of this predatory band stands one who sustains in this case the double and most convenient character of contestant and witness; and it is but a subdued expression of my estimate of the deposition he has lodged, to say that this Parthian shaft — the last that he could hurl at an invention which he has so long and so remorselessly pursued — is a fitting finale to that career which the public justice of the country has so signally rebuked."

Mr. Holt paid a noble tribute to the class of men of whose rights he was the official guardian: —

> "All that is glorious in our past or hopeful in our future is indissolubly linked with that cause of human progress of which inventors are the *preux chevaliers.* It is no poetic translation of the abiding sentiment of the country to say, that they are the true jewels of the nation to which they belong, and that a solicitude for the protection of their rights and interests should find a place in every throb of the national heart. Sadly helpless as a class, and offering, in the glittering creations of their own genius, the strongest temptations to unscrupulous cupidity, they, of all men, have most need of the shelter of the public law, while, in view of their philanthropic labors, they are of all men most entitled to claim it. The schemes of the politician and of the statesman may subserve the purposes of the hour, and the teachings of the moralist may remain with the generation to which they are addressed, but all this must pass away; while the fruits of the inventor's genius will endure as imperishable memorials, and, surviving the wreck of creeds and systems, alike of politics, religion, and philosophy, will diffuse their blessings to all lands and throughout all ages."

When Mr. Goodyear had seen the manufacture of shoes and fabrics well established in the United States, and when his rights appeared to have been placed beyond controversy by the

Trenton decision of 1852, being still oppressed with debt, he went to Europe to introduce his material to the notice of capitalists there. The great manufactories of vulcanized India-rubber in England, Scotland, France, and Germany are the result of his labors; but the peculiarities of the patent laws of those countries, or else his own want of skill in contending for his rights, prevented him from reaping the reward of his labors. He spent six laborious years abroad. At the Great Exhibitions of London and Paris, he made brilliant displays of his wares, which did honor to his country and himself, and gave an impetus to the prosperity of the men who have grown rich upon his discoveries. At the London Exhibition, he had a suit of three apartments, carpeted, furnished, and decorated only with India-rubber. At Paris, he made a lavish display of India-rubber jewelry, dressing-cases, work-boxes, picture-frames, which attracted great attention. His reward was, a four days' sojourn in the debtors' prison, and the cross of the Legion of Honor. The delinquency of his American licensees procured him the former, and the favor of the Emperor the latter.

We have seen that his introduction to India-rubber was through the medium of a life-preserver. His last labors, also, were consecrated to life-saving apparatus, of which he invented or suggested a great variety. His excellent wife was reading to him one evening, in London, an article from a review, in which it was stated that twenty persons perished by drowning every hour. The company, startled at a statement so unexpected, conversed upon it for some time, while Mr. Goodyear himself remained silent and thoughtful. For several nights he was restless, as was usually the case with him when he was meditating a new application of his material. As these periods of incubation were usually followed by a prostrating sickness, his wife urged him to forbear, and endeavor to compose his mind to sleep. "Sleep!" said he, "how can I sleep while twenty human beings are drowning every hour, and I am the man who can save them?" It was long his endeavor to invent some article which every man, woman, and child would necessarily wear, and which would make it impossible for them to sink. He experimented with hats, cravats, jackets, and petticoats; and, though he left his principal object incomplete, he contrived many of those means of saving life which now puzzle the occupants of state-rooms. He had the idea that every article on board a vessel seizable in the moment of danger, every chair, table, sofa, and stool, should be a life-preserver.

He returned to his native land a melancholy spectacle to his friends, — yellow, emaciated, and feeble, — but still devoted to his work. He lingered and labored until July, 1860, when he died in New York, in the sixtieth year of his age. Almost to the last day of his life he was busy with new applications of his discovery. After twenty-seven years of labor and investigation, after having founded a new branch of industry, which gave employment to sixty thousand persons, he died insolvent, leaving to a wife and six children only an inheritance of debt. Those who censure him for this should consider that his discovery was not profitable to himself for more than ten years, that he was deeply in debt when he began his experiments, that his investigations could be carried on only by increasing his indebtedness, that all his bargains were those of a man in need, that the guilelessness of his nature made him the easy prey of greedy, dishonorable men, and that his neglect of his private interests was due, in part, to his zeal for the public good.

Dr. Hutton of New Haven, his pastor and friend, in the Sermon dedicated to his memory, did not exaggerate when he spoke of him as

> "one who recognized his peculiar endowment of inventive genius as a divine gift, involving a special and defined responsibility, and considered himself called of God, as was Bezaleel, to that particular course of invention to which he devoted the chief part of his life. This he often expressed, though with his characteristic modesty, to his friends, especially his religious friends. . . . . His inventive work was his religion, and was pervaded and animated by religious faith and devotion. He felt like an apostle commissioned for that work; and he said to his niece and her husband, who went, with his approbation and sympathy, as missionaries of the Gospel to Asia, that he was God's missionary as truly as they were."

Nothing more true. The demand for the raw gum, almost created by him, is introducing abundance and developing industry in the regions which produce it. As the culture of cotton seems the predestined means of improving Africa, so the gathering of caoutchouc may procure for the inhabitants of the equatorial regions of both continents such of the blessings of civilization as they are capable of appropriating.

An attempt was made last winter to procure an act of Congress extending the vulcanizing patent for a further period of seven years, for the benefit of the creditors and the family of the inventor. The petition seemed reasonable. The very low tariff paid by the manufacturers could have no perceptible effect upon the price of articles, and the extension would provide a competence for a worthy family who had claims upon the gratitude of the nation, if not upon its justice. The manufacturers generally favored the extension, since the patent protected them, in the deranged condition of our currency, from the competition of the foreign manufacturer, who pays low wages and enjoys a sound currency. The extension of the patent would have harmed no one, and would have been an advantage to the general interests of the trade. The son of the inventor, too, in whose name the petition was offered, had spent his whole life in assisting his father, and had a fair claim upon the consideration of Congress. But the same unscrupulous and remorseless men who had plundered poor Goodyear living, hastened to Washington to oppose the petition of his family. A cry of "monopoly" was raised in the newspapers to which they had access. The presence in Washington of Mrs. Goodyear, one of the most retiring of women, and of her son, a singularly modest young man, who were aided by one friend and one professional agent, was denounced as "a powerful lobby, male and female," who, having despoiled the public of "twenty millions," were boring Congress for a grant of twenty millions more, — all to be wrung from an India-rubber-consuming public. The short session of Congress is unfavorable to private bills, even when they are unopposed. These arts sufficed to prevent the introduction of the bill desired, and the patent has since expired.

The immense increase in the demand for the gum has frequently suggested the inquiry whether there is any danger of the supply becoming unequal to it. There are now in Europe and America more than a hundred and fifty manufactories of India-rubber articles, employing from five to five hundred operatives each, and consuming more than ten millions of pounds of gum per annum. The business, too, is considered to be still in its infancy. Certainly, it is increasing. Nevertheless, there is no possibility of the demand exceeding the supply. The belt of land round the globe, five hundred miles north and five hundred miles south of the equator, abounds in the trees producing the gum, and they can be tapped, it is said, for twenty successive seasons. Forty-three thousand of these trees were counted in a tract of country thirty miles long and eight wide. Each tree yields an average of three table-spoonfuls of sap daily, but the trees are so close together that one man can gather the sap of eighty in a day. Starting at daylight, with his tomahawk and a ball of clay, he goes from tree to tree, making five or six incisions in each, and placing under each incision a cup made of the clay which he carries. In three or four hours he has completed his circuit and comes home to breakfast. In the afternoon he slings a large gourd upon his shoulder, and repeats his round to collect the sap. The cups are covered up at the roots of the tree, to be used again on the following day. In other regions the sap is allowed to exude from the tree, and is gathered from about the roots. But, however it is collected, the supply is superabundant; and the countries which produce it are those in which the laborer needs only a little tapioca, a little coffee, a hut, and an apron. In South America, from which our supply chiefly comes, the natives subsist at an expense of three cents a day. The present high price of the gum in the United States is principally due to the fact that greenbacks are not current in the tropics; but in part, to the rapidity with which the demand has increased. Several important applications of the vulcanized gum have been deferred to the time when the raw material shall have fallen to what Adam Smith would style its "natural price."

Charles Goodyear's work, therefore, is a permanent addition to the resources of man. The latest posterity will be indebted to him.

ART. IV. — 1. *Considerations on Representative Government.* By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1864.

2. *Ancient Law; its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas.* By HENRY SUMNER MAINE. With an Introduction by THEODORE W. DWIGHT, LL.D. First American from Second London Edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.

THERE have been few, if any, democrats who have done so little to bring their idol to shame, who have laid so small a number of fallacies and absurdities on its altar, as those of the United States. They have neither seen visions nor dreamed dreams. They have been eminently practical and sober both in their means and in their aims, and have certainly never been surpassed, if ever equalled, in the accuracy of their estimate of the proper limits of the province of government and of those of individual rights. In so far as they have erred, it has been rather in the direction of too great reverence for precedent, than of too great devotion to logic.

Nevertheless, when we state that democracy in America, though by no means what its enemies represent it, still falls far short of what its friends would wish to see it, we only state what everybody knows and deplores. All democracy, though less assailable on logical grounds than most other systems of government, has, of course, defects such as every system must have which depends on the virtue and self-restraint and intelligence of ordinary mortals. But it is not of the existence of these defects that we, in this country, complain. What troubles the admirers of American democracy is, not that men's vices and imperfections prevent its being everything that they could desire it, but that it is not as good as it might be in spite of men's vices and imperfections.

Some of the causes of these shortcomings we discussed in a former number of the Review, and attempted to show that they were to be found in the preponderance, both social and political, assumed during the last fifty years by what may be termed the pioneering element in the population. Some, at least, of the remainder may, we are satisfied, be discovered in certain misconceptions widely prevalent amongst democrats, both in Europe and America, touching the fundamental principle of democracy, misconceptions which have been instrumental, not only in giving a wrong direction to much of the political thought of the country, but also in saddling democratic government with burdens and encumbrances for which nothing in its own nature can be fairly held responsible, and which, as long as they exist, must prevent its entire success, or even, as some think, threaten it with failure. And they are misconceptions which not simply circulate in the streets and bar-rooms and popular meetings, but pervade most of the literature which of late years has issued from the democratic press.

There can be very little doubt that the doctrine of "popular sovereignty," in the shape in which modern democrats generally hold it and put it in practice, — that is, as implying the personal right of each individual, for his own sake, to take part in the management or direction of the affairs of the state, — is the offspring of the older doctrine of the "equality of men"; and the mode in which the one was transmitted from the ancient to the modern world, and then produced the other, is curious as well as interesting, and some examination of it is necessary to a proper appreciation of the value of either.

The equality of the Greeks meant an equal administration of the laws amongst the citizens of the state; but citizenship always remained a privilege restricted to the few. The claim by an alien, or by a man of any other than the favored race, to share in it, would have been treated as monstrous and absurd by the most enlightened of the Greek political philosophers. And, as long as the Romans retained their freedom, the correlation between the right of making laws and the duty of obeying them, which is preached in modern times, was never dreamed of. The work of government was believed by them to have been assigned within the limits of the empire to the conquering race; and it is now well ascertained that even the idea of the equality of freemen before the law was first conceived, at least with any serious comprehension of its value or of the possibility of putting it into practice, by Julius Cæsar, after the rule of the people had been finally overthrown.

The Greek Stoics constructed, for purely speculative purposes, a theory of the existence, at some indefinitely remote period, of a perfect state, in which men's whole lives, as well as their relations with each other, were regulated by "the law of nature," which nobody could define any better than by calling it the "nature of the universe, the common law of all, which is right reason spread everywhere." It was, in other words, the sway of pure reason and pure justice; but what reason dictated and what justice required were of course left to the imagination of philosophers. One feature of this state seems to have been brought out with tolerable distinctness, namely, "the equality of men." How this idea was taken hold of by the Roman lawyers, who were all more or less under the influence of the stoical philosophy, and by them converted into a juridical maxim, which subsequently exercised a marked and valuable influence on the growth of Roman jurisprudence, has been described by Professor Maine in his third chapter, in a passage of great eloquence and lucidity, but which is unfortunately too long for quotation. From the Roman jurists it came down with the great fabric of Roman law, the noblest legacy bequeathed by the ancient to the modern world, and continued during many centuries to furnish materials for speculation and themes for declamation to French lawyers, though, strangely enough, without exercising any perceptible influence on the course of French legislation, of which the lawyers, during several centuries, may be said to have had almost entire control. It would, however, in all probability, either have died out for want of a "local habitation," or have perished under the application of the historical method to the study of jurisprudence, introduced by Montesquieu, had it not suddenly found friends and preservers in a band of lay speculators on the origin of society, foremost amongst whom was Hobbes, whose share in rescuing "the law of nature" from oblivion Professor Maine has entirely overlooked.

Hobbes was the first to undertake the conduct of inquiries in politics and morals in accordance with the method of his master, Bacon; and as this required all generalizations on these as well as on all other subjects to be based on an examination of nature, "the natural state of man" of course became the first object of his investigations, as the only safe foundation of a theory of society. He discovered this state to be something very different from the dream of the Stoics, — a state of incessant warfare between individuals with fear and selfishness, as the two great springs of action, and he deduced from it the necessity as well as the actual formation of "a social contract." The individual savages, becoming weary of strife, mutually agreed to combine and surrender themselves body and soul to the state, or "Leviathan," as he calls it, which thenceforth became the sole fountain both of law and morality; in other words, a despot, though an all-wise one.

The idea of "a social contract," thus originated by Hobbes, was taken up by Rousseau, who, however, not only deduced it from a different "natural state," but based upon it a different "civil state." Hobbes found all men in the natural state enemies of each other, and engaged in constant warfare; Rousseau found them dwelling together in perfect simplicity and harmony, strangers to hate and greed and selfishness, and all other antisocial passions. Hobbes made them agree to surrender themselves, for the sake of security against one another, to a power stronger than them all, and which was to dispose of them at will, and to be burdened with no obligations towards them whatever. Rousseau's contract, on the other hand, is based on complete reciprocity, and the power created by it is lodged in the hands of all, for the benefit of all. A man, under his theory, surrenders none of his rights; he simply agrees to exercise them through a new channel.

As might have been expected, Rousseau's hypothesis gained an easy victory over that of Hobbes. Everybody knows the extraordinary success with which it met from the moment it was promulgated, and the prodigious disturbance in the framework of European society to which it at once led. He became the founder of the democratic party in Europe; and the social contract, with its corollary, the sovereignty of the people, became the first article in the creed of those who then began to assail the existing order of things. It is not difficult to understand the favor with which it was received by the generation to which it was first preached. It seemed to furnish a simple solution of many social problems by which the world had long been puzzled. It placed a powerful weapon, owing to the absence of anything worthy of the name of historical criticism, in the hands of those to whom the vices of the actual society had become intolerable. When it was desired to liberate the lower classes from the crushing yoke of feudalism, a better way of supporting their cause could hardly have been discovered, than the assertion of the existence of a long-forgotten agreement between government and individuals, in which the duties of the one and the concessions of the other were strictly defined. The fiction of the divine right of kings and aristocrats was thus met by another fiction, the offspring, no doubt, of a nobler feeling, and promising a better result, but still a fiction.

For it is hardly necessary now to say, that the use of the historical method in the study of the origin of society, of which Montesquieu set the example, and of which Professor Maine's work is a brilliant illustration, shows beyond question that the "social compact" was made only in the imagination of philosophers. There is no trace of any such incident in the career of the human race to be found either in history or tradition or law. It is now well established that society grew, and was not made; that the first social bond was kinship, and not contract. The germ of the existing social organism in all countries, and amongst all races, was undoubtedly the family. The earliest form of society was what is called the patriarchal, in which the father was supreme ruler over his own household, and each household, for all practical purposes, formed a state. The first political organization, in the modern sense of the phrase, was undoubtedly a collection of families, descendants of a common ancestor, and ruled by the eldest male of the eldest branch; or, in other words, that which has come down to historical times, and even to our day, in various countries, as the tribe or clan. The period in which each man roved the forest alone, his will his only law, acknowledging no superior, and bound by no permanent ties to any other member of his species, clearly never existed; and the speculations of some modern jurists, in which the origin of property is discovered in the "squatting" of individuals on particular spots of earth, may therefore be pronounced baseless. In archaic society the individual neither owned nor could acquire anything.

The doctrine of the equality of men, after having undergone a reasonable amount of discussion at the hands of the school of political philosophers which Rousseau called into existence in France, and which prepared the way for the French Revolution, in due course of time, according to Professor Maine, crossed the Atlantic, and began to color the writings of those of the founders of the American commonwealth who had time or taste for speculation. We are far from believing, however, that the seed thus imported fell on fruitful soil. The men of the Revolutionary epoch had, in even a still greater degree than the men of our day, that repugnance to exploration in the fields of political philosophy, which makes political progress amongst all Anglo-Saxons so slow and so uncertain, and, to more logically-minded races, so unsatisfactory. That the doctrine of the equality of men, whatever hold it may have taken of the minds of some of those who were actually concerned in drafting the Declaration of Independence, thus causing its recognition in that instrument, met with little or no acceptance from the body of the people, is proved, or at all events strongly suggested, by the fact that we do not find much trace of its influence in the legislation of the various States for some time afterwards; not, in fact, until the settlement of the West had begun to develop a fresh type of character, and brought entirely new influences to bear on the work of government. When the theory had, by force of circumstances, been embodied in the actual social condition of the new States, it speedily began to show itself in the legislation of the older ones.

The great and fundamental difference between the political organizations of modern and those of ancient times is, as Professor Maine shows, the substitution of "local contiguity" for consanguinity, as the basis of political union. Men are members of the same state now, because they live within certain fixed limits, and not, as formerly, because they are descended from a common ancestor. But the theory which modern democrats have adopted of the relations between society and the individual is not deducible from this circumstance. The reason why I belong to a particular community does not either account for or justify my status in it. In short, the connection which, according to this theory, exists between the power of making laws and the duty of obeying them — the inseparableness of the two ideas — must either be based on a convention, or on a natural right deducible from the fact of human existence. Of the convention, as has been shown, there is no trace in history either ancient or modern, or in the practice of any democratic state.

The natural and inalienable rights of man, those which are inevitable deductions from the mere fact of his creation, and which it is or ought to be the first object of all governments to secure, are, we believe, correctly enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." But the value of this enumeration is, for all practical purposes, very much less than it appears; for it will hardly be pretended that each individual may define liberty or happiness for himself, or attempt to assert or pursue them in his own way. Society composed of men making any such claim would be a contradiction in terms. To make society possible, the nature of liberty, the nature of happiness, and the mode of enjoying them, have to be fixed by some authority higher than the will of the individual citizen, to which all must submit, — those who concur in, as well as those who dissent from, its conclusions. In all democracies this paramount authority is of necessity lodged in the majority; and although the minority is loosely said to share in the government, its influence on it, if it have any, is generally neither direct nor recognized. It expresses its opinion about the public policy; but the very fact that it is a minority shows that for the moment at least this opinion has no weight. So that in practice the right of the individual to take part in the management of the national affairs does everywhere, and must always, resolve itself into the right of saying what he thinks as to the way in which the work should be done; and this he does by means of his vote.

A vote is, however, not always simply an expression of opinion. If it were, we should have little to say against the proposition, that every man is entitled to it, as one of his natural rights, and therefore responsible only to his own conscience for the use he makes of it. But it may be, and very frequently is, something more than this; and whenever it is so, its consequences are very far from being confined to the voter himself.

The vote of one man, insignificant as it seems, and small as is the force which it derives from his will, may, in certain combinations of circumstances which nobody can foresee or control, turn the scale in favor of a measure vitally affecting the condition and destiny of a whole nation. Moreover, no man ever casts a vote on a question about which there is any division of sentiment, without neutralizing the opinion of somebody else. The immediate result of this is to deprive the voice of one of his neighbors of all weight, or in fact to impose silence on him just as effectually as if he were dragged away from the polls before depositing his ballot.

Now there is no argument in support of the natural right of individuals to a power of this sort, the exercise of which may so seriously influence the welfare of other human beings, which might not be urged with almost equal force in favor of the divine right of kings or of the divine mission of Cæsars. It would be difficult, in fact, to imagine anything more repugnant to the ideas on which all true democracy is based, than the notion that any man, or any body of men, has been armed with any power whatever over the fate of others as a personal prerogative, — something which may be claimed and is claimed by modern democrats for each inhabitant of a free state in virtue simply of his age and sex.

It may be supposed by some, however, that the theory of democratic government, preached by the majority of democratic writers either here or in Europe, is after all a matter of purely speculative interest, and that it has not, and cannot have, any practical influence on affairs.

It is true that the fallacy — as we believe it to be — has never in America obtained any formal recognition in legislation. The much-talked of right of all who pay taxes and obey the laws to share in the government has never been acknowledged in the Constitution of any of the States. Women, minors, aliens, and negroes are either totally deprived of the franchise, or subjected to a property qualification. In some of the States all voters are forced to submit to an educational test. But in spite of these express admissions of the inapplicability of the cherished principle, even to a political organization like that of the United States, composed of the most intelligent community in the world, democratic politicans continue to talk of it in much the same strain as of "eternal justice," or "eternal truth," without apparently ever perceiving, or at least acknowledging, that there are any limits to its operation, or that it is open to any more question or cavil than a man's right to his life or to the fruits of his industry. And the effect of this manner of talking and thinking upon national politics is, in our opinion, highly injurious in a variety of ways, and principally in this; that it banishes or conceals from the electors that sense of trusteeship which ought always to underlie the exercise of the franchise, and which is the only sound and safe basis of citizenship. It may be confidently asserted, that in no democratic country, however favored by circumstances, in which the doctrine that he holds the suffrage, not as a personal right, but in trust for the rest of the community, is not constantly present to the voter's mind as the only true one, will the highest attainable purity or efficiency in the government ever be witnessed. The steady cultivation, by every possible agency, of a feeling of responsibility to others than ourselves for the use made of the franchise, is absolutely necessary to secure a general advance towards the conscientious performance of this most important of all our social duties.

Although there can be no doubt that great efforts are made to diffuse this feeling both by the pulpit and the press, they can never be attended with even a fair measure of success, as long as the bulk of the population are taught from their childhood that every male, on arriving at the age of twenty-one, has the same right to vote that he has to air or light or to the wages of his labor. The idea of property in a thing is a simple one, which the popular mind readily apprehends, and, once apprehended, all subsequent attempts to saddle it with conditions or modifications are likely to prove abortive, as everybody will admit who has watched the result of the efforts to create a sense of trust with regard to other things to which the claim of individual right cannot well be disputed, — such as health, strength, and riches. How often and how solemnly men are told that their mental and bodily powers, their wealth and their accomplishments, are all given them for the promotion of God's glory and the good of their fellow-creatures; and yet who does not know how lamentably small is the influence of these teachings on the majority of the possessors of these gifts, how generally the idea of irresponsible ownership overrides or excludes every other? One of the results of the great sanctity with which modern jurisprudence has, for reasons which we cannot here stop to discuss, clothed everything bearing the name of property, has been the creation of a very strong tendency — especially amongst Anglo-Saxons, owing, no doubt, to their marked individualism — to strip it of all conditions and qualifications, and knit it as closely as possible to the person of the owner, as if it were an emanation from himself. This has been remarkably exemplified in the history of the modern law of wills, in that of English land tenures, and in that of slavery in this country. No such absolute dominion over the soil as that claimed and exercised by Scoth and Irish landlords was known in the ancient or mediæval world, and the complete degradation of the slave to the level of a thing was a feat reserved for the legislation of our own age.

Of the way in which this tendency has affected the popular notion of the nature of the franchise, there are abundant illustrations in the political history both of this country and of France and England. In England it has all but completely destroyed electoral purity. The farmer uses his vote to "oblige his landlord," with as little hesitation as he would display in lending him his horse; and in the boroughs, as recent investigations have proved, electors sell their suffrages as unblushingly, and almost as openly, as the goods on their counters. The remarkable picture drawn by M. de Tocqueville, in the now famous speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies a few weeks before the Revolution of 1848, of the moral condition of the comparatively small body of persons who then possessed the franchise in France, reveals the striking fact, that so completely had they come to look on it as personal property, that they generally felt it to be a duty which a man owed to his relatives to use it in whatever way would most redound to their personal advantage.*

In the United States, the idea of his being a trustee is not suggested to the elector's mind, as in England, or as in France before 1848, by the visible legal exclusion of a majority of the male population from the electoral body. But there is in every democratic country a body of persons who are, to all intents and purposes, deprived of all share in legislation; a fact which we disguise by calling them "the minority." This minority, especially when great interests are at stake, stands very much in the position of the non-electors in those countries in which the franchise is restricted to a particular class. It is true, it can always remove its disability by going over to the camp of the majority; but as this means the surrender of its convictions, or in other words suicide, it cannot be seriously spoken of either as a means of relief or as a distinction. We cannot, by any choice of phrases, get rid of the fact that the majority elects the government, and is apt to administer it in its own fashion and for its own purposes; and under the influence of the reigning theory of the nature of democracy, the tendency in this direction grows every year stronger and stronger. The majority is, of course, liable to be driven from power, as all governments are, by its own excesses; but this retribution rarely comes in free countries, except through a long course of agitation, during which there is plenty of time for serious injury to the public morals.

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* Democracy in America, (Bowen's ed.,) Vol. II. p. 472.

We cannot undertake to discuss here all the means by which this tendency may be effectively checked. It may be stated in general terms, that it will be checked in proportion to the spread of intelligence, and the consequent strengthening of sympathy, and the sense of justice in the community at large. But among the agencies which may be employed to hasten this consummation, there stands prominently the banishment from political literature of the mischievous fallacy, that persons are armed with the franchise in a free state for the simple reason that they are of the male sex, of full age, and not lunatics or idiots.

If the franchise be, as we believe it, not a right, but a trust committed to each individual still more for the benefit of the rest of the nation than for his own, and to be used solely for the promotion of the general progress of the community in virtue and knowledge, which is after all the only real progress, — it is a corollary from this, that there are different degrees of fitness for the exercise of it. If it be conferred for the promotion of certain ends, men's sense of the value of these ends, and their skill in discovering the best means of securing them, must vary as their knowledge, cultivation, and powers of mind vary. Some will know much better than others in what way a vote ought to be used, or, in other words, be very much better judges both of measures and of men. And this disposes at once of the extraordinary notion, which, under one disguise or another, has of late years obtained so much currency in the United States, that majorities are infallible, that the general diffusion of an opinion is to be accepted as proof of its soundness, and that, after being adopted by the people, there is not much left for those who differ with them, let their training or experience or ability be what it may, but to acquiesce and be silent. What those who are possessed with this notion ask us to believe is neither more nor less than that God, who has so constituted man that, in all other sciences, the highest excellence and deepest insight can only be attained by the careful cultivation of the natural powers, has left the solution of the great problems of political science — that which perhaps most strongly influences human nature and destiny — to the passions or selfish instincts of the least cultivated or gifted portion of the community. And it is to the spread of this theory, differently expressed of course, that we owe a large portion of that exclusion of men of high culture from much share in the management of our affairs, or even much direct influence on it, which is one unfortunate feature of our political life. If we watch the course of these men during the progress of any great political crisis, we shall very frequently find them either reduced to inaction, or relegated to the humble task of finding reasons for the popular decisions.

Some of the indirect effects of this doctrine are none the less mischievous for being seldom traced to their proper source. It is safe to say, that a very large proportion of whatever evil influence foreign-born voters exercise on our politics has been due to the false impression of the nature of the franchise which they have received from democratic teachings in Europe, and which every party that seeks their support here takes all possible pains to confirm.

Instead of hearing the franchise always spoken of and having it always presented to his mind as a trust or privilege, something to be highly valued and carefully used, every ignorant peasant who sets foot on our shores hears, from the moment of his landing, that it is a right to which his age and sex entitle him for his own special use and behoof, not simply by the laws of the land, but by the laws of nature. The idea that the rest of the community has anything to say to the manner in which he employs it; that he is bound, in casting his ballot, to take any thought for the national honor, or for the feelings, tastes, or traditions of those whose fathers' labor and self-denial have made the republic the safe and splendid refuge for poverty and misfortune which he finds it; that he has anything to learn from its men of education touching the policy of the government, or the merits or demerits of legislation, — is something which it is safe to say is now but rarely offered for his consideration. To such a height has this worship of majorities run of late, that it is leading, on the part of a portion of the press and many of our public men, to a sort of hostility to everybody who possesses property, apparently for no better reason than that they are the fewer in number. Nobody who has paid much attention to our political discussions of late years, both in and out of Congress, can have avoided being struck by the general tendency to exalt and glorify "the poor," apparently for the simple reason that they are poor, and in a corresponding degree to depreciate "the rich"; and, singularly enough, the standard of wealth seems to be, in political phraseology, every year sinking lower and lower. It appeared in a recent debate on the Enrolment Bill in the Senate, that to be "rich," for political purposes, a man need now-a-days only possess an income of two thousand dollars a year, no matter from what source he derives it. Once in receipt of this or any greater sum annually, whether as the wages of labor or the interest on savings, it seemed to be the conclusion of some of the speakers that he lost all claim to tenderness, consideration, or even justice, on the part of the government. It was gravely proposed by one Senator to draft him, or, in case he provided a substitute, to levy a tax of five per cent on his income for the full term for which he might have been liable to serve.

What makes this tendency all the more singular, and, let us add, all the more dangerous, is the fact that hereditary wealth may be said to be so rare in the United States as to be almost unknown. Nearly all those who possess property have accumulated it by their own industry, prudence, and self-denial,— qualities which are of the highest value in every country, but which, it may be safely alleged, must be possessed by the bulk of the citizens of a republic in order to insure its stability. Consequently property-holders are in reality the most valuable portion of the population, and small property-holders, those who have already given proofs of their intelligence and of ambition to rise in the world and to raise their children, are that class of all others which it should be the object of legislation to foster and encourage.

We can hardly wonder that, under the influence of such teachings as these, the foreign element in our population should play a part in politics that fills some of the most thoughtful and dispassionate observers with alarm as to the consequences of the immigration which still continues to pour in, and which many of those whose idea of progress is limited to the increase of wealth hail with delight. Nor can we wonder that that most important function of popular government — the education of those who live under it — should be so ill performed as it now notoriously is in many districts, and produce so little impression, at least on the mass of "adopted citizens," when every pains is taken by democratic leaders to represent the office of elector as something which calls for no qualifications beyond a human form and the masculine gender, and which entails even fewer responsibilities than the possession of a suit of clothes.

By far the most important political problem before the nation at this moment is that concerning the immediate extension of the franchise to the liberated slaves. While recognizing fully the impolicy of excluding, where it can possibly be avoided, any portion of the population from the enjoyment of the privileges possessed by the rest, the theory of the franchise for which we have been contending, if sound, suggests certain considerations with regard to its bestowal on them which it would be neither prudent nor just to overlook, even on the part of those who, like ourselves, are most friendly to the claims of the negroes, and who believe that the reorganization of the Southern society, and the future peace of the nation, both require the abolition of all political distinctions drawn from color.

The joy which we feel at the disappearance of slavery from our soil must not make us unmindful of all that has been said, and justly said, within the last thirty years, of its effects on the character of the slave. If even half what we have heard of it from those who have studied its workings be true, the worst scars it inflicts are not those which it leaves on the bodies of its victims. It begets, we know, an indifference and insensibility to the obligation of truth. It destroys self-respect, as well as respect for property and for the marriage tie. Its systematic refusal to recognize any moral relation between parents and children has of course a strong tendency to extinguish that sense of parental responsibility which is the very basis of civil society. It purposely keeps the understanding in the lowest and darkest condition to which it can be reduced by external circumstances. It prevents the formation of habits of industry, by refusing to labor its just reward, and supplying no better incentive to exertion than the base passion of bodily fear. And it keeps even the instincts in a rudimentary condition, by exempting the slave from the anxieties and cares of the savage or wild beast.

We are far from suggesting that the mere fact that a man has been subjected to the operation of an agency of this sort should be allowed to form an absolute disqualification for citizenship ; but we doubt if sound statesmanship does not require that it be deemed, in practice, sufficient to raise a presumption of unfitness, to be rebutted by each voter for himself, by submitting to a test. What the nature of this test should be, it is not very difficult to decide. No modern republic can, in our opinion, be said to rest on a sure foundation, in which the ability to read understandingly is not possessed by all or nearly all voters. We have just had, in the Southern insurrection, a tremendous demonstration of this proposition. A people who cannot read in modern times becomes the blind tool of an educated few, as naturally as sheep become the prey of wolves. The ability to read is not only the best attainable indication of general intelligence, but the only proof, constituted as society now is, which a man can offer of his fitness to follow or take part in various political discussions of the day, and to possess himself of the facts and arguments necessary to the formation of anything worthy of the name of a judgment on any public measure or public man. By reading, we need hardly say, we do not mean that singular educational test imposed on the voter in some of the States, by which the recitation of a scrap of the Declaration of Independence or of the Constitution is allowed to establish a man's claim to the franchise. What should be required of a voter who is expected to be able to read should, in our opinion, be a fair exhibition of his capacity to read a newspaper of election-day in an intelligible manner; not because newspapers are a very high or very instructive species of literature, but because they have become in our day the only means by which the citizens of a free state can either interchange their opinions or concert plans of political action. It is the modern equivalent for the meeting in the agora. In the ancient republics the citizens were a comparatively small body, in the habit of assembling frequently, discussing public questions with each other, and listening to the opinions of the most enlightened men of the community. Nearly all knowledge, too, was at that time communicated orally, and the memory is believed to have possessed a strength which the printing-press has long ago destroyed. So that a Greek or a Roman might have been a very intelligent and well-informed man, without knowing one letter from the other.

A republic of the size of ours would, therefore, in those days, have been pronounced an impossibility, and in those days it was an impossibility. But the newspaper brings the voter in Kansas into almost as close and intimate communion with the voter in New York, as if they met every day in the market-place; and that the electors rely more and more on it every day for the formation and diffusion of their opinions, must be evident to everybody who watches the drift of popular habits amongst ourselves. Speeches are certainly listened to, but the influence of oratory in politics is every year decreasing. A speech in our day possesses little potency till it is printed; and nobody who pays much attention to those that are delivered, either "on the stump" or in the various legislatures, can avoid seeing how largely they consist of a rehash of "editorials" on the same questions. During a Presidential or other canvass, the "great demonstrations" are poorly attended by the reading classes; and at the South, where reading is a comparatively rare accomplishment, the stump possesses an importance in electioneering which it has never assumed here.

A voter, therefore, who, in our day and in a republic like this, cannot read, may be said to labor, for all political purposes, under mental incapacity. He stands towards the rest of the citizens very much in the position in which a deaf mute must have stood in Greece. He is of necessity imperfectly informed with regard to all the leading facts of the national life, is at the mercy of anybody who has any interest in deceiving him, and becomes one of a class which is isolated in feelings as well as in opinions by a barrier which is none the less formidable for being invisible. When we propose, therefore, to require of the negro proof of his ability to read before allowing him to vote, we seek to impose no restriction on him which we would not impose on the white man as well.

In the hands of any man to whom this requirement would prove an insurmountable obstacle, the franchise would certainly prove simply a delusion and a snare. And it is fair to infer from what is already known of the freedmen, that the exaction of this qualification from them at the polls would not continue very long to exclude any considerable number from the electoral body, while it would almost certainly prove the means of stimulating the great mass of them in the acquisition of knowledge and of the habits of civilized life.

The argument in favor of the general bestowal of political rights on the freedmen without the imposition of a test, drawn from the well-known efficacy of the franchise as a means of education, sound as it undoubtedly is when applied either to small minorities, as the foreign immigrants in this country, or to men inheriting the training of many generations in the ordinary duties of social life, such as the working classes of France or England or Germany, would seem to call for some modification when applied to the case of an immense body of men like the negroes, suddenly liberated from the lowest form of human degradation, and isolated by certain marked peculiarities, both moral and physical, from the rest of the community. We repeat, that it must not be forgotten, in discussing this question, that the franchise cannot be so bestowed as to be simply an instrument of elevation, or so that the use made of it by the voter shall affect himself only. It is and must be a power, as well as a means of training. The manner in which a million of men use it, besides influencing their own welfare, influences that of the rest of the community; and it may be used in such fashion as to deprive another million of all voice in the management of the national affairs. It would seem as if the training power of citizenship would be in no way diminished by the imposition of such conditions as we have suggested above. Any man whom citizenship would elevate or improve, would be very ready to fulfil them. Any man who failed or refused to do so, would hardly be likely to benefit either himself or others by the use he would make of it.

We are not so visionary as ever to look for the total disappearance of party organizations from the politics of free communities, or to suppose that it will ever be possible to carry on a popular government without them. They stand in very much the same relation to opinion that the engine does to steam. They furnish the machinery by which it is enabled to make its impression on society and government; and there can be little question that, much as they have been declaimed against, they stimulate thought on political questions, by associating the spread of certain ideas with the honors and exultation of victory. To prevent them, however, from shutting the state itself out of view altogether, and concentrating the thoughts and even the allegiance of the citizen in themselves alone, it is absolutely necessary that the prizes for which they struggle should be great, and that the interests which they represent should possess both dignity and importance. In all free countries there exists, as long as the questions on which opinion is divided are trivial or promise no striking or serious result, no matter how they may be decided, that tendency to convert party organizations from means into ends, which Kinglake remarks as existing in some European countries with regard to armies. During a long peace, the drill, the discipline, and general appearance of the men are apt to assume the first place in the eyes of the leaders, and the objects for which the regiment or corps exists to be altogether forgotten. A party from which principles or ideas have departed, which is held together simply by the *esprit de corps*, or the traditional attachments of the members to the name, is somewhat like an armed force, which can manœuvre beautifully on the parade-ground, but is confounded and paralyzed by the noise and disorder of the battle-field.

And yet this was very nearly the condition to which a long period of almost unbroken prosperity reduced parties in the United States. The form of government had been definitely settled, and it had become certain that the new republic was dedicated, in fact as well as in form, to democracy. There was nothing to differ about possessing enough vital interest to stir the national heart or touch the national conscience. Slavery, it is true, was there, with all its hideousness and all its promise of coming woe; but nobody regarded it, except a small band of far-sighted thinkers and a few fanatics. Long years had to elapse before it assumed the rank of a national question. In the mean time there was nothing to agitate about which possessed for the great mass of the people any but a speculative importance. There were no wars, no seditions, no liberties to be asserted or defended, no privileges to be overthrown, no principles to be vindicated. The public threw itself accordingly into the work of making money; but the party organizations remained, and, for want of better employment, carried on a war of cries and catchwords, fought about leaders as long as men of eminence still lingered in the arena, and at last fought for office and nothing more.

We should certainly have abundant reason to be thankful for the war, bold as the statement may seem, if it had done nothing else than put an end to this ignoble game, and give parties loftier and more momentous subjects of strife. But it is evident that many of the old ideas and old practices have managed to obtrude themselves into the new era, and are likely to preserve their place in it in spite of the gravity which the events of the last four years have infused into the national politics. The great doctrine that a victorious party is, after all, only the trustee of the nation, which was entirely banished from the public sight during the period of reckless trifling and corruption which preceded the Rebellion, has not yet regained its ascendency, and is not likely to do so until its claims to recognition are forced on professional politicians with a strong hand by the public at large. To these men, no matter to which side they belong, it is, we are sorry to say, thoroughly distasteful. The habit of regarding the various public offices as, first and foremost, means of rewarding services rendered in electioneering, and only secondarily as instruments of administering the national government, has grown so inveterate with most of those who at present make politics a pursuit, that they are apt to regard anybody who suggests such reforms as making the places of officials permanent, or their appointment dependent on their qualifications, or giving them promotion in regular gradation, or providing pensions for the superannuated, as a visionary, to whom it is not worth the while of "practical men" to listen. In fact, large numbers of the latter class are now so used to the present system, that they never think of any other as possible, and look on "rotation in office" as an inseparable incident of all democracy. The ridiculous custom of selecting the Cabinet of a new President from amongst the disappointed aspirants to the office of the same party, to which Mr. Lincoln adhered with such simple fidelity, and of consulting "the claims" of geographical localities in filling some of the most important positions in the public employ, are among the indirect consequences of the belief that the majority is a final cause, and that its chief business is to secure its position and reward its adherents.

One of the obvious results of this system, and one of the most mischievous, is that the government rarely finds itself able to secure the best men for its civil service. Its subordinate offices are not sought as desirable positions by persons of high character and qualifications, and are therefore, as a matter of necessity, too often bestowed on men who have been unsuccessful in other walks of life, or who have made electioneering a profession. So that we witness at this moment the extraordinary fact, that to be the servant of what is fondly called "the best government the world ever saw," not only does not, as in other countries, raise a man in the social scale, but actually reflects something very like discredit on him. Of course the maintenance of thorough discipline or responsibility amongst a body thus composed is impossible. Its members have nothing to hope, and very little to fear. As they are not appointed because they are considered valuable, they are not dismissed when found to be worthless, and rarely could be dismissed without giving offence to some influential patron, who had either earned the gratitude of the administration or managed to excite its apprehensions. The want of all means, on the part of heads of departments, either of rewarding merit or punishing neglect or incompetency, of course produces the usual fruits, — waste, corruption, and inefficiency. And the temptation to dishonesty or negligence amongst the employees is increased by the nefarious practice — in which all parties, we regret to say, indulge — of extorting from them a portion of the salaries paid them by the public by way of subscription towards election expenses, making dismissal the penalty of refusal to pay. This tax sometimes runs so high, as was proved on a recent notorious trial in New York, as twenty-five per cent of the incomes of the poor wretches who have to submit to it. Nothing could better exemplify than this does the extent to which political parties have become indoctrinated with the notion that whichever of them happens to be in power is for the time being the state, and is therefore entitled to use all its resources, without restriction, for its own ends, however selfish.

This question of administrative reform possessed before the war very little of what, in popular parlance, is called "practical importance"; that is to say, the amount of damage done by administrative abuses was small. But this was entirely owing to the fact that the machinery of government was very limited in extent, and had very little work to do. The collection and outlay of a revenue of sixty or eighty millions, the maintenance of an army of fifteen thousand men and of a navy of a hundred ships, offered but a narrow field of operations, at worst, to negligence or fraud. But we have now a host of tax-gatherers, an excise system which throws its net over almost every act of life, one of the largest armies and largest navies in the world; and the vast and complicated civil service by which all these have to be managed and directed is liable, under the existing political usage, to be utterly disarranged or broken up once in four years by the dismissal of everybody connected with it. We should insult the intelligence of our readers by offering to prove that the maintenance of any such usage under present circumstances must end in disaster to our institutions, or in a radical change in their character. The employment of such a large body of officials as electioneering agents would of itself, in a very short time, render the Presidential election the merest farce, and render executive responsibility a sham. And to suppose that business so extensive, so complicated, so wide in its ramifications — dealing with so many important and delicate interests, and offering, as it must offer under the best system of administration, so many temptations to fraud and misconduct — as that of our government has become, can be carried on without radical changes, is to display great ignorance both of human nature and of political science. We must have a general rule for the selection of employees; their tenure of office must be made dependent on their good behavior; there must be promotion as a reward for fidelity and ability, and pensions as a refuge for old age. In other words, some inducement must be held out to honest and competent men to enter the public service, to remain in it and behave well in it.

The control of the people over the administration would be amply secured, and secured in accordance with the soundest democratic principles, if no offices were made vacant by a change of administration, except those of the President and of the heads of departments. It is well known that the responsibility of the Executive to the public is under the present system reduced to a minimum, by the fact that he is able to shield all bad appointments under the plea of party customs or obligations, and that the Senate aids him in doing so. There can be very little doubt, too, that the withdrawal of the minor offices of government from party competition at every election would exercise a purifying influence on politics. What attracts such swarms of needy and unscrupulous adventurers to the political arena — men whose very presence in it has made the word "politician" a term of reproach — is undoubtedly the multitude of small prizes which are at every election placed within the reach of those who now make a trade of striving for them and retailing them. Remove them, and this class would, we are satisfied, cease to take much interest in public affairs, and the management of them would naturally fall — at least to a far greater extent than at present — into the hands of those who feel some interest in the national welfare, and some generous concern for the national reputation. But as we have said before, we need not hope for changes of this sort from the hands of those eminently "practical" sages called "party leaders," to whom electioneering and "lobbying" comprise the whole science of government. They live by these abuses, and they are able to live by them solely by their success in persuading the people that their mode of carrying on the government is the only truly "democratic" one. Every attempt to bring the administration really under the control of the public, to make it really amenable to the honest and enlightened opinion of the nation, is denounced by this class as "aristocratic" or "monarchical," — as "opposed to the genius of our institutions" or "un-American"; and the experience of nearly forty years in the use of this clap-trap and cant has rendered them so dexterous, that they generally manage to cover everybody who directly assails them or their practices with odium, and drive him into private life as a "fanatic," a "visionary," or an "old fogy."

When we look about us in quest of the agencies by which the American people is to be aided and enlightened in preparing itself and its institutions for the great responsibilities which it has incurred through the war, for the proper discharge of the momentous trust which has devolved upon it as the consequence of the firm grasp with which it now holds possession of the continent, we confess that the prospect is not wholly encouraging. If we are to judge of what is to happen hereafter by what has happened in the past, we shall be driven to the conclusion that the great problems which will henceforward present themselves for solution at every step will have to be solved in a large degree by the blind drift of events, — that we shall too often either find ourselves at the mercy of circumstances, or possess no better means of controlling them than the natural force of the nation. We are far from underrating the strength of this force. But let it be ever so powerful, it will always be in a certain sense "brute force," in so far as it is not exerted under the direction of skill, experience, and culture. As long as its movements are not controlled by intelligent forethought, it will never reach its results except by processes purely empirical, and after a prodigious waste of strength, of time, of faith and hope and enthusiasm.

Some striking indications of what we fear on this score are to be found in the history of our military organization, and of the various attempts which have been made to raise revenue by taxation during the recent war. The most wonderful results were achieved; but in both cases there was an enormous strain thrown upon the vital force of the nation, which the command of greater skill and training, and greater respect for discipline, organization, and experience, might have enabled us to avoid. Those who think it a good plan for a people to accept no rule or principle which it has not itself tested, would do well to remember that there is such a thing as overtasking national as well as individual nerves, and that there is a kind of exhaustion which does not show itself either in custom-house or in agricultural tables, a weariness which is not incompatible with prodigious activity in making money, which the very love of material good often hastens, and which often ends in making men first careless about popular government, and then hostile to it. There was, for instance, no lesson of history and no deduction from principles of human nature clearer than that which told of the fatal influence of slavery on public morals, on politics, and on industry; but nothing short of actual experiment was sufficient to convince the body of the people of its real danger. We have learnt only through four years of war, and the desolation of half a continent, to believe what all the wisest men in the world have been telling us for a whole century. The political and moral value of a system of forced labor was actually still a debated question four years ago, or less, in many parts of the North; now, everybody has made up his mind about it; but surely it ought to have been possible to reach a conclusion so plain without wading through slaughter and piling up a mountain of debt.

The spectacle of a great nation limping and stumbling to its destiny is not a pleasing or a hopeful one; and though mistakes and waste of power cannot under our system, any more than under any other system of government, be entirely avoided, they may be reduced to a minimum; and to effect this a large share of the brains and culture of the country must be brought to bear on the work of government. We have no hesitation in concluding, even with the data now before us, that this is essential to the success of the "great experiment." Whatever in our social or political arrangements tends to secure this result may be pronounced good; whatever tends to prevent or retard it may be pronounced bad. The feature in all democratic governments now in existence which excites most alarm and misgiving amongst philosophical observers, is the absence of vigorous attempt to secure it; and this alarm is heightened by the small amount of concern which, as a general rule, democratic communities evince about it. That more study and training may be every year called into the service of our government, as the popular appreciation of their value increases, and as the growing complexity of our affairs calls for them, is very possible; but ignorance and recklessness may, in the mean time, work infinite mischief among us. The only aid which the busiest, most restless community in the world, that which is perhaps more than any other absorbed in material pursuits, receives, and without some great change is likely to receive, in forming its opinions on the thousand momentous questions which the place it has assumed in the world will now force it to decide nearly every year, is offered by the clergy and the press.

With the goodness or badness of the "taste" displayed by the clergy in discussing political questions in the pulpit, we have nothing to do; nor are we at present concerned with the effect of this practice either on religion or on religious teaching. We have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, however, that, during such crises as the anti-slavery struggle and the present war, the influence of political preaching on politics and society has been beneficial, and has done much to supply one of the great wants of our time. But the clergy do not now constitute what Coleridge calls "the clerisy" of any civilized country. They are not, in other words, the guardians and teachers of all the liberal arts and sciences, the sole repository of the knowledge of the nation, and the only persons competent to instruct it in whatever the interests of progress require it to learn. The range of their studies everywhere has become very much contracted since the period when they formed the only cultivated class in Europe, or, perhaps we should rather say, has not expanded as the field of science has expanded. Their education in modern times, like that of all other professions, has become peculiarly professional, and is, therefore, concentrated on a very small number of subjects. And although it is safe to say that, as a class, they rank in America above any other in the community in general attainments, the nature of their duties and of their training, and the sort of social isolation to which usage condemns them, as well as the habit which they are, in a certain sense, driven into cultivating, of attaching little or no influence to purely material considerations, render them unsafe guides in the decision of great questions of government. Nor is it at all likely that they will ever arrogate to themselves any such position, or that, if they did, it would be generally conceded to them by the public. The tendency of the times is rather to diminish than, increase the authority of their office, and it is safe to say that, in all countries, their influence on public affairs is every day becoming weaker. The prominence of the part they have played in American politics during the last fifteen or twenty years has been mainly due to the exceptional nature of the contest which has been raging during that period, and the unusual weight and importance of the moral interests involved in it.

There is a popular theory, that in every free state in modern times the liberty of the press is the great safeguard of public liberty; that the press is in fact the only trustworthy champion of the popular interests; that, let parties become ever so corrupt or selfish, or power ever so menacing, it never flinches from the work of honest criticism. Mr. Mill quotes M. Salvador, "a distinguished Hebrew," as saying, "that the Prophets were in church and state the equivalent of the modern liberty of the press"; and adds, that this "gives a just, but not an adequate, conception of the part fulfilled in national and universal history by this great element of Jewish life, by means of which, the canon of inspiration never being complete, the persons most eminent in genius and in moral feeling could not only denounce and reprobate, with the direct authority of the Almighty, whatever appeared to them deserving of such treatment, but could give forth higher and better interpretations of the national religion, which thenceforth became part of the religion."

Now the press in all democratic countries (we use the term *democratic* in a general sense, to designate all countries in which the popular element predominates in the government) may be said, for all political purposes, to consist simply of the newspapers. They have long emerged from the humble position of purveyors of news; and comment on public events and public measures, in short, on the whole national life from day to day and from year to year, may now be said to form their principal business, and they have monopolized it. Hardly any other form of publication in which political questions are discussed, be it pamphlet, magazine, review, or book, now obtains more than a very trifling circulation, while the daily papers enter every hut in the land.

If the press were to stand in the relation to society which the needs of a democracy require that it should stand, and in which orators and editors in some of their loftiest flights of rhetoric sometimes try to persuade the public that it does stand, the part that it would play would undoubtedly be something like that suggested by M. Salvador. It ought to be the instrument by which "the persons most eminent in genius and moral feeling," as well as in culture, standing aloof from the tumult of the forum, could counsel their countrymen on the conduct of their affairs, as well as "denounce and reprobate" whatever they considered wrong in the national policy. And if the press could be converted into such an instrument, it would be hard to conceive of a pursuit which would present greater attractions for the very best class of minds than that of a journalist. To watch the ebb and flow of party strife, without being stirred by its passions; to find in philosophy the moral of each year's story, and in each year's story the verification of philosophy; to keep the great lessons of history and the great principles of law and morality constantly before the eyes of the public; to guard legislation against the idols of the tribe, of the forum, and of the theatre, — to do all these things, and do them well, would furnish occupation which the purest ambition and highest culture might well crave. And if the press is ever to occupy, in democratic countries, the place which it claims for itself, and which its admirers assign it, this, or something like this, is the work it must do.

How far it falls short of this standard amongst us, everybody knows. Work of this kind can never be done by men who are, as is the case with nearly all our editors of influence and ability, themselves partisans, and who pass their lives in the political arena, rent by all the passions of the hour, and clutching at every prize which party offers to the competition of its followers. There are few newspapers in the United States which aspire to fill any higher position than that of the "organ" of some party, or set, or clique, and hardly an editor who is not bound by his party associations, or obligations, or ambition, to be silent on a thousand subjects on which a true regard for the interest of the public would require him to speak, to pass over hundreds of abuses which it is his duty to expose, to eulogize innumerable persons whom he is bound by every valid consideration "to reprobate and denounce." And it is but just to the public to say, that it is perfectly well aware of all this. Hence there is every day less and less importance attached to anything the newspapers may say. Even when honest criticism of public men or public measures appears in them, it produces little or no effect, owing to the general want of confidence in the good faith or disinterestedness of the writer. One of the evil results of this state of things is the practical exemption of the administration for the time being from that most useful of all checks, — the vigilance of the opposition. The opposition press in the United States is watchful enough, and fault-finding enough; but the administration is always able to treat its warnings and remonstrances with indifference, for the simple reason that the public is not disturbed by them.

But these defects are not peculiar to the press of the United

States. They displayed themselves not less glaringly in the French press during the brief period of freedom which it enjoyed under the Orleans dynasty. The newspapers played a great part in the political contests of those days, but it was as combatants. The editors became great political personages, not as commentators or critics, but as party leaders, who enjoyed the privilege of making a short speech to a great many thousand people every morning, and by whom all the prizes of official life were as attainable as by any member of the Chamber. The newspaper was nothing, the editor or contributors were everything. The *National* and the *Presse* were simply sheets on which Carrel or Girardin printed their speeches; and they reflected the fears, hopes, hates, and prejudices of their owners, without an attempt to disguise them. Either of these distinguished men would have repelled the imputation of impartiality or neutrality with scorn or indignation. In fact, it may be said that no such thing as a political press has ever existed in France. What went under that name was a band of political partisans, who wrote their harangues instead of delivering them. The result was, that the public never looked to it for either criticism or advice, and witnessed its overthrow with extraordinary equanimity. If it had expected from it anything like judicial comment on public affairs, it would have been miserably disappointed. What it got was passionate and brilliant invective directed against the government, glowing with party heat, bitter with a bitterness which in our contests is unknown, and finished in every line with that exceeding finish of form which has placed French political writing, in spite of its inaccuracy and vagueness of thought, so far above that of every other country.

The English press, we feel bound to say, has come nearer to the performance of the legitimate functions of a press than that of either France or America; not, in our opinion, through the merit of its conductors, but because they have been forced by circumstances to retain its anonymousness. The preservation of this feature, which many people consider obnoxious, but which we are persuaded is necessary for the proper performance of the duties of the press, has been due mainly to the peculiar social and political organization of the country. The landed aristocracy has for ages been the dominant force, both in society and government, while the press has been the creation of the middle class, and the liberty of the press one of its hardest-earned victories. If, however, every editor and every writer had been obliged to appear in the lists visor up, to try conclusions with such antagonists as king and church and peers, his social insignificance, in a community in which social position was, and still is, of such vast importance, would of itself have insured his defeat. Masked by the editorial helmet, however, crown, nobility, and legislature have all gone down before his victorious lance; and the result has been the acquisition of a power and influence which, under any other circumstances, would have been impossible, such as has in no other country been witnessed, and which, taken for all in all, has achieved great and lasting triumphs for liberty and humanity.

Now, however, this influence begins to wane. Recent discussions reveal very clearly the fact, that English society begins to get restive under newspaper rule, and to dispute the authority of the tribunal before which it has long bowed submissively. But this is due, in our opinion, mainly to the fact that the press has of late years been rendered careless by its success. It has grown weary of the arm to which it owed its strength, or, in other words, has begun to abandon its anonymousness. When the *Times* was at the zenith of its power, Sir Robert Peel wrote to thank the editor for his support, without even knowing his name; to-day the editor is one of the best-known members of London society, and may be seen any evening in the season in the drawing-rooms of cabinet ministers. This may be a personal gain for the editor, but it involves a serious loss for the *Times*. Jupiter Tonans in a dress-coat and white cravat is not such a terrible deity after all.

It may be readily inferred from the foregoing remarks, that we believe the press, in a democratic country, will never stand in its proper relation towards the public, as long as the newspaper is an appendage to the editor and an instrument for pushing his personal fortunes, — as long, in short, as it is not conducted anonymously, or as nearly anonymously as the ordinary conditions of social life will allow. Most of the denunciations which one hears of anonymous writing in periodical publications, on the ground of the facility it affords for slanderous attacks on private character, are hardly worth consideration. In any community in which such attacks are not prevented by the fear of the law and of public reprobation, the ostentatious parade of the editor's name before the world will not prevent them either, as is proved by some notorious examples in this country. And the restraint, if there be any, which is imposed on a writer by the necessity of signing his name, as under the existing law in France, is productive of no gain to the public, of whatever use it may in despotic countries be to the government, which will at all counterbalance the injury done to the press by its forced conversion into a mere expression of individual opinion. For it is very well known that, in the present state of general cultivation, by far the greater portion of the public in every country are unable to separate an opinion from the character or standing of the man who utters it, and to consider it on its own merits. To reveal, therefore, the names of the authors of most of the political articles, either here or in England, would be to deprive them of great part of their weight. To a very large number of persons their own want of familiarity with a writer's name prevents them from attaching any importance to, much less bestowing any consideration upon, anything he says.

If journalism is to play the part in democracy to which it aspires, the journalist must, therefore, seek to withdraw himself as far as possible from the gaze of his readers, — to become, in short, a Voice, and nothing more. And, above all things, he must put the "deluding joys" both of office and of patronage far from him. For we confess we are unable to think of any surer expedient for rendering the press useless and worse than useless, for converting it into a means of debauching public opinion and throwing a mantle over corruption, than the practice, which is becoming more and more general, of rewarding editors for political services with places in the public employ. It ought to be, and we trust one day will become, as discreditable for an editor to accept any such favor from any administration, as for a member of Congress to take a bribe. The honest and conscientious journalist must seek the reward of his labors solely in the extension of his influence, and the nurture and propagation of his ideas; and any political writer to whom this prospect seems cheerless or repulsive, may rest satisfied that he has mistaken his calling.

Art. V. — *The American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac for the Year* 1867. Published by Authority of the Secretary of the Navy. Bureau of Navigation, Washington. 1865.

This volume is the thirteenth of the series which was begun in 1852 by the publication of the Ephemeris for 1855. These publications were authorized by act of Congress in 1849, and the work was placed in charge of Admiral (then Lieutenant) C. H. Davis. With that zeal in the cause of science for which many officers of the United States Navy have been distinguished, Admiral Davis undertook the difficult task of giving the materials and form of this work such a value as should not only adapt it to the needs of the Navy, hitherto dependent on a foreign country for so important a part of its equipment, but should adapt the work also to the scientific wants of the country, and make it worthy to take the place of the British Nautical Almanac in our geographical surveys and in the numerous observatories which have been established in this country. By the aid of our most skilful astronomers, and especially through the co-operation of Professor Peirce and Mr. Sears C. Walker, the more serious difficulties were surmounted; fundamental tables were prepared from the best determined astronomical data, and a corps of computers was trained for the work.

To appreciate adequately the value of this important enterprise some account of the history and use of such publications will be of service.

The principal nations of Europe have for two centuries given public support to the cultivation of the science of astronomy, as well as of the art of navigation; and this support was the more earnestly and generously given, when it became evident, near the close of the seventeenth century, that the most refined and complete results of astronomical research could be made directly and in the highest degree serviceable to the needs of the navigator. The celebrated problem of finding the longitude at sea by astronomical means, arose from the insufficiency of the magnet for guiding the navigator with the requisite degree of certainty on the pathless sea. By astronomical determinations of latitude, and a careful observation of the course of the ship by means of the magnet, and the rate of the ship's sailing by means of the log, navigators had been able to estimate rudely their positions on the sea, and the relative positions of distant ports, headlands, and islands. But the insufficiency of these means, when the "dead-reckoning" was interrupted by storms or disturbed by sea-currents, was at all times aggravated by the uncertainty of the magnet itself, which points rarely to the exact north, and deviates in different parts of the earth's surface by different amounts from the north, and varies in direction from time to time in the same locality. The laws of these variations have been carefully studied, yet at the present day less is known about the complex phenomena of magnetic variation than was then known (two centuries ago) about the complexities in those movements of the heavenly bodies which astronomers have since completely unravelled and reduced to calculation.

While astronomical observations afforded direct and simple means of determining the latitude of any place, and the distance in a north or south direction from one place to another on the earth's surface, means were still wanting for independent determinations of longitude, and the distance from one place to another in an east or west direction. As the tables afforded means for determining the latitude and local time of any place by observations of the sun, it was seen that, if this local time could be compared with that of any fixed place of reference, the port of departure for example, then the problem of longitude would be solved. For this purpose sea-clocks, or chronometers, were invented, to be carried in the ship, and regulated to keep the time of the port of departure, or some standard meridian of longitude. But as these clocks could not be secured from the accidents and variations to which long voyages exposed them, their indications could hardly be trusted more than the use of the magnet in "dead-reckoning," unless some means could be devised for testing and correcting them from time to time. To accomplish this end — to determine by astronomical means alone, at any time, and at any place on the earth's surface, the local time of the standard meridian of longitude — has been the aim steadily pursued by practical astronomy down to the present time.

For this purpose the famous Royal Observatory was established at Greenwich, and those illustrious observers, the Astronomers Royal, were in succession severally commissioned and expressly commanded each "to apply himself with the utmost care and diligence to the rectifying the tables of the motions of the heavens, and places of the fixed stars, in order to find out the so much desired longitude at sea, for the perfecting the art of navigation."

The labors of the earlier Astronomers Royal, extending through nearly a century, were finally crowned with a partial success, and the celebrated Dr. Maskelyne devoted his genius and energy to making this success practically available to the art of navigation ; and his efforts resulted in the establishment of the English Nautical Almanac, the first volume of which was published in 1766 for the following year.

The long-continued series of accurate observations and measurements made at the Greenwich Observatory have become so famous for their value to theoretical astronomy, have led to so many brilliant discoveries, and have been so long regarded as the common property of the scientific world, that the purpose for which this Observatory was primarily established by the eminently practical English nation — the perfecting the art of navigation — is almost lost sight of. This purpose was partially accomplished in the establishment of the English Nautical Almanac.

The tables which the Greenwich observations were designed to perfect were derived from those mathematical theories of the movements of the heavenly bodies which astronomers had elaborated from the whole course of observations from the earliest to the latest records, and had finally greatly improved and enlarged by the mathematical development of the Newtonian theory of gravitation. To adapt these theories to an accurate representation of the positions of the heavenly bodies observed from time to time, to embody them in tables for facilitating computation, and finally to *predict* from them future positions with sufficient accuracy for nautical purposes, were the problems of nautical astronomy.

From such predicted positions, made for equal intervals of time, and arranged in tables called *ephemerides*, all other astronomical predictions are derived; such as eclipses of the sun and moon, the occultations of the stars by the moon, the passages of any heavenly body over the meridian of any place, the apparent distances of the moon from other luminaries, and many other phenomena useful to the navigator, the surveyor, and the astronomer.

Such ephemerides, or tables of position, predicted several years in advance for the sun, the moon, the planets, and the principal fixed stars, together with the "lunar distances," and such special phenomena as are of chief use or interest, form the principal contents of a nautical almanac, and their value to the navigator or astronomer depends entirely on the accuracy of the tables from which they are derived.

As the moon moves with a comparatively great rapidity among the stars, its constantly varying relative positions are used as *time-signals*, predicted beforehand and observed by the navigator or astronomer in the various forms of lunar distances, occultations, eclipses, and meridian transits or culminations. Accurate tables of the moon are thus of primary importance in the construction of a nautical almanac for the solution of the problem of longitude, and nearly a century elapsed from the first proposal of the problem before lunar tables of sufficient accuracy were produced.

Such, however, has been the subsequent progress of astronomy, that the lunar tables now used in the construction of the American Ephemeris, as well as those now employed in Europe, have more than twenty times the accuracy attained in those which were first used for the British Almanac. At first, the navigator was fortunate if he determined his position at sea within one degree of longitude, or sixty nautical miles. With his present facilities, he can fail to determine his position within three miles only by the imperfection of his instruments, or by errors in their use.

This surprising progress in astronomy, for which the present century is especially distinguished, is in great measure due to the continuous publication of the British Nautical Almanac, and of similar works on the continent of Europe. For, important as the Almanac was to the navigator, and indispensable as it soon became, it was quite as useful to the astronomer. Not only was the observer saved much labor and watching by the predictions in the pages of the Almanac of the phenomena to be observed, but sources of error, both in theory and in observation, were easily detected, and improvements in astronomical tables greatly facilitated. It was by comparing the observed places of the planet Uranus with its predicted places in the Almanac, that those discrepancies were noticed which guided astronomers to the discovery of the new planet Neptune on the confines of the solar system, whose influence on the motions of the planet Uranus betrayed its existence, and led to its discovery. In this, and in many other ways, the Nautical Almanac repaid the debt it owed the astronomer, and received again new and improved means of usefulness; thus serving at once the noblest of the sciences and the most useful of the arts. No ship at sea and no astronomical observatory can dispense with the Nautical Almanac. The numberless minor observatories in Europe and America complete their equipment with it, and become serviceable to the progress of astronomy, with its aid. All geographical and nautical surveys require its use, and depend for their value on its accuracy.

A few years before the establishment of the Observatory at Greenwich, the French government founded the Royal Observatory at Paris, and a few years later, 1679, the publication of the French Almanac, the *Connaissance des Temps*, was begun, at first, under the direction of the French Academy of Sciences, but afterwards, when its utility to navigation became a prominent object, it was placed under the direction of the *Bureau des Longitudes*. Several other European states have, from time to time, established and continue the publication of almanacs and ephemerides, both in connection with public observatories and for use at sea, — namely, Prussia, Sardinia, the Roman States, Spain, and Portugal.

The accumulation of astronomical knowledge during the past century has been so rapid, and improvements in the arts of observation and computation have been so great, that frequent improvements in the tables used for the preparation of Almanacs have been demanded, both for the needs of practical astronomy and to render the increased knowledge available for nautical purposes; and these improvements have in some cases been so long delayed as to render the Almanac almost useless to the astronomer, and only a miserable necessity to the navigator.

The *Connaissance des Temps*, for instance, was greatly improved under the superintendence of the astronomer Lalande in the last century; but from that time the work had remained substantially as he left it, even down to our own times, when, in the volume for 1862, the long needed improvements in the lunar ephemeris were introduced. In other respects, however, the work still remains as deficient as when, in 1856, Le Verrier announced in the French Academy that it had been for a long time of no scientific value. This charge against the *Connaissance des Temps* was repeated so late as 1860, when Le Verrier again called the attention of the Academy to its insufficiency and want of accuracy, remarking that "The *Connaissance des Temps* is no longer of use to astronomers. A fundamental reform is urgent, which shall raise it from its inferiority as compared with foreign Ephemerides." (*Comptes Rendus*, No. 6, 1860.) To these charges the only response which could be made in behalf of the *Bureau des Longitudes* was the insufficiency of the pecuniary means which the French government had appropriated for its support.

During the lifetime of Dr. Maskelyne, numerous changes were made in the tables used in the preparation of the English Nautical Almanac; but from the time of his death, 1811, till very recently, only two important changes in astronomical tables had been made, — the introduction of the French tables of the moon (Burckhardt's) in 1821, and of the Italian tables of the sun (Carlini's) in 1834.

In the year 1830, the construction of the Almanac was found to be so defective, that the subject was referred by the Commissioners of the British Admiralty to the Astronomical Society, requesting that body to consider what improvements could be made. The council of the society presented their report upon the subject the same year. This was immediately approved by the Admiralty, and the proposed changes in the form of the Almanac were carried into effect in 1834. From that date till very recently no material changes were made.

In the important matter of lunar tables no change was made in 1834, although the researches of geometers had already brought the lunar theory to a much greater degree of perfection than belonged to the tables then in use; and the French, German, and English Almanacs continued to use the obsolete tables of Burckhardt long after the advance in practical astronomy and the requirements of nautical astronomy had rendered their further employment inexcusable.

Accurate determinations of longitude depended at that time chiefly on the perfection of the lunar tables, yet the tables in use were serviceable only for the approximate determinations of the positions of ships at sea. The importance of greater accuracy cannot be better expressed than in the words of the committee of the very council that proposed the changes just referred to.

In their report this distinguished committee expressed

> "their decided opinion, that it is not by the mere helps with which the seaman is furnished for the purpose of determining the position of his vessel at *sea*, that the full intent and purpose of what is usually called *nautical* astronomy are answered, since this object is a *part* only of that comprehensive and important subject. An equally important and more difficult portion of it consists in the exact determination of the position of various interesting points on the surface of the earth (equally essential and almost solely applied to the purpose of *navigation*), — such as remarkable headlands, ports, and islands, together with the general trending of the sea-coast between well-known harbors, — and which may properly be designated by the name of *nautical geography;* this can only be effectually and properly executed by methods not available on board a ship, and by delicate instruments placed firmly on solid ground. And the observer in such cases requires all the astronomical aid which can be afforded him from the best tables, arranged in the most convenient form for *immediate* use. This was evidently Dr. Maskelyne's view of the subject, when he first proposed the formation of the Nautical Almanac, as appears from his 'Explanation and Use of the Articles' annexed to that work; and the propriety and accuracy of his opinion have been confirmed by the repeated wants and demands of those distinguished navigators who have been employed in several recent scientific expeditions. There are, moreover, many individuals in various parts of the world attached to the science of astronomy, who, by the encouragement and facilities thus given, render considerable assistance to the improvement of astronomy and geography by their exertions; and neither private nor national observatories, on which many thousands are annually expended, can proceed with activity or good effect, unless some aid of this kind is afforded them."

The United States Coast Survey is an example of the scientific department in nautical astronomy referred to in the above extract. This Survey labored under great disadvantages, on account of the imperfections of the British Almanac during the long time it was obliged to depend on a foreign Ephemeris. Many observations of "moon culminations" made on the Pacific coast for determinations of longitude were laid aside "for want of moon's places more reliable than the British Almanac can give us." (Letter of A. D. Bache, Superintendent of the United States Coast Survey, to the Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac, 1851.) Expensive chronometric expeditions were undertaken for the same reason, to determine by chronometers alone, and without the aid of lunar observations, the difference of longitude between our eastern coast and the western coast of Europe.

In this condition of national dependence on an inferior foreign Ephemeris, the design of establishing an American Ephemeris was favorably entertained by Congress. In other departments of astronomy, America had already achieved great distinction. The establishment of the National Observatory and of the Coast Survey; the achievements of many private observatories, and those improvements in means of observing, which have been adopted in foreign observatories under the name of the "American Method"; the success of American mathematicians in the most recondite researches, by which America has shared with Europe the glory of the most famous discoveries in the present century,—such examples of the independent cultivation of astronomy in America rendered our dependence on a foreign Ephemeris an anomaly and a disgrace. When, moreover, we consider the chief and indispensable uses of the Nautical Almanac, and that independence of foreign nations in all practical matters which every American has at heart, it is strange that our navy and merchant marine should have been left so long dependent on their rivals for the means of navigating the seas on which they aspire to pre-eminence. It was as if our navy had been armed with foreign ordnance, and our merchant-ships equipped in foreign dockyards. In our present relations to foreign nations these considerations are of special significance.

In the preliminary preparations for publishing the American Ephemeris care was taken to improve upon the form and construction of foreign almanacs, as well as upon the tables and other data. For a clear statement and unprejudiced estimate of these improvements, we will quote the words of the Rev. Robert Main, late President of the English Royal Astronomical Society. Writing for the *Encyclopædia Britannica* soon after the publication of the American Ephemeris was begun, this distinguished astronomer says (Vol. III., Art. *Astronomy*) : —

> "Very recently an American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac has appeared, which promises to be of great service. It is printed in a large octavo, and is published under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. It is at present under the superintendence of Lieutenant C. H. Davis, U. S. N., the theoretical part being placed under the special direction of Professor Peirce of Harvard College, Cambridge.
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> "This work does not copy implicitly any existing Nautical Almanac, but, retaining what is best in our own and others, modifies the arrangement in a way which promises to be more generally convenient. One great peculiarity in this work is the separation between the part designed exclusively for the purpose of navigation, and that which is generally useful for the theoretical or practical astronomer.
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> "In the second part the places of the fixed stars and the planets are referred to the meridian of Washington, and in the computations the best elements at present known are scrupulously employed. Thus, for the star corrections, Peters's constants of precession, nutation, &c. have been adapted to Bessel's formulæ ; and with regard to the lunar computations, the elements are based on Plana's theory, but include Hansen's inequalities and secular changes of the mean motion and perigee, and Airy's corrections of the elements derived from the reduction of the Greenwich observations. For the planetary computations, the latest corrections of the elements of each planet have been employed. For Mercury, Leverrier's theory has been used (*Conn. des Temps* for 1848) ; for Venus and Mars, Mr. H. Breen's corrections have been applied to Lindenau's elements (Memoirs of Royal Astronomical Society, Vols. XVIII. and XX.) ; for Jupiter and Saturn, Bouvard's tables have been used, with some changes, and Bessel's value of the mass of Jupiter is employed ; for Uranus the elliptic elements of Bouvard are used as the basis, with Leverrier's corrections and perturbations caused by Jupiter and Saturn (*Conn. des Temps* for 1849), and with Peirce's corrections and perturbations arising from the action of Neptune ; finally, for Neptune, Peirce's theory and Walker's orbit have been used in the construction of the Ephemeris."

Such are the many and important improvements introduced in the American Ephemeris. Of the esteem in which this enterprise was held by the English astronomers, very gratifying proofs were received by the Hon. J. P. Kennedy, late Secretary of the Navy, under whose authority the publication of the American Ephemeris was conducted. While in London, in 1857, this distinguished gentleman was invited to attend the annual visitation of the Greenwich Observatory by the Astronomical Society, where, among many commendations of the organization and efficiency of the scientific departments of our Navy from members of the Society, he had the gratification to receive from the Astronomer Royal "generous and earnest praise of the great merit of our Almanac," of which he said, "It is very admirable, and does great credit to the science of your Navy."

The superiority of the lunar tables prepared under the direction of Professor Peirce for the use of this Almanac rendered its practical value more prominent even than its general scientific merit. Numerous tests of their accuracy have been made, with the most gratifying results. While these tables were in the course of preparation, the Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac was authorized to publish his predictions and elements of the total eclipse of July 28, 1851, for the express purpose of testing the accuracy of the new tables. From observations of this eclipse, made at Cambridge, the British Almanac was found in error eighty-five seconds, and the American Almanac only twenty seconds. From Washington observations, the British Almanac was found in error for the beginning of the eclipse seventy-eight seconds, and for the end sixty-two seconds. The American Almanac was in error for the beginning only thirteen seconds, and for the end only one second and a half. Where the eclipse was total, and where, for this and other reasons, the test was more rigid and conclusive, the result was still more gratifying and decisive as to the superiority of our own lunar tables. The same tables were used in the French and Prussian Almanacs as in the British, and the errors were, therefore, the same. The errors of the old tables exposed in this eclipse may give rise to an error of from fifteen to twenty miles in the determination of the longitude at sea by means of lunar distances, and to an uncertainty of twice that amount. The possibility of so great an error arising from this source was removed in the American Ephemeris. Before the new tables were completed, important corrections were introduced, which rendered them still more exact, and from tests by meridian observations, made several years later, these tables were found to be sufficiently accurate for the most refined determinations of nautical astronomy. These later tests were made in the office of the Nautical Almanac by Professor Newcomb, by comparing the American Lunar Ephemeris for the years 1856, 1857, 1858, with Greenwich observations. These comparisons were communicated by the Superintendent of the Almanac to the Astronomical Journal, and were published in Nos. 129 and 142. They show that the mean error of the tables is quite within the limits of errors of observation, and less than one fourth the error of the tables then used by other almanacs. Concerning these observations Sir J. W. Lubbock says (Memoirs of the Royal Astr. Soc., Vol. XXX.): "The errors of the observations of the moon at Greenwich vary up to ± 6″, and the small differences which exist between the place given by the American tables and the observations at Greenwich are due as well to the errors of the observations as to the errors of the tabular places. This is confirmed by the extreme irregularity of the differences. And it should be remarked, that the large differences which occasionally occurred before have been entirely got rid of by the American tables." And again he says: "As it appeared to me that astronomers would view with greater confidence a comparison of places given by the American tables, made by persons who could have no interest in enhancing their value, I made application to Mr. Hind, the Superintendent of the [English] Nautical Almanac; and, in consequence, he directed Mr. Farley to procure places of the moon from the American Almanac, and compare them with the observations made at Greenwich for the years 1856, 1857, and 1858; and as Mr. Hind has kindly allowed me to publish them with this paper, any one can see at once how extremely accurate the places given by these tables are, and how much more so than places given by Burckhardt's tables."

In consequence of this great inferiority in the tables of Burckhardt, which had been used for more than forty years by the British and other European Almanacs, they were at last, very recently, discarded, and the new tables of Professor Hansen, published by the Board of Admiralty, were introduced. Ephemerides prepared from these tables first appeared in the British and French Almanacs for 1862. From such tests as have been applied to them in the National Observatory and in the office of the Nautical Almanac they show but slight improvement upon the American tables; the apparent "probable errors" of the two Ephemerides, as tested by observations made at Washington in 1862, being in the ratio of eight to nine. In both comparisons, however, the magnitudes of the apparent errors bear such relations to their relative frequency as to indicate that they are chiefly composed of errors of observation. In the Ephemerides of later years there is an increase in the magnitudes of the greatest discrepancies; and though the test of observation has not yet shown any decisive or important inferiority in the American tables, yet the more elaborate and more recent investigations embodied in Professor Hansen's tables make it probable that at some future day the former will be superseded either by the latter, or by new tables which shall incorporate still better astronomical determinations. At present, both Ephemerides are as perfect as nautical uses require, and are vastly superior to the tables they have superseded.

Modern observations have shown that material corrections are required in the tables of most of the planets, and a systematic revision of the elements and theories of the four outer planets, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune, was accordingly undertaken several years ago by the Nautical Almanac, under the direction of Professor Peirce; and considerable progress in this work has already been made.

The present Superintendent, Professor Winlock, has added much to the astronomical value of the Almanac, by increasing the number of the ephemerides of the fixed stars, in the volume for 1865; and in the volume for 1867, a list of occultation phenomena is given for the year 1866, to facilitate the geographical exploration of California and the adjacent territory.

The Almanacs of all maritime nations are designed to contain all that can be of importance to nautical astronomy, but in other respects they have each an individual character, and are devoted to such special service to astronomy as each can best render. Thus the *Connaissance des Temps* has always been the vehicle for the publication of some of the most valuable papers of the French astronomers. One of the objects of the Prussian Almanac, the Berlin *Jahrbuch*, was "to obtain a repertory for all observations, information, remarks, and treatises connected with astronomical science." The Milan Ephemeris contains many valuable observations and papers of the Italian astronomers. The American Ephemeris has already published valuable papers, — two of great practical importance in navigation, and another of great use to astronomers in facilitating the computation of planetary perturbations. Even the nautical part of the Almanac requires, in one respect, different tables for different nations. For although the subject of the tides is an astronomical problem, yet geographical data are necessary to render accurate predictions possible. From the times of the occurrence of high tides, as given in the British Almanac for British ports, only approximate predictions can be made for the American Atlantic coast, while the tides on the Pacific coast are quite distinct and peculiar. Tide-tables have accordingly been prepared, for the use of navigators, from the Coast Survey observations, by Professor A. D. Bache, the Superintendent. These are prepared for the principal ports on our Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, and published with directions for their use in the nautical part of the Almanac.

To support the publication of works like these, which are not only of great scientific value, but of material importance to the useful arts and industries, ought to be regarded not merely as creditable to the government, but as a peculiarly incumbent duty; since a public patronage is especially demanded for the furtherance of such enterprises as cannot command the resources of individuals by the inducements of profit or honor, but which are none the less important to the uses of life and the advancement of civilization. And in the performance of this duty the government ought to consider, beside the immediate wants of the public service, those ultimate utilities of science to the welfare of mankind, of which the history of Astronomy affords so signal an example.

ART. VI. — DUTIES ON EXPORTS.

IN one respect our American life has been changed by the war, and made to resemble that of the nations of Europe; we have become, in less than four years, a people heavily indebted and heavily taxed. Four years of civil war have imposed on us almost as great a burden as twenty-five years of war against France, Bonaparte, and democracy did upon England. Unlike England, we expect to pay both principal and interest of our debt, so large are the resources afforded by our vast territory and the intelligent energy of our people. Meanwhile, however, the pressure will be felt by every one. Everything we use or consume must pay its quota. Obviously, therefore, an object of taxation less burdensome than any other is at this time a thing to be desired.

Such are exports of our own growth and manufacture, more especially of raw material. A tax on these would be paid by the foreign consumer. A moderate tax would scarcely check exportation; and one that had this effect would, by lowering the price at home, encourage our own manufactures. These advantages have not escaped the notice of our men of business. The expediency of a tax on exports is generally admitted. That it would add largely to the revenue, without pressing injuriously upon any interest, no one doubts; but every one seems to take it for granted that such a tax is forbidden by the Constitution. At the last session of Congress a proposition was introduced that the Constitution be amended to permit a tax upon exports.

Is any amendment necessary? The clause in the Constitution relating to this subject is as follows: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Do these words mean that no tax or duty shall be laid upon exports at all? Clearly not. The plain meaning of the clause is, that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any *one* or any *single* State. The addition of either of these words would only render the language more emphatic. They are not necessary to express the sense, which we shall endeavor to show harmonizes with the combination of federal and national, or local and central power, which is the distinguishing feature of our government, and also with other provisions of the Constitution relating to the power of taxation.

There are certain maxims of moral and political science which, as Mr. Hamilton says in the Federalist, No. 31, "are, like the axioms of mathematics, self-evident, and carry conviction to every mind without the aid of argument. Of such are the truths that the means should be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is in itself incapable of limitation." As the command of money is necessary for all the operations of government, — necessary, therefore, for the honor, safety, independence, and existence of a nation, — every government must have unlimited power over all the resources of the people, because all may be required to accomplish its objects. This may therefore be stated as a natural and universal law of every political society; and any constitution by which that power is restricted is so far defective.

Every American citizen lives under two governments, State and Federal; the former possessing power for State purposes only, the latter for National purposes only, and each supreme within its sphere. The sphere of local or State power is the good of the State; the sphere of central or Federal power is the good of the whole country. Central power, charged with duty to the whole, cannot use the power of the whole for the exclusive benefit of a part. Local power, confined to local objects, cannot use the power of a part for the benefit of the whole. Congress cannot tax the whole country for the exclusive advantage of Ohio. Ohio cannot tax the people of Ohio for the advantage of all the other States.

If revenue drawn from the whole may not be appropriated to a part, it follows that what is intended for the use of the whole must be drawn from the whole, and not from a part. In other words, that, as the Federal government ought to exercise the power to impose taxes only for national purposes, so those taxes should be laid upon the whole nation, and not on a part of it, that all may bear a just share of the burden.

These are plain and simple principles necessarily implied from the relation of central to local power, which distinguishes our government; and they are therefore provided for in the Constitution, which is the written plan of that government. The power to tax is granted in the fullest manner; but at the same time the Constitution directs that it shall be exercised for the good of the whole nation, not of a part, and that the taxes shall be laid, not on a part, but on the whole. Such is the obvious meaning of the following clauses, which are all that relate to the subject.

Art. 1, Sect. 8. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the *common* defence and *general* welfare of the *United States;* but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be *uniform throughout the United States.*"

Sect. 9. "No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken," for the purpose of ascertaining the population of each State, according to which it is provided, in Sect. 2, that "representatives and direct taxes are to be apportioned." And lastly,—"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State."

Here, then, we find the principles above mentioned applied. The power of laying taxes is granted for the advantage of the whole country, "the *common* defence and *general* welfare of the *United States*," and the taxes must be drawn from the resources of the whole country. Direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the population of the several States; "duties, imposts, and excises," that is to say, internal taxes and customs, or duties on imports, "shall be *uniform* throughout the United States." Duties on exports ought to be uniform also. The productions of one part of the country ought not to be taxed, and those of other parts exempt. It would not be just to tax the cotton or rice or tobacco of the South, and let the grain and lumber and fish of the North go free. How is this uniformity secured? By forbidding Congress to tax the exports of "*any State*," or, by parity of reasoning, of any section or region of the country, whilst others remain untaxed. Such is the plain meaning of the words used,—"*any State*." These words cannot, without violence, be construed to mean a prohibition on Congress to tax exports at all. The presumption is in favor of the unlimited power to tax,—a power necessarily possessed by all governments, and granted by the Constitution. The presumption is also in favor of the restriction imposed, agreeing as it does with the ruling principle of our peculiar system, and with other provisions of like nature in the Constitution.

This construction of the clause in question is supported by the fact that it was adopted by the Convention instead of another clause offered by Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina, viz.: "No tax shall be laid on articles exported from *the States*." The Southern States, dependent almost exclusively on the export of the peculiar products of their soil, demanded that all exports should be exempt from taxation. They argued that, unless this were granted, the commercial States of the North might subject them to an unequal and oppressive burden, and injure or destroy the sources of their wealth. The proposition above mentioned is contained in a plan of a constitution presented by Mr. Pinckney, at the opening of the Convention, May 29, 1787. Certain resolutions intended to express the general principles on which the future government was to be founded were submitted at the same time by Mr. Randolph and Mr. Patterson. These were discussed till June 20th, and the result was the passing of nineteen resolutions, also declaratory of general principles. These were debated till July 26th, when twenty-three resolutions growing out of that debate, and containing a rough sketch of the proposed government and a statement of its ruling principles, were referred, together with *Mr. Pinckney's plan*, to a committee of detail, with instructions to report a constitution.

Accordingly, on the 6th of August, the draft of a constitution was submitted to the Convention. Art. 7, Sect. 4, is in these words: "No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles exported from *any State*, nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several States may think proper to permit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited." It would seem from this that the proposal of Mr. Pinckney to prohibit taxes on exports generally had been rejected by this committee. One would infer from the substitution of the words "from *any State*," instead of the words, "from *the States*," in Mr. Pinckney's plan, that the committee had regarded the demand of the South for the complete exemption of their principal source of wealth unreasonable, but had been willing to grant them protection from the inequality they professed to dread.

Not only did the South claim the privilege of paying no tax upon their exports, but they demanded also that their principal article of importation, negro slaves, should be free from duty, and that the perpetuity of the slave-trade should be guaranteed so long as the Southern States chose to carry it on. This last demand was yielded by the committee.

The constitution reported August 6th was discussed in the Convention, section by section, until September 10th, when, with the modifications it had received, it was referred to a committee of revision, who made a report on the 12th, submitting a constitution almost identical with that which now exists, which latter was signed September 17, 1787. In this constitution the language of the clause relating to a tax on exports, already quoted from the report of August 6th, was retained. But it is no longer connected in the same clause with the provision in relation to the slave-trade. It stands as a part of a clause intended to secure uniformity and equality in all commercial relations between the States. These are its words: —

"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."

From the company in which we last find it, as well as from the plain meaning of its language and from its history, most people would think this paragraph, forbidding a tax on exports from *any State*, was also meant to secure equality and uniformity among the States.

Looking therefore to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties, which Judge Story says is the fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments, (Story, Com., § 400,) and which intention is to be gathered "from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence or the reason and spirit of the law," the meaning we have given to the clause in question seems reasonable and just. The words are sufficiently clear, and the context and subject-matter confirm the obvious sense of the words. The subject-matter is the power of taxation, which is granted without limit: — "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Every species of tax is comprehended in these words, which cover every sort of property. The restrictions imposed do not limit the scope of the power, but the manner in which it is to be exercised. They relate first to the appropriation of the revenue collected, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States"; and secondly, to the mode in which that revenue is to be obtained. As already explained, being intended for the benefit of the nation, it is to be drawn from the resources of the whole nation, not from "any State" or any section. Thus duties, imposts, and excises are to be uniform throughout the United States; that is to say, they shall be laid to the same amount on the same articles in every part of the country; — as, for example, teas shall not pay a duty of five per cent in New York and ten per cent in Maryland; nor incomes, profits of business, or coal or iron be taxed five per cent in one State and ten per cent in another. This is the only sort of uniformity attainable, for duties on imports and excises must necessarily press most heavily on those regions where they are most largely consumed. "Duties, imposts, and excises" are not laid upon the States, but upon the people, whether they are internal or external, that is, whether derived from articles produced and consumed at home or from exports and imports. The difference between these two last is, that whereas imports, wherever introduced, are consumed throughout the country, exports are local, the tax falling on the producer if high enough to check exportation. Consequently, a government that was willing to oppress one State or States could not do so by taxing articles imported by that State, but might accomplish its purpose by a tax on the exports of a State. In the former case, the tax would be paid by all the consumers of the article throughout the nation; in the latter, by the producers only. For this reason, the South claimed absolute exemption, a claim manifestly unjust. The clause which declares that duties shall not be laid on the exports of *any State*, together with the provision that all duties "shall be uniform throughout the United States," secures all the equality possible, without depriving the government of a most important and convenient source of revenue, one which may become absolutely necessary to the "common defence," as well as conducive to the "general welfare." Under these rules, Congress cannot lay a duty of five per cent on wheat exported from New York, and of ten per cent on wheat sent from Pennsylvania; neither can they tax exclusively the cotton of South Carolina or the tobacco of Virginia.

The only sort of taxes that can be laid upon the States, as such, are direct taxes. There is no limit to the power of Congress as to the amount that may thus be raised, but care is taken that each State shall bear its fair share. "No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census." It has been decided that Congress has no power to exempt any State from direct taxation or its portion of the burden. (Story's Com., § 1008.) The clause relating to direct taxation is in Art. 1, Sect. 9, which contains the restrictions on the power of Congress. The next clause is that which relates to duties on exports. To construe this as a prohibition of all taxes on exports would be repugnant not only to the first clause of the preceding Sect. 8, which grants unlimited powers of taxation, but also to the other clauses on the same subject, which are restrictions, not upon the power, but on the manner in which it shall be exercised. Such a construction would violate the rule of interpretation above quoted, that the intention of the law is to be gathered from its context and subject-matter.

It is also to be inferred from the "effects and consequences, or the reason and spirit of the law." These we have already discussed. We have endeavored to show that the effect of our interpretation of the clause in question would be to produce that equality and uniformity in the distribution both of the burdens and benefits of taxation which the Constitution manifestly designed, as well in the grant of the power as in the restrictions imposed upon it, and which is in harmony with the "reason and spirit" that pervade and control, not a part only, but the whole of our system of government.

We might here rest our case, satisfied with the conclusion, that, in a time of need and peril to the nation, Congress, in order to save it, has absolute control over the whole of its resources, and that no amendment to the Constitution is necessary, as its framers did not commit the error of setting limits to a power "destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation."

Nevertheless, the idea prevails that Congress has no authority to tax exports. Such also is the opinion expressed by our most eminent writers on constitutional law, Kent, Story, and Rawle; and, if we may judge from the debates, so thought and intended the majority of the Convention that made the Constitution.

The subject is of grave importance. A judicious tax on exports at this time would throw upon the foreign purchaser a large portion of a burden which presses injuriously upon the industry and business of the country and on the comforts of every individual. The burden is likely to increase, and so also are the vast resources that would lighten it, but which are now withheld. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire what the opinions above referred to really are, and whether they are binding authority on us.

The clause restraining the power of the general government over exports was one of what are called the "compromises of the Constitution." The Southern States, or rather Georgia and North and South Carolina, insisted upon the perpetuity of the slave-trade and of slavery, the representation of three fifths of their slaves, and the exemption of exports from taxation, as conditions precedent to their entering into the Union. They demanded them peremptorily, and threatened, if these terms were not granted, to prevent the Union of the States, as they have since threatened, from time to time, to destroy it. They were only too successful. They had the power to defeat a great and noble enterprise, to disappoint hopes dear to a generous and aspiring people, to blast the promise of a mighty future. They knew their power and were determined to exercise it, wholly intent, then as since, on the interests of their section. They knew how anxious were the men associated with them in the work of creating a nation that their undertaking should not fail, and how deeply they felt the responsibility resting on their labors. Much, doubtless, would be conceded by them, rather than behold their hopes vanish and the chaos of anarchy that would ensue. Much was conceded, much that ought to have been withheld at any risk, for some of the points yielded compromised the eternal principles of truth and justice; and these ought never to be sacrificed,—cannot be, indeed, without due punishment sooner or later. The punishment has come at last, and it has fallen chiefly where it was richly merited,—on the South. They could not see it at the time; but the result has shown that the march of Sherman through Georgia and South Carolina last winter, and the surrender of Charleston and Savannah, were connected, in the relation of cause and effect, with the arrogant demands of the Southern members of the Convention. So, also, are the many battle-fields of this war, on which so much Northern blood has been shed, and the heavy load of debt and taxation it has imposed on us and on our posterity, connected in a like relation with the concessions of the Northern members,—concessions which violated their own sense of right, and contradicted their avowed sentiments. They sought to establish a great nation, but against their own convictions, forgetting that a nation is a moral being, they embodied in its structure a great wrong, destined to destroy their work. The wrong has destroyed it for a time, and will keep it a ruin forever, unless it can be done away. Let us hope that it will be, nay, that it has been done away, and that we may rebuild on surer foundations the stately edifice of our ancestors.

The South got the slave-trade, but only for twenty years; it got slavery; it got the representation of three fifths of the slaves; and it got the prohibition of a tax on exports. Each of these was warmly contested in the Convention. The dogma that there could rightfully be property in men was denied, and both slavery and the slave-trade were denounced as criminal and destructive to the best interests of society. But our present topic is the prohibition of duties on exports. This was a question of expediency, involving no moral principle. Some of the most eminent members of the Convention — Madison, Gouverneur Morris, John Dickinson, Clymer, &c. — argued that the power to tax exports was proper in itself; that such a tax was often less burdensome and more productive than duties on imports, more especially where some of the productions of a country were peculiar to it and in universal demand, as was the case with some of ours; that the power to lay such a tax was an essential prerogative of government, the exercise of which, even if not now proper, might become of the utmost importance hereafter, for revenue, for the encouragement of domestic manufactures, and for procuring equitable arrangements with foreign nations; that to deny the power would take from the government half the regulation of trade; that the Convention were providing, not for the present only, but for a distant future, and therefore it would be unwise to prohibit such a tax forever. (3 Madison Papers, 1383, 1388, 1395.) These arguments, however, did not prevail. The clause as it now stands was passed, and passed too, it must be confessed, with the understanding that it prohibited the tax.

Clearly, however, such is not its meaning. But it was the meaning of the clause, "No tax shall be laid on articles exported *from the States*," in Mr. Pinckney's plan, already mentioned, and which was referred to a committee. That committee altered its language and substituted the words "*from any State*." This change could not have been accidental. Obviously it not only narrowed, but wholly changed, the character of the former clause. The one was an absolute denial of power, the other a grant of unlimited power, restricted only as to the manner in which it was to be exercised. How did it happen, therefore, that the Convention rejected the former, which unquestionably is prohibitory, and voted for the latter, which as plainly is not? It is difficult to answer this question, as our reports of the debates are neither full nor accurate. Perhaps the change in phraseology was not noticed, perhaps some may have been willing to let it go to the people to be afterwards interpreted by them; and others, who voted for it only to secure the Union, may "have seen lurking beneath the text what commended it to their judgment, against even present interest." Possibly also the clause may have been left in its present shape through the inadvertence of the committee of detail. The Convention had under debate the draft of a constitution reported on the 6th of August. In it, Art. 7, Sect. 4, are the words, "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Mr. Madison's notes of the vote taken on this section say (3 Madison Papers, 1388): "On the question on Art. 7, Sect. 4, as far as to 'No tax shall be laid on exports,' it passed in the affirmative: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia (*General Washington* and *Mr. Madison*, No), *North Carolina*, *South Carolina*, *Georgia*, Aye, — 7; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, No, — 4." It would seem from this that the words, "from any State," were intended to be left out by the Convention, and that the words above quoted, emphatically excluding all exports, had been substituted in some previous debate, or in the debate of the same day, without attracting the attention of Mr. Madison, who merely noted the result. If this were the case, it was an accidental oversight of the committee of detail to report the clause in its present shape.

Leaving this problem unsolved, it is more pertinent to inquire what was the real intention of the founders, — the purpose and motive by which they were governed. Evidently their first and general purpose was to secure equality of taxation, — to protect any State or section from oppression by the government. Their second and special purpose was to do this by a total prohibition of taxes on exports. The second was to the first as means to object. The first, being founded on justice, is in its nature above argument and unchangeable. The second, being founded on expediency, is by its nature always open to discussion, and its propriety must necessarily vary with the changes of time. Moreover, the primary intention, being founded on reason, was freely and spontaneously entertained, whilst the secondary was extorted by a threat. Time has shown the wisdom of those members of the Convention who spoke and voted against the prohibition. It *was* a mistake to tie up the hands of the government, to refuse adequate power for necessary purposes, to attempt to fetter the unknown and limitless future. The war has proved all this. The government now needs all the resources of the country; and to withhold them cripples its ability to defend and preserve itself and the nation, — the chief object for which governments are created.

Which, then, ought we to take as our guide, the general or the special, the paramount or the subordinate, intention of the founders? Shall we seek to execute their design only by the means they were forced to adopt, now that those means are no longer expedient, or, looking to what in their plan is permanent and disregarding the transient, endeavor to carry it out by means that suit our present circumstances, and which they have left to us, — the letter and spirit of the Constitution which they made?

The debates of the Convention are full of historical interest, and are most valuable aids to a proper understanding of the Constitution. They show how, by successive touches, it was gradually moulded from a vague and rude outline into symmetrical shape, as the statue is slowly carved from the marble block. They describe the growth of our plan of government, and reveal the process by which it drew the materials of its structure from the thought and knowledge and experience of its founders, as the oak draws from the riches of earth and air the stuff of which it is made. But neither the debates nor contemporary interpretation are authority, however useful they may be "to illustrate and confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure clause." No point is better settled than this. (Story's Com., § 407.) The Constitution, which is the matured result of the debates and judicial construction of it, is alone authority; and for this plain reason, that, although the Convention made the Constitution, the people adopted it, and their adoption made it the law. The people had before them the Constitution only, not the debates. These were not published till long after the Constitution was ratified, —the notes of Yates and Lansing in 1821, those of Mr. Madison in 1840. The people had before them nothing but the written law, not the conflicting opinions and heated discussion out of which that law grew. And this was all that the Convention intended they should have, for they determined to keep even their journals secret. (3 Madison Papers, 1604.) It was proposed that they should either be destroyed or placed in the custody of the President, which latter proposition was carried, and he was directed to retain them, "subject to the order of Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution."

If the debates and the interpretation of contemporary founders are not to be held as authority, neither are the mere *dicta* of the courts nor the opinions of elementary writers on the law, however eminent. As no tax on exports has ever been laid by the general government, no case has occurred involving the constitutionality of such a tax. In Hylton *v.* The United States, 3 Dallas, 171, the question before the court related to the nature of direct taxes, and it was incidentally stated in the opinion that taxes on exports were forbidden, but the point was not connected with the case, and was not argued. Judge Kent, in referring to that case, simply quotes the statement of the court, also without giving any reason. Congress, he says, "had plenary power over every species of taxable property, except exports." (1 Kent's Com., 240.) Mr. Rawle uses almost precisely the same language, (Rawle on the Constitution, 74,) yet on page 111, after quoting the clause in question, he says: "The leading principle of the Constitution is uniformity in respect to the several States so far as it can be obtained. The natural and artificial products of States are different. To lay a general duty on the exports of rice, or cotton, or tobacco, would affect only the Southern States; on flour and grain, only the Middle States; and on domestic manufactures, would operate chiefly on the Northern and Eastern States engaged in them;—yet, without this restriction, perhaps it might have been done." The restriction is that which the language of the clause he was discussing imposes,—the prohibition of duties on the exports of *any State*, the plain object of which is to secure that uniformity which, as he says, is the leading principle of the Constitution. Such is the obvious meaning of Mr. Rawle's words, and possibly that which he intended; for it is not inconsistent with what he says on page 74, as the clause referred to does put some restriction on the "full power" of Congress over exports.

Judge Story, however, after giving a similar explanation, for which he refers to Mr. Rawle, arrives at a different conclusion. When treating of the clause relating to duties on exports, and forbidding a preference of the ports of one State over those of another, he says (the italics are ours), Sect. 1014: "The obvious object of these provisions is to prevent any possibility of applying the power to lay taxes or regulate commerce injuriously to the interests of *any one State*, so as to favor or aid another. If Congress were allowed to lay a tax on exports from *any one State*, it might unreasonably injure, or even destroy, the staple productions or common articles of that State. The inequality of such a tax would be extreme," &c. To prevent that inequality, one would think from this, was plainly the design, as it is the meaning, of the law. Yet immediately afterwards he says, "The power is therefore wholly taken away to intermeddle with the subject of exports." He might as well have said that because, in the same clause, it is declared that "No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another," Congress is prohibited from appointing any ports of entry at all.

Whence did Judge Story get the idea that Congress is forbidden to intermeddle with exports? Clearly not from the Constitution, for in the extract above given he had just put a different construction upon its words. He must have got it from the history of the Constitution. He knew from contemporary authority that such was the intention of the Convention; and what he says must be regarded, not as an interpretation, but as the statement of an historical fact. Perhaps, had his attention been drawn to the real meaning of the law, by the stress of our present troubles, he would have reached a different conclusion. Whether the absolute denial of authority over exports to Congress was approved by him, he does not say. Probably not; for he has denounced more than once, in his great and valuable work on the Constitution, the error of refusing to a government necessary power because it may possibly be abused. The history of the country has shown that the national government, as Hamilton and Madison predicted, is in far more danger from the sectional selfishness, pride, and jealousy of the States, than they are from its power. State power destroyed the Confederation, State arrogance caused the war which for a time at least destroyed the Union. The fear that the general government will ever oppress *any State* is a delusion. The attempt would rouse at once all the popular passions that are connected with State rights; and how violent and sensitive these passions are, we have reason to know. No State, moreover, is isolated. It is connected by interest, intercourse, geographical position, and manners with its immediate neighbors, and with them forms groups of States; and the tendency of these is to crystallize more and more definitely into sections. Thus we have the South, the East, the Middle States, the Southwest, the Northwest, each powerful and growing in strength, each ready to resist an attack upon one of its members, and each able, by throwing its weight in favor of one of the political parties that divide the people, to secure to that party the control of the government. Thus it has happened that, by holding the balance of power, the Slave States, though a minority, and becoming always, relatively to the Free States, a weaker minority, have been able from the first, as Mr. Stephens, late Vice-President of what Rebels and Democrats call "the Confederate States," said in 1860, almost always to rule the country, to enjoy most of the time the principal offices, to direct or greatly influence at all times the policy of the nation, and to interpret the Constitution to suit their own views and designs.

The opinions of the founders and of eminent writers on the law are no doubt the source of the generally received notion, that a tax on exports would be unconstitutional. We have therefore endeavored to show the true character of those opinions at greater length than may seem necessary to some, since no one can regard them as binding authority on Congress or the courts, or on the nation. On this point, therefore, the Constitution is presented to us just as it was presented to the people of 1787. They adopted it as they understood it, and we are at liberty to interpret it as we understand it. We are not bound by their circumstances or their opinions, but are entitled to put such a construction upon it as may suit our circumstances and accord also with its letter and spirit. Such must be the rule for interpreting the Constitution, which was intended not for the people of 1787 only, but for all that should come after them. It is virtually adopted by each successive generation, and belongs not to the past, but to the present and the future, and must satisfy the wants of the constantly shifting present, or be altered or destroyed. The process of alteration provided by the Constitution itself is difficult and cumbersome, and not always possible. It should be resorted to only when urgent necessity demands an amendment, and the language of the law is too plain to be construed so as to meet that necessity, as is the case with slavery. It is well not to familiarize the minds of the people with the idea of change, which in laws should be silent and gradual, like the changes of time. Interpretation, therefore, to suit the needs of the passing hour, is to be preferred when it is possible. By this process the Constitution may be slowly and insensibly moulded by the wants and opinions of the people. Let us make our Constitution a protecting vesture for the living, not a fetter imposed by the dead, so that it may receive the love and reverence of successive generations of the living, and thus endure forever.

ART. VII.—1. *Brigandage in South Italy.* By DAVID HILTON. In Two Volumes. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston. 1864.

2. *Il Brigantaggio alla Frontiera pontificia dal* 1860 *al* 1863. *Studio Storico-politico-statistico-morale-militare, del* CONTE ALESSANDRO BIANCO DI SAINT-JORIOZ. Milano: G. Daelli. 1864.

3. *Notizie Storiche Documentate sul Brigantaggio nelle Provincie Napoletane, dai Tempi di Fra Diavolo, sino ai Giorni nostri.* Aggiuntovi l' intero Giornale di Borjes finora inedito, per MARCO MONNIER. Firenze: G. Barbèra. 1863.

NOT long since, we climbed to the top of a mountain at Capri, to look upon the ruins of the palace which Tiberius Cæsar built there. As commonly happens with ruins, there was a great deal of rubbish to a very little grandeur; but the view from the crest of the rock, over which the Emperor, in moments of extreme ennui, cast his victims into the sea below, so exceeded all thought and expectation in its loveliness, that we felt ourselves more than compensated for momentary loss suffered in the state of the palace. It would be hard to say whether Naples were visible or not, in that golden sunset light which rested on the waters; but looking across the blue Gulf of Salerno, we saw faintly sketched upon the horizon the undulating line of the other mainland coast.

Our guide was an old man of that mixed tribe, half fisherman, half mountaineer, which inhabits the sea-fondled cliffs of Capri; and now, pushing back from his dim eyes the larger kind of woollen sock which he wore for head-gear, he gazed pensively upon the distant shore. Perhaps the friendly solitude of the height on which we stood, and its favorable remoteness from the little towns of the island, first inspired the pastoral thoughts which the sight of the romantic coast beyond, with all its association of free life in hills and unmolested plunder in valleys, brought with a tremulous pathos to the old man's lips; nothing certainly could have fallen from us to suggest the pleasant train of ideas.

"I do not know why, little Sir," * said this good old man, "they should accuse us of brigandage in these parts. We are tranquil, little Sir, tranquil. It is true that in yonder hills there are numbers of poor soldiers of all nations, who have taken refuge from their enemies. They live upon herbs and wild berries, and they never molest peaceful travellers. It is only when they are driven to despair by cruel pursuit that they sometimes shed blood."

The value of this idyllic contribution to the history of Italian brigandage will be apparent, we hope, when we come to look more closely at the question in the examination of works which regard the career of the persecuted hermits of the hills in another light. At the moment, it deepened the gloom of the gathering twilight, and the thought of the gentle exiles on those distant heights touched us, quite across the Gulf of Salerno, with a faint shiver of trepidation; although even then we were not without delight in the delicate skill with which our guide masked a bloody and frightful evil in that peaceful, all but saintly guise.

Elsewhere, the delicacy of the fancy might have seemed exaggerated; but the Neapolitans abound in courtesies of paraphrase when they have to speak of vices and crimes. They have but a weak sense, it seems, of the wickedness of wrong-

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* *Signorin,* being the caressing diminutive by which every person of probable drink-money is fondly addressed in Naples.

doing, and the popular sympathies are quickly touched by the troubles of a rogue. A gentleman in Naples, who caught a boy picking his pocket and caned him for it, made himself odious to the street-crowd, whose indignant compassion found utterance in the protest of an old woman: "Poor child! he was earning his bread!" In that land, guilt has always had such consideration that the blackest misdeeds are not called by hard names. Assassination is pleasantly named misfortune; that is, misfortune to the assassin, poor fellow. And Marc Monnier tells of a Calabrian guide of his, that he pointed out, during a day's journey, twenty-nine crosses which he had erected in places where the misfortune of as many murders had occurred to him. He piously offered a prayer at each of the crosses for the repose of the slain who had brought so much woe upon him; and he commended himself to the traveller by his good nature, fidelity, and honesty. He was probably not a hardened man, and might not have been so very wicked.

It must remain a question for the psychologist, how far these people are depraved. The thoughtful observer must discern in their character a wonderful degree of innocence, and in men stained by the worst crimes a childlike simplicity, which will confound all former ideas of the effects of guilt on human nature. It seems that crimes fail to harden a man, when they fail to disgrace him with his fellow-men and make him an outcast. Is there really a land where the standards of wrong and right are absolutely lost, or hopelessly perverted, — where people sin without becoming wicked, and do good without growing better? One comes to such doubts as these in reading the annals of brigandage. The brigand chief Crocco took the little town of Lavello in 1861, and found seven thousand ducats in the treasury. He was implored to spare something for the poor, and he left all but five hundred of the ducats. He was a man defiled with every misdeed, and he passed at once from his act of charity to preparations for shooting twenty-seven prisoners in cold blood. These poor people are as tender-hearted and as ignorantly pitiless as children. There was found an amusing letter from a woman whose husband was out with the brigands in 1862, and who wrote to reproach him that, while everybody was talking of the brilliant success of his band, he had forgotten his family, and had sent his wife no token of his good fortune; she knew that his heart was warm and kind, but why did he show her a heart of stone? The letter is as simple and honest as a letter can be; and no doubt the poor woman who wrote it would have sympathized heartily with a neighbor whose husband was taken and held to ransom by her own, in order to procure her the coveted token of regard.

About relates how he sat down in a lonely place with some Roman peasants, whose district on the Neapolitan border had formerly been infested with brigands, but which was now quiet and peaceful. The Frenchman, after passing cigars to his companions, asked them of the good old times, and learnt that several of them had led the life of the hills. When he pressed the subject, and put his own defenceless case to them, demanding why they neglected the occasion to cut his throat and take his purse, these ex-brigands were hurt, and replied: "Sir, brigandage is now no longer the fashion. We are honest, poor people, and would not harm anybody."

Of course they were perfectly sincere, and having resumed their peaceful labors of the field, they had consciences as tranquil as old soldiers returned from a campaign. Their sins had been confessed and forgiven; their account with Heaven was clear; but if ever brigandage became the mode again, there they were, ready to fall in with the fashion.

It would be hard to say why this complaisant indifference with regard to abominable things should exist, but it does exist all over Italy, and only in worse degree in Naples. Most tourists must have observed how things which are thought very shameful with us bring no disgrace among Italians. The poor do not blush to beg, and every one with whom the traveller comes in contact lies and cheats. But the traveller cannot see the depths of the meanness and bad faith over the surface of which it costs him so much to pass: life in Italy must reveal that, and it is possible that, by the time the observer has sounded these depths, he has lost something of the fine sense which would have enabled him to perfectly appreciate in its real deformity the state of things, and he has certainly no disposition to blame it angrily, unless through chagrin at finding himself, after all, only in possession of truth to be learned far less troublesomely from the world's immemorial attribution of insincerity and want of honest pride to the Italians. It costs a young man, perhaps, a pang to confess to himself that the world is nearly right in this, as in most other things which it believes; but that easier humor which, after a while, the proper study of mankind is apt to produce in man may enable others to contemplate the fact without surprise. In Italy one sees the people so naturally and frankly mendicant and untruthful, that one is by no means sure whether scorn of their vices would be virtuous or absurd. The little children learn to babble falsehood; gentlemen and ladies do not scruple to tell lies; quite well-dressed and well-fed men will take a present of money for a trifling service or for a complaisance. We do not say there are no exceptions to these rules; we have met very startling ones: but we believe we are just in thus generalizing the Italians; and we know that fiction among the polite, and beggary among the poor, are not at all disgraceful. The complacency with which those vices are regarded extends in a degree to crime; and a bad lenity to criminals is characteristic of the people. One could not be sure how far theft or prostitution among a man's relations would go to bring shame upon him, or upon the guilty ones themselves. Such things are certainly not approved anywhere in Italy; but they are certainly quite as much pitied as condemned, and they have to a great extent impunity. Among the abandoned poor of Southern Italy, these and other misdeeds are, as we have seen, not harshly dealt with. These people are not good husbands and wives. Their unbridled passions, and their falsehood of word, thought, and deed, prevent fidelity: they are bad husbands and bad wives, but they are true, loving, and tender fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters. What we call vices and crimes do not rend these natural ties: nay, they seem to knit the vicious and the criminal, as being unfortunate, closer to the comparatively virtuous, whose compassion their forlorn condition excites. The sons and brothers of quite an honest man are brigands, not only without danger of being cast off by him, but with some probability of affording him just cause of pride by the splendor of their deeds. They are living a wild, free life, to which he himself would turn, if he had the vocation; for there is that in his nature which moves him to admire lawlessness and adventure as boys do. In his poor, honest way he gratifies this instinct as well as he can by unfair advantages taken in bargain, and by the hazard which he introduces into the simplest transactions. He prefers always to risk a high demand and be possibly beaten down below a just price, rather than ask justice, and get it without excitement. Moreover, his own vocation to the hills may come when he least expects it. He may kill his best friend, and be forced to fly. Who knows? He is as fatalistic as a Turk, and regards his act, good or bad, as something ordered and quite apart from his own agency.

This excellent wretch has yet another feeling which makes him merciful to brigandage, — the fear of it. The outlaws are strong as compared with the law-abiding; and there is no telling how quickly, if he offended them, he might bring the misfortune of his death upon them. How they act upon his fear, and how far fear is really an element of his character, must be noticed in another place. Controlled and guided, he rises to the height of courage, and in the Italian army has no more fear than a horse habituated to the sound of fire-arms. The unwilling witness of a Roman soldier of this army, a private with whom we spoke, and who expressed great scorn of the Neapolitan character, was, that these peasants, so mean and timorous in their country life, became brave soldiers; and he confirmed a great deal of testimony in print, by declaring that they had been especially efficient against brigandage. But in his wild state there seems little doubt that the Neapolitan peasant is a coward, and has only courage when brought to bay, or when he thinks he detects the shadow of his own fear in an antagonist.

We have sketched here at the beginning these traits of Neapolitan character, because they bear directly upon the social and political phenomena recorded in the books under review, and because we think they form the best explanation of an anomalous condition of things. We do not mean to say that these traits explain themselves: they only explain brigandage. We willingly relinquish the task of reconciling their existence with established theories of morals, to the philosopher, who, calling to mind the Donatello of Hawthorne's romance, (a copy in great part from Italian nature, and not wholly a fantastic creation,) may at last end with the doubt, Have these creatures of the South really something sylvan and untamable in their nature, capable of a certain love, pity, fear, hatred, and revenge, but not amenable to the ethics by which we judge other men? Are they something to be taught and reformed, or to be utterly extirpated, that the plague, breaking out of their abominable nature, (which had all but confounded us with its seeming immunity from the penalties that follow sin in ours,) may perish with them, and that their haunts may be wholesomely peopled with rational, responsible human beings?

There are, however, certain facts of geographical, religious, social, and political condition, as well as traits of character, to be considered in accounting for brigandage in Naples. Life in the fields of that smiling land has always been, and is, slavery, peril, and misery; life on its hills, freedom, security, and glory. Our authors seem to be agreed with the private sources of information to which we have had recourse, in attributing this wretchedness in the first place to the monopoly of the lands, which are either cultivated at the wages of starvation by the peasants immediately under the proprietors, or else let at cruel rates to starving renters. In any case, the hand of the lord is heavy on the serf; and the only natural relation — that of hatred, envy, destruction, contempt, and fear — grows up between them. Then, in the great majority of the communes, there are no roads and never have been roads; for this country, so old in history and romance, has never been fairly reclaimed from the wilderness. It has happened that, for want of intercommunication, the peasantry of one district have died of hunger, while the means of life were abundant and cheap in the next. It is no wonder that people thus isolated are ignorant and imbruted; especially when the only light they have, their religion, is a darkness of superstition. Then let their fierce passions be taken into account, together with the endless provocation of their miserable lives, the honor which revenge bears among them, the looseness and caprice with which the laws are administered, and, above all, their own want of moral sense, and it need not seem strange that their nature of brigand should overpower their education of peasant, and that they should take to the life of the hills. There they are free and secure, for the soldier is as little able to reach them in their fortresses as to protect the peasants in the valley from their depredations. Their priest is with them, (he is sometimes their chief,) their consciences are at rest, their career is full of novelty and excitement, and infinitely to be preferred before the grovelling, insulted, famished existence they have abandoned. They maintain themselves easily: their late brothers, the peasants, are their friends, through favor or fear; their late master's substance is their prey, and if his person falls into their hands they have a sweet revenge or a fat ransom. And after all, there is hope of wearing out the government, which will offer them pardon and peace; or, as has often happened, there comes a revolution, in which they can take sides, make themselves useful, and be honored by kings with places of trust, emolument, and power.

Among the conditions favorable to the perpetuation of brigandage, that friendship, already noticed, between part of the population and the robbers, is one which has been found intangible, except in a single instance, by the government's warring upon the free citizens of the hills. In all the districts infested by brigands, they have voluntary allies among the people on whom they prey, — allies who succor them with food and shelter in extremity, and share their booty in prosperity, who give them timely notice of the movements of the troops, and who watch over all their interests, and serve them with a fidelity unknown to any other service in that unhappy land. These allies of the brigands are called *Manutengoli;* and their system, which is of venerable antiquity, is still in such perfect repair at the present day, that, according to Saint-Jorioz, they are enabled to befriend the brigandage of reaction, while receiving pay as the *employés* of the National Italian Government. But brigandage does not trust its safety solely, nor even chiefly, to the affection of allies; the system of the *Manutengoli* is, with all its perfection, only part of the yet grander and more sovereign system of the Camorra, which, under all princes, has ruled Naples, and which now, attacked by the free government, and sorely hurt, still retains a great share of its ancient life and power. It seems to have been the offspring of that infernal state of things created by the Spaniards in Naples, under which every person of quality kept several daggers in his pay, and the miserable population was ruled by bravos. In the course of time the ruffians found it feasible and profitable to exercise for their own behoof the power acquired under lordly and influential masters, and they entered into a conspiracy against all orders of society.

"To-day," says Marc Monnier, "it is known how this plebeian freemasonry had extended itself into all the provinces, and how government, impotent to suppress it, constantly studied not to rouse its enmity. All who had the courage to wield a dagger were eager to join it. There were two grades of initiation, passing which, the candidates were enrolled members of the society. It had heads in the twelve districts of Naples, in all the towns of the realm; it reigned wherever the people were; it levied an impost on the money you gave your coachman; it superintended the markets, and assumed a part of the proceeds of the sales; it watched over the games of the populace, and received a tribute from the winner at cards; it lorded it over the very prisons, and the police did not oppose it, — nay, they even called it to their aid, to discover and arrest dangerous persons, in the king's name. It is not long since they thus succeeded in taking an assassin of whom all trace had been lost. I myself saw him pass through the streets covered with blood, and dragged to prison by his accomplices! Sometimes the government arrested the Camorristi, and sent them to the galleys. But even thence they terrified honest men, — men living in perfect freedom. In the depths of a prison, with their hands and feet loaded with chains, they received the visits of their abject vassals, who came humbly and regularly to pay them their monthly tribute. This society had places of meeting, a common treasury, a strong organization, inflexible laws. The chiefs assumed terrible rights over their adherents: if they assigned an assassination to one of these, he was forced to obey under pain of death. The dagger punished every infraction, composed every dispute. Every Camorrista bore two knives, — one for himself, and one for you, if you resisted his orders; it was a fearful duel; he struck straight to your *cash-box*, that is, your heart."

The Camorra in towns has always been the ally of brigandage on the hills, and without the former the latter could never have existed. Using this deadly machinery of fear, it has outbidden the law in terror, and it has established obstacles in the way of its enemies almost impossible for them to surmount. The brigands always receive perfect and trustworthy information from the peasants concerning the movements of the troops, for their informant knows that certain death waits on treachery. The troops, on the contrary, learn nothing of the brigands; nobody has seen them nor heard of them in the neighborhood, for the fear of their vengeance closes all mouths. The troops pass away, but the brigands never do, and they never forget. When a man is taken prisoner and held to ransom, his friends hasten in secret to pay it, and are in anguish lest the military authorities learn their misfortune and come to their aid. They deny, they evade, they lie outright; for they well know that the prisoner dies at the first rumor of approaching rescue, and that their own punishment will follow the suspicion of having dealt treacherously with his captors. The system is very simple and very effectual, and we think it may be understood without the light of the abundant anecdote which our authors throw upon it.

These authors are all alike strong in developing the causes which produce brigandage; and they seem all alike weak in the simples which they propose for its cure, and leave their readers with a longing for the application of some heroic remedy, that shall utterly destroy, if it does not restore, the abandoned race afflicted with this disorder. Yet it must be confessed that heroic remedies have been tried, and have failed either to kill or to cure; and now we must have faith in the simples, if we are to have faith in anything. We shall see in the course of a few centuries how far education, equal laws, justice, and humanity, not to mention the material alleviations of opening and clearing the country and building roads and bridges, will go toward civilizing and reclaiming this desperate population. Perhaps in that time, also, the experiment which commends itself to our own mind as most feasible will have been tried, and a system of intermigration will at once have assisted to solidify Italian unity, and to cure brigandage by peopling Naples with honest Lombards and Piedmontese, and transferring Neapolitans to scenes where their crimes are physically impossible. Some such scheme as this is, in the opinion of many Italians, the only true and thorough method of destroying brigandage at once and forever. But leaving all these difficult questions to be practically settled by the Italians themselves, it is curious to note in our authors a common tendency to reason of brigandage as brigandage reasons of itself, and to extend a bad compassion to a scoundrel because he is such a very miserable scoundrel. There are few defects which an Italian does not contrive to pardon in his nation because it has been oppressed; and it is indeed a nice question to settle just how far men's ignorance, fear, and suffering are to be taken into account in dealing with their crimes. One feels, in looking at this and certain other phases of the subject, that the only complete work on brigandage would be a work treating fully of Italian civilization, in which the most careless observer must discern, contrasted with qualities of the highest and humanest refinement, traits of wild and predatory lawlessness descended from savage instincts innate in the race before robbery founded Rome. But wanting this exhaustive work, we are glad to have the ready-witted, clearly written books before us; and we have particular praise to bestow on the volumes in English. Their immediate occasion has been that train of events and circumstances of which, during the last four years, much rumor has no doubt reached our readers,

> "Like a tale of little meaning, though the words are strong,"

through the public journals, but of which the story is by no means inarticulate in Italy, and is fearfully distinct at Naples, where people see the mutilated victims of the brigandage inspired by the Bourbons and Pio IX.; where they have such witness to its existence and its cruelties as soldiers with noses cut off and eyes plucked out; where they meet the widows of the prisoners slain, and the families of the prisoners held to heavy ransom; where the daily talk has been full of the horrible facts of the reaction of Bourbon brigands against a revolution willed by the nation.

The pamphlet by Marc Monnier is the work of a Frenchman who has spent the greater part of his life in Neapolitan Italy, and who knows perfectly the conditions and character of the people. Unhappily he was born a Frenchman, and one feels, in running through his facile, brilliant, and generous little book, that he is fatally fond of epigram, and that he is perhaps better at adorning a tale than pointing a moral. Besides, he only brings up the history of contemporary brigandage to the year 1862, and he sketches too slightly for much use the history of past brigandage. The best part of his work is that containing the complete diary of Don Josè Borjes, the Spaniard who was sent into Calabria by the Bourbon Committee from Rome, to head the reaction, and found no visible movement against the Italian government, except on the part of brigands.

The work of Count Jorioz is of much greater value to the student of the Italian question; and it has peculiar worth as the production of a soldier in the war against brigandage; but it is ill arranged, and its author, in dividing his subject into many heads, has presented more than once the same phase of things to his reader, without gaining perspicuity by the repetition. The Count writes with the ardor of a partisan, and perhaps his fervor wearies a little; though there is abundant evidence of his candor and veracity throughout.

The volumes by Mr. Hilton absorb most of the valuable material of the French and Italian authors, while they gather nearly all that it is useful to know on the subject from other sources, and to a great extent make history of what was testimony before. We think the reader will regret that the author at times suffers his work to take the form of mere compilation, and that one who has so clear and terse a way of telling things himself should quote so largely the garrulous phrases of eye-witnesses. This amplitude of quotation is of course intended to present more freshly and fully the incidents of the story which Mr. Hilton recounts; but we would willingly see its breadth reduced to the compass of foot-notes. The work necessarily grows more and more desultory as it approaches the present time, when the history it records is still making, and what seems to us a defect of plan is so obvious in the closing chapters as to give an unpleasant flavor of book-making to the volume.

We are the less inclined to blame occasional lapses of our author into an Italian or French method of saying things, first because we count no manner of putting an idea as alien to the English tongue if it be direct and striking, and next because we find this pleasant and piquant vice (if it be a vice) in a book which could not have been written either by an Italian or Frenchman: in one case over-intensity, and in the other case want of earnestness, would have operated fatally against its production.* An Englishman would have been equally disabled from the task by want of real sympathy with a people who have suffered all things from aristocrats and kings, and want of candor in dealing with progress that tends to destroy the former and idealize the latter into the will, not of certain classes, but of a whole people. The nationality, therefore, of the American who writes this book is at once apparent; and it is gratifying to find him taking American views, and, which is vastly better, thinking American thoughts, of the comparatively imperfect civilization yet known to the Old World, while dealing with the most perplexing phase of Italian unification, and giving to a story of the wildest character and adventure the high interest which belongs to every question involving the freedom and happiness of a people. There is not a dull page in Mr. Hilton's book, and there are many very brilliant ones. His style is clear and simple, he rehearses events briefly and perspicuously, and he has a dry humor and a pleasant sarcasm in his philosophy, which we think extremely relishing and original of its kind.

Our author finds it necessary to go back almost to the creation of the world in his researches for the origin of brigandage; and his first chapter, which rapidly recounts the story of twenty centuries of brigandage, is a curious chain of evidences linking the fugitives from Roman conquest and Roman oppression to the bandits of the present day, in a solidarity of suffering and crime. From each city that relinquished its freedom and independence to Rome, the bolder and nobler spirits escaped, and peopled the fastnesses of the same hills which now shelter bandits from the pursuit of the Italian troops with a fierce and predatory tribe of men, to whom from time to time the fugitive slaves of the Romans fled in great numbers, and united in the purpose of rending from the common tyrant some part of the spoil first wrung from themselves. They made all mountain ways unsafe, descended and pillaged the valleys, destroyed villages, and even attacked and captured cities. It is a pardonable enthusiasm for his theme which leads Mr. Hilton to identify Spartacus with brigandage, and to adorn the annals of that distinguished profession with the story of deeds that belong properly to servile war: an army of seventy thousand men, operating against the regular forces of a state, and beating them in pitched battles in open fields, is too respectable in point of numbers and organization to be called banditti, though it be composed of those who steal and kill. The troops of Spartacus certainly made the seat of the war pay its expenses, but so did the Germans lately in Denmark. After all, however, there is great justice and sense in classing in the same condition the peasant slaves of Roman times and the slavish peasants of modern Naples; and there is no doubt that the same causes, in great part, produced brigandage then, which produce it now.

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* Marc Monnier cannot be accused of want of heart; but he is a Frenchman who has spent his life in Italy.

It can well result from the peculiar conditions heretofore noticed, that the brigands of Southern Italy have not always been the least respectable men in their country. Throughout the pandemoniac ages, when the land was overrun by the successive hordes of Goth, Vandal, and Saracen, brigandage was of course the only gentlemanly calling; and later, when French misrule was succeeded by Spanish misrule in ever-miserable Naples, it is probable that quite as much justice and humanity lodged in the breasts of outlawed robbers as in those of robbers established in authority over the cities. But however this may be, it is certain that in the mountains and in the remote rural districts, during the whole vice-regal domination of the Spaniards, the brigand was really sovereign, and that all the efforts of the government which dwelt in towns to overthrow brigandage were but a series of revolts, more or less futile, against his power. Mr. Hilton rapidly recounts the story of these operations, in which the viceroys of Naples fought the brigands with fire, sword, flattery, and treason, and at last left them unconquered to the Bourbon kings. As the progress of time brings him nearer to our own era, the writer enters more minutely into the annals of brigandage, and the chapters rehearsing the history of this disorder during the brief existence of the Parthenopean Republic and the reigns of Joseph Bonaparte and Murat, present a careful narrative, relieved by skilfully blended anecdote and picturesque incident.

The Parthenopean Republic found the Neapolitans too thoroughly benumbed by long and unnatural constraints, to rise into the dignity of revolution, and the French enthusiasts, who brought the Rights of Man into the country, were obliged to force freedom upon it by means of bloody conquest. The Bourbon had fled — the Bourbon always flies — before the march of an enemy on his capital, and Naples fell into the hands of the French on the 23d of January, 1799. But the fugitive prince paused in Sicily, and thence began to direct the reaction, which almost immediately followed, against the French. This seems to be the period when brigandage, afterwards carefully distinguished by our authors into *common* and *political brigandage*, first assumed a political complexion. Before that time, the brigand, though he respected himself, could not be said to have fixed principles. He now learnt that he was a devoted adherent of the legitimate king, and that he was a chief pillar of Holy Church. This conviction has never since deserted him; and though he has at different times lapsed into common brigandage, under the domination of the true king and Church, he has never failed to rise to the nobler heights of political brigandage when these were threatened; and he is at this moment cutting throats and taking purses in the cause of Francesco II. and Pio Nono, as against Victor Emmanuel and the powers of darkness.

The allies of the brigand in 1799 were Russians, Turks, and Englishmen; and it would be difficult to say whose was the greater share in the work of restoring a prince by divine right to his people. The English under Nelson co-operated generously with their fleet; but it is probable that the priests and the assassins were mainly instrumental in the good cause. The Bourbon's regular forces, chiefly composed of brigands, were under the command of Cardinal Ruffo; and his irregular forces, wholly composed of brigands, were led by Fra Diavolo, and other distinguished patriots whose names have not yet passed into the musical drama. The uncertainties of the time, when the country under two nominal governments was ruled by neither prince nor people, afforded brigandage occasion and scope to assert authority. The hills swarmed with pious and loyal miscreants, who responded with ardor to the call of king and Church, and either entered the Bourbon ranks, or proceeded to pillage and slay the Republicans in small bands and upon individual account. The work, however accomplished, was known to be profitable and blessed, and it was effectually done; men won heroic honors in it; the Bourbon queen gave Fra Diavolo a diamond ring, the king promoted and ennobled him; and at this day, by operation of the anomaly which seems sovereign in all Italian affairs, the descendants of the Duke of Cassano draw from Victor Emmanuel the pension bestowed by Ferdinand upon their great ancestor!

So the regular and irregular forces of the Bourbon, under Cardinal Ruffo and Fra Diavolo, succeeded, with the help of their foreign allies,* in reducing the Republicans, taking Naples, and overthrowing the commonwealth, such as it was. The unlucky state, without having lived long enough to war upon brigandage, was destroyed by it; but its fall was amply avenged by the governments of Bonaparte and Murat.

The Bonaparte succeeded the Bourbon in 1805, and at once the country swarmed with political brigands, zealously aided and comforted from without by the English fleet. These partisans were properly brigands, although they were also insurgents. Though they fought against the government, their object was not freedom, as with the followers of Spartacus, but rapine and slaughter. Their numbers were seldom those of armies; and their only trait in common with soldiers was that they killed. Fra Diavolo, who held the rank of Brigadier-General in the Bourbon service, was the chief and cruellest of their leaders; and the French, declaring a crusade against brigandage, first devoted themselves to his destruction. This man's name was Michele Pezza. He was born of low parentage at Itri, and he took instinctively to homicide and pillage in his youth, living two years in the hills, with a price set upon his head by the Bourbons, before the war against the French broke out, and made him one of the principal defences of legitimate authority. It is not universally believed that he received his nickname of Friar Devil because he belonged to the Church, but because he united the cunning and wickedness of a priest and a devil, — characters which, according to Neapolitan proverb, are invincible.

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* Nelson employed his ships to carry aid and comfort to the robbers under Cardinal Ruffo, and on one occasion used them to transport a thousand convicts, released from the prisons of Sicily, to Calabria, where they were flung full-armed upon the defenceless coast, to pillage and slay the partisans of the French. When the Republic was at an end, and the Republicans of Naples, who had taken refuge in the forts Castel Nuovo and Castel dell' Ovo, capitulated to the Bourbon, on terms signed by his general, and the English naval commandant, permitting them to remain in Naples or to embark for France as they chose, Nelson, at the instigation of the faithless prince, refused to let those sail who preferred exile. "It belongs to his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies to decide upon the fate of his rebellious subjects," he said; and he dictated the change of sentence which consigned to death, instead of perpetual imprisonment, the Republican "Admiral Caracciolo, every way Nelson's equal except in fortune, and one of the most beautiful characters of his time."

The French began by drawing a cordon around this formidable scoundrel in the province of Gaeta; and Colonel Hugo, father of the poet, was sent to hunt the wild beast down. The story of the chase and capture is too long to be quoted here, and it is too graphically told in Mr. Hilton's book to be cut down to our limits without injustice. Colonel Hugo employed all the means to destroy brigandage which it employed to sustain itself, — terror, tenacity, vigilance, celerity, surprise; and to secure the peasants to his interest, and turn them from their natural tendency to favor the robbers, he expended enormous sums of money in bribery. The people thus alienated and the brigands isolated, their destruction became merely a question of time. The French succeeded in scattering and seducing the followers of Fra Diavolo, and drew their impenetrable lines closer and closer about him. At last, however, he was not taken as Fra Diavolo, but was accidentally arrested as an unknown man, on suspicion of brigandage, and was recognized by an agent of Hugo's in the hands of the police. He was taken to Naples, and hung in his uniform of a Bourbon general.

The campaign against Fra Diavolo was the chief military operation of Joseph Bonaparte against brigandage. He afterwards descended to the Bourbon artifices of treaty and pardon;

but the brigands accepted his amnesty so rapidly, and so filled his towns with their numbers, that his government was endangered in the city of Naples itself, and he was obliged to descend still further, and employ Bourbon bad faith. The amnestied were shot (now on the pretext that they had attempted escape from their guards, and now on some other pretext quite as flimsy) as fast as they delivered themselves up. Measures like these could only confirm and strengthen brigandage; and Murat, when he came into his kingdom of Naples in 1808, found it on all his hills, a flourishing and hardy growth.

Happily for Murat, the situation produced its master, and the new king was enabled to make the most effective attacks ever made upon an evil never before so threatening. The Bourbon was reigning in Sicily, the French ruled Naples: there was not organized war between the two powers, but the continent was disordered and desolated by brigands, who fought for plunder and revenge, as usual, under the names of true king and Holy Church.

The master of the situation was named Manhès,* who, loathing his work, yet entered upon it with unsurpassable zeal, energy, and success. Murat made him a general of brigade, and he first marched against a brigand who had taken the name of

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* "The iron hand with which Murat crushed brigandage was young Colonel Manhès, afterwards, for his services in this war, raised successively to the rank of brigadier and lieutenant-general.

"In this war with brigands, so foreign to all the instincts of a soldier, this officer acquired fame. He was one of those wonderful soldiers produced in the campaigns of Napoleon, and had spent his life in camps and battles.

"Manhès was then only thirty-two years of age, but he had seen fourteen years of active service. He is described as beautiful in person, and, standing with his head uncovered, with his blonde hair flowing in ringlets about his neck, he inspired the rude peasantry, familiar with pictures of the Madonna and her Son, with a singular reverence, as a being more than mortal, and allied to the objects of their religious veneration. When to these personal charms of his presence was added the fame, exalted beyond bounds, of his success against brigands, he acquired a singular ascendency over the minds of the superstitious inhabitants of Calabria.

"In 1809, Manhès was asked by Murat to undertake the task of restoring order in the provinces. The spirit of the chivalrous soldier recoiled from the foul work, and he made the utmost efforts to escape it. Murat closed the discussion with these words: —

"'As your friend, I ask it; as your king, I command you.'

"Manhès, then holding the rank of colonel and *aide-de-camp* to the king, accepted, in the spirit of military obedience, the perilous and disgusting office." — *Brigandage in South Italy.*

Bonaparte, in the Cilento, and in six weeks he had killed and handed over to justice six hundred brigands, capturing the chief himself. Then, passing into the Abruzzi, he repressed the disorder there in three months.*

During that period of uncertainties created by Napoleon's truce with Austria and contemplated marriage with Maria Louisa, however, the government of Murat was betrayed into offering pardon to the brigands, then terrified and all but quelled by Manhès. This had only the effect to embolden them anew, being considered a token of weakness in the government, against which the Bourbon Queen Caroline and the priests throughout the kingdom reanimated them with every hope of earthly and heavenly recompense. In 1810 it became necessary to resume the war upon them in the Calabrias, which had become "the scene of reaction and brigandage, so artfully combined as to present the appearance of revolution."

Manhès opened the campaign with vigorous attacks upon the brigands; and he determined to render his warfare effective and final, by striking as nearly at the life and source of brigandage as he could, without absolutely destroying the whole population, in whose perverted nature the very spring of the evil is. His unsparing expenditure and his unsparing severity made it more profitable and safer for the peasant to give him information of the place and movements of the brigands, than to betray him to the robbers. Manhès resolved to war upon the *Manutengoli* no less than the robbers; and his proclamation issued from his head-quarters in Monteleone in Calabria, on the 9th of October, 1810, was chiefly addressed to the destruction of their system. It called every able-bodied man in the province into service, including the near kinsmen of the brigands, and authorized them to arrest or kill any bandit whose name was published in the lists as an outlaw; it condemned to death whoever communicated with the brigands in any way; it permitted no work to be done that required the laborers to carry food into the fields with them, and the flocks and herds were to be driven to guarded places, while the troops were posted sentinel over the people to see that they obeyed; then, on a given day, the chase of the brigands was ordered to commence throughout the Calabrias. This proclamation the priests of every parish were commanded to read to their people with exhortations to obedience.

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* "Manhès displayed, in an exalted degree, the qualities by which Hugo had succeeded in hunting down Fra Diavolo. Not content with exterminating the bands, he kept up the chase until he had captured or killed the chiefs. In these rapid marches and desperate encounters, he did not rely so much upon the regular soldiery as upon the militia and the peasantry, whom he inspired with loyalty and enthusiasm, or at least awed into obedience." — *Brigandage in South Italy.*

Manhès caused his orders to be executed. An old man who was found giving food to his brigand son was put to death with him; some women and children who carried bread and olives into the fields to eat while at work were shot; a woman was shot who received the babe of her friend, the wife of a brigand flying from pursuit; a peasant who had sold flour to the robbers was shot, with the purse containing the price of it appended to his neck.

The success of this severity was complete. Of three thousand brigands on the lists of Manhès at the beginning of November, not one remained at the end of December. "The historians are all agreed," says Mr. Hilton, "in representing that the roads had never been so secure, the trade over the country so safe, and the public peace so general, as at the end of the year 1810. It seemed like a sudden change from barbarism to civilization." Manhès had argued logically that brigandage must perish before a system which made it death for its friends to succor it in extremity, and which made it death to any brigand who ventured out of hiding to help himself.

After the extirpation of the evil in the Calabrias, Manhès passed with his system and his success into the other provinces of the kingdom.

Altogether the most remarkable incident of these campaigns of Manhès is that of his excommunication of an offending town: an incident which Mr. Hilton transfers from the pamphlet of Marc Monnier, and relates with singular power and effect. Such enormities had been committed in this town of Serra, that Manhès, weary of striking at these perverted people through their terror of death, resolved to strike at them through their fear of hell. He therefore banished their priests and closed their churches, forbade them the sacraments of marriage and baptism, and the offices of the Church in their last hours. Eminently wicked, these ferocious mountaineers are also eminently religious: they implored Manhès to kill them, but he left them under his interdict, and drew his lines about their district that none should escape. The interdict wrought a miracle: the people of Serra devoted themselves at once to the destruction of brigandage, and in reward of their zeal Manhès removed the interdict. From this time they paid their taxes, and submitted to conscription; they built a fort, manned it with their militia against the brigands, and swore "By Saint Manhès," instead of "By Saint Devil," which was their favorite imprecation before.

The rigor of the orders of Manhès had been tempered in all the provinces with offer of pardon to such brigands as should give themselves up. Twelve hundred surrendered on the same terms as those offered to brigands surrendering themselves to the Italian government at the present day: their lives were safe, but they were liable to imprisonment and trial for non-capital crimes. While the military commission was sitting to decide the fate of robbers who now filled the prisons of Calabria, a putrid fever broke out among them. Mr. Hilton describes the last scene of Murat's dramatic war against brigandage with a pathetic force which almost moves his reader to pity brigands.

After the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, political brigandage ceased, because the despotic party, which alone had ever employed the brigands in its cause, had now achieved full power, and had no further need of its friends. These honest fellows were therefore forced to pursue their calling of murder and robbery, under the censure of the ungrateful king whom they had helped to restore. His warfare against them was waged with the stupid cruelty and falsehood proper to a Bourbon. He formed *juntas*, composed of the governor, the military commandant, and the president of the criminal court in each province, and the juntas made out lists of all the brigands, and set upon the chase. To be in these lists was to be a brigand, and to be captured was condemnation and death. This was a fine system for a king who had disaffected subjects, and for generals, governors, and presidents, who had private enmities to gratify. These infamous means did not suffice to crush the brigands, and Ferdinand resorted to the robbers for aid against themselves. He won over to his interest the great band called the Vardarelli, and employed them to exterminate the smaller bands. They did their work well, and when it was done, the king resolved to break his tools. It is true the Vardarelli had been persuaded into his service by solemn treaty, "in the name of the most holy Trinity." The king vainly tried to decoy the band to his capital, with the pretence of wishing to review them; but they were induced to enter the mountain village of Ururi, inhabited chiefly by their friends, for this purpose. As they lay sleeping there in the public square, the king's assassins, posted in hiding for the purpose, fired upon them, killing the chief, Gaetano Vardarelli, and other leaders of the band. The rest, forty-eight in number, escaped to the woods, where they chose new captains. The government then treated with them again, promising to punish the assassins of Ururi, whom it disowned. It also invited them to go to Foggia, in order to swear fidelity to the prince who knew no faith, and thirty-eight were such fools as to go. They dismounted in the piazza, and greeted with shouts of "Viva il Re!" the king's general, who smiled upon them from a balcony, while a colonel detained them with compliments till troops could be placed for their massacre. When all was ready, the troops fired; nine of the Vardarelli fell, ten dashed through the lines and escaped. The rest took refuge in the cellar of an empty house, where burning straw and resinous wood was poured down upon them. Except two brothers of Gaetano, who preferred death by their own hands and shot themselves in the cellar, the brigands all gave themselves up and were slaughtered. The Bourbon General Pepe, who relates these things, says he was tempted to tear off his king's uniform and throw it out of the window when he heard of them.

Such warfare could not exterminate brigandage. It sprang up from the blood of the Vardarelli, and flourished throughout the time of the Bourbons; but until the union of Naples with Italy, in 1860, it has had no political character. Since that time it has called itself reaction, and has, with the sanction of Francis II. and the benediction of Pius IX., continued to destroy property and make life wretched in the provinces which it has always infested.

The first struggles of this nascent reaction are scarcely to be distinguished from the last efforts of the expiring system which it sought to restore. The Bourbonists still held a fort in the Abruzzi in the autumn of 1860; and on the day before the people of Naples voted their union with the Kingdom of Italy, the garrison of this fort made a sally, and, in concert with the mountaineers, descended into the plains, "stormed and sacked villages, overthrew the liberal, and substituted Bourbon authorities, desolated the country, and cut the throats of liberals in true brigand style." Their success was checked by a legion of Abruzzese volunteers; the troops were driven back to the fort, and the mountaineers to their fastnesses, where all honest and sincere friends of the fallen prince deserted them, leaving only the professional brigands steadfast to the common cause.

This was long after Garibaldi's departure from Naples. It was quite time, in the natural course of things, for a volatile people, unused to freedom, to have lapsed into disaffection; and besides, the Piedmontese had offended the Neapolitans by being different from their adored liberators, the Garibaldini. "After the volunteers," says Marc Monnier,—"the volunteers, noisy, picturesque, glorious, who scattered their money with both hands, willing to live well before dying well,—after these heroic Gypsies there came all at once soldiers, well-ordered, disciplined, tranquil, sober, poor, cold. The new-comers went on foot, they did not drink, they hardly smoked; they could in no way bring profit to the lower classes. They had only one uniform, they dressed on Sunday just as on week-days; they did not yell in the streets; they seemed out of place under the sky of Naples; they spoke a dialect almost French. The people held aloof from them. The Piedmontese lived by themselves, as the Swiss had done. Against the king the popular opposition was even more unjust. When Victor Emmanuel came to Naples, he committed a great error: he did not drag his sabre, his boots were too short. People love long sabres and big boots. In a word the King Honest-man had nothing of Murat but the courage; but here even courage does not succeed without its plumes,—perhaps neither here nor elsewhere."

But the Piedmontese had awakened disaffection far more serious than that of the populace, — not indeed by any intended wrong, but by generous and well-meaning errors: they had attacked the abusive privileges of the priests, and, without being able to subject, had alienated that most powerful and numerous order, while their efforts to unify Italy by the introduction into Naples of the laws of the realm and the assimilation of the civil system had turned from them the large lettered class which sincerely loved good government and freedom, but could not bear to see Naples Piedmontized, as they called it. Count Saint-Jorioz, in the last chapter of his book, frankly condemns this measure of the government which he loyally serves: assimilation of laws properly follows the unity of Italy, he thinks, and the unity of Italy is not the result of equalized laws. Besides, the laws of North Italy are not good for South Italy; they aggravate the poor with increased taxation, and, by abrogating the old Neapolitan laws, (which were good when justly executed,) the government of the king has thrown out of his service in Naples the only men who could have served it faithfully,—the intelligent men bred to the legal profession, who have been ruined and forced into the ranks of the disaffected. It is actually a fact, that many of the *employés* of the Italian government in Naples are its enemies,—men without faith and without honor, who are morally incapable of administering any laws, so that the reforms of popular education, municipal cleanliness, and the other schemes for improving the condition of the country, are often thwarted and nullified by the very agents intrusted with their execution.

But the disaffection under the first years of Italian rule must not be misunderstood. That it never was love of the Bourbon, there is very amusing proof in the facts of the insurrection of Melfi in 1861. The day before the breaking out of the insurrection, (which lasted three days, and on the fourth turned into enthusiastic restoration of the Italian government, and of the portraits of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel which had been temporarily displaced by those of Francis II. and his wife,) Melfi had elected to the Italian parliament F. D. Guerrazzi, author of *Beatrice Cenci*, and the most unrelenting foe of the Bourbon and the Pope in all Italy. It was Garibaldi or a Neapolitan republic which the honest malecontents wanted, not the return of a despot; and all efforts to raise the people in favor of Francis II. failed disastrously. Borjès made fair trial of the business, when, after landing in Calabria, with a few Spaniards at his back, and the commission of the Bourbon in his pocket, he proclaimed his purpose of restoring the true king. The people almost without exception received his proclamation with the utmost coolness, when it did not excite their enmity, and the Spaniards marched through the whole length of the kingdom to the place of their capture within five hours of the Papal frontier, without finding a single honest man in their favor. "I was going," Borjès said to the Italian officer, "to tell King Francis II. that he has none but rogues and scoundrels to defend him, — that Crocco is a miscreant, and Langlois a beast."

Still, a disaffection toward the Italian government existed, and this disaffection, arising in the capital and pervading all classes of people throughout the kingdom, was the condition that has made political brigandage possible in Naples since her union with Italy; and it is this internal element of weakness in which the Bourbon and Papistical party at Rome have found their chief strength.

We suppose the reader need hardly be told that all the brigandage of the last four years has been inspired by the friends of Francis II. and Pius IX., who have alone recruited robbers, armed, clothed, and fed them, and despatched them into every part of Naples, or rather to such parts as the cautious rogues choose to enter. This brigandage, therefore, has been chiefly confined to the Papal frontier, which the assassins could easily pass and repass. It is not our present purpose to enter fully either into a discussion of the nature of the reaction, or to recount the events of campaigns, which have ended uniformly in the defeat and dispersion of the brigands, after they have destroyed a certain amount of life and property. If the reader will turn to the old newspapers which describe the incursions of the Missourians into Kanzas, and record the horrors of that cruel and lamentable warfare, he will have some notion of the kind of war which has been waged upon the frontier provinces of Naples; but if he desires to trace carefully the course of the miserable events in those provinces, and to understand at all steps of the progress how they were possible, there is no book so much to his purpose as that of Count Saint-Jorioz.

The numbers engaged in the so-called reaction have not been sufficient to lift it to the dignity of civil war; and the conduct of the struggle has not been such on either side as to qualify it with the character of organized defence and invasion. The largest band of brigands was that of Crocco; it once amounted to four thousand, but after Melfi was reduced to obedience again, this band broke up and disappeared. The assassins under Chiavone once reached the number of five hundred; but the robbers seldom have herded together in troops of more than threescore. They crossed the frontiers as quietly as possible, having their lives in their hands, and crept back at the approach of danger. They spared neither life nor property; and if they were taken by the Italian troops, they were shot at once. They have always had, however, the privilege of surrender, with exemption from the death-penalty, and trial for non-capital crimes.

The humane government of Italy has never approved the severe and effective measures of Manhès, in striking at the roots of brigandage, by cutting up the system of *Manutengoli;* and General Pinelli, the first sent to deal with the evil, was recalled because of his disposition to adopt the measures of Manhès, by which, indeed, many innocent suffered with the guilty. The plan of the government has been to guard the frontier with numerous posts, under instructions for swift mutual assistance at preconcerted signals. But the frontier is long, and the chain of surveillance was inevitably weak. There was little danger to the troops, for the brigands rarely attacked them, but there was peril to the peaceful inhabitants; and in a country where every peasant was forbidden by deadly fear to give the troops information of the brigands, while the brigands perfectly informed themselves concerning the troops from his terror, and from the voluntary good offices of the unmolested *Manutengoli*, there was so much safety for brigandage that there was small probability of its destruction. Unluckily for themselves, the brigands combined politics and religion so unskilfully with their profession, that they after a while fell into the error of murdering French soldiers, and even taking Papistical Monsignori and holding them to ransom. The French, therefore, began to cooperate with the Italian troops for their destruction, driving them back into the Italian territory when they attempted to recross the Papal frontier after a raid. Brigandage also began to be regarded as a doubtful means of grace at Rome, and so it gradually came to commit suicide upon the frontier. As an element of political disturbance, it may now be pronounced dormant at least; but the reader is not to suppose that brigandage as a private calling is by any means unknown in Naples. It still exists in all the wilder regions of the kingdom, (that is to say, in most parts of it,) and the seeker of the fair and old may find it on the way to Pæstum, at little distance from the capital.

We have already intimated the slighter esteem in which we hold the part of Mr. Hilton's book treating of recent and contemporary brigandage. He leaves the course of history after recounting the transactions under Ferdinand II., and in several chapters, written with admirable intelligence and force, enters into discussion of the political, moral, religious, and natural causes of brigandage. It is a fault of arrangement which the excellence of these chapters goes far to redeem; but it is the author's misfortune that, when he resumes his narrative, the really less careful chapters of the end fail to sustain the higher interest awakened. Perhaps, however, the greatest skill would fail to sustain it, for the soul revolts at last from the story of horror, and the events and characters of these closing scenes of brigandage are so like all that have gone before, that they pall upon the mind.

There is a philosophy teaching that men may rise to higher things and better life through suffering from their sins, to which we think it might be especially comfortable for its disciples to turn from these events and characters of brigandage. It would not be impossible to find reason for hope in the worst deeds of our time; and it may be that the evil-doers will prove to be chief agents of good to others, if not to themselves. The blessing of Christ's Vicar on earth has been upon robbers and assassins, and from the capital of Christendom the most infamous crimes against helpless people have been planned; but it seems that the temporal power of the Pope, so cruelly perverted, is about to fall. In this day, two hulking German despotisms have combined to rend from a constitutional government a part of its slender territory, but it is not one of the vainest hopes of mankind that they may yet fall into deadly quarrel over their spoils. The Polish revolution has been crushed with circumstances that make us a little ashamed of the effusion which America displays in caressing the bloody paw of the great Bear, but the suppression of the revolt has completely enfranchised the Polish peasants. We ourselves presented to the nineteenth century (which its friends have puffed into unmerited consequence) the spectacle, anything but gratifying, of a great nation dead to honor and humanity, building its ghastly temple of peace and concord upon the agony of slaves; but the unconditional abolitionists of Charleston, who fired upon Fort Sumter, have changed all that. Our redemption has developed the worst passions and prejudices in those who have witnessed it; but the aggressive hatred of democracy which it has vivified, especially in the privileged classes of England, has alarmed the democratic principle in the English people to new and active life.

It must certainly be confessed, however, that the sins of others against the Neapolitan people have been many and grievous enough to do them good, without favorable result; and also that, so far, their own crimes have failed to reform them. But we do not yet refuse to hope for them, and we trust even to see some good effected by the freedom and justice which Italian unity seeks to bestow upon them.

Indeed, who are we, to doubt of any nation's future, who have the Union to reconstruct, and the whites of the South to civilize?

Art. VIII. — *The Rebellion Record.* Edited by Frank Moore. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1860–64. Six volumes. 8vo.

It has been said that the American people are less apt than others to profit by experience, because the bustle of their lives keeps breaking the thread of that attention which is the material of memory, till no one has patience or leisure to spin from it a continuous thread of thought. We suspect that this is not more true of us than of other nations, — than it is of all people who read newspapers. Great events are perhaps not more common than they used to be, but a vastly greater number of trivial incidents are now recorded, and this dust of time gets in our eyes. The telegraph strips history of everything down to the bare fact, but it does not observe the true proportions of things, and we must make an effort to recover them. In brevity and cynicism it is a mechanical Tacitus, giving no less space to the movements of Sala than of Sherman, as impartial a leveller as death. It announces with equal *sangfroid* the surrender of Kirby Smith and the capture of a fresh Rebel Governor, reducing us to the stature at which posterity shall reckon us. Eminent contemporaneousness may see here how much space will be allotted to it in the historical compends and biographical dictionaries of the next generation. In artless irony the telegraph is unequalled among the satirists of this generation. But this short-hand diarist confounds all distinctions of great and little, and roils the memory with minute particles of what is oddly enough called intelligence. We read in successive paragraphs the appointment of a Provisional Governor of North Carolina, whose fitness or want of it may be the turning-point of our future history, and the nomination of a minister, who will at most only bewilder some foreign court with a more desperately helpless French than his predecessor. The conspiracy trial at Washington, whose result will have absolutely no effect on the real affairs of the nation, occupies for the moment more of the public mind and thought than the question of reconstruction, which involves the life or death of the very principle we have been fighting for these four years.

Undoubtedly the event of the day, whatever it may be, is apt to become unduly prominent, and to thrust itself obscuringly between us and the perhaps more important event of yesterday, where the public appetite demands fresh gossip rather than real news, and the press accordingly keeps its spies everywhere on the lookout for trifles that become important by being later than the last. And yet this minuteness of triviality has its value also. Our sensitive sheet gives us every morning the photograph of yesterday, and enables us to detect and to study at leisure that fleeting expression of the time which betrays its character, and which might altogether escape us in the idealized historical portrait. We cannot estimate the value of the *items* in our daily newspaper, because the world to which they relate is too familiar and prosaic; but a hundred years hence some Thackeray will find them full of picturesque life and spirit. The "Chronicle" of the Annual Register makes the England of the last century more vividly real to us than any history. The jests which Pompeian idlers scribbled on the walls, while Vesuvius was brooding its fiery conspiracy under their feet, bring the scene nearer home to us than the letter of Pliny, and deepen the tragedy by their trifling contrast, like the grave-diggers' unseemly gabble in Hamlet. Perhaps our judgment of history is made sounder, and our view of it more lifelike, when we are so constantly reminded how the little things of life assert their place alongside the great ones, and how healthy the constitution of the race is, how sound its digestion, how gay its humor, that can take the world so easily while our continent is racked with fever and struggling for life against the doctors.

"Let Hercules himself do what he may,
The cat will mew, the dog must have his day."

It is always pleasant to meet Dame Clio over the tea-table, as it were, where she is often more entertaining, if not more instructive, than when she puts on the loftier port and more ceremonious habit of a Muse. These inadvertences of history are pleasing. We are no longer foreigners in any age of the world, but feel that in a few days we could have accommodated ourselves there, and that, wherever men are, we are not far from home. The more we can individualize and personify, the more lively our sympathy. Man interests us scientifically, but men claim us through all that we have made a part of our nature by education and custom. We would give more to know what Xenophon's soldiers gossiped about round their camp-fires, than for all the particulars of their retreat. Sparta becomes human to us when we think of Agesilaus on his hobby-horse. Finding that those heroic figures romped with their children, we begin for the first time to suspect that they ever really existed as much as Robinson Crusoe. Without these personal traits, antiquity seems as unreal to us as Sir Thomas More's Utopia. It is, indeed, surprising how little of real life what is reckoned solid literature has preserved to us, voluminous as it is. Where does chivalry at last become something more than a mere procession of plumes and armor, to be lamented by Burke, except in some of the less ambitious verses of the Trouvères, where we hear the canakin clink too emphatically, perhaps, but which at least paint living men and possible manners? Tennyson's knights are cloudy, gigantic, of no age or country, like the heroes of Ossian. They are creatures without stomachs. Homer is more condescending, and though we might not be able to draw the bow of Ulysses, we feel quite at home with him and Eumœus over their roast pork.

We cannot deny that the poetical view of any period is higher, and in the deepest sense truer, than all others; but we are thankful also for the penny-a-liner, whether ancient or modern, who reflects the whims and humors, the enthusiasms and weaknesses, of the public in unguarded moments. Is it so certain, after all, that we should not be interesting ourselves in other quite as nugatory matters if these were denied us? In one respect, and no unimportant one, the instantaneous dispersion of news and the universal interest in it have affected the national thought and character. The whole people have acquired a certain metropolitan temper; they feel everything at once and in common; a single pulse sends anger, grief, or triumph through the whole country; one man sitting at the keyboard of the telegraph in Washington sets the chords vibrating to the same tune from sea to sea; and this simultaneousness, this unanimity, deepens national consciousness and intensifies popular emotion. Every man feels himself a part, sensitive and sympathetic, of this vast organism, a partner in its life or death. The sentiment of patriotism is etherealized and ennobled by it, is kindled by the more or less conscious presence of an ideal element; and the instinctive love of a few familiar hills and fields widens, till Country is no longer an abstraction, but a living presence, felt in the heart and operative in the conscience, like that of an absent mother. It is no trifling matter that thirty millions of men should be thinking the same thought and feeling the same pang at a single moment of time, and that these vast parallels of latitude should become a neighborhood more intimate than many a country village. The dream of Human Brotherhood seems to be coming true at last. The peasant who dipped his net in the Danube, or trapped the beaver on its banks, perhaps never heard of Cæsar or of Cæsar's murder; but the shot that shattered the forecasting brain, and curdled the warm, sweet heart of the most American of Americans, echoed along the wires through the length and breadth of a continent, swelling all eyes at once with tears of indignant sorrow. Here was a tragedy fulfilling the demands of Aristotle, and purifying with an instantaneous throb of pity and terror a theatre of such proportions as the world never saw. We doubt if history ever recorded an event as touching and awful as this sympathy so wholly emancipated from the toils of space and time that it might seem as if earth were really sentient, as some have dreamed, or the great god Pan alive again to make the hearts of nations stand still with his shout. What is Beethoven's "Funeral March for the Death of a Hero," to the symphony of love, pity, and wrathful resolve which the telegraph of that April morning played on the pulses of a nation?

It has been said that our system of town-meetings made our Revolution possible, by educating the people in self-government. But this was at most of partial efficacy, while the newspaper and telegraph gather the whole nation into a vast town-meeting, where every one hears the affairs of the country discussed, and where the better judgment is pretty sure to make itself valid at last. No memorable thing is said or done, no invention or discovery is made, that some mention of it does not sooner or later reach the ears of a majority of Americans. It is this constant mental and moral stimulus which gives them the alertness and vivacity, the wide-awakeness of temperament, characteristic of dwellers in great cities, and which has been remarked on by English tourists as if it were a kind of physiological transformation. They seem to think we have lost something of that solidity of character which (with all other good qualities) they consider the peculiar inheritance of the British race, though inherited in an elder brother's proportion by the favored dwellers in the British Isles. We doubt if any substantial excellence is lost by this suppling of the intellectual faculties, and bringing the nervous system nearer the surface by the absorption of superfluous fat. What is lost in bulk may be gained in spring. It is true that the clown, with his parochial horizon, his diet inconveniently thin, and his head conveniently thick, whose notion of greatness is a prize pig, and whose patriotism rises or falls with the strength of his beer, is a creature as little likely to be met with here as the dodo, his only rival in the qualities that make up a good citizen; but this is no result of climatic influences. Such creatures are the contemporaries of an earlier period of civilization than ours. Nor is it so clear that solidity is always a virtue, and lightness a vice in character, any more than in bread, or that the leaven of our institutions works anything else than a wholesome ferment and aeration. The experience of the last four years is enough to prove that sensibility may consist with tenacity of purpose, and that enthusiasm may become a permanent motive where the conviction of the worth of its object is profound and logical. There are things in this universe deeper and higher, more solid even, than the English Constitution. If that is the perfection of human wisdom and a sufficing object of faith and worship for our cousins over the water, on the other hand God's dealing with this chosen people is preparing them to conceive of a perfection of divine wisdom, a constitution in the framing of which man's wit had no share, and which shall yet be supreme, as it is continually more or less plainly influential in the government of the world. We may need even sterner teaching than any we have yet had, but we have faith that the lesson will be learned at last.

If the assertion which we alluded to at the outset were true, if we, more than others, are apt to forget the past in the present, the work of Mr. Moore, the title of which we have put at the head of our article, would do much in helping us to recover what we have lost. Had its execution been as complete as its plan was excellent, it would have left nothing to be desired. Its want of order may be charged upon the necessity of monthly publication; but there are other defects which this will hardly excuse. The editor seems to have become gradually helpless before the mass of material that heaped itself about him, and to have shovelled from sheer despair of selection. In the documentary part he is sufficiently, sometimes even depressingly full, and he has preserved a great deal of fugitive poetry from both sides, much of it spirited, and some of it vigorously original;* but he has frequently neglected to give his authorities. His extracts from the newspapers of the day, especially from Southern and foreign ones, are provokingly few, and his department of "incidents and rumors," the true mirror of the time, inadequate both in quantity and quality. In spite of these defects, however, there is enough to recall vividly the features of the time at any marked period during the war, to renew the phases of feeling, to trace the slowly gathering current of opinion, and to see a definite purpose gradually orbing itself out of the chaos of plans and motives, hopes, fears, enthusiasms, and despondencies. We do not propose to review the book, — we might, indeed, almost as well undertake to review the works of Father Time himself, — but, relying chiefly on its help in piecing out our materials, shall try to freshen the memory of certain facts and experiences worth bearing in mind either for example or warning.

It is of importance, especially considering the part which what are called the "leading minds" of the South are expected to play in reconstruction, to keep clearly before our minds the motives and the manner of the Rebellion. Perhaps we should say inducements rather than motives, for of these there was but a single one put forward by the seceding States, namely, the obtaining security, permanence, and extension for the system of slavery. We do not use the qualifying epithet African, because the franker propagandists of Southern principles affirmed the divine institution of slavery pure and simple, without regard to color or the curse of Canaan. This being the single motive of the Rebellion, what was its real object? Primarily, to possess itself of the government by a sudden *coup d'état;* or that failing, then, secondarily, by a peaceful secession, which should paralyze the commerce and manufactures of the Free States, to bring them to terms of submission. Whatever may have been the opinion of some of the more far-sighted, it is clear that a vast majority of the Southern people, including their public men, believed that their revolution would be peaceful. Their inducements to moving precisely when they did were several. At home the treasury was empty; faithless ministers had supplied the Southern arsenals with arms, and so disposed the army and navy as to render them useless for any sudden need; but above all, they could reckon on several months of an administration which, if not friendly, was so feeble as to be more dangerous to the country than to its betrayers, and there was a great party at the North hitherto their subservient allies, and now sharing with them in the bitterness of a common political defeat.* Abroad there was peace, with the prospect of its continuance; the two great maritime powers were also the great consumers of cotton, were both deadly enemies, like themselves, to the democratic principle, and, if not actively interfering, would at least throw all the moral weight of their sympathy and encouragement on the Southern side. They were not altogether mistaken in their reckoning. The imbecility of Mr. Buchanan bedded the ship of state in an ooze of helpless inaction, where none of her guns could be brought to bear, and whence nothing but the tide of indignation which followed the attack on Sumter could have set her afloat again, while prominent men and journals of the Democratic party hastened to assure the Rebels, not only of approval, but of active physical assistance. England, with indecent eagerness, proclaimed a neutrality which secured belligerent rights to a conspiracy that was never to become a nation, and thus enabled members of Parliament to fit out privateers to prey with impunity on the commerce of a friendly power. The wily

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* See especially "The Old Sergeant," a remarkable poem by Forceythe Willson, in the sixth volume.

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* Mr. A. H. Stephens, Vice-President of the late Confederacy, attributed the Secession movement to disappointed ambition.

Napoleon followed, after an interval long enough to throw all responsibility for the measure, and to direct all the natural irritation it excited in this country, upon his neighbor over the way. England is now endeavoring to evade the consequences of her hasty proclamation and her jaunty indifference to the enforcement of it upon her own subjects. The principle of international law involved is a most important one; but it was not so much the act itself, or the pecuniary damage resulting from it, as the *animus* that so plainly prompted it, which Americans find it hard to forgive.

It would be unwise in us to forget that independence was a merely secondary and incidental consideration with the Southern conspirators at the beginning of the Rebellion, however they may have thought it wise to put it in the front, both for the sake of their foreign abettors who were squeamish about seeming, though quite indifferent about being, false to their own professions and the higher interests of their country, and also for the sake of its traditionary influence among the Southern people. Some, it is true, were bold enough or logical enough to advocate barbarism as a good in itself; and in estimating the influences which have rendered some minds, if not friendly to the Rebellion, at least indifferent to the success of the Union, we should not forget that reaction against the softening and humanizing effect of modern civilization, led by such men as Carlyle, and joined in by a multitude whose intellectual and moral fibre is too much unstrung to be excited by anything less pungent than paradox. Protestants against the religion which sacrifices to the polished idol of Decorum and translates Jehovah by *Comme-il-faut*, they find even the divine manhood of Christ too tame for them, and transfer their allegiance to the shaggy Thor with his mallet of brute force. This is hardly to be wondered at when we hear England called prosperous for the strange reason that she no longer dares to act from a noble impulse, and when, at whatever page of her recent history one opens, he finds her statesmanship to consist of one Noble Lord or Honorable Member asking a question, and another Noble Lord or Honorable Member endeavoring to dodge it, amid cries of *Hear! Hear!* enthusiastic in proportion to the fruitlessness of listening. After all, we are inclined to think there is more real prosperity, more that posterity will find to have a deep meaning and reality, in a democracy spending itself for a principle, and, in spite of the remonstrances, protests, and sneers of a world busy in the eternal seesaw of the balance of Europe, persisting in a belief that life and property are mere counters of no value except as representatives of a higher idea. May it be long ere government becomes in the New World, as in the Old, an armed police and fire-department to protect property as it grows more worthless by being selfishly clutched in fewer hands, and keep God's fire of manhood from reaching that gunpowder of the dangerous classes which underlies all institutions based on the wisdom of our ancestors.

As we look back to the beginnings of the Rebellion we are struck with the thoughtlessness with which both parties entered upon a war, of whose vast proportions and results neither was even dimly conscious. But a manifest difference is to be remarked. In the South this thoughtlessness was the result of an ignorant self-confidence, in the North of inexperience and good humor. It was long before either side could believe that the other was in earnest, the one in attacking a government which they knew only by their lion's share in its offices and influence, the other in resisting the unprovoked assault of a race born in the saddle, incapable of subjugation, and unable to die comfortably except in the last ditch of jubilant oratory. When at last each was convinced of the other's sincerity, the moods of both might have been predicted by any observer of human nature. The side which felt that it was not only in the wrong, but that it had made a blunder, lost all control of its temper, all regard for truth and honor. It betook itself forthwith to lies, bluster, and cowardly abuse of its antagonist. But beneath every other expression of Southern sentiment, and seeming to be the base of it, was a ferocity not to be accounted for by thwarted calculations or by any resentment at injuries received, but only by the influence of slavery on the character and manners. "Scratch a Russian," said Napoleon, "and you come to the Tartar beneath." Scratch a slaveholder, and beneath the varnish of conventionalism you come upon something akin to the man-hunter of Dahomey. Nay, the selfishness engendered by any system which rests on the right of the strongest is more irritable and resentful in the civilized than the savage man, as it is enhanced by a consciousness of guilt. In the first flush of over-confidence, when the Rebels reckoned on taking Washington, the air was to be darkened with the gibbeted carcasses of dogs and caitiffs. Pollard, in the first volume of his Southern History of the War, prints without comment the letter of a ruffian who helped butcher our wounded in Sudly Church after the first battle of Manassas, in which he says that he had resolved to give no quarter. In Missouri the Rebels took scalps as trophies, and that they made personal ornaments of the bones of our unburied dead, and that women wore them, though seeming incredible, has been proved beyond question. Later in the war, they literally starved our prisoners in a country where Sherman's army of a hundred thousand men found supplies so abundant that they could dispense with their provision train. Yet these were the "gentry" of the country, in whose struggle to escape from the contamination of mob-government the better classes of England so keenly sympathized. Our experience is thrown away unless it teach us that every form of conventionalized injustice is instinctively in league with every other, the world over, and that all institutions safe only in law, but forever in danger from reason and conscience, beget first selfishness, next fear, and then cruelty, by an incurable degeneration. Having been thus taught that a rebellion against justice and mercy has certain natural confederates, we must be blind indeed not to see whose alliance at the South is to give meaning and permanence to our victory over it.

In the North, on the other hand, nothing is more striking than the persistence in good nature, the tenacity with which the theories of the erring brother and the prodigal son were clung to, despite all evidence of facts to the contrary. There was a kind of boyishness in the rumors which the newspapers circulated (not seldom with intent to dispirit), and the people believed on the authority of reliable gentlemen from Richmond, or Union refugees whose information could be trusted. At one time the Rebels had mined eleven acres in the neighborhood of Bull Run; at another, there were regiments of giants on their way from Texas, who, first paralyzing our batteries by a yell, would rush unscathed upon the guns and rip up the unresisting artillerymen with bowie-knives three feet long, made for that precise service, and the only weapon to which these Berserkers would condescend; again, for the fiftieth time, France and England had definitely agreed upon a forcible intervention; finally, in order to sap the growing confidence of the people in President Lincoln, one of his family was accused of communicating our plans to the Rebels, and this at a time when the favorite charge against his administration was the having no plan at all. The public mind, as the public folly is generally called, was kept in a fidget by these marvels and others like them. But the point to which we would especially call attention is this, that, while the war slowly educated the North, it has had comparatively little effect in shaking the old nonsense out of the South. Nothing is more striking, as we trace Northern opinion through those four years that seemed so long and seem so short, than to see how the minds of men were sobered, braced, and matured as the greatness of the principles at stake became more and more manifest, how their purpose, instead of relaxing, was strained tighter by disappointment, and by the growing sense of a guidance wiser than their own. Nor should we forget how slow the great body of the people were in being persuaded of the expediency of directly attacking slavery, and after that of enlisting colored troops; of the fact, in short, that it must always be legal to preserve the source of the law's authority, and constitutional to save the country. The prudence of those measures is now acknowledged by all, and justified by the result; but we must not be blind to the deeper moral, that justice is always and only politic, that it needs no precedent, and that we were prosperous in proportion as we were willing to be true to our nobler judgment. In one respect only the popular understanding seems always to have been, and still to remain, confused. Our notion of treason is a purely traditional one, derived from countries where the question at issue has not been the life of the nation, but the conflicting titles of this or that family to govern it. Many people appear to consider civil war as merely a more earnest kind of political contest, which leaves the relative position of the parties as they would be after a Presidential election. But no treason was ever so wicked as that of Davis and his fellow-conspirators, for it had no apology of injury or even of disputed right, and it was aimed against the fairest hope and promise of the world. They did not attempt to put one king in place of another, but to dethrone human nature and discrown the very manhood of the race. And in what respects does a civil war differ from any other in the discretion which it leaves to the victor of exacting indemnity for the past and security for the future? A contest begun for such ends and maintained by such expedients as this has been, is not to be concluded by merely crying *quits* and shaking hands. The slave-holding States chose to make themselves a foreign people to us, and they must take the consequences. We surely cannot be expected to take them back as if nothing had happened, as if victory rendered us helpless to promote good or prevent evil, and took from us all title to insist on the admission of the very principle for which we have sacrificed so much. The war has established the unity of the government, but no peace will be anything more than a pretence unless it rests upon the unity of the nation, and that can only be secured by making everywhere supreme the national idea that freedom is a right inherent in man himself, and not a creature of the law, to be granted to one class of men or withheld from it at the option of another.

What have we conquered? The Southern States? The Southern people? A cessation of present war? Surely not these or any one of these merely. The fruit of our victory, as it was always the object of our warfare, is the everlasting validity of the theory of the Declaration of Independence in these United States, and the obligation before God and man to make it the rule of our practice. It was in that only that we were stronger than our enemies, stronger than the public opinion of the world; and it is from that alone that we derive our right of the strongest, for it is wisdom, justice, and the manifest will of Him who made of one blood all the nations of the earth. It were a childish view of the matter to think this a mere trial of strength or struggle for supremacy between the North and South. The war sprang from the inherent antipathy between two forms of political organization radically hostile to each other. Is the war over, will it ever be over, if we allow the incompatibility to remain, childishly satisfied with a mere change of shape? This has been the grapple of two brothers that already struggled with each other even in the womb. One of them has fallen under the other; but let simple, good-natured Esau beware how he slacken his grip till he has got back his inheritance, for Jacob is cunninger with the tongue than he.

We have said that the war has given the North a higher conception of its manhood and its duties, and of the vital force of ideas. But do we find any parallel change in the South? We confess we look for it in vain. There is the same arrogance, the same materialistic mode of thought, which reckons the strength and value of a country by the amount of its crops rather than by the depth of political principle which inspires its people, the same boyish conceit on which even defeat wastes its lesson. Here is a clear case for the interference of authority. The people have done their part by settling the fact that we have a government; and it is for the government now to do its duty toward the people, by seeing to it that their blood and treasure shall not have been squandered in a meaningless conflict. We must not let ourselves be misled by the terms North and South, as if those names implied any essential diversity of interest, or the claim to any separate share in the future destiny of the country. Let us concede every right to the several States except that of mischief, and never again be deceived by the fallacy that a moral wrong can be local in its evil influence, or that a principle alien to the instincts of the nation can be consistent either with its prosperity or its peace. We must not be confused into a belief that it is with States that we are dealing in this matter. The very problem is how to reconstitute safely a certain territory or population as States. It is not we that take anything from them. The war has left them nothing that they can fairly call their own politically, but helplessness and confusion. We propose only to admit them for the first time into a real union with us, and to give them an equal share in privileges, our belief in whose value we have proved by our sacrifices in asserting them. There is always a time for doing what is fit to be done; and if it be done wisely, temperately, and firmly, it need appeal for its legality to no higher test than success. It is the nation, and not a section, which is victorious, and it is only on principles of purely national advantage that any permanent settlement can be based.

The South will come back to the Union intent on saving whatever fragments it can from the wreck of the evil element in its social structure, which it clings to with that servile constancy which men often show for the vice that is making them its victims. If they must lose slavery, they will make a shift to be comfortable on the best substitute they can find in a system of caste. The question for a wise government in such a case seems to us not to be, Have we the right to interfere? but much rather, Have we the right to let them alone? If we are entitled, as conquerors, and it is only as such that we are so entitled, to stipulate for the abolition of slavery, what is there to prevent our exacting further conditions no less essential to our safety and the prosperity of the South? The national unity we have paid so dearly for will turn out a pinchbeck counterfeit, without that sympathy of interests and ideas, that unity of the people, which can spring only from homogeneousness of institutions. The successive advances toward justice which we made during the war, and which looked so difficult and doubtful before they were made, the proclamation of freedom and the arming of the blacks, seem now to have been measures of the simplest expediency, as the highest always turns out to be the simplest when we have the wit to try it. The heavens were to have come crashing down after both those measures; yet the pillars of the universe not only stood firm on their divinely-laid foundations, but held us up also, and, to the amazement of many, God did not frown on an experiment of righteousness. People are not yet agreed whether these things were constitutional; we believe, indeed, that the weight of legal opinion is against them, but nevertheless events are tolerably unanimous that without them we should have had a fine Constitution left on our hands with no body politic for it to animate.

Laws of the wisest human device are, after all, but the sheath of the sword of Power, which must not be allowed to rust in them till it cannot be drawn swiftly in time of need. President Lincoln had many scruples to overcome ere he could overstep the limits of precedent into the divine air of moral greatness.

Like most men, he was reluctant to be the bearer of that message of God with which his name will be linked in the grateful memory of mankind. If he won an immortality of fame by consenting to ally himself with the eternal justice, and to reinforce his armies by the inspiration of their own nobler instincts, an equal choice of renown is offered to his successor in applying the same loyalty to conscience in the establishment of peace. We could not live together half slave and half free; shall we succeed better in trying a second left-handed marriage between democracy and another form of aristocracy, less gross, but not less uncongenial? They who before misled the country into a policy false and deadly to the very truth which was its life and strength, by the fear of abolitionism, are making ready to misrule it again by the meaner prejudice of color. We can have no permanent peace with the South but by Americanizing it, by compelling it, if need be, to accept the idea, and with it the safety of democracy. At present we seem on the brink of contracting to protect from insurrection States in which a majority of the population, many of them now trained to arms, and all of them conscious of a claim upon us to make their freedom strong enough to protect them, are to be left at the mercy of laws which they have had no share in enacting.

The gravity of this consideration alone should make us pause. The more thought we bestow upon the matter, the more thoroughly are we persuaded that the only way to get rid of the negro is to do him justice. Democracy is safe because it is just, and safe only when it is just to all. Here is no question of white or black, but simply of man. We have hitherto been strong in proportion as we dared be true to the sublime thought of our own Declaration of Independence, which for the first time proposed to embody Christianity in human laws, and announced the discovery that the security of the state is based on the moral instincts and the manhood of its members. In the very midnight of the war, when we were compassed around with despondency and the fear of man, that peerless utterance of human policy rang like a trumpet announcing heavenly succor, and lifted us out of the darkness of our doubts into that courage which comes of the fear of God. Now, if ever, may a statesman depend upon the people sustaining him in doing what is simply right, for they have found out the infinite worth of freedom and how much they love it, by being called on to defend it. We have seen how our contest has been watched by a breathless world, — how every humane and generous heart, every intellect bold enough to believe that men may be safely trusted with government as well as with any other of their concerns, has wished us God-speed. And we have felt as never before the meaning of those awful words, "Hell beneath is stirred for thee," as we saw all that was mean and timid and selfish and wicked, by a horrible impulsion of nature, gathering to the help of our enemies. Why should we shrink from embodying our own idea as if it would turn out a Frankenstein? Why should we let the vanquished dictate terms of peace? A choice is offered that may never come again, unless after another war. We should sin against our own light, if we allowed mongrel republics to grow up again at the South, and deliberately organized anarchy, as if it were better than war. Let the law be made equal for all men. If the power does not exist in the Constitution, find it somewhere else, or confess that democracy, strongest of all governments for war, is the weakest of all in the statesmanship that shall save us from it. There is no doubt what the wishes of the Administration are. Let them act up to their own convictions and the emergency of the hour, sure of the support of the people; for it is one of the chief merits of our form of polity, that the public reason, which gives our Constitution all its force, is always a reserve of power to the magistrate, open to the appeal of justice, and ready to ratify the decisions of conscience. There is no need of hurry in readmitting the States that locked themselves out of the old homestead. It is not enough to conquer unless we convert them, and time, the best means of quiet persuasion, is in our own hands. Shall we hasten to cover with the thin ashes of another compromise that smouldering war which we called peace for seventy years, only to have it flame up again when the wind of Southern doctrine has set long enough in the old quarter? It is not the absence of war, but of its causes, that is in our grasp. That is what we fought for, and there must be a right somewhere to enforce what all see to be essential. To quibble away such an opportunity would be as cowardly as unwise.

ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*Essays in Criticism.* By MATTHEW ARNOLD, Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865.

MR. ARNOLD'S Essays in Criticism come to American readers with a reputation already made,—the reputation of a charming style, a great deal of excellent feeling, and an almost equal amount of questionable reasoning. It is for us either to confirm the verdict passed in the author's own country, or to judge his work afresh. It is often the fortune of English writers to find mitigation of sentence in the United States.

The Essays contained in this volume are on purely literary subjects; which is for us, by itself, a strong recommendation. English literature, especially contemporary literature, is, compared with that of France and Germany, very poor in collections of this sort. A great deal of criticism is written, but little of it is kept; little of it is deemed to contain any permanent application. Mr. Arnold will doubtless find in this fact—if indeed he has not already signalized it—but another proof of the inferiority of the English to the Continental school of criticism, and point to it as a baleful effect of the narrow practical spirit which animates, or, as he would probably say, paralyzes, the former. But not only is his book attractive as a whole, from its exclusively literary character; the subject of each essay is moreover particularly interesting. The first paper is on the function of Criticism at the present time; a question, if not more important, perhaps more directly pertinent here than in England. The second, discussing the literary influence of Academies, contains a great deal of valuable observation and reflection in a small compass and under an inadequate title. The other essays are upon the two De Guérins, Heinrich Heine, Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment, Joubert, Spinoza, and Marcus Aurelius. The first two articles are, to our mind, much the best; the next in order of excellence is the paper on Joubert; while the others, with the exception, perhaps, of that on Spinoza, are of about equal merit.

Mr. Arnold's style has been praised at once too much and too little. Its resources are decidedly limited; but if the word had not become so cheap, we should nevertheless call it fascinating. This quality implies no especial force; it rests in this case on the fact that, whether or not you agree with the matter beneath it, the manner inspires you with a personal affection for the author. It expresses great sensibility, and at the same time great good-nature; it indicates a mind both susceptible and healthy. With the former element alone it would savor of affectation; with the latter, it would be coarse. As it stands, it represents a spirit both sensitive and generous. We can best describe it, perhaps, by the word sympathetic. It exhibits frankly, and without detriment to its national character, a decided French influence. Mr. Arnold is too wise to attempt to write French English; he probably knows that a language can only be indirectly enriched; but as nationality is eminently a matter of form, he knows too that he can really violate nothing so long as he adheres to the English letter.

His Preface is a striking example of the intelligent amiability which animates his style. His two leading Essays were, on their first appearance, made the subject of much violent contention, their moral being deemed little else than a wholesale schooling of the English press by the French programme. Nothing could have better proved the justice of Mr. Arnold's remarks upon the "provincial" character of the English critical method, than the reception which they provoked. He now acknowledges this reception in a short introduction, which admirably reconciles smoothness of temper with sharpness of wit. The taste of this performance has been questioned; but wherever it may err, it is assuredly not in being provincial; it is essentially civil. Mr. Arnold's amiability is, in our eye, a strong proof of his wisdom. If he were a few degrees more short-sighted, he might have less equanimity at his command. Those who sympathize with him warmly will probably like him best as he is; but with such as are only half his friends, this freedom from party passion, from what is after all but a lawful professional emotion, will argue against his sincerity. For ourselves, we doubt not that Mr. Arnold possesses thoroughly what the French call the courage of his opinions. When you lay down a proposition which is forthwith controverted, it is of course optional with you to take up the cudgels in its defence. If you are deeply convinced of its truth, you will perhaps be content to leave it to take care of itself; or, at all events, you will not go out of your way to push its fortunes; for you will reflect that in the long run an opinion often borrows credit from the forbearance of its patrons. In the long run, we say; it will meanwhile cost you an occasional pang to see your cherished theory turned into a football by the critics. A football is not, as such, a very respectable object, and the more numerous the players, the more ridiculous it becomes. Unless, therefore, you are very confident of your ability to rescue it from the chaos of kicks, you will best consult its interests by not mingling in the game. Such has been Mr. Arnold's choice. His opponents say that he is too much of a poet to be a critic; he is certainly too much of a poet to be a disputant. In the Preface in question he has abstained from reiterating any of the views put forth in the two offensive Essays; he has simply taken a delicate literary vengeance upon his adversaries.

For Mr. Arnold's critical feeling and observation, used independently of his judgment, we profess a keen relish. He has these qualities, at any rate, of a good critic, whether or not he have the others, — the science and the logic. It is hard to say whether the literary critic is more called upon to understand or to feel. It is certain that he will accomplish little unless he can feel acutely; although it is perhaps equally certain that he will become weak the moment that he begins to "work," as we may say, his natural sensibilities. The best critic is probably he who leaves his feelings out of account, and relies upon reason for success. If he actually possesses delicacy of feeling, his work will be delicate without detriment to its solidity. The complaint of Mr. Arnold's critics is that his arguments are too sentimental. Whether this complaint is well founded, we shall hereafter inquire; let us determine first what sentiment has done for him. It has given him, in our opinion, his greatest charm and his greatest worth. Hundreds of other critics have stronger heads; few, in England at least, have more delicate perceptions. We regret that we have not the space to confirm this assertion by extracts. We must refer the reader to the book itself, where he will find on every page an illustration of our meaning. He will find one, first of all, in the apostrophe to the University of Oxford, at the close of the Preface, — "home of lost causes and forsaken beliefs and unpopular names and impossible loyalties." This is doubtless nothing but sentiment, but it seizes a shade of truth, and conveys it with a directness which is not at the command of logical demonstration. Such a process might readily prove, with the aid of a host of facts, that the University is actually the abode of much retarding conservatism; a fine critical instinct alone, and the measure of audacity which accompanies such an instinct, could succeed in placing her on the side of progress by boldly saluting her as the Queen of Romance: romance being the deadly enemy of the commonplace; the commonplace being the fast ally of Philistinism, and Philistinism the heaviest drag upon the march of civilization. Mr. Arnold is very fond of quoting Goethe's eulogy upon Schiller, to the effect that his friend's greatest glory was to have left so far behind him *was uns alle bändigt, das Gemeine*, that bane of mankind, the common. Exactly how much the inscrutable Goethe made of this fact, it is hard at this day to determine; but it will seem to many readers that Mr. Arnold makes too much of it. Perhaps he does, for himself; but for the public in general he decidedly does not. One of the chief duties of criticism is to exalt the importance of the ideal; and Goethe's speech has a long career in prospect before we can say with the vulgar that it is "played out." Its repeated occurrence in Mr. Arnold's pages is but another instance of poetic feeling subserving the ends of criticism. The famous comment upon the girl Wragg, over which the author's opponents made so merry, we likewise owe — we do not hesitate to declare it — to this same poetic feeling. Why cast discredit upon so valuable an instrument of truth? Why not wait at least until it is used in the service of error? The worst that can be said of the paragraph in question is, that it is a great ado about nothing. All thanks, say we, to the critic who will pick up such nothings as these; for if he neglects them, they are blindly trodden under foot. They may not be especially valuable, but they are for that very reason the critic's particular care. Great truths take care of themselves; great truths are carried aloft by philosophers and poets; the critic deals in contributions to truth. Another illustration of the nicety of Mr. Arnold's feeling is furnished by his remarks upon the quality of *distinction* as exhibited in Maurice and Eugénie de Guérin, "that quality which at last inexorably corrects the world's blunders and fixes the world's ideals, [which] procures that the popular poet shall not pass for a Pindar, the popular historian for a Tacitus, nor the popular preacher for a Bossuet." Another is offered by his incidental remarks upon Coleridge, in the article on Joubert; another, by the remarkable felicity with which he has translated Maurice de Guérin's *Centaur;* and another, by the whole body of citations with which, in his second Essay, he fortifies his proposition that the establishment in England of an authority answering to the French Academy would have arrested certain evil tendencies of English literature, — for to nothing more offensive than this, as far as we can see, does his argument amount.

In the first and most important of his Essays Mr. Arnold puts forth his views upon the actual duty of criticism. They may be summed up as follows. Criticism has no concern with the practical; its function is simply to get at the best thought which is current, — to see things in themselves as they are, — to be disinterested. Criticism can be disinterested, says Mr. Arnold,

> "by keeping from practice; by resolutely following the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play of the mind on all subjects which it touches, by steadily refusing to lend itself to any of those ulterior political, practical considerations about ideas which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them, which perhaps ought often to be attached to them, which in this country, at any rate, are certain to be attached to them, but which criticism has really nothing to do with. Its business is simply to know the best that is known and thought in the world, and, by in its turn making this known, to create a current of true and fresh ideas. Its business is to do this with

inflexible honesty, with due ability; but its business is to do no more, and to leave alone all questions of practical consequences and applications, — questions which will never fail to have due prominence given to them."

We used just now a word of which Mr. Arnold is very fond, — a word of which the general reader may require an explanation, but which, when explained, he will be likely to find indispensable; we mean the word *Philistine*. The term is of German origin, and has no English synonyme. "At Soli," remarks Mr. Arnold, "I imagined they did not talk of solecisms; and here, at the very head-quarters of Goliath, nobody talks of Philistinism." The word *epicier*, used by Mr. Arnold as a French synonyme, is not so good as *bourgeois*, and to those who know that *bourgeois* means a citizen, and who reflect that a citizen is a person seriously interested in the maintenance of order, the German term may now assume a more special significance. An English review briefly defines it by saying that "it applies to the fat-headed respectable public in general." This definition must satisfy us here. The Philistine portion of the English press, by which we mean the considerably larger portion, received Mr. Arnold's novel programme of criticism with the uncompromising disapprobation which was to be expected from a literary body, the principle of whose influence, or indeed of whose being, is its subservience, through its various members, to certain political and religious interests. Mr. Arnold's general theory was offensive enough; but the conclusions drawn by him from the fact that English practice has been so long and so directly at variance with it, were such as to excite the strongest animosity. Chief among these was the conclusion that this fact has retarded the development and vulgarized the character of the English mind, as compared with the French and the German mind. This rational inference may be nothing but a poet's flight; but for ourselves, we assent to it. It reaches us too. The facts collected by Mr. Arnold on this point have long wanted a voice. It has long seemed to us that, as a nation, the English are singularly incapable of large, of high, of general views. They are indifferent to pure truth, to *la verité vraie*. Their views are almost exclusively practical, and it is in the nature of practical views to be narrow. They seldom indeed admit a fact but on compulsion; they demand of an idea some better recommendation, some longer pedigree, than that it is true. That this lack of spontaneity in the English intellect is caused by the tendency of English criticism, or that it is to be corrected by a diversion, or even by a complete reversion, of this tendency, neither Mr. Arnold nor ourselves suppose, nor do we look upon such a result as desirable. The part which Mr. Arnold assigns to his reformed method of criticism is a purely tributary part. Its indirect result will be to quicken the naturally irrational action of the English mind; its direct result will be to furnish that mind with a larger stock of ideas than it has enjoyed under the time-honored *régime* of Whig and Tory, High-Church and Low-Church organs.

We may here remark, that Mr. Arnold's statement of his principles is open to some misinterpretation, — an accident against which he has, perhaps, not sufficiently guarded it. For many persons the word *practical* is almost identical with the word *useful*, against which, on the other hand, they erect the word *ornamental.* Persons who are fond of regarding these two terms as irreconcilable, will have little patience with Mr. Arnold's scheme of criticism. They will look upon it as an organized preference of unprofitable speculation to common sense. But the great beauty of the critical movement advocated by Mr. Arnold is that in either direction its range of action is unlimited. It deals with plain facts as well as with the most exalted fancies; but it deals with them only for the sake of the truth which is in them, and not for *your* sake, reader, and that of your party. It takes *high ground*, which is the ground of theory. It does not busy itself with consequences, which are all in all to you. Do not suppose that it for this reason pretends to ignore or to undervalue consequences; on the contrary, it is because it knows that consequences are inevitable that it leaves them alone. It cannot do two things at once; it cannot serve two masters. Its business is to make truth generally accessible, and not to apply it. It is only on condition of having its hands free, that it can make truth generally accessible. We said just now that its duty was, among other things, to exalt, if possible, the importance of the ideal. We should perhaps have said the intellectual; that is, of the principle of understanding things. Its business is to urge the claims of all things to be understood. If this is its function in England, as Mr. Arnold represents, it seems to us that it is doubly its function in this country. Here is no lack of votaries of the practical, of experimentalists, of empirics. The tendencies of our civilization are certainly not such as foster a preponderance of morbid speculation. Our national genius inclines yearly more and more to resolve itself into a vast machine for sifting, in all things, the wheat from the chaff. American society is so shrewd, that we may safely allow it to make application of the truths of the study. Only let us keep it supplied with the truths of the study, and not with the half-truths of the forum. Let criticism take the stream of truth at its source, and then practice can take it half-way down. When criticism takes it half-way down, practice will come poorly off.

If we have not touched upon the faults of Mr. Arnold's volume, it is because they are faults of detail, and because, when, as a whole, a book commands our assent, we do not incline to quarrel with its parts. Some of the parts in these Essays are weak, others are strong; but the impression which they all combine to leave is one of such beauty as to make us forget, not only their particular faults, but their particular merits. If we were asked what is the particular merit of a given essay, we should reply that it is a merit much less common at the present day than is generally supposed, — the merit which pre-eminently characterizes Mr. Arnold's poems, the merit, namely, of having a *subject.* Each essay is *about* something. If a literary work now-a-days start with a certain topic, that is all that is required of it; and yet it is a work of art only on condition of ending with that topic, on condition of being written, not from it, but to it. If the average modern essay or poem were to wear its title at the close, and not at the beginning, we wonder in how many cases the reader would fail to be surprised by it. A book or an article is looked upon as a kind of Staubbach waterfall, discharging itself into infinite space. If we were questioned as to the merit of Mr. Arnold's book as a whole, we should say that it lay in the fact that the author takes high ground. The manner of his Essays is a model of what criticisms should be. The foremost English critical journal, the Saturday Review, recently disposed of a famous writer by saying, in a parenthesis, that he had done nothing but write nonsense all his life. Mr. Arnold does not pass judgment in parenthesis. He is too much of an artist to use leading propositions for merely literary purposes. The consequence is, that he says a few things in such a way as that almost in spite of ourselves we remember them, instead of a number of things which we cannot for the life of us remember. There are many things which we wish he had said better. It is to be regretted, for instance, that, when Heine is for once in a way seriously spoken of, he should not be spoken of more as the great poet which he is, and which even in New England he will one day be admitted to be, than with reference to the great moralist which he is not, and which he never claimed to be. But here, as in other places, Mr. Arnold's excellent spirit reconciles us with his short-comings. If he has not spoken of Heine exhaustively, he has at all events spoken of him seriously, which for an Englishman is a good deal. Mr. Arnold's supreme virtue is that he speaks of all things seriously, or, in other words, that he is not offensively clever. The writers who are willing to resign themselves to this obscure distinction are in our opinion the only writers who understand their time. That Mr. Arnold thoroughly understands his time we do not mean to say, for this is the privilege of a very select few; but he is, at any rate, profoundly conscious of his time. This fact was clearly apparent in his poems, and it is even more apparent in these Essays. It gives them a peculiar character of melancholy, — that melancholy which arises from the spectacle of the old-fashioned instinct of enthusiasm in conflict (or at all events in contact) with the modern desire to be fair, — the melancholy of an age which not only has lost its *naïveté*, but which knows it has lost it.

The American publishers have enriched this volume with the author's Lectures on Homer, and with his French Eton. The Lectures demand a notice apart; we can only say here that they possess all the habitual charm of Mr. Arnold's style. This same charm will also lend an interest to his discussion of a question which bears but remotely upon the subject of education in this country.

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2. — *The Life and Times of John Huss; or the Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century.* By E. H. Gillett. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1863. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xx., 632; xiii., 651. [Second Notice.]

Our readers may remember that on a former occasion we exhibited in a conclusive manner some of the false pretences and grave faults of these volumes, and expressed our regret that Dr. Gillett had so dishonored the subject which he undertook to treat. Our judgment has since been called in question, with no attempt, however, to impugn the facts upon which it was based; but we should not think it worth while to take up the subject again, had not evidence been presented to us of a still more grievous literary sin on Dr. Gillett's part than any with which we previously charged him. We propose now to show, by evidence the force of which Dr. Gillett himself cannot dispute, that he has been guilty in these volumes of plagiarism of the grossest character. The task is a painful one. But however repulsive to ourselves, and however shocking the facts may be to the friends of Dr. Gillett, it is due to the public who have read the puffs of his work that his crime should be exposed, and that those who have trusted in him should be warned of his literary dishonesty.

The charges we now bring against Dr. Gillett are as follows: — 1st. That many sentences, paragraphs, and pages, in both volumes of his work, are taken bodily from the American edition of the English translation of Bonnechose's "Reformers before the Reformation" (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1844); 2d. That many sentences, paragraphs, and pages, in both volumes of his work, are stolen from the translation mentioned above, with slight alteration, sometimes to suit the plagiarist's taste, and sometimes to introduce additional matter;

3d. That, in many instances where Dr. Gillett has copied the translation of Bonnechose exactly, he does not refer to Bonnechose, but refers to other authors for verification, and that these authors do not always give the details which Gillett takes from Bonnechose, so that his references are found to be false; 4th. That, although the instances where Dr. Gillett has plagiarized the translation mentioned above are numerous in both volumes of his work, he has only referred to Bonnechose eight times, — three times in Vol I. (pp. 69, 72, 129), four times in Vol. II. (pp. 63, 239, 425, 507), and once in the Preface to Vol. I., where he speaks as follows: "The task so long deferred I have ventured to undertake. When I commenced it, I was not aware of a single work in the English language which could afford me any material aid. But, since that period, the last volume of 'Neander's Church History' has been translated and published in this country, and the work of Bonnechose, 'Reformers before the Reformation,' has been brought to my notice. But neither of these presents such a view of the subject as the great body of intelligent readers demand. The former is fragmentary and disconnected in its arrangement; while the American edition of the latter is impaired in value by chronological errors, and the whole account of the life of Huss previous to the Council of Constance is despatched in a few pages. On some important points the work is quite meagre, while on others the author has fallen into errors, through a failure to consult some of the most important authorities." (Vol. I. pp. iii., iv.)

Having thus presented our indictment, we shall proceed to give the evidence, not upon each point separately, but as it occurs in the order of narration in Dr. Gillett's volume. In order to exhibit the facts plainly, we proceed to give in parallel columns some quotations from Dr. Gillett's work and the translation of Bonnechose: —

GILLETT, Vol. I. p. 310.	BONNECHOSE, Book II. ch. I. p. 49.
"A few days before his departure, in a paper affixed to the gates of the palace, he announced that he was about to depart in order to justify himself before the council; 'so that,' said he, 'if any one suspects me of heresy, let him proceed thither and prove, in presence of the pope and the doctors, if I ever entertained or taught any false or mistaken doctrine. If any man can convict me of having inculcated any doctrine contrary to the Christian faith, I will consent to undergo all	"A few days before his departure, in a paper affixed to the gates of the palace, he announced that he was about to depart, in order to justify himself before the council. 'So that,' said he, 'if any one suspects me of heresy, let him proceed thither and prove, in presence of the pope and the doctors, if I ever entertained or taught any false or mistaken doctrine. If any man can convict me of having inculcated any doctrine contrary to the Christian faith, I will consent to un-

the penalty to which heretics are liable. But I trust that God will not grant the victory to unbelievers — to men who outrage the truth.' "

dergo all the penalty to which heretics are liable. But I trust that God will not grant the victory to unbelievers — to men who outrage the truth.' "

In the lines which immediately follow those given above, in both Gillett and Bonnechose, Gillett has changed a few words of the translation of Bonnechose, much as one might change in copying without strict accuracy from an open volume.

GILLETT, Vol. I. p. 310. " Huss next announced his readiness to render an account of his faith in presence of the archbishop of Prague and his clergy. He then boldly applied for a certificate of his orthodoxy from the very person who, in virtue of his office, should have been most anxious to condemn him if he had believed him guilty, — the bishop of Nazareth, grand inquisitor of the diocese of Prague."

BONNECHOSE, Book II. ch. I. p. 49. " Huss next publicly announced that he was ready to render an account of his faith, in presence of the archbishop and his clergy; and then boldly applied for a certificate of his orthodoxy from the very person who, by his office, ought to be the most ardent to condemn him — from the bishop of Nazareth, the grand inquisitor of the diocese of Prague."

In both the above instances Gillett refers to " *Mon. Hussi*, i. 2," which he alludes to in the Preface (p. vi.) as " Johannis Hus, et Hieronomi Pragensis, Confessorum Christi, Historia et Monumenta." The proper title of the work is " Historiae et Monumentorum Joannis Hus atque Hieronymi Pragensis," etc., etc. Perhaps Dr. Gillett did not know that there was more than one edition of this work, and considered his access to the edition he used as what he calls one of his " rare opportunities "; for the above incorrect title and the " *Mon. Hussi*, i. 2," with other similar references on his pages, are the only means he affords for finding his authority. The edition used by us (" Norimbergensem, Johannis Montani et Ulrici Neuberi, — MDCCXV.") is paged differently from that used by Dr. Gillett, but bears references upon each page to the other edition. Dr. Gillett's " i. 2 " is equivalent to Vol. I. p. 3 of the edition before us.

We will quote the passage referred to, to show still more plainly that Dr. Gillett copied the translation of Bonnechose, instead of translating for himself.

" Significo praeterea toti Bohemia et omnibus Nationibus, me velle sisti primo quoque tempore coram Concilio Constantiae in celeberrimo loco, praesenti Papa, praesidente Papa, praesentibus denique omnibus, quicunque ad illum celeberrimum locum convenerint: Eo conferat pedem, quisquis suspicionem de me habuerit, quod aliena a fide Christi docuerim vel defenderim. Item, doceat ibi astante Papa, astantibus omnibus Theologiae Doctoribus, me ullo unquam tempore erroneam et falsam doctrinam sequutum esse et tenuisse.

"Porrò, si me de errore aliquo convicerit, et me aliena a fide Christi docuisse probaverit, non recusabo quascunque haeretici poenas ferre. Spero enim ex toto corde, quod Deus non daturus sit victoriam hominibus infidelibus, et qui ultro adversantur veritati.

"Eodem tempore misit Joannes Hus suos Procuratores ad Dominum Nicolaum Episcopum Nazarethensem, Inquisitorem haereticae pravitatis, civitatis et Dioecesis Pragensis, a sede Apostolica constitutum, eumque rogavit, si quid in eo erroris comperisset, ut publice significaret. Sed idem Episcopus," etc., etc.

We have no room for a long document following the above, the translation of which Gillett copied from the translator of Bonnechose, but will refer to that with similar passages farther on. On the next page of Dr. Gillett's book occurs a passage in which he copies the translation of Bonnechose, changing only a few words, and refers to "*Mon. Hussi*, i. 4," which is equivalent to Vol. I. p. 4 in both editions. Dr. Gillett might have varied by chance from Bonnechose, if he had been independent enough to translate for himself.

On page 312 of Vol. I., Gillett copies a detailed account from Bonnechose, and refers to Fleury, who merely alludes briefly to the point narrated. We give the three accounts. Gillett here also omits to tell what edition of Fleury he uses, referring simply to "Fleury, XXV. 403."

We have, however, identified the passage by other references. The edition before us is "Paris, MDCCLI.," in thirty six volumes, with a Table in addition, of one volume.

Gillett, Vol. I. p. 312. "A few days later, Huss asked permission to appear before a general assembly of the clergy of Prague, presided over by the archbishop. He offered to establish his innocence by Scripture, by the holy canons of the church, and by the fathers; but his application was refused."

Bonnechose, Book II. ch. I. p. 50. "A few days after, Huss asked for permission to appear before a general assembly of the clergy of Prague, presided over by the archbishop. He offered to establish his innocence by Scripture, by the holy canons of the Church, and by the Fathers; but his application was refused, and he was not admitted."

Fleury, *Histoire Eccles.* (Paris, MDCCLI.,) Tome XXI. p. 214, § cxix. "Il demanda aussi à l'évêque de Nazereth inquisiteur, s'il n'avoit rien à proposer contre lui, et il en reçut un temoignage favorable, mais s'étant presenté à la cour de l'archevêque, qui avoit convoqué une assemblée contre lui, on lui en refusa l'entrée, et on ne voulut pas l'écouter."

The next two passages are followed, in both Bonnechose and Gillett, by the parting words of Jerome to Huss; Gillett copying from Bonnechose, but referring to "*L'Enfant*, XIII.," a sign which we are unable to interpret.

GILLETT, Vol. I. pp. 312, 313.	BONNECHOSE, Book II. ch. I. p. 50.
"In the month of October, 1414, Huss bade adieu to his chapel at Bethlehem, where his voice was never more to be heard, and to his faithful friends and disciples, some of whom were to follow him in his path of self-denial, suffering, and martyrdom. He left behind him his faithful companion and bosom friend, Jerome, and the scene of parting was one of deep emotion on the part of each. . . . . Several other noble barons joined the escort. John de Chlum was one of the most devoted adherents of the reformer, and his life offers a pure model of the most touching and devoted friendship. His name in the eyes of posterity is inseparably associated with that of Huss."	"In the month of October, 1414, Huss bade adieu to his chapel of Bethlehem, which he was no more to behold, and to his friends and disciples. He left behind his faithful Jerome, and their parting was not without emotion. . . . . John Huss was accompanied by several noble barons, Henry de Latzembach, Wenceslaus Duba, and John de Chlum. The life of this last offers a pure model of the most touching and most devoted friendship; and his name, in the eyes of posterity, is inseparable from that of John Huss."

On page 316, Vol. I., Gillett, beginning to copy the English translation of Bonnechose's translation of a letter of Huss, refers to "*Mon. Hussi*, i. Epis. ii. p. 57." The correct reference is, Epis. I. Vol. I. p. 57 (*in both editions*). Then, after copying the letter from Bonnechose, he concludes as the two following passages will show. And after this is a page inspired by a paragraph of Bonnechose, in which Bonnechose's words are used here and there.

GILLETT, Vol. I. p. 317.	BONNECHOSE, Book I. ch. I. p. 51.
"He concludes by making some bequests, and disposing, as if by will, of several articles which belonged to him; and then, on the cover of the letter, he adds this prophetic phrase, 'I conjure thee, my friend, not to break this seal till thou art fully certified of my death.'"	"He concludes by making some bequests, and disposing, as if by will, of several articles which belonged to him, and then, on the cover of the letter, he adds this prophetic phrase; 'I conjure thee, my friend, not to break this seal until thou shalt have acquired the certitude that I am dead.'"

Another shameful instance of wholesale plagiarism occurs in Vol. I. pp. 324, 325. The parallel passage in Bonnechose is to be found in Book I. ch. II. p. 53.

All the passages from Gillett which we have given thus far are from a single chapter, Ch. XII. Vol. I. This chapter covers twenty-four pages, and is in great part transferred bodily from Bonnechose, but no reference to this author is contained in it. The chapter ends with a short but characteristic plagiarism, as follows, in which Dr. Gillett adorns his stolen goods with fictitious ornaments.

Gillett, Vol. I. p. 327. "The thoughtful observer turns his eye away from all the pageantry and pomp that allure the senses, to the humble dwelling of a poor widow, whom Huss compares to her of Sarepta, who received Elijah. In her house the Bohemian reformer found a welcome refuge, if not a secure asylum."

Bonnechose, Book II. ch. I. p. 52. "Huss arrived at Constance on November 3d. He put up at the house of a poor widow, whom he compares to her of Sarepta, who received Elijah. But if she offered him a refuge, she could not insure him an asylum. However, he was not molested for several days."

The next chapter, XIII., begins with plagiarisms to which we shall refer in our final list. Turning to the latter part of the chapter, we find other cases of double fraud. After copying several lines from Bonnechose, Dr. Gillett refers to "*Mon. Hussi*, i. 6"; he then continues for half a page borrowing the ideas and words of Bonnechose, and murdering his style. The whole of the next paragraph in Gillett, which we give below, is taken, with a few words changed, from Bonnechose, but our plagiarist here thinks fit to refer briefly to "*L'Enfant*, 38," which is a most indefinite direction. The proper and full reference is, L'Enfant, *Hist. Conc. de Const.* (Amsterdam, MDCCXIV.), Tome I. Liv. I. p. 38, § XL. It will be noticed that L'Enfant does not put the story into the dramatic form, but that our plagiary adopts this form from Bonnechose.

Gillett, Vol. I. pp. 348, 349. "Chlum hastened to the pope to inform him of what had taken place, and to remonstrate with him on the violation of his promise. He exhorted him not so unworthily to disregard his plighted faith. John XXIII. declared that he had done nothing against Huss, and, pointing to the cardinals and bishops, exclaimed, 'Why do you impute anything to me, when you well know that I am myself here in their power?'"

Bonnechose, Book II. ch. III. p. 58. "He hastened to the pope to inform him of what had passed; he reminded him of the promise which his holiness had made to him and Henry de Latzembach together, and called on him not to break his plighted faith so unworthily. The pope declared that he had not done anything against John Huss; and pointing to the cardinals and bishops, exclaimed—'Why do you impute anything to me, when you know well that I am myself here in their power?'"

L'ENFANT, *Histoire Conc. de Constance* (Amsterdam, MDCCXIV.), Tome I. Liv. I. p. 38, § XL. "Jean de Chlum courut aussitôt au Pape pour lui en faire des plaintes, comme d'une violation manifeste de la foi publique et de sa propre parole. Mais le Pape en rejetta la faute sur les Cardinaux, et sur les Evêques, ajoûtant qu'il était lui-même entre les mains de ces gens-là."

Turning now to Ch. XVII., we find one of the very few instances in which Bonnechose is referred to. Here Gillett really refers to the place in Bonnechose whence he has taken almost a page. But there is deceit even upon this page. Dr. Gillett here appears to be guilty of a worse falsehood than any of which we have yet convicted him. He copies almost a page of the very words of the translation of Bonnechose, referring to Bonnechose, to be sure, but only for the first few lines; and then, for some curious facts in the midst of his copy from Bonnechose, this reckless plagiarist declares by his notes that the credit is due to "*Mon. Hussi.*" But this work does not even allude to the facts Dr. Gillett pretends to get from it!

The passages are as follows: —

GILLETT, Vol. I. p. 470. "Since his arrival in the city, he had mingled, without being known, with the crowds of people about the streets, and had overheard disastrous intelligence. It was said that John Huss would not be admitted into the presence of the council; that he would be judged and condemned in secret, that he would leave his prison only to die. Jerome was struck with alarm, and thought that all was lost." (*Here Dr. Gillett refers to Bonnechose.*) "A violent terror seized on him, and he took to flight as suddenly as he had come. It is even stated, so precipitate was his departure, that he left his sword at the inn where he had alighted." (*Here Dr. Gillett refers to Mon. Hussi.*) "The news of his arrival had already spread abroad, and he was searched for in every direction. But it was soon ascertained that he had left the city.

"By the aid and counsel of his friends, the Bohemian magnates, he withdrew to the neighboring free city of Uberlingen. Here deeming himself more secure," etc., etc., etc.

BONNECHOSE, Book II. ch. VII. p. 72. "He arrived in that city on April 4th, and mingling, without being known, with the crowd of people, he overheard disastrous intelligence. It was said that John Huss would not be admitted into the presence of the council — that he would be judged and condemned in secret — that he would leave his prison only to die. Jerome was struck with alarm, and thought that all was lost. A violent terror seized on him, and he took to flight as suddenly as he had come. It is even stated, so precipitate was his flight, that he left his sword behind him at the inn where he had alighted. The news of his arrival had already begun to be spread abroad, and search was made for him in every direction; when it was ascertained, almost at the same time as his arrival, that he had departed. Jerome did not stop until he had arrived at Uberlingen. There, deeming himself more in security," etc., etc., etc.

Gillett refers to "*Mon. Hussi*, ii. 349, 354," in which number of pages only a few lines speak of the departure of Jerome, and in these few lines, which we give below, no mention can be found of "precipitate . . . . departure," or "his sword at the inn."

In the edition of the "Monumentorum" before us, p. 522 is equivalent to p. 349 of the edition used by Gillett. On p. 522 is the following:—

> "Sponte et liberè venit Constantiam . . . ., ibique videns audientiam pro tunc dicto Magistro Joanni Hus denegari et sibi insidias positas undiquaque: Inde in crastinum recessit Iberlingam, Imperii civitatem, unum milliare a Constantia distantem: et ab inde scripsit," etc.

The three following pages Gillett copies from Bonnechose, and perpetrates another double fraud, in referring to L'Enfant, whose account does not contain all that Gillett takes from Bonnechose.

On the next two pages we find another case in which Gillett tries to mislead his readers with regard to his authority. He copies a speech of Jerome's to the Council, from Bonnechose, and refers to L'Enfant. His note is "L'Enfant, i. 183."

From p. 476 to p. 479, Gillett continues his easy task as copyist, but on p. 479, in the full current of Bonnechose, he refers to another author, "*Van* der Hardt," by which he means Von der Hardt. This error of using "Van" for Von is repeated continually through both volumes. It even occurs in the Preface (p. vi.). By comparison of the English passages with the Latin of Von der Hardt, it will be seen that, although Dr. Gillett stole the translation of Bonnechose for three quarters of a page, he corrected it in a single phrase. Bonnechose says, "so as to force him to hold down his head." Gillett says, translating one word from Von der Hardt, "compelling him to incline his head forward and downward." It is refreshing to see even so small a spark of accuracy in these dark, uncertain volumes.

Let us now turn for a moment to the second volume, for we have neither time nor inclination to bestow upon this the attention we have given the first volume. Having proved Dr. Gillett to be guilty of so much, it is wearisome to pursue him further.

On pp. 74, 75, Dr. Gillett copies a full page from Bonnechose.

In the next passages, Gillett has put together two paragraphs copied from different pages of Bonnechose.

Here is a stolen description of Zisca, in which the slight changes from the original, as in other passages, seem to betray Dr. Gillett's sense of his own dishonesty.

GILLETT, Vol. II. pp. 370, 371.	BONNECHOSE, Book V. ch. III. pp. 157, 158.
"Never did any man unite in him-	"Never did any man unite

self qualities more eminently fitting him to be at once the head of a party, and the leader of an army. His genius for planning a campaign or assault was only equalled by his prompt energy in putting his plan into execution. He understood perfectly the art of rendering himself the master of the minds of the multiltude. Bohemia was in arms for the communion of the cup. He holds up a sacramental cup before the army, and tells them to behold their standard. He has no troops but infantry. By an unexpected assault he surprises the army of the emperor, and carries off a thousand horses, thus at once providing himself with cavalry. He is without a fortified town to afford security to his troops. He ascends a high mountain with his soldiers, and there addresses them: 'Do you want houses? Set up your tents here, and make your camp your city.' The thing is done, and Tabor is at once a fortress. From its impregnable heights Zisca can defy his foe. Hither, moreover, he may always securely retreat. Cromwell's Ironsides could not surpass Zisca's soldiers. The latter also felt the inspiration of their leader's words — words derived from Scripture, and glowing with the enthusiasm which it inspired."

in his own person to a higher degree all the qualities requisite for the leader of an army and the head of a party. No one on the field of battle had more genius for conceiving a plan, or more determination and promptitude in carrying it into execution: none also better knew the art of gaining mastery over men, of striking their imagination, of attaining his object by popular resolutions and sudden and decisive movements. Bohemia was in arms for the communion with the cup. Ziska exhibits a sacramental cup to his army, and tells them that they behold their standard. He has no troops but infantry; by an unexpected attempt he carries off a thousand horses from the emperor, and is at once supplied with cavalry. He possesses no fortresses: he ascends a lofty mountain with his soldiers. 'Do you want houses,' says he to them, 'dress your tents here, and let this camp be speedily converted into a town.' Such was his fortress, and thus was founded the impregnable Tabor. In his proclamations and letters, Ziska showed himself, as Cromwell did afterwards, a warrior using the glowing language of the Bible, whom nothing could stop, and who provided for every case."

Immediately after this description there follows, in both Bonnechose and Gillett, a long letter of Zisca's, introduced by Bonnechose thus: "He wrote thus to the inhabitants of Tausch"; and by Gillett, thus: "To the inhabitants of Tausch he writes." Then, although he copies this letter, which fills a page, from Bonnechose, Dr. Gillett has the audacity to refer to "*L'Enfant's Guerre des Hus.*, i. 93."

Further on Dr. Gillett makes a curious variation in his plagiarism. He copies a page from Bonnechose, and refers to some one else, as usual, for a curious fact which he has taken with the rest from Bonnechose, but, contrary to his custom, he puts a fine sentiment from Bonnechose into quotation-marks, without, to be sure, telling where he gets it. We give the last part of the page containing this mixture.

Gillett, Vol. II. p. 546. "Gathering his bravest men around him, Procopius threw himself into the thickest of the fight, and made a manful stand against the hostile squadrons. But he was at last overcome by numbers, and, amid the unceasing shower of darts by which he was overwhelmed, he fell pierced by an unknown hand, '*tired of conquering, rather than vanquished.*' Procopius the Less also fell in this terrible battle, and the prophecy of Sigismund" (here Dr. Gillett refers to *Menzel*, ii. 177) "was fulfilled, that 'the Bohemians will only be conquered by themselves.'

"The Taborites never recovered from this defeat," etc.

Bonnechose, Book V. ch. IV. p. 170. "Then Procopius, with his bravest men, to whom he had given the name of the fraternal cohort, threw themselves into the very thick of the squadrons of the enemy, and beat them back: but surrounded at last on all sides, overwhelmed by an unceasing shower of darts, he fell, pierced by an unknown hand, *tired of conquering, rather than vanquished.* The other Procopius also perished in this famous battle, in which the word of the emperor was accomplished: — 'The Bohemians will be conquered only by themselves.'

"The Taborites never recovered from this defeat," etc.

The last instance which we shall notice of Dr. Gillett's plagiarism is a long and curious one. He copies, Vol. II. pp. 548, 549, with variations, half a page from Bonnechose, referring to no authority; then, still copying from Bonnechose, puts half a page in quotation marks and refers to "*Cochleius*, 312," and continues for several lines in the words of Bonnechose, referring to no one.

The following references will furnish the curious reader with a summary of the additional evidence concerning Dr. Gillett's dishonest use of Bonnechose.

Compare —

Gillett, Vol. I. pp. 308, 309	with Bonnechose, Book II. ch. II. p. 53.
" " p. 311 (Document)	" " " ch. I. p. 49.

In this case (p. 311) Dr. Gillett has succeeded in correcting a date of the translation of Bonnechose.

Compare —

Gillett, Vol. I. pp. 314, 315 (Document, etc.)	with Bonnechose, Bk. II. ch. I. p. 50.
" " 316–318	" " " " 51.
" " 322 (Speech)	" " " " 52
" " 328, 329	" " " " 52.
" " 343 (Speech, etc.)	" " " ch. III. p. 56.
" " 347	" " " " 57.
" " 471, 472 (Document, etc.)	" " " ch. VII. p. 73.
" Vol. II. p. 544	" " Bk. V. ch. IV. p. 169.
" " 551	" " " " 172.

Among the pages just referred to may be found translations of long documents which Dr. Gillett has copied from Bonnechose; and it will be observed that Dr. Gillett's omissions in various parts of these documents are the same as those of Bonnechose. There is more ease than honor in such a course. His corrections here and there show, to be sure, that he glanced at some of the authorities which he parades in his notes, but we cannot believe that he verified all the details from Bonnechose in which he has indulged so freely. The cause of his complaint, in his Preface, of the inaccuracy of Bonnechose, is very evident; for in copying that author's words, Dr. Gillett must have been put to continual inconvenience, even with his loose literary conscience, by the necessity of correcting Bonnechose by other historians. And it is simply revolting to hear him complain in his Preface, that "on some important points the work is quite meagre," when we know how much he has stolen. "The whole account of the life of Huss" in Bonnechose, he grumbles, previous to the Council of Constance, "is despatched in a few pages"; but as soon as Bonnechose begins to elaborate, Gillett begins to copy. When he copies from Bonnechose, without giving credit to that estimable author, he disgusts us, and when he varies from Bonnechose, we wish that he had continued to copy.

We trust that it will be long before we have to expose another such disgrace to American scholarship as has been brought upon it by these volumes.

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3. — *Treatise on Grand Military Operations. Illustrated by a Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great. With a Summary of the most important Principles of the Art of War.* By Baron de Jomini. Translated by Col. S. B. Holabird, A. D. C., U. S. Army. In Two Volumes, with an Atlas. New York: B. Van Nostrand. 1865.

In the last four years we have read many newspapers and few books. Now newspapers have suddenly ceased to be interesting, by reason of the astonishing suddenness with which the war has come to an end. Books will be read in the coming days by many who have had little leisure, and by many who have had little inclination for them, since the war began. Among these many readers will be some who will be disposed to study the military history of the war. We are all of us ready to do full justice to the bravery of our soldiers; but we know that the Southern soldiers have fought as bravely as our own, and there are few men of any reading who do not know that battles have often been lost, not in America alone, but in every country and every age, by brave soldiers, bravely led. To those who wish to know how this may be, to those who wish to understand the principles of the art of war, these volumes will be very welcome. They are the work of an author whose ability is universally admitted. They are respectably translated, and presented to us in an attractive form. For a concise description of them, and of their object, we may well refer to the author's Preface, and give the substance of its opening paragraphs.

The work embraces a critical history of the campaigns of Frederick the Great. Those who read merely as an agreeable pastime will find the narrative of the Seven Years' War minute and tedious. The work is intended for those who desire to instruct themselves, for whom too many details cannot be given, since these enable them to seize and understand both the small and great combinations of the trade of war.

The statement of Jomini, that this work was not likely to interest those who read merely as an agreeable pastime, is still more true for Americans in the latter half of the nineteenth century, than it was for Europeans in the earlier half. The campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington, the Crimean war, the Italian war, and the great Rebellion in this country, have absorbed our attention, and few among us have more than a vague idea of the wars of Frederick the Great. The names of his great battles strike harshly on our unaccustomed ears. The names of Marathon and Pharsalia and Cannæ are more familiar to us than Kunersdorf and Zorndorf and Torgau. And yet at these last-named places great armies were arrayed against each other, and there was more terrible bloodshed than even our experience has paralleled. At Zorndorf, out of seventy-six thousand combatants, twenty-eight thousand were killed or wounded. At Kunersdorf, out of forty thousand men, the Prussians lost twenty thousand. The loss of the Russians and Austrians was upwards of nineteen thousand.

Though the wars of Frederick excite far less interest than the wars of Napoleon, this work is more attractive than the author's Life of Napoleon, for there is more coloring in its descriptions. It is full of instruction, and of the highest value for the student of the art of war. The author treats the successive campaigns of Frederick, giving first a general sketch of each campaign, then an account of the operations and battles, then observations upon the campaign, and, finally, such maxims as the events he has just narrated seem to illustrate. There is no more convenient method of briefly giving an idea of the book, than to describe his treatment of the campaign which ended with the battle of Leuthen, the second period of the campaign of 1757. He describes the position of the Prussians under the King and the Duke of Bevern, and of the Austrians under Prince Charles and Nadasty, and sets forth the purposes of each side, the manœuvres employed by each to attain his own end or to defeat the attempts of his opponent, and the skirmishes, sieges, and battles to which they led, ending with the indecisive battle of Breslau. The King was then many marches distant from the beaten army of the Duke of Bevern. Jomini describes the movements by which he effected a junction with that army, the skill with which he revived the courage and the hopes of his troops, and the preparations for battle which he immediately made. Frederick's order of battle is given in full, and contains the names, not of the generals only, but of the battalions also, as they were arranged. The march of the Prussian army is minutely described, and a clear account is given of the memorable battle of Leuthen, which was gained by the King, with a loss to the Austrians of some fifty thousand men. The author regards this battle as an epoch in the annals of the military art. The line of the Prussian army was in an oblique direction, relatively to that of the Austrians. That oblique order, Jomini says, in the estimation of well-instructed military men, decided the battle, as it ought to have done, in favor of the Prussians. The description of these operations is followed by a discussion of the military principles involved in them, and by a review of the criticisms to which they have been subjected by other military writers. It is in such "observations" as these that the great value of the book consists. They follow all the great groups of events. In the chapter before us, the following propositions are laid down and illustrated: —

"Lines of operation have their key, as well as fields of battle."

"Small armies should always act in mass."

"A double line of operations is good, when the enemy has formed the same; provided that the latter are exterior and a greater distance apart than the former, and that they cannot be united without fighting."

"Single interior lines of operation are always the most sure; for they permit action *en masse* against the isolated divisions of the enemy, if they be so imprudent as to engage."

"The principle of all combinations in war consists in putting in action, upon the most important point of the line of operations, or of an attack, more forces than the enemy. It may be arrived at by marches, by strategic manœuvres, or by the choice of orders of attack.

"It is not the troops borne upon the rolls of an army, nor even those upon the ground, which gain battles, but those only who fight, — those put in action upon the decisive points.

"The secret of war does not exist in men's legs, but in the head which sets their legs in motion. An army might uselessly make forced marches throughout a campaign; for if their direction be faulty, these will lead to no result."

Throughout the book important maxims of this sort may be found, accompanied by the weightiest reasoning upon all military questions; for example, the proper use to be made of the order *en potence,* — the liability of an army immovably fixed in its position to be turned or overwhelmed upon one extremity, — the use of villages as a means of covering defensive positions, — the secrecy necessary to the success of attacks to be made on one extremity of the enemy's line, and the best modes of attaining such secrecy, — the duties of an army covering a siege, — the course to be pursued by an army foreseeing an attack, or an attempt to turn one of its flanks, — the advantages to be gained by the commander of an army which is superior in the skill of manœuvring, from attacking the enemy when he is in march, — observations upon different orders of march, — maxims concerning magazines, — the inferiority of the parallel to the oblique order, — maxims upon isolated attacks, — the danger of attacking a line at the same time on both of its extremities, unless the attacking party is greatly superior in numbers, — the uselessness of a front attack when a concentrated effort can be made against one extremity of a line, — the true method of covering a siege, — the directions of march possible to a retreating army, — the mode of drawing off an enemy from an advantageous position, &c.

There are two chapters to which the especial attention of the student may well be turned; — the fourteenth, which contains general observations upon lines of operation, maxims of this important branch of the art of war, and definitions of lines of operation considered as those of manœuvre; and the thirty-fifth, which contains a masterly exposition of the general principles of the art of war.

"These principles are unchangeable. . . . . While comparing the causes of the victories of ancient and modern times, we are greatly surprised to discover that the battles of Wagram, Pharsalia, and Cannæ were gained from the same original cause."

A faithful study of these twenty pages will do more for correcting erroneous ideas and giving correct ones upon military matters, than reading the letters of special correspondents and army chaplains and intelligent privates for four years of war.

A very large part of the book is made up of comparisons between the operations recorded and the actual system of war, as developed by the author. We need feel no hesitation to accept the system of Jomini as correct. It will be an interesting and useful occupation for the American student of the art of war to provide himself with accurate statements of the movements made by each side in our principal battles, and then to see how far these operations conform to, or depart from, the true principles of the art, as laid down by Jomini, and how far success followed conformity, and how far failure followed departure. He may examine General McClellan's plan of battle at the Antietam, as stated by him in his Report, and ask himself whether our victory might not have been more decisive, if our army of eighty-seven thousand men had not been (substantially) formed into two corps for the purpose of attacking the two extremities of an army, not only equal, but, according to the Report, superior in numbers. He may reflect upon the battle of Chancellorsville, and see whether the disastrous result of that battle was not owing to General Hooker's not knowing how to engage his masses after bringing them skilfully to bear on the extremity of General Lee's line. "Whenever we become established upon the desired points and rest in inaction, the true principle is lost sight of. The enemy may then make counter-manœuvres, and in order to deprive him of the power of doing this, whenever we gain one of his extremities, we must march upon and combat him." (Vol. II. p. 453.) He may read the remarks upon the parallel order of battle (Vol. I. pp. 205 – 208), and see whether it was not in great measure because the Northern and Southern armies were arranged in the earlier battles of the war precisely in the manner there condemned, that so many of those battles were indecisive, and yet attended with fearful slaughter. He may compare the position of the Russians at Kunersdorf with that of our army at Gettysburg, and, observing the resemblance between these two great battles, he may read with peculiar profit the observations of Jomini upon the former. Calling to mind the successful career of Stonewall Jackson, he will see how many of the victories of that General were due to the celerity and secrecy with which he placed himself upon an extremity of an opponent's line, or the impetuosity with which he broke through a weak part of a line too much lengthened.

How far the decaying interest of the reading world in the history of Frederick may be restored by Carlyle's work, it is a little too early to say. His Life of Frederick can hardly prove as interesting as his History of the French Revolution. A hundred years is a long time. The last hundred years, crowded with events, have been a very long time. New interests occupy our thoughts.

We are less likely than Jomini's first readers to turn to the story of Lignitz, and Leuthen, and Prague, and Kunersdorf, and Torgau, and Kollin, and Zorndorf, "as an agreeable pastime"; but these volumes, with their excellent Atlas, cannot be too highly recommended to those who wish to study the art of war. Such students will find in them the most important principles of the art clearly laid down, and illustrated by striking examples, — examples of success attending obedience to those principles, and failure following departure from them.

4. — *History of the Romans under the Empire.* By Charles Merivale, B. D. From the Fourth London Edition. In seven volumes. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1863 – 64.

The general merits of Mr. Merivale's History have been noticed at considerable length in this Review. The New York reprint is very welcome just at this time, when the cost of foreign books is an embargo to students of moderate means, and when it is a patriotic duty not to buy any English books. It is only a pity that the American publishers have not made their edition better than the English, by having the work carefully revised and such occasional corrections made as are obviously needed. Of course justice to the author requires the main features of the book to be left as they are. But a writer of Mr. Merivale's cast of mind now and then strays away from his authorities on minor points, and forgets in his eloquent episodes the duties of a cold and sober criticism. The attentive reader, who follows up the book page by page, examining the authorities, will find much to correct. Among other things, in the original edition the Greek citations are sometimes printed execrably. This is probably due to the author's living at some distance from his printers; in the American reprint these errors should have been corrected. Other blemishes here and there to be noticed, which are evidently slips of the author's own pen, might have been corrected with equal ease. When the "quaestores homicidii" are mentioned, it would be easy to alter it to *quaestores parricidii*. When he speaks of the "band of young nobles entitled Augustani," it would be a trifling matter to alter it to the correct form, *Augustiani*, given by Suetonius and the improved texts of Tacitus. When he says "Anicetus dropped a dagger at the feet of Agerinus," he misunderstands the language of Tacitus (*Ann.* 14, 7), where *ipse* refers to Nero, not to Anicetus; and he does not notice the statement of Suetonius (*Nero*, 34), who says distinctly that it was Nero, not Anicetus, who dropped the dagger. To history it does not make much difference whether the dagger was dropped by Anicetus or by Nero. But it is just as easy to have it right as to have it wrong.

If the corrections required were nothing but verbal ones, like the above, it would hardly be necessary to make the book the subject of another notice. But sometimes the misunderstanding of a passage, or even of a word, leads to incorrect accounts, which require the broad-axe rather than the pruning-knife. We will show what we mean by considering a couple of passages from Mr. Merivale's fifth volume, premising that in finding fault with single points we have no wish to make any unfair insinuations against his general merits as an historian; for "quotation-mistakes, inadvertency, expedition, and human lapses may make not only moles but warts in learned authors, who notwithstanding, being judged by the capital matter, admit not of disparagement."

In the fifth volume the author says: "After all the plodding industry he [Claudius] manifested, he was accused, not perhaps without foundation, of giving sentence often with only one side heard, sometimes with neither." Then he adds in a note: —

> "Senec. *Apocol.* 12: Quo non alius
> Potuit citius discere causas
> Una tantum parte audita
> Saepe et neutra.

"*The satirist is copied or confirmed by Suetonius* in saying that Claudius put to death in the course of his reign thirty senators and above three hundred knights. The numbers may readily be suspected. We may remember the three hundred whom, according to one account, Cæsar slew after Thapsus, the three hundred killed by Antonius at Brundusium, the three hundred killed by Octavius at Perusia."

Probably all that the author means here is the general fact that Suetonius copies or confirms Seneca in saying that a great many judicial murders were committed in the reign of Claudius. But owing to the looseness of his language, we might infer that the numbers of Suetonius were taken directly from Seneca, and that there was something in the round and to the Romans favorite number three hundred that appealed to the imagination of both writers. Looking at the authorities we find the following statements: —

Seneca says (*ibid.* 14): "Occisos senatores XXX., equites R. CC., ceteros CCXXI."

Suetonius says (*Claud.* 29): "In quinque et triginta senatores, trecentosque amplius equites R. . . . animadvertit."

According to Seneca *thirty* senators and *two hundred* knights; according to Suetonius *thirty-five* senators and *more than three hundred* knights. There is no doubt about the text in either author. Obviously then it is not quite correct to say that Seneca is *either copied or confirmed* by Suetonius. The exact number three hundred, or more than three hundred, is indeed suspicious. But there is no need of Mr. Merivale's historic parallels to refute it. If Seneca, the panegyrist of Nero, who had been banished from the court of Claudius, who owed his recall to Agrippina and his boundless wealth to Nero, only puts the number at two hundred, there is little need of speculating about Suetonius's larger number. For Seneca had every reason to load the name of Claudius with odium by making the number as large as possible, and Suetonius's number must be viewed as a groundless exaggeration:

although that the number was not small is proved by the hyperbole of Tacitus, who says that whole armies (*agmina*) of knights were condemned to death under Claudius (*Ann.* 13, 43).

The second illustration shall be a story as familiar as any in Roman history, the incidents connected with the death of the Emperor Claudius: and here the "quotation-mistakes, inadvertency, expedition, and human lapses" will force us to discuss Mr. Merivale's narrative and the authorities it is founded on with considerable detail.

Everybody knows that Claudius was killed at the instigation of his wife Agrippina, in order to secure the succession to her own son Nero, and killed by poison administered in the mushroom which the historians and the verse of Juvenal and Martial have made historical. Of course the Empress's policy would be to throw a veil over these dark doings of the court, and to keep the tongues of her few chosen confidants under close control. But suspicions and rumors she could not wholly stifle; and hence the conflicting accounts which, according to Suetonius, went abroad as to the manner of his death. Moreover, while she inherited from her mother Agrippina very few of those virtues which made Agrippina the elder the idol of the people and the soldiers, she did inherit one striking trait, her mother's ungovernable temper and daring imprudence of speech. On more than one occasion, — if we are to credit Tacitus (*Ann.* 13, 14 and 21), — she betrayed her own secret. We may therefore conclude that Tacitus is right in saying that the historians of the period were able before long to give a pretty circumstantial account of the transaction.

The authorities for the last incidents of Claudius's life are Seneca, Tacitus, Suetonius, Dion, and Josephus. Of these Seneca would be the best witness, since he was a contemporary and in all probability personally cognizant of the facts, were it not that his relation to Nero and the nature of the occasion for which he writes put him very much on his guard: the *Ludus de Morte Claudii*, a satirical composition describing the advent of Claudius to the lower world, was probably written for the amusement of the court on the Saturnalia next following the death of the Emperor, about two months after that event. As to the manner of his death it gives no information, and merely confirms the date of the death as reported by other authors. Tacitus and Suetonius are better sources of information. It is pretty well established that while Suetonius had the earlier work of Tacitus, the Histories, before him in writing the biographies of Galba and his successors, he was not acquainted with the Annals; nay, Tacitus himself, on the contrary, seems to have used Suetonius's biographies of the first Emperors, including Nero, for the Annals. If this is so, the incidents of Claudius's reign recorded by Suetonius and not recorded by Tacitus are to be taken with some hesitation. What Tacitus gives is the residuum, after a critical sifting of Suetonius and the historians of the period. Of the remaining writers, Dion, or his epitomist Xiphilinus, supplies some incidents and confirms others, and his testimony is valuable, as he follows neither Tacitus nor Suetonius; while the Jewish contemporary of Claudius, Josephus, merely says in general terms that Claudius was poisoned by Agrippina, without any particulars.

Taking the brief story of Tacitus, then, as our guide, let us see how Mr. Merivale has used this historian.

Where did Claudius spend the last months or weeks of his life, and where was the crime committed? The true answer to this question was given as long ago as the time of Goldsmith; it has been given by as recent a historian as Hoeck; still it is among those traditional errors which appear from time to time in history, that Agrippina removed Claudius away from Rome to Sinuessa in Campania, for greater security. In Smith's Dictionary of Biography, for example, it is bluntly stated in the biography of Agrippina that Claudius was killed at Sinuessa. Mr. Merivale is somewhat more cautious, but at the same time more vague. In his marginal heading he says, "*Decline* of Claudius," and continues in the text: "Claudius, now in his sixty-fourth year, and *exhausted with affairs* at least as much as by the intemperance in which he is said to have indulged, *fell sick at Rome, and was induced to quit his constant station in the city* — for he alone of all the Roman Emperors seems to have denied himself the customary relaxation of occasional retreat to baths and suburban villas — *for the medicinal air and water of Sinuessa.* Agrippina, we are assured, had long determined to hasten *his still lingering end,* and precipitate by a crime the advent of her son to power."

Mr. Merivale leaves Claudius therefore sick at the waters of Sinuessa, and then, after speaking of the frequency of poisoning at Rome and the agents employed to poison Claudius, comes back to him again and speaks of him as dying at Rome. How he is spirited away from Sinuessa and made to turn up in the palace of the Cæsars to die, Mr. Merivale leaves in the dark.

What is the authority for the "*Decline* of Claudius" and his retreat to the "medicinal air and water of Sinuessa"? Mr. Merivale gives three references, — to Strabo, Pliny, and Martial. But these passages merely show that the waters of Sinuessa had certain medicinal properties. *There is not a particle of evidence that Claudius was in a decline, or that at the time of his death he was not in very good health.* Suetonius says distinctly (c. 31) that, while his health was infirm in his younger years, it was good while he was Emperor, with the exception of an affection of the stomach, which led him at one time to think of suicide. But this disease occurred not at the very end of his life, but some time before. Neither can it be argued — and this Mr. Merivale to be sure does not attempt — from his making his will, (Suet. 44), that his health was broken down; for this precaution was taken only for fear of Agrippina, of whose true character and ambitious aims he became fully aware toward the end of his life.

The truth is, Mr. Merivale is misled by a careless use of his Tacitus. In the Annals (12, 65) the historian dilates on Narcissus's opposition to Agrippina, sets forth his anxieties and his full assurance that he would be put to death, whether Nero or Britannicus succeeded to the throne. "Thus speaking," continues Tacitus, "he embraced Britannicus, prayed that he might speedily grow to manhood, might drive off his father's enemies, and punish his mother's murderers. While *oppressed by this load of care, he is taken sick and goes to Sinuessa* to recruit his strength by the mildness of the air and the healthful properties of the waters."

It was Narcissus therefore, Claudius's favorite freedman and factotum, not Claudius, who was "exhausted with affairs." It was Narcissus, not Claudius, who quitted his "station in the city for Sinuessa." And Tacitus goes on in immediate continuation: "Then Agrippina, long bent on crime and hastily availing herself of the proffered chance," [by which he means the absence of Narcissus,] "and with agents enough to help her, deliberated what kind of poison to use," &c.

This passage of Tacitus is interesting as showing how long a spurious reading may be causelessly perpetuated. In the older texts of Tacitus, in fact in texts as recent and as respectable as those of Walther, Immanuel Bekker, and Döderlein, the word "Claudius" is foisted upon the sentence, thus wrenching the verb from Narcissus to Claudius. In the second Medicean manuscript, the sole basis of the last books of the Annals, no "Claudius" is found. It is found only in one inferior Vatican manuscript, transcribed at Genoa as late as 1448, and is a mere gloss added by some copyist who misunderstood the context.

The testimony of Dion (60, 34), whose unimportant discrepancies prove that he does not copy Tacitus, entirely confirms the genuine text, if any confirmation were needed. After giving his account of Claudius's death, Dion says, "Now Agrippina made haste to do this because *she had previously sent Narcissus to Campania*," [i. e. to Sinuessa,] "under pretence of his using the waters there for his gout, since in his presence she never could have done this. So faithful a guardian of his master was he."

It would be extremely interesting, if we had the histories of Cluvius or Fabius Rusticus or other writers of the time, to follow up the details of the historical mushroom a little further than Mr. Merivale undertakes to do. Tacitus unfortunately does not inform us exactly where the poison was administered, while Suetonius gives us too much information. "Where it was given," he says, "or by whom, is differently reported. Some say it was administered to him, *epulanti in arce cum sacerdotibus*, by the eunuch Halotus, the [imperial] foretaster; others, at a banquet in the palace, by Agrippina herself, who had set before him a poisoned mushroom, a dish of which he was passionately fond." The date of his death, some time between the night of the 12th and noon of the 13th of October, might seem at first sight to make the former account credible. The 12th of October, the day when the poison was administered, was, as we learn from the Calendar of Amiternum, a high state festival, the last and greatest day of a festival of eight days' duration, established in honor of Augustus's happy return from the provinces beyond the sea. This would account for the Emperor's taking part with the priests in a great public festival. But apart from the extreme improbability of the poison being given on so public an occasion, "the prince of pictorial writers," as Mr. Merivale somewhere calls Tacitus, would hardly have failed to mention the public festival, if he had believed in it. In his subsequent account of the death of Britannicus, Tacitus mentions it as an awful aggrävation of the crime, that the young prince was poisoned during the sacred moments of supper (*inter sacra mensae*). Now this was at an ordinary domestic festival in the palace. How much more dramatic an incident for the irony of Tacitus, if the graybeard Claudius had been poisoned at a festival in honor of the founder of the imperial line! On the whole, then, where so much must rest on conjecture, with so small basis of historical fact, the probabilities seem to be that the fatal mushroom—*post quem nil amplius edit*—was eaten in the palace, and this supposition is certainly not invalidated by what Dion says, who speaks merely of a supper (συμπόσιον), without adding where it was, leaving us to understand, by the absence of any descriptive epithet, the *domesticum convivium* of Suetonius.

But to return to the immediate text of Tacitus and Mr. Merivale's interpretations. Tacitus says (c. 67): "Adeoque cuncta mox pernotuere, ut temporum illorum scriptores prodiderint infusum delectabili cibo boleto venenum, nec vim medicaminis statim intellectam, socordiane Claudii an vinolentia." On this Mr. Merivale remarks: "The words *socordiane Claudii an vinolentia*, with some varieties of reading, have caused much perplexity. If they are correct, I should imagine *socordia* to mean the languid action of the internal organs, which might be supposed, with what reason I know not, to retard the operation of the poison. . . . . By the words, *nec vim medicaminis statim intellectam*, Walther supposes that the *guests* did not at once perceive that poison had been given. But *intelligere* is the proper word for feeling the effect of a medicine or a wound. Comp. Statius, *Theb.* xi. 546: Mox intellecto magis ac magis aeger anhelat Vulnere."

Mr. Merivale cannot have given much attention to this passage, and does not understand it clearly. First, as to the text and varieties of reading which he speaks, there can be very little doubt what the true reading is; the manuscript, here corrupt, reads *socordiane an Claudii ui an uinolentia.* In this reading there is a difficulty, a double difficulty: 1. The position of the genitive *Claudii;* 2. The unintelligible word *ui.* But it is easy to see how this word crept into the text: it is a confused repetition of the *ii* in the termination of *Claudii.* In dozens of places in the Medicean codex, there is a difficulty between the end of one word and the beginning of the next. Sometimes a short word or part of a word is dropped out in consequence of its resemblance to the end of the word before it or the beginning of the word after it. For instance, in the passage just quoted, *delectabili cibo boleto* reads in the manuscript "delectabili cibo leto"; — in 13, 48, we have "eaque seditio ad saxa . . . progressa necem et arma proliceret," for *ne necem;** — in 14, 9, "Mnester ipse ferro transegit," for *ipse se ferro;* — in 14, 8, "nam morte centurioni ferrum destringenti," for *iam in mortem;* — in 14, 20, "sed vim adhibeant proceres Romani . . . . polluantur," for *adhibeant ut proceres;* — and in 14, 21, "efflagitandi Graeca certamina magistratibus," for *certamina a magistratibus.* Or again, in the manuscript the beginning of a word is repeated: for example, in 11, 6, "quippe in ma manifestos"; — in 13, 53, "de deterrendo," for *deterrendo;* — in 15, 28, "consilium eius fidum cre credebant," for *fidum credebant* (or *fidum esse credebant?*). Or the end of the word is sometimes repeated; as in 12, 10, "sed et filium Vononis," for *sed* or *set filium Vononis;* — in 16, 23, "prohibentis . . . libertum statuas et picturas sevehere," for *picturas evehere;* — in 12, 61, "sociasque uictorias potuisset tradidisset claudius," for *potuisse tradi: set Claudius;* — and in 13, 16, "ut uox pariter et spiritus eius raperentur," for *vox, et spiritus raperentur.*

From these examples it is extremely probable that the unintelligible *ui* in our passage is nothing but a repetition, *Claudii ui* being written for *Claudii* alone. The word *vi* once introduced into the text, the insertion of *an* became necessary, in order to elicit a show of sense. The cause of this corruption is so apparent, that all late editors have adopted the emendation of Rhenanus, which is what Mr. Merivale himself quotes. It would be well indeed if in all the corrupt passages of the manuscript we could come to a conclusion as satisfactory as we can here.

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* This seems the true reading rather than Nipperdey's emendation *ne caedem*, which is adopted by Halm in his second edition.

Now as to the interpretation, Mr. Merivale's explanation of *socordia*, "languid action of the internal organs," is evidently suggested to him by his preconceived notion of Claudius's "decline." But what Roman ever would or ever could understand by *socordia Claudii*, without any qualifying or explanatory word, "the languid action of Claudius's internal organs"? This would indeed be a brevity more than Tacitean. No unbiassed reader, taking the passage as it stands by itself, would ever think the word was here used in a secondary, physical sense. *Socors* and its abstract *socordia* are derivatives of *cor*, the heart, which, as is well known, is with the Romans the seat of the intellect. Strictly speaking, however, *socors* is not always used as the opposite of *cordatus*, as Döderlein (*Syn.* iv. p. 219) defines it, for one and the same man may be a *socors* homo and a *cordatus* homo. For while some of the floating ideas, for which *socors* stands as the sign, sweep off in the direction of *stultitia*, others come very near to *ignavia*, *segnitia*, *incuria*. Thus Cicero says (*Nat. D.* 1, 2, 4), "the effect of Carneades's discourses was to arouse to the investigation of truth *homines non socordes*," that is, thoughtful-minded men, men of intellectual activity, fond of speculation. While philosophers are here called *homines non socordes*, on the other hand the *Auct. ad Her.* (2, 23, 35) says, in seeming contrariety, "*philosophia affert socordiam* et desidiam." But in this passage *socordia* by no means implies lack of intellectual activity; it refers to a misdirected activity. The average old-fashioned Roman, with his fidgety ideas of duty, looks upon promptness, tact, *savoir faire*, bustling activity, as the principal things in life. The philosopher, absorbed in abstract subjects, is often unable to bring his mind readily to bear on what is going on immediately around him, is apt to be dazed, absent-minded, or plunged in a brown study, and while he may have intelligence enough, appears to by-standers like a fool.

To whom does this pliant word better apply than to Claudius? Claudius was no fool, — that is clear, — though Seneca and incidentally Juvenal do their best to make him appear so; and certainly his shuffling walk, his horse-laugh, his drooling mouth — *longam manantia labra salivam* — and snuffling nose, his mumbling talk, and the everlasting mandarin-bob of his head were not prepossessing. Neither was Claudius a lazy or slothful man, as the record of his conscientious labors shows. His great misfortune was a complete and utter want of tact in the ordinary intercourse of life, a missing link between the inner world of thought and the outer world of action, his droll *oblivio, inconsiderantia, μετεωρία, ἀβλεψία,* — for such are the terms applied to him by Suetonius (c. 39), — which made him the veritable Dominie Sampson of Roman Emperors, and the subject of numberless court gibes and practical jokes. It is this chronic mental infirmity, — and no physical condition, — so difficult to convey by any Latin word, that Suetonius, after straining the word *oblivio* and coining the word *inconsiderantia*, at last flies to the Greek to express it, to which Tacitus alludes. And in the epistle of Sidonius (5, 7), in which he hits off several of the Emperors by a single striking quality, — Tiberius callidior, Caius periculosior, *Claudius socordior*, Nero impurior, Galba avarior, — it is evident that no temporary condition of body is referred to, but a predominant and characteristic quality of mind.

That *socordia might* perhaps be transferred by analogy from a person to a thing, or a part of the body, may be yielded to Mr. Merivale; but, as before said, the mere words *socordia Claudii*, without further description or limitation, never could mean what he imagines them to mean. *Pigritia*, like its synonyme *socordia*, is properly a personal attribute; in one instance Seneca ventures to use it of a part of the body, and with very much the same meaning that Mr. Merivale ascribes to *socordia*, but not alone; his expression is, *pigritia stomachi nausiantis.* (*Prov.* 3, 6.)

That the word *intellectam* likewise *might* be understood of *Claudius's feeling the effect of the poison*, as Mr. Merivale will have it, and not of the *guests perceiving* its effects, as Walther explains it, or, as it would be a little safer to say, of *Agrippina and her accomplices perceiving* its effect, is very true, if we take the word by itself. But if we examine the context, we shall not find it probable.

In the chapter of Tacitus just before this, there is a discussion as to the kind of poison to be employed. Agrippina was afraid to use a sudden and precipitate poison, for fear the crime would be apparent; or a slow and wasting one, for fear the Emperor's dormant affection for his own son Britannicus might revive, as he slowly drew near his end and became convinced of the cause of his death. She fixed, therefore, on the use of a subtle drug, which would have the effect of unsettling his mind and would not cause instant death.

Now the following narrative, instead of being perplexed, agrees with this in all particulars. The fatal drug was given, according to the programme, in the mushroom; but *Agrippina and her friends could perceive no effect*, owing either to the quantity of wine the Emperor had drunk or to his habitual absent-mindedness, his usual vacant, distracted, fumbling way, which made it impossible for them to tell whether his conduct at the dinner-table was the legitimate effect of the drug, one of the main objects of which was to unsettle his mind, or only the ordinary working of his strangely-veiled intellect. The story of Tacitus is perfectly clear and coherent in every respect, and certainly quite as philosophical as that of Dion, who ascribes the feeble action of the poison, (which, by the way, he makes Agrippina herself experiment with on the Emperor before she employed Locusta,) either to the indulgence of Claudius in wine, or to the potent mithridates habitually used by the Roman Emperors.

Mr. Merivale goes on still further to say of the actual death of Claudius: "There is surely some confusion in the account of Tacitus, whatever may be the corruption of the text." It might appear here too, on examination, that the confusion is not in the account of Tacitus, but in the mind of his English interpreter. Enough, however, has been said to show that Mr. Merivale is not always very critical in the use of his Tacitus, whose credit he is so fond of assailing. It is, to be sure, a matter of very little moment to know just how the great Cæsar turned to clay, whether at Sinuessa or at Rome, whether half prepared for death by lingering disease, or cut off in the fulness of his strength But even petty "moles and warts" may offend the eye, and a reprint gives opportunity to remove the little quotation-mistakes, inadvertencies, and human lapses which are to be expected in the original edition.

5.—*War Powers under the Constitution of the United States.* By WILLIAM WHITING. Tenth Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1864. 8vo.

THE English are fond of charging us with sacrificing all high statesmanship to the idol of a paper constitution. They allege that our legislative debates resemble the squabbles of lawyers over the construction of a contract; that our politics are thus incurably belittled; that there is no scope for genius under such a system, and the soaring wings of statesmanship are cut.

It is true that the disadvantages of our system do lie in the direction thus indicated. It is true that narrow men, small, mole-eyed men, men whose best gift is that of *sharpness*, will argue upon an instrument which was meant to be the perpetual charter of freedom for a self-governing nation, as if it were a contract between two individuals for some momentary and trivial act of common life.

It is true, also, that democratic institutions in their practical working have proved unfavorable in many ways to the growth of the best sort of statesmen, — so that our written constitutions have often been interpreted — and authoritatively interpreted — by small legislators, who have construed them in a small way, "after their kind."

Besides this, our constitutions, like all other laws, are the frequent subject of adjudication in the courts, and sometimes they come out of court crippled and shorn of their splendor. Judges are not always statesmen, and they succeed occasionally in impressing upon our charters of government narrow and technical constructions, that are but little in keeping with the great ends which these instruments contemplate.

And, finally, that very love of liberty which is the life of our institutions sometimes renders men over fearful, and disposed to insist on such strict views of our Constitutions as belittle the field and opportunity of statesmanship.

Yet, notwithstanding all this, when has it proved that wise and competent statesmen in this country have been deterred by any superstition about the national Constitution from adopting measures which the good of the nation manifestly demanded? Washington suppressed the Whiskey Insurrection, Jefferson purchased Louisiana, and Lincoln has poured upon the Southern Rebels all the thunderbolts of war; and these things have been "a stumbling-block and foolishness" to many. Yet these great actions were seen to be in harmony with the Constitution, because they were seen to be essential towards the great ends for which, and in subordination to which, the Constitution was made. They were acts enjoined, so to speak, *by the Constitution of the Constitution.* Although there might be no obvious authority for them in the letter of the Constitution, and even though they might appear to be inconsistent with parts of it, yet authority enough was found in their consent and harmony with every main part of the Constitution, ringing, as they clearly did, to the same key-note.

If we can but have men of liberal good-sense to interpret our constitutions, as we always may have, or if we can have great events to enlarge the minds of all of us, such as we have lately had, these instruments will not be found to hamper statesmanship. The war has already educated the whole nation in this respect. Many an act which dull, narrow, and cold-hearted persons esteem unconstitutional, is now seen by most men to be only the application of the principles of the Constitution as against the letter of it, — of the whole Constitution as against a part of it, — of the main or controlling part as against the less important part. Men see that a Constitution which is to last for a thousand years may have a different construction in one age from that which obtains in another. They see that with the growth of population, the introduction of new manners and institutions, and the decay and disappearance of old ones, — with the growth of knowledge and the elevation of moral ideas, — it is inevitable that there should come also new views of the Constitution. They see that when great wars come upon the nation, — when domestic traitors and foreign enemies are craftily plotting to turn to their own account constitutional restrictions which were laid down for the protection of liberty, — when events occur, as they inevitably will, which never could have been foreseen by the framers of the Constitution, — it is not fitting that the people should be fettered by obsolete constructions of this vital, life-giving, elastic instrument under which they are organized. It was meant to guard and foster the growing strength of a free people for many centuries; and the only sensible or adequate view of the matter is that which commits the application and construction of it from age to age to the ripening intelligence and the growing moral sense of those who from age to age are to live under it.

It is in harmony with such views that Mr. Whiting's book discusses most of the leading questions of constitutional law which have been developed by the war. Although this book is but an ill-digested collection of separate treatises, differing widely in their mode of treatment and in the purpose for which they were written, and marked by a hundred striking faults of style and method, yet there is much acuteness, originality, and courage in its arguments, and it is marked throughout by good-sense in its conception of the principles of constitutional interpretation.

For instance, Mr. Whiting successfully argues for the right of the commander-in-chief, in time of war, summarily to arrest the public enemies and their abettors wherever found, whether single and unarmed, at home in Ohio or assembled in open hostility in Virginia, and to do with them, subject only to the laws of war, whatever the public exigency, in his judgment, may require. With equal success he maintains the right and propriety of setting up military governments in conquered districts, to be the agent and right-hand of the commander-in-chief until peace is recognized.

Again, he contends with justice that the terms and time and manner of reinstating civil government in the rebellious States are questions specially addressing themselves to the sound discretion of the conquerors. He claims, with good reason, that the emancipation of slaves by proclamation of the commander-in-chief may be proper and effectual as a war measure; and in reference to slavery, he insists that the legislative department, in time of peace, under the right of eminent domain, and no less in time of war, under the right to provide for the common defence and to pass laws in aid of the measures of the commander-in-chief, has the right totally to abolish that institution.

On all of these points we are disposed to think that Mr. Whiting makes out his case. Upon the last one, however, he sometimes indulges in a kind of speculation and reasoning which is perhaps rather strained and over-nice. There are also other parts of the book in which he fails occasionally, in the argument of details, to show that large kind of capacity which seems to be demanded by the subject. He is not quite accurate in his statement (simply as a matter of fact) that it was "authoritatively settled" by the opinions in the "prize causes" that "all the rights of war may be lawfully and constitutionally exercised against all the inhabitants of the seceded States."

There are some interesting points in reference to the relative powers of the commander-in-chief and the legislative department in bringing about a reorganization of the rebellious districts, upon which Mr. Whiting does not enter.

A very interesting part of this book is the thorough and able argument upon the meaning of the second clause of Article III. Sect. 3, of the national Constitution, viz.: "The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." (By the way, Mr. Whiting never punctuates the clause correctly.) In construing this clause, Mr. Whiting comes to the conclusion, — in our judgment the sound one, — that Congress has power to punish treason by the confiscation of the whole property and estate of the criminal. He argues that the attainder of treason here referred to is a judicial attainder, — one which was a technical consequence following at common law, as of course, upon judgment and sentence passed upon a traitor. The punishment specifically awarded by the sentence is a different thing; whatever that is, there follows immediately, by operation of law, and without judicial mention of it, the consequence of corruption of blood and forfeiture of all property. "There is a clear distinction between the punishment of treason by specific penalties and those consequential damages or injuries which follow by common law as the result or technical effect of a sentence of death or outlawry for treason." Under our Constitution, it is true, the common law of England, as to crimes, does not take effect; and if there should be any attainder at all, it could only be by special provision of law.

The clause in question means, therefore, just this: Congress shall have full power to declare the punishment of treason (including forfeiture *of all property*); but no attainder of treason, if any should be enacted, following, as it might happen to do, on some comparatively light judicial sentence, shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

This argument, we may add, gains considerable strength from the fact (which is not distinctly mentioned by Mr. Whiting), that the clause in question is placed in that article of the Constitution which is appropriated to the judicial department. Judge Story, in his Commentaries, refers to this clause as one *relating to the powers of Congress*, which, "for no apparent reason, is put out of its proper position." But if Mr. Whiting's construction of the clause be the true one, it is obviously in its right place where it is, — as being, in the main drift of it, a limitation on the power *of the judiciary*, — or rather, to speak more exactly, a restriction of the usual effect of a certain judicial act.

6.—*Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defences of Charleston Harbor in* 1863. By Q A. Gillmore, Major of Engineers, Major-General of Volunteers, and Commanding General of the Land Forces engaged. New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1865.

This book is "published by authority." It is a handsome octavo volume of three hundred and fifty well-printed pages. It is illustrated by seventy-six plates and engraved views. It is uniform in style with the series of octavos on military subjects which Mr. Van Nostrand has been for some time issuing, and whose red-cloth covers are becoming familiar and welcome.

General Gillmore's Report to the general-in-chief, somewhat enlarged in preparing it for publication, makes rather more than one third of the text. The rest is composed mainly of Reports of General Gillmore's Chief of Staff and of Artillery, and the engineer officers under his command.

General Gillmore commences his Report with a brief statement of the position of Charleston, a description of its harbor, and an account of the fortifications in the harbor before the war. We learn from it one fact of interest. At the commencement of the war Fort Sumter was an unfinished work. None of the embrasures of the second tier had been finished, and Major Anderson's command walled up with brick the openings left for them, and the enemy afterwards allowed them to remain in that condition.

The Report next gives the plan of operations against the defences of Charleston, which was to take possession of Morris Island, to besiege and reduce Fort Wagner, and to demolish Fort Sumter; and finally, when these objects had been successively attained, to co-operate with the fleet, when it was ready to move in, by a heavy artillery fire. The entire effective force in the department amounted to rather more than seventeen thousand, officers and men. The number of pieces of artillery, of various kinds and sizes, was about a hundred, and several more Parrott guns of heavy calibre were added from time to time.

The plan of preliminary attack upon Morris Island, and a description of the descent upon the island, occupy the next place in the Report. They are perfectly clear and very interesting, though there is none of the romance of war in them. All is simple and to the point. They are followed by a sketch of the characteristic physical features of the island, which contains the results of much close and scientific observation.

The unsuccessful assault on Fort Wagner, July 18, 1863, which made so deep an impression upon the North, is described in a couple of pages. General Gillmore selected the hour of twilight for the advance of the storming party, in order that it might not be distinctly seen from the batteries within range; but his hopes were disappointed, and the batteries of five different sets of works opened upon it simultaneously as soon as its head debouched from the first parallel. In despite of the difficulties of the attempt and of the disorder into which the leading regiment was thrown, one bastion was gained and held for three hours, but it then became necessary for our troops to withdraw, and the attempt to capture the work failed, with severe loss.

In the next forty pages, General Gillmore gives a singularly plain history of the siege of Fort Wagner, the successive opening of five parallels, the first bombardment of Fort Sumter, the final bombardment and capture of Fort Wagner, and the second bombardment of Fort Sumter, with which ended for the season all aggressive operations against the defences of Charleston. There is nothing more striking in this story than the fact that operations against Fort Sumter were carried on over the heads of the men in the outpost which was specially designed to prevent the erection of breaching batteries against that work. Fort Wagner was a simple outpost of Fort Sumter, and valueless except as such. General Gillmore's account of these operations is so compact and business-like that it is hardly wise to attempt to compress it. It takes but a short time to read it carefully, and one who reads it carefully will possess himself completely of the details of a very extraordinary enterprise. The work which General Gillmore undertook was one of great difficulty. It was so difficult, that it is probable that there was hardly another officer in the service to whom the plan would have suggested itself as practicable. If it was wise to place a fort where Wagner was built, nature had given the Rebel engineer great advantages, and he had laboriously and skilfully improved them. He had built an enclosed work all across Morris Island, at a point where the island in its front was a mere strip of sand. He had built it very strongly, and of a material on which the heaviest projectiles had little effect. Some twenty guns swept the shifting beach which furnished the only approach, besides the guns of Fort Sumter and several other heavily-armed batteries. It had free communication with Charleston by night.

The Rebel engineer had supposed that, in order to silence Fort Sumter, it would be necessary first to reduce Fort Wagner, and this he thought would be beyond the power of our arms. General Gillmore recognized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of effecting anything against Fort Wagner while Fort Sumter remained intact, and he conceived the ingenious and surprising project of "the early elimination of Fort Sumter from the conflict, simply as auxiliary to the reduction of Fort Wagner." Ingenuity, industry, patience, and daring were largely displayed in carrying out the project. As the parallels were successively opened, the most formidable character possible was given to their defensive arrangements. In rear of them, great numbers of breaching guns were placed. Most of the work of arming the batteries could be performed during the night time only, and under a continuous, and at times very severe fire.

The story of the construction of the "Marsh Battery," popularly known as the "Swamp Angel," is very interesting, as the record of a successful attempt to solve a complicated problem in civil engineering. The gun which it contained reached Charleston from a distance of seven thousand yards; but it burst before it had been fired forty times.

The Report by this time assumes almost the form of a journal of the siege. On the 10th of August, just after the third parallel was opened, the fire of the enemy stopped our advance entirely, and it was decided not to push the sap beyond the third parallel until the fire upon Fort Sumter had been opened. This took place on the 17th of August. The breaching batteries contained eighteen heavy guns. They were at a mean distance of about four thousand yards from the centre of the gorge wall of Fort Sumter. The firing continued for seven days; and on the 24th of August, General Gillmore reported to the general-in-chief "the practical demolition of Fort Sumter as the result." There remained in the work no serviceable gun pointing towards us.

Before the bombardment ceased, active operations against Fort Wagner were resumed by night. The progress of the sap was hotly opposed, and one ridge, about two hundred yards in front of Wagner, was so stubbornly held, that a fourth parallel was opened and found insufficient. The ridge was then carried at the point of the bayonet, and the fifth parallel established there. The space intervening between this parallel and the fort was simply a flat ridge of sand, scarcely twenty-five yards in width, over which in rough weather the sea swept entirely. All this ground was thickly filled with torpedoes, to be exploded by the tread of persons walking over them. Half through this intervening space, the sappers advanced by the flying sap during the night following the capture of the ridge. Further than this, the fire of the enemy made it almost impossible to go. General Gillmore describes, in a few most interesting paragraphs, the combination of difficulties that now checked and discouraged his command, and the ingenious plans which he adopted and energetically pursued, till his troops, cheerful once more, pushed forward toward the fort and crowned the crest of the counterscarp soon after dark on the evening of September 6th. An assault was ordered for the hour of nine on the next morning; but before that hour arrived the enemy had evacuated the island, and Fort Wagner was in our hands.

General Gillmore's elaborate observations, notes, and suggestions upon Parrott rifled guns and projectiles are beyond the general reader, except so far as his doubts of the trustworthiness of Parrott's large rifles may interest those who have been disappointed at the accounts of the bursting of many such guns in Porter's fleet, in the attack on Fort Fisher. His chapters on Fortifications and on Errors in the Enemy's Defence are of the highest interest and value. The former is peculiarly appropriate to a time when the minds of men are so unsettled as they are now upon the question how far masonry is to give way to earth in the construction of works for the defence of harbors, arsenals, and depots. The latter contains a useful piece of instruction for those of us who have been disposed to credit General Beauregard with the possession of engineering talent of the first order. It is understood that he devised the system of defences constructed by the Rebels in Charleston Harbor. General Gillmore says, and his whole Report proves, that "Fort Wagner affords a striking example of the injudicious location of an earthwork."

Of the appended documents, the most deserving of attention is the Report of Major T. B. Brooks, Assistant Engineer, including his journal of the siege. It is valuable for the military student, and most interesting reading for all who wish to inform themselves about military operations. It disposes the reader to give Major Brooks credit for a clear head, and a large share of patience, modesty, and ingenuity.

In the notes to Major Brooks's Report there is a deal of miscellaneous information, to which we can allude no further than to say that it relates to the subjects of Palisading, Wire Entanglement, Booms, Barricades, Torpedoes, Engineer Depots, Siege Material, Platforms, Sapping, &c.

There is other matter in the book instructive and interesting, both for professional men and amateurs, but space does not suffice for more particular mention of it. The correspondence between General Beauregard and General Gillmore, and that between Admiral Dahlgren and the latter, and a statement of R. P. Parrott in defence of his guns, conclude the volume.

Besides the numerous well-executed plates which are scattered through the book, there are some very excellent charts and maps. The book is thoroughly satisfactory. Paper and print are good; the proofs have been well read; the text is well written, almost without exception. It should find a place in the library of scientific soldiers everywhere, and in the library of every American, whether he make a study of military matters or no. For mere practical value, as a book of consultation and reference, it seems as if it must be beyond price for all casters of heavy cannon.

7.— *Southern Slavery in its Present Aspects: containing a Reply to a late Work of the Bishop of Vermont on Slavery.* By DANIEL R. GOODWIN. Philadelphia. 1864. 12mo. pp. 393.

As a reply to Bishop Hopkins, this is a work of supererogation, admirably executed. The world has already heard more of the Bishop's efforts to justify Southern slavery and Southern rebellion than those efforts deserve. His infirmity of temper, superficiality of information, and deficiency of reasoning power, render him peculiarly unfit to grapple with the details of a subject involving the history of man in his religious, social, and political relations. His feeble attempts, therefore, to stem the mighty current of public opinion, would have met the silent indifference which they merit, had not a corrupt faction required the aid of one whose position seemed to command attention and respect. Finding in him the tool which they required, politicians succeeded in elevating his essays into the bad eminence of temporary notoriety. Used as political "campaign documents" by one party, they were necessarily combated by similar documents on the other side. They failed in their mission, and may safely be left to the obscurity into which, by a natural law, they have so speedily fallen.

Admitting, however, that it was worth while to dissect Bishop Hopkins, the autopsy could not have been intrusted to abler hands than those of the distinguished Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. The defects of temper, the fallacies of argument, the *suggestio falsi*, the *suppressio veri*, are successively developed with a trenchant logic that leaves little to be desired. Had not the Bishop, indeed, placed himself without the pale of human sympathy, it would be difficult to repress a feeling of pity at the helplessness of his overthrow. The disparity between the disputants is so great, that it seems like a grown man wrestling with a child; and at every throw of the weaker party, one is tempted to ask his antagonist, in school-boy parlance, "Why don't you take one of your size?"

Dr. Goodwin commences by reviewing the controversy between the clergy of Pennsylvania and the Bishop, — or rather by showing that there has been no "controversy," where one party simply repudiated all complicity with odious theories disseminated by the other. He points out the groundlessness of the complaints so loudly reiterated by the right reverend assailant, and characterizes in fitting terms the bad temper and worse logic with which he has endeavored to extricate himself from his false position.

Dr. Hopkins's "Bible View of Slavery" then comes under review. After satisfactorily disposing of it, Dr. Goodwin takes up the Bishop's more ambitious performance, the "Scriptural, Ecclesiastical, and Historical View of Slavery." If any of our readers have been so unfortunate as to wade through that dullest of dull performances, they will remember that its leading characteristic is shallow sophistry, enlivened occasionally by smart special pleading. These peculiarities receive full justice at the hands of Dr. Goodwin.

In one respect, indeed, he might have been much more severe than he has seen fit to be. Whether from ignorance or from obliquity, the historical portions of the Bishop's labors are singularly incorrect. In some instances, we are tempted to assign blunders or misstatements to the former, for the work is evidently the result of *cramming* for the occasion; in others, the latter is evidently the cause of error, for the Bishop has had within reach the means of ascertaining the truth, but has chosen to suppress a part of the facts before him. Much of this Dr. Goodwin charitably passes over. Thus (p. 201) the Bishop has the incredible audacity to assert that, in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, "although Massachusetts had abolished slavery, yet her *delegation*, along with that of the other Eastern States, insisted on continuing the slave-trade for twenty years more, against the wishes of Virginia," — when he must or ought to have known that the permission to carry on that infernal traffic was the price which the extreme Southern

States set on their assent to entering the Union, and that they coerced their Eastern sisters, as they have so often done since, into a compromise with them. As Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, defiantly declared, "If the Convention thinks that North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest." And Mr. Madison, in the ratifying Convention of Virginia, expressly asserted, "The Southern States would not have entered into the Union of America without the *temporary* permission of that trade." The debates in the Massachusetts Convention show that this temporary permission was a great objection to the adoption of the Constitution in New England, and that it was only overcome by the argument that under the Constitution the trade might be stopped in twenty years, while without the Constitution it might be continued indefinitely. Yet Bishop Hopkins ignorantly or maliciously endeavors to fasten upon New England the sole responsibility of that great wrong in which she reluctantly acquiesced at the bidding of imperious South Carolina.

The same effort at a *suggestio falsi* by a *suppressio veri* is to be found in the Bishop's account of the Council of London in 1102 (not 1011 as he persistently asserts), which adopted a canon forbidding the sale of men like cattle.* Bishop Wilberforce had alluded to this as a rule of the Church which should be observed in America, and Bishop Hopkins makes a great parade of his success in demolishing the authority of the canon: — "I took the pains to look into the real state of the matter, and discovered that the statement was founded upon a mistake." This "mistake" lies in the fact that Archbishop Anselm, who presided over the Council, shortly afterwards wrote an epistle to Archdeacon William giving him certain instructions as to enforcing its decrees. In this, he says that the canons were hastily adopted, and that some changes were requisite in them. As his instructions do not cover the one forbidding the sale of men, Bishop Hopkins boldly styles the canon "imaginary," and says, "Hence this supposed decree of the Council of London really amounts to nothing."

Now Bishop Hopkins, knowing this much, must also have known that this "supposed" "imaginary" canon rests on the authority of Archbishop Anselm himself. Our only account of the Council is derived from the contemporary Eadmer, in his *Historia Novorum.* He does not give us the full canons, but only a summary or series of rubrics, and these he expressly quotes from Anselm.* The letter to Archdeacon William, moreover, is exceedingly short, and alludes to but five out of the thirty canons adopted by the Council. Are we therefore to conclude that Anselm, as quoted by Eadmer, amused himself with manufacturing the other five and twenty "imaginary" and "supposititious" canons?

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* "Ne quis illud nefarium negotium, quo hactenus homines in Anglia solebant velut bruta animalia venundari, deinceps ullatenus facere præsumat." — Concil. London., ann. 1102, can. xxviii.

It would be a wearisome and unprofitable task to recount and expose the blunders and misstatements of Bishop Hopkins, and we do not wonder that Mr. Goodwin has charitably passed many of them by. Had he, indeed, confined himself to a review of the Vermont prelate, his book would have been, as we suggested above, a work of supererogation. Fortunately he has not done so. In his later chapters he takes a wider range, and considers slavery in its political and social relations, with a clearness of thought and precision of reasoning which impart a permanent value to his book. These chapters are well worthy the study of every one who is called to take part, as all citizens of the Republic must, in the settlement of the momentous questions which, within the next few years, will decide the fate of the country. His vigorous intellect penetrates to the heart of issues which have been complicated by the declamatory artifices of innumerable politicians; and in a few terse sentences he disentangles them from the shams in which they have been so industriously concealed. Nowhere, for instance, have we seen so clear and condensed a presentation of the status of the revolted States, or of our rights and duties with respect to them, as the following: —

> "In short, then, secession took no State out of the Union, either as a territory or as a people; but, as a political organization, it did take every seceded State out of the Union, — that is to say, it left the State no organization in the Union, and the organization it has substituted is out of the Union; is, *de jure*, spurious, illegitimate, unconstitutional, null; and *de facto*, hostile and rebellious. Neither the national Constitution nor national self-respect will allow the United States government to recognize, or in any manner to treat with, such treasonable organizations. Such a recognition would itself be an acknowledgment of the dissolution of the Union. The rebellious States are all constitutionally and legally in the Union; but, in order to re-

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* Eadmer, Hist. Novor., Lib. iii. p. 67, seqq., ap. Wilkins, Conc. Britan. I. 382. "Cujus concilii seriem, sicut ab eodem patre Anselmo descripta est, huic operi inserere non incongruum existavimus. Scribit itaque sic." Then follows the summary of thirty canons. Anselm might well shrink from essaying to enforce a canon which would bring him into conflict with the whole feudal power of the realm. Even as a mere expression of opinion, we may wonder at the boldness of the Council in adopting it. We have seen in our own day how prompt are slave-mongers to resent any such manifestations of the freedom of thought and of speech.

sume their *political functions* as members of the Union, they must be *organized de novo.* In this sense, and so far, they must be treated as 'Territories.' This reorganization must be based upon some enabling act or some legitimating authority proceeding from the government of the United States. And such enabling act or legitimating authority cannot, without absurdity, be forbidden to apply such conditions, restrictions, and modes of procedure in the process of reorganization, as the Rebellion itself has demonstrated to be absolutely necessary to the national existence, the national Union, and national peace." — pp. 334, 335.

In conclusion, we cannot but regret that Mr. Goodwin had not at the start thrown off all reference to Bishop Hopkins, and given us an independent work upon a subject which he has shown himself so well qualified to treat. Vast masses of our people still require education on the vital questions connected with slavery, and many thinking men, who would be benefited by the sturdy and impervious logic of our author, will be deterred from taking up his volume on account of the controversial aspect arising from his demolition of the thrice-routed Bishop of Vermont.

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8. — *The Life and Times of Sir William Johnson, Bart.* By William L. Stone. Albany: J. Munsell. 1865. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xv. and 555, 544.

This work was planned and the first seven chapters of it were written by the late Colonel William L. Stone, sometime editor of the New York Commercial Advertiser, and favorably known as the author of a Life of Joseph Brant, a History of Wyoming, and some other works in the department of Indian biography. At his death, in 1844, his manuscripts passed into the possession of his son of the same name, together with the copious materials which, with much difficulty and expense, he had collected for his long meditated Life of Johnson, and which comprised upward of five thousand unpublished letters. The portion of the work for which we are indebted to Colonel Stone fills about half of the first volume; and the residue, if we may judge from the internal evidence afforded by a comparison of the two parts, has been executed in strict accordance with the original plan. The style of the son is very much like that of the father; their views of the character of Sir William Johnson and of the time in which he lived seem to be identical; and the same characteristics of plan and execution are apparent in one part which we notice in the other.

Failing to recognize the broad distinction between history and biography, the authors have given us a history of the times of Sir William

Johnson, rather than a compact and well-digested life of him. If we remember rightly, his name does not occur half a dozen times in the first two hundred pages; and all through the book the thread of the narrative is continually disappearing under episodes which have not the slightest connection with him. After a few paragraphs about Johnson, the reader is transported without warning to Nova Scotia or Massachusetts, only to find himself the next moment plunged into the middle of an account of something which happened in Pennsylvania or Virginia, or threading the devious mazes of New York politics. In reading these volumes, we are constantly reminded of one of our old-fashioned ordination sermons, in which the preacher always found it necessary to include an account of the creation and the fall of man, with some reflections on the horrors of the French Revolution, whatever might be the chief topic of discourse. With the immense mass of inedited materials at his disposal, Mr. Stone could scarcely have failed of making an attractive book, in spite of a want of picturesqueness and animation in his style, if he had contented himself with simply narrating the life of Johnson, and delineating his character with such reference only to the general history of the country as might be needful for the elucidation of his proper subject. That Mr. Stone keeps out of sight the less reputable transactions in which his hero was concerned, and that he paints him in colors brighter than a strict regard to historical justice will warrant, is not perhaps surprising, but it diminishes the confidence with which we might otherwise follow his guidance. The partisan spirit too often exhibited, the want of vigor in the style, the number of the digressions, and the length to which the work is extended, must prevent its becoming popular, or holding a high place in our historical literature.

In one other respect Mr. Stone has been peculiarly unfortunate: his volumes are among the worst printed books which it has been our painful duty to read. The dropping, improper insertion, or transposition of one or more letters in a word, is a frequent occurrence; and even when a word is spelt correctly, it is in several important instances not the word intended, and the meaning of the passage is obscured by the blunder. Thus we find "effects" instead of "efforts," "advocated" instead of "adverted," "mutually" instead of "mentally," "conformation" instead of "confirmation," "Siberia" instead of "Silesia," and other equally gross errors.

William Johnson was born at Warrentown, in the County of Down, Ireland, in the year 1715, and was derived from an ancient and respectable stock. Of his early life nothing is known, and it is probable that not much care was bestowed on his education, though there is some reason to believe that later in life he was acquainted with French and German, and perhaps with some branches of natural science. At the age of twenty-three he came to this country on the invitation of his uncle, Sir Peter Warren, afterward commander of the naval forces at the siege of Louisburg, and an admiral in the British service. Warren had a large estate in New York, and the management of a part of it was intrusted to his nephew, who, immediately after landing, fixed his residence on the Mohawk River, about thirty miles west from Albany. For several years Johnson seems to have devoted himself mainly to his uncle's affairs and to the improvement of his own fortunes, gradually acquiring that familiarity with the Indian character and that influence over his Indian neighbors which subsequently made him one of the chief personages in the Colonial history.

Not long after his arrival he married; but this part of his life is involved in almost as much obscurity as his childhood, and we know only that his wife was a young German girl, who died in a few years, leaving a son, Sir John Johnson, a noted Loyalist of the Revolution, and two daughters. Meanwhile the young adventurer was slowly rising into public notice, and acquiring a wide-spread reputation by his skilful management of various negotiations with the Indians; and in 1750, the importance of his services was recognized by his appointment as a member of the Provincial Council. Three years afterward he was still further rewarded by the grant of Onondaga Lake, with all the land around it for a width of two miles. Up to this time he had had no military experience; but such were already his influence and his reputation for ability and good judgment, that when Braddock, in the spring of 1755, planned his four expeditions to repel the encroachments of the French on the English frontier, Johnson was selecled to command the forces intended to operate against Crown Point. Considerable delay occurred in making the necessary preparations; and it was not until the end of August that his little army of thirty-four hundred men reached the head of Lake George, or St. Sacrament, as it was called by the French. It was composed partly of Indians and partly of undisciplined militia from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut; but among them were three men whose names will always fill an honorable place in our early annals, — Ephraim Williams, the founder of Williams College, John Stark, and Israel Putnam. Having reached Lake George, Johnson determined to clear a space for a camp, and to await the tardy arrival of his artillery and boats. Meanwhile the French were not inactive, and early in September the Baron Dieskau, an experienced soldier, who had been intrusted with the defences of Crown Point, determined to take advantage of this unforeseen delay. Accordingly he ascended Lake Champlain at the head of about fourteen hundred men, — regulars, Canadians, and Indians, — and, entering the South Bay, landed not far from the spot where Whitehall now stands, with the design of making a night attack on Fort Edward. Through some blunder of the guides the party took the wrong road, and instead of marching direct upon the fort, they found themselves at nightfall some distance on the way to Lake George. Information of the advance of the French soon reached Johnson's camp, and on the morning of the 8th of September Colonel Williams was sent with a thousand or twelve hundred men, partly militia and partly Indians, to relieve the threatened fort. Marching without those precautions which experience should have taught them were needful, they soon fell into an ambush, and after a short and sharp fight they were compelled to retreat with the loss of a large number of officers and men, including Williams himself, and Hendrick the Mohawk chief, a man venerable in years, and held in just esteem as a prudent and sagacious counsellor and a faithful friend of the English.

If this first success had been instantly followed up, there is reason to believe that Johnsons's little force in the neighboring camp would have been utterly routed; but the Canadian Indians held back. Time was thus afforded for the fugitives to recover from their panic, and for Johnson to make some hasty preparations for defence. In a few hours, however, the battle commenced, and after a severe contest, which lasted for five hours, the French were put to flight, leaving Dieskau wounded and a prisoner in the hands of the New England troops. Johnson also had been wounded at the commencement of the action; and to the end of his life he suffered more or less from the effects of the wound. We would not depreciate the importance of this battle, nor of the part which Johnson took in it; but it will be generally conceded, we think, that the chief credit should be awarded to General Lyman, who was second in command, and that the British Ministry were somewhat extravagant in their exultations over a victory which was not followed up by the successful prosecution of the sole object of the campaign. Nevertheless, Johnson was made a Baronet, and received a grant of five thousand pounds sterling in the following November; and shortly afterward he was appointed "Colonial Agent and sole Superintendent of all the Affairs of the Six Nations and other Northern Indians." After the battle he suffered the autumn to slip away in inactivity, contenting himself with building a fort, called Fort William Henry, on the southern shore of the lake, on the spot where a large and fashionable hotel now stands; and on the approach of winter he disbanded his army, with the exception of six hundred men, who were left to garrison the new fort, and then returned home.

During the next two or three years he took no active part in the military operations which were languidly carried on, but devoted himself to the more congenial duties of a civil functionary, and the management of various negotiations with the Indians. In the spring of 1756 he held a council at Onondaga, which was attended by representatives of the Six Nations, the Shawanese, and the Delawares. The principal objects of this council were to persuade the Delawares to lay down the hatchet which they had taken up against the settlers of Pennsylvania, and to induce the Indians to join in the proposed expedition against the French posts on Lake Ontario. By the exercise of much skill and adroitness on the part of Johnson, both objects were fully attained, and the way was opened for two other councils in the same year, at the last of which a reconciliation of the Delawares of the Susquehanna with the English was effected, and a definitive treaty of peace was concluded. In the following year, however, the Six Nations, who had begun to waver in their attachment to the English, threw off all hesitation and doubt, and sent a large delegation to Canada to make peace with the French governor. To counteract the evils which he anticipated from this step, Johnson summoned a new council to meet in June, and by much exertion he persuaded the Indians either to remain neutral or to renew their alliance with the English, and to enter actively into the contest. In these negotiations, in organizing and sending out war parties against the French, and in conducting in person some unimportant operations in the field, he found abundant occupation until the summer of 1759, when he accompanied the expedition of General Prideaux against Fort Niagara.

On the death of that officer, who was accidentally killed in the trenches on the 19th of July, while directing the siege, Johnson succeeded to the chief command. The attack was pressed by the new general with unabated vigor; and he soon signalized himself by a bold and successful movement, resulting in the total defeat of a strong body of French and Indians who were advancing to relieve the fort. Leaving a sufficient force to hold the garrison in check, he marched out on the 24th to give battle to the approaching enemy; and after a brisk and well-directed fire of musketry, he charged them at the point of the bayonet, capturing a large number of prisoners, among whom was the French commander, M. d'Aubry, and utterly dispersing the remainder of the army. The same evening he summoned the fort to surrender; and the next morning he had the satisfaction of taking possession of this famous post, the last important link in the chain of forts by which the French had sought to unite their possessions on the St. Lawrence with those in Louisiana. Immediately afterward, the remaining forts between Lake Erie and the Ohio, Venango, Presque Isle, and Le Bœuf, were evacuated and blown up; and having made some necessary repairs on the captured fort, Johnson returned home, justly proud of the victory which he had achieved.

In the early part of the following year, he founded the settlement not far from Schenectady called Johnstown, which afterward became his own place of residence; and at a little later period he joined General Amherst with a body of Indian auxiliaries, and took an active part in the siege of Montreal. The next year we find him still more busily engaged in the management of Indian affairs, and even making a journey so far west as Detroit, for the purpose of holding a grand council. His mission was crowned with success; and after holding several smaller councils on the way, he reached his place of destination on the 3d of September, 1761. Here he was at once waited on by delegations from the various Western tribes, and on the 9th the council opened. Its result was the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty with the Indians, and the adoption of such measures as, it was hoped, would prevent the recurrence of the grievances which had hitherto endangered the peace of the frontier.

On the breaking out of Pontiac's conspiracy, in 1763, he took active measures to secure the neutrality of the Six Nations, and at the same time armed his own tenantry, and erected a strong stockade at Johnson Hall, flanked by two stone towers. By the exercise of all his personal influence, enforced no doubt by these defensive steps, he firmly attached five of the Six Nations to the English, and, to cite his own words, preserved the frontiers of New York "and the important communication to Ontario, both of which must have inevitably fallen but for their fidelity." Similar, if less important, negotiations occupied most of his time during the last ten or twelve years of his life; and when not thus engaged, he found employment in agricultural pursuits and in the management of his private affairs. He did not overlook in the mean time his duties as a member of the council, nor the interests of his growing settlement at Johnstown; and by the erection of a grist-mill and a church, and in various other ways, he endeavored to promote its welfare and to attract to it new settlers.

When it became apparent that a great and final struggle between the Colonies and the mother country was inevitable, and that it would not be possible much longer for any one to remain neutral, Johnson hesitated and wavered, and it must be regarded as extremely doubtful which side he would have taken when the line was finally drawn. On the one hand, Mr. Stone unhesitatingly expresses the opinion, that, "had he lived until it was necessary to have taken a decided stand, he would have boldly espoused the cause of the Colonies." On the other hand, Mr. Sabine classes him among the American Loyalists, and there, we think, he would in the end have been found. But death closed his career before the war had actually begun and the position of every man had become clearly defined.

Still retaining, through all the stress of the times, the management of Indian affairs, he probably owed his last brief illness to a too energetic performance of his duties. When the Six Nations heard of the outbreak on the Virginia frontier known as Cresap's war, and of the unprovoked murder of Logan's family, a strong feeling of revenge was excited among many of the younger warriors, while the older chiefs were filled with alarm lest the friendly relations which they had so long maintained with the people of New York should be violently ruptured. Accordingly they expressed a wish to Johnson for a council to deliberate on the existing state of affairs; and on the 7th of July, 1774, they assembled at Johnson Hall to the number of about six hundred. Three or four days were occupied with the customary preliminaries; and on the 11th, Johnson addressed them for about two hours, endeavoring to soothe their exasperation, and to cement the existing peace, by all those arguments which he had learned so well how to urge. Scarcely had he closed, and the crowd dispersed, before he was seized by a violent attack of the dysentery, which terminated fatally at an early hour in the evening. It has sometimes been asserted, on the strength of local tradition, that his death was caused by his own hand; but this story is utterly rejected by his biographer, and there seems to be no good reason for accepting it. Johnson, it is true, was not an old man; but his health had been seriously impaired, he had long suffered from his wound, and it is known that he was unwell when the council met. Under these circumstances, it is probable that the exertion of speaking so long in the open air, under a July sun, added to his anxiety at the condition of public affairs, was too great for him, and that this was the immediate cause of his death. Two days afterward, his body was borne to its final resting-place beneath the altar of the village church, followed by his neighbors and the great council with which he had so recently been in consultation.

That Sir William Johnson was in several respects a remarkable man, and that his life well deserves to be written, will be conceded by all who are familiar with our later Colonial history. He had a rare power of adaptation, and no other subject of Great Britain on this continent ever acquired or maintained so strong an influence over the Indians. This influence he owed in part to the facility with which he entered into their feelings, and fitted his words and actions to their habits of life and modes of thought, and in part, no doubt, to the fairness of his dealings with them. In spite of some traditions which imply that he was not always scrupulous about the manner of acquiring land-grants from them, there is no evidence that he ever defrauded them in a single transaction, or that his large property was amassed by dishonest means. To this praise, we think, he is fairly entitled; and such rare honesty could scarcely have failed to impress his semi-barbarous neighbors. The influence which he had thus acquired was in general wisely used, and was on many occasions of great advantage to the English Colonists. It must, however, always be a cause of shame and regret that he organized scalping parties among the Indians, and that he did not endeavor to soften the atrocities of Indian warfare.

When we turn from Johnson's management of Indian affairs to his military, political, and private life, we find little evidence of superior abilities, and nothing to show a high moral tone. As a soldier, his most important and creditable achievement was the capture of Fort Niagara; as a politician, he took no conspicuous part in the discussions which preceded the Revolution; and his domestic relations were disreputable, though not worse, perhaps, than those of many of his contemporaries. If he owed little to his early education, he doubtless owed much to his uncle's patronage; and the circumstances in which he was placed were those best suited to call out the strong points of his character.

9. — *Historical View of the American Revolution.* By GEORGE WASHINGTON GREENE, Author of "Historical Studies," "Biographical Studies," etc. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 16mo. pp. 459.

MR. GREENE has long been known to our readers as a careful and accurate student of history, and as an able and scholarly writer; and in his life of his grandfather, in Sparks's Library of American Biography, he early gave evidence of the fidelity with which he had studied our Revolutionary annals. The volume now before us is a further proof of his ability to deal with that portion of our history, and bears in every part the marks of ripe and various culture. It comprises a course of twelve lectures read before the Lowell Institute, in this city, in the winter of 1863, and, with the exception of one of the lectures, apparently printed in the same form in which they were originally prepared. The subject is one that is well adapted to the purposes of the lecture-room and the requirements of a miscellaneous audience. Apart from the interest which it must always have for every American, there are so many aspects under which it may be considered, and such opportunity for various treatment, without ever fatiguing the hearer with a minute narrative or perplexing him with an intricate course of reasoning, that no one of ordinary knowledge and tact can fail of making his lectures attractive. Of these advantages Mr. Greene has known how to avail himself; and he has produced a series of lectures which must not only have been listened to with pleasure and profit, but which in their published form ought to be received with a very high degree of favor. Without attempting to present our Revolutionary struggle under any new aspects, or to bring forward any new facts, he has judiciously chosen his special topics, and illustrated them by a copious learning and a wise selection of arguments, while the leading events in the history of the war are harmoniously grouped and concisely narrated. The style, if seldom fervid and eloquent, is always clear and idiomatic, and is for the most part compact and nervous.

The first lecture is devoted to an examination into the causes of the Revolution, the chief of which Mr. Greene finds in the nature of the colonial system itself; the gross ignorance as to the Colonies prevailing in England, even among the governing classes; and in the character of the political institutions, and especially of the municipal institutions, which the Colonists brought over with them. These causes, as he abundantly shows, would sooner or later have produced a violent separation of the Colonies from the mother country, "for the colonial system would have led to a collision of interests; English ignorance to ill-directed attempts at coercion; the sentiment of inalienable rights fostered by English institutions to firm and resolute resistance." But their effective operation was hastened by the concurrence of two other causes, — the pressure of taxation in England, and "the fact that, in her war upon the freedom of colonial industry, England was at war with the spirit of her own political system."

Having thus analyzed the principal causes of the Revolution, Mr. Greene proceeds in his second lecture to glance at the various phases by which its progress was marked, tracing in rapid outline the history of the Colonies from the settlement of the country, through the successive stages of legislative oppression and popular remonstrance, down to the first act of armed resistance, and then, in a few well-considered paragraphs, exhibiting the various fortunes of the war, to the final consummation in the Peace of Paris.

In his third and fourth lectures he enters more directly on his subject, and treats of the Congress of the Revolution and of the State Governments. After a brief account of the various attempts at colonial union which preceded the war, he passes in review the various acts of

Congress down to the Declaration of Independence; and in the fourth lecture he describes the organization of the State governments, indicating the various features common to all of them.

The next two lectures deal with the Finances and Diplomacy of the Revolution, and are, on the whole, the ablest and most attractive of the course. The substance of them, however, has been so recently printed and so widely circulated in the pages of the Atlantic Monthly, that very little needs to be said of them here. It is sufficient to observe that Mr. Greene has given a very clear and admirable summary of the principal financial and diplomatic transactions, awarding praise where it is justly due, and pointing out the unfortunate blunders which were committed, and that nowhere else is there so good a view of this part of his subject in a form so compact and so easily accessible.

The next three lectures relate chiefly to military affairs, and treat of the army, the campaigns, and the foreign element of the Revolution. In them the reader will find a well-digested accôunt of the organization of the army, and of the various acts of Congress affecting it, a satisfactory, though brief sketch of the different campaigns, and a merited recognition of the important services rendered by Lafayette, Steuben, and other foreign officers during the most important period of the war.

The tenth lecture is devoted to the Martyrs of the Revolution, and contains more or less extended notices of Otis, Quincy, Warren, Nathan Hale, and Isaac Hayne, and of the thousands of nameless victims of the prison-ships and other places of confinement for the prisoners of war.

The last two lectures are on the Literature of the Revolution, comprising specimens of both the prose and poetry to which it gave birth, with some account of the principal writers and a judicious estimate of the general character of their productions.

An Appendix of fifteen pages gives us a "Chronological Outline" of American history from the settlement of Canada to the year 1783, a "List of General Officers at the Commencement and Close of the Revolutionary War," several statistical tables of the number of troops furnished and the expenses of the war, and an Address to General Greene from the officers under his command, recommending retaliation for the injuries inflicted on Colonel Hayne.

From this rapid sketch of the topics discussed it is easy to see how judiciously Mr. Greene has laid out his plan; and his execution of it is not less praiseworthy. No one can read the volume, we think, without finding in it a pledge of the learning and candor with which our author will discharge his duties as editor of the long-promised selection from the writings of General Greene, and without feeling a deep regret that the failure of Congress to make the necessary appropriation should have hitherto prevented the publication of that important work.

10. — *The Militia of the United States. What it has been. What it should be.* 8vo. Boston. 1864. pp. 130.

The author of this pamphlet evidently brings to his task some personal experience, as well as very definite opinions upon the present defects and future needs of our militia system, or want of system; and he has fortified his opinions by a formidable array of testimony, drawn from such a wide variety of sources, embracing, as it seems to a cursory inspection, all the most accredited and competent authorities from the earliest days of the Union down to Governor Andrew's Message in 1864, that he appears to be justified in assuming them to be not his alone, but the result of the best experience that we have upon the subject. Whether he has fully established his position in all its details or not, it is clear that he has collected many of the materials indispensable to a thorough study of this momentous and impending question, and not hitherto accessible without great labor, — and for this, at least, he deserves the thanks of all good citizens. From reports and memoirs, from letters and speeches scattered through many volumes, from all sorts of utterances, official and casual, he has brought together a mass of documentary evidence of the best kind upon a variety of points connected with the militia system. We have here, in their own words, opinions of Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Franklin, Knox, Gaines, Hamilton, Madison, Gerry, Scott, Harrison, and many other persons of special experience at home and abroad, bearing upon the different details of the plan advocated by our author.

His positions are briefly as follows. We need "for the common defence" an organized military force, which should consist in part of a small standing army, but mostly of militia. This militia cannot be properly supplied by volunteers; nor, on the other hand, is it worth while to drill and equip all of the population who are capable of military service. But the active militia should consist of a select body, — the principles of selection being left, within certain limits, to the State authority, — to be paid for the time actually in service, uniformly organized and disciplined, and subject to a rigid, uniform code, and of course to Federal inspection, though not officered ordinarily by the general government. He acquiesces in the election of officers by the men whom they are to command as an unavoidable evil, — evil, not because the officers thus chosen are necessarily worse than if otherwise appointed, but because of the false relation thus created between the commander and the commanded. He would obviate its bad effects, first by a State examination, and secondly by a system of Federal inspection; and he recommends for this purpose, as well as for the sake of uniformity in essentials throughout the militia, (in his view indispensable to high efficiency,) the establishment of a Federal Militia Staff, which shall be devoted to carrying into effect the direction of the Constitution that Congress shall have power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," by prescribing uniform rules of organization and discipline, and enforcing attention to them. This last clause, relating to discipline, seems to have remained hitherto inoperative. Yet it is second in importance only to the general authority to call out the militia, and is properly connected with it; for the barren privilege of recommending a form of discipline to the States, without a coextensive provision for enforcing it, is futile. Either the right of the general government is superfluous, and the common defence may be safely intrusted to State action, or else this right should be made a reality by supplying the means for its exercise. If the general government may "call out" the militia, it ought to be able to make sure, in advance of actual need, that there is a *militia*, worthy of the name, to call out.

The slackness of our fathers was owing in part, no doubt, to an extension of the not unnatural dread of standing armies to everything that had the look of fixed organization, or that tended to produce an *esprit de corps*, or to furnish a ready, compact weapon to a possible usurper. And the democratic instinct against centralization, and in favor of individual action, of rotation in office, of improvised administration, was aided perhaps as time went on by an apprehension similar in effect, though of different origin, among the opposite political party, — the dread of a democratic despotism on the French model. There is some foundation for such fears; an efficient army, whether of regulars or of militia-men, is more dangerous than an inefficient one. And while everything that goes to weaken organization goes so far to diminish efficiency for good, a state of real disorganization under a show of system is merely dangerous, without any counterbalancing advantage. A militia that cannot fight cannot be a sword in the hand of an intriguer, but neither can it be a shield against him; and if it encourage a false reliance, it is only a snare. But such fears are not very potent now. We shall hardly hear of them, except as a cover to the little ambitions of little side interests. Perhaps the chief cause of the torpor has always been the obstinate optimism of our people, too careless or too busy to believe in the reality of danger, — at least that it is real enough to justify the certain trouble and expense of preparation to meet it. A real militia would sadly interfere with business; the militia accordingly became simply an idle pageant. Probably the minds of most persons are disabused of this amiable weakness for some time to come. And the States-right feeling is not likely at present to form any serious impediment in the minds of thoughtful men, — not because of the temporary set of the tide towards centralization, but because our fathers' faith in the people has become sight to us. We have believed that the real interest of each man and each section of the country was the interest of all and of every part, and that the people generally were enlightened enough to perceive this; and acting upon this belief, we have found it true. We do not need, therefore, to substitute for this *consensus* an arrangement that presupposes it to be false.

Many other suggestions of obvious importance are made by our author, all looking to the same end of a comparatively small body of uniformly disciplined militia, with a large latent force to fall back upon. Among these suggestions is that of the general introduction of elementary drill into schools, a measure commended by independent advantages, and to which we hear of no valid objection. He is opposed to State military academies, as not only uneconomical, but as tending to promote sectional feeling and military crotchets. These and other points we do not undertake to discuss. Whether the plan proposed is in all its details perfect, or how nearly perfect, it is not our province to say. But it seems to us clear that the main principle is sound, and worthy of general attention. Probably this is all that our author would claim.

11. — *The Origin of Human Races and the Antiquity of Man deduced from the Theory of "Natural Selection."* By ALFRED R. WALLACE. In the Anthropological Review. May, 1864.

MR. WALLACE, in this very well-written essay, makes an important contribution towards the clearing up of the great controversy of the Monogenists and the Polygenists. The firmest argument of those who advocate the original diversity of mankind has been that everywhere in *history* the evidence of the permanence of human types meets us. The differences that we can positively trace to variation are always most insignificant in amount compared with the extreme differences that exist, and that seem to have existed, side by side, perhaps in the same country, as far back as our evidence reaches. The monogenist "cannot show in a single case that at any former epoch the well-marked varieties of mankind approximated more closely than they do at the present day." Now this, though but negative evidence, still weighs heavily against the advocate of unity. After listening to his general arguments in favor of variation, the polygenist can always ask: "Why then do we never seize variation in the act? Why need this divergence of types of which you speak have taken place wholly in the dark background of pre-historical times, so that we only know it by its results? Will you pretend that the causes of variation are no longer active?" To such questions as these, the monogenist can make no reply, so that the problem still remains an unsolved one. Mr. Wallace, however, thinks that Darwin's theory of Natural Selection supplies an answer to them, and shows that in mankind the causes of variation *are* no longer active, by pointing out that any further physical change must be checked as soon as certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are given when man's affections and intellect are sufficiently developed to make of him a truly social, instead of a solitary or a merely gregarious being.

Among the brutes, the individual is self-dependent and isolated. If through any cause he finds himself out of harmony with the medium which he inhabits, he must almost inevitably perish, and those only of his relations who are better fitted for their circumstances than he will survive. But their superior gifts are of no assistance to him. He is thrown entirely upon his own personal resources. If, being an herbivorous animal, he is a little sick, and has not fed well for a day or two, and the herd is then pursued by a beast of prey, our poor invalid inevitably falls a victim. So in a carnivorous animal, the least deficiency of vigor prevents its capturing food, and it soon dies of starvation. There is, as a general rule, no mutual assistance between adult brutes which enables them to tide over a period of sickness. Neither is there any division of labor; each must fulfil *all* the conditions of its existence; and therefore Natural Selection keeps all up to a pretty uniform standard. In this way, if circumstances require it, the features of the race as a whole may come to change in a comparatively short space of time. The stock will now be represented entirely by the descendants of the more fortunate individuals, and will have inherited the peculiarities to which *they* owed their success.

"But in man, as we now behold him, this is different. He is social and sympathetic." All the members of a community profit by the gifts of any one member, and the deficiencies of any one member may be made up to him from the common wealth. "In the rudest tribes the sick are assisted at least with food; less robust health and vigor than the average does not entail death. Neither does the want of perfect limbs or other organs produce the same effects as among animals. Some division of labor takes place; the swiftest hunt, the less active catch fish or gather fruits; food is to some extent exchanged or divided. The action of natural selection [on the physical man] is therefore checked; the weaker, the dwarfish, those of less active limbs or less piercing eyesight, do not suffer the extreme penalty which falls upon animals so defective."

"Again, when any slow changes of physical geography or of climate render it necessary for an animal to alter its food, its clothing, or its weapons, it can only do so by a corresponding change in its own bodily structure and internal organization." But man, on the contrary, adapts himself to his new circumstances, for the most part by his intellect alone. He makes himself a different dress or habitation, new arms, and tools; "he plants the seed of his most agreeable food, and thus procures a supply independent of the accidents of varying seasons or natural extinction; he domesticates animals which serve him either to capture food or for food itself"; he has the use of fire; and is thus enabled "with an unchanged body still to keep in harmony with the changing universe." Natural Selection, then, in its action upon man, singles out for preservation those communities whose social qualities are the most complete, those whose intellectual superiority enables them to be most independent of the external world. The physical part of him is left immutable, and his mental and moral advance is secured.

Such is Mr. Wallace's theory. It certainly seems most reasonable, indeed obvious; so that in this case, as in the case of Darwin's original law, what most astonishes the reader is the fact that the discovery was made so late. Why may there not now be lying on the surface of things, and only waiting for an eye to see it, some principle as fertile as Natural Selection, or more so, to make up for its insufficiency (if insufficiency there be) in accounting for all organic change?

> "These considerations," says Mr. Wallace, "enable us to place the origin of man at a much more remote geological epoch than has yet been thought possible. He may even have lived in the eocene or miocene period, when not a single mammal possessed the form of any living species. . . . . During the long periods in which other animals have been undergoing modification in their whole structure to such an amount as to constitute distinct genera and families, man's body will have remained generically, or even specifically, the same, while his head and brain alone will have undergone modification equal to theirs. We can thus understand how it is that, judging from the head and brain, Professor Owen places man in a distinct sub-class of Mammalia, while as regards the rest of his body there is the closest anatomical resemblance to that of the anthropoid apes. . . . . The present theory fully recognizes and accounts for these facts; and we may perhaps claim as corroborative of its truth, that it neither requires us to depreciate the intellectual chasm which separates man from the apes, nor refuses full recognition of the striking resemblances to them which exist in other parts of his structure."

12.—*A Geography for Beginners.* By the REV. K. J. STEWART. Palmetto Series. Illustrated with Maps and Engravings. Richmond, Va.: J. W. Randolph. 1864. pp. 223.

THIS is a small volume of some two hundred pages, published in England, and destined, like the rest of the "Palmetto Series," to serve as a text-book for the schools of the Southern Confederacy. The printing, paper, and maps are good, and the wood-cuts, on the whole, as fair as are usually seen, and perhaps as true to nature as can be expected in a school-book of this sort. The geographical facts, the dimensions, population, mountains, rivers, and lakes of the different countries of the world are mentioned, and treated in much the same way in which these subjects have been handled by Mitchell or Cornell. It is true that the inhabitants of the United States are stated as numbering 13,000,000; but considering the origin of the book and the object of its publication, it is rather to be wondered at that this and a subsequent misstatement with regard to the cause of the late war are the only glaring falsehoods contained in it with reference to this country. The second misstatement to which we refer is the following paragraph, which occurs on page 200: "In the year 1861, the Federal Government of these States, elected by a sectional minority of 1,700,000 (out of a total vote of 5,000,000), attempted to subjugate the Southern States by military occupation. This occasioned the final separation of those States, and the formation of 'the Confederate States of America' as an independent government." In the list of Presidents just preceding these sentences the name of Abraham Lincoln is omitted. Is this because Mr. Stewart recoiled from the thought of forming with his own patriotic hand the letters which make up the name of that man whose principles embodied all that was hostile to the cause for which he wrote, or did he, with so many others, really think that the United States had ceased to exist on the secession of the Rebels, and that by conquest or compromise the Federal Government would merge in the Confederate? Perhaps the latter was the reason; and although the recollection appears laughable now, would it not be well to remember — will it ever be well to forget — that people who held such opinions were not without numbers and influence only a few months ago,— that, though their influence to do us harm in this particular direction is almost, if not entirely, gone, the spirit that possessed them remains, ready to marshal them against the true interests and principles of America whenever opportunity offers?

This "Geography for Beginners" is chiefly valuable as a curiosity in politics and religion. The character of the author's political statements with regard to his own country is marked by that skilful distortion of facts which the progress of the world in morality, and the increased inconvenience of downright lying caused by the general use of the printing-press, have forced upon those who commit and those who defend unjust public acts. A good instance of this sort is contained in an abstract of the history of Virginia on page 40, in the course of which he says: "When Virginia adopted the Federal Constitution of the United States, in 1788, the Commissioners of the State were directed to annex the condition and reservation of the right to withdraw from the federation at will. In the exercise of this reserved right, Virginia withdrew from the United States in the year 1861." That is to say, they did not reserve it, therefore they had it. One cannot help being reminded, in reading some of the arguments made use of by the Southerners during the Rebellion, of the old fallacy, "It rains, or it does not rain; it does not rain, therefore it rains." Again, on page 41: "The first collision of the war for independence of the Southern States occurred at Charleston in the spring of 1861, and was occasioned by the President, elected by citizens of the Northern States, attempting to seize, provision, and occupy the forts in Charleston harbor, and turn their guns upon the city they were designed to protect."

But the author, having dwelt at length on the productions, fauna, flora, and manufactures of the Confederate States, passes to the consideration of the British Empire, in which he tells us that "the Crown derives its authority from the acknowledged Supreme Ruler of the Universe by Divine right," and that "the Common Law of Great Britain is a model of just and equitable legislation, embodied from the great principles of the Book of Leviticus." There have been a great many severe things said of the Common Law, but never before, we believe, has an accusation so severe been brought against it, as that it embodied the principles of the Book of Leviticus. Crossing the Channel, France is next described; and though the Emperor is not stated to have derived his title directly from God, Mr. Stewart evinces such a loyal veneration for all authority of an imperial and regal nature, as to make it hardly possible to doubt he considers the Prince imperial at least to have been sent into the world by Divine interposition, lest the line of "the brave general, the humane and wise governor and sagacious statesman," should become extinct.

But if this description of the earth's surface has its political tint to suit the tendencies of those whom it was to educate, what shall we say of the varnish of religion that covers the whole picture? The author had no need to write *Rev.* before his name; his calling is sufficiently vouched for in the text of his book. There are so many allusions to the necessity of a dependence on God, so many subtile questions of ethics raised, as almost to leave it doubtful whether Mr. Stewart intended to make Religion the handmaid of Geography, or *vice versa;* as in a moral pocket-handkerchief it is difficult to say which is chiefly aimed at, — moral or physical relief. The "geography" of Palestine furnishes a marked instance of this needless and impertinent confusion of two entirely distinct subjects. Here we have perhaps a dozen lines of description, while two pages are devoted to the religious history of the country, with quotations from the Bible, and reasons why, by Christian, Jew, and Mohammedan, this land should be regarded with peculiar veneration. The following are some of the questions at the end of this section: "Which is the most interesting of all lands? Why? Is Palestine older than Great Britain? Why does the Jew venerate it? Were the Jews ever a populous and wealthy nation? When? Is God able to restore them to their own land? Who says that he is? How do Christians regard this land? Why? *Who was Christ? What did he do? Why?* From what place did he ascend? Will he ever return? For what purpose? Where does Mohammed say the judgment will take place? Is Mohammedanism true? Is it mixed with truth?" Again, *apropos* of the fauna of the Confederate States, the juvenile Rebel was to give answers on the following points. "Is it cruel in the Almighty to permit them (falcons) to tear a living victim, and eat it? Who says 'the whole creation travaileth together in pain'?" Would it be cruel for man to add to the sufferings of animals? Has man a right to crush worms to death when he digs in his garden? Has he a right to catch a fish with a hook? *Did one of the Apostles catch a fish with a hook? Which?* Have you a right wantonly to destroy animal life? To make them suffer for your amusement? Is it noble, or ignoble, to do so? What is the difference between *barbarian* and *gentleman?*

The "Palmetto Series" will probably never have a great sale; the nation for whose use it was designed has ceased to be; and it might perhaps seem hardly worth while to notice a book which is unlikely to do any harm. But besides being a curiosity in one view, it is well that it should be held up to scorn. That mawkish sentimentalism which passes with many for true religion, and which, never applied to the practical affairs of this world, grows rank and foul side by side with the truth it vainly seeks to copy, — in this the book before us abounds, being thus admirably suited to the taste of a people who mistook sentiment for religion, fancies for facts, and of information of every kind were always sadly in need.

13. — *Comparative Geography.* By Carl Ritter. Translated for the use of Schools and Colleges by William L. Gage. Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1865. 12mo. pp. 120.

This new volume which Mr. Gage has given to the public is a translation of one of the courses of geographical lectures which gave renown to the name of Ritter, as he delivered them in the University of Berlin. At the death of this distinguished man it was a matter of much regret to his scholars at home and abroad that he had left in print no systematic and comprehensive statement of the principles of a science of which he was acknowledged a chief promoter. To supply this want as far as possible, Dr. H. A. Daniel of Halle, a very competent editor, prepared and published from the manuscripts of Ritter, after comparing them with the note-books of his assiduous hearers, three little volumes which give an excellent notion of the doctrine and the style of this celebrated teacher. The first of the courses of lectures thus given to the public is a History of the Science of Geography and of Geographical Discovery; the second is a General Introduction to Comparative Physical Geography; and the third is an elaborate study of the Physiography of Europe. Mr. Gage has done wisely, in our judgment, in first translating the middle volume of this series. It is an attractive work, which fills an acknowledged gap in our scientific literature.

Many persons who took up the "Geographical Studies" of Ritter, a translation of which also we owe to the unwearied pen of Mr. Gage, laid down the volume disappointed. The fragmentary structure of these academic dissertations, and the peculiar involutions of the style, which did not wholly disappear in the English version, proved embarrassing to those readers whose acquaintance with the topics discussed was limited and elementary. Such obstacles will not be encountered in the volume before us. Unlike the essays which were written for the Academicians of Berlin, these lectures were prepared for students corresponding in attainments with those of American colleges. Consequently a systematic discussion of topics is followed, the language is clear and precise, the scope is comprehensive rather than profound, and the statement of facts is full enough for the uninformed reader, while it is not so extended and minute as to weary the attention. More than this, — the principles which are announced are so simple, so striking, and so broad, the comparisons are so sagacious and so indicative of varied learning and research, and the development of the relations which subsist between the earth and its inhabitants, though only brief, is so satisfactory, that the student feels conscious all the while that he is listening to a master.

A good text-book in physical geography, as we have intimated, has long been called for in this country. An admirable series of wall-maps, prepared with the highest scientific skill and printed with great mechanical perfection, is already circulating in our school-rooms and colleges; but the companion volumes are wanting, and we know not where a progressive teacher, unfamiliar with the German language, can look for such help as he urgently needs. Mrs. Somerville's little book is a useful compendium, but is so laden down with facts that the scholar is fatigued before he is introduced to the rudiments of the science. Dana's Manual of Geology contains an admirable chapter on Physical Geography, but it is only introductory to the study of geology, and is not extended enough to meet the wants of the geographical student. Guyot's "Earth and Man," the earliest of American books upon this subject, remains the best; but it is cast in the form of popular lectures, which is not the most appropriate for a scientific class-book. Herschel's excellent essay on Physical Geography is to a limited extent accessible in the Encyclopædia Britannica, but it has not been republished in this country. Most of the physical geographies of the school-room evince but little acquaintance on the part of their authors with the subjects discussed, and their principal value is to excite a desire for the knowledge which they fail to communicate.

We therefore regard this book of Ritter's as likely to be of great utility in its new garb; and yet we must caution the reader against inferring from its title, or from anything which we have said, that it is an introduction to all the branches of the science which it treats of. Its range is limited to geography in its strictest sense, — to a study of the earth-surface. Hydrography and meteorology, the study of the ocean and the atmosphere, with all their important phenomena, are not included within the scope of the volume. Consequently the climate, and its influence upon animal and vegetable life, are passed by; and the scholar must look elsewhere for the knowledge which he may desire respecting the geographical distribution of plants and animals. So, too, the relations of man to the world which he inhabits, are but briefly brought out in the introductory chapter. The great problem of the influence of the material world upon the human race, to which Buckle and Draper and other recent writers have directed so much attention, is only touched upon; and the equally interesting inquiry into the conquests of man over nature, so vividly portrayed by Marsh, forms no extended part of the writer's plan in the book which lies before us.

On the other hand, the present work is chiefly an examination of the great land-features of the globe, and more especially still, of what may be termed the solid dimensions of the land. In other words, it is a discussion of the great system of upheavals and depressions, of high reliefs and low reliefs, which give to the world its varied characteristics. It is a survey of the manifold forms of the high-land, the plateau, the mountain, the low-land, the terrace, and the river, and a comparison, under these several heads, of the features of this planet. It is true that Ritter excels, and that just in these particulars this work will prove of value to geographical students in this country. More than half the volume is thus taken up with a view of what are termed the solid forms of the earth's surface. Introductory to this are a few sections regarding the various portions of the globe in their most general relations, the form of the sphere, the comparative amount of land and water, the position of the continents, the historical element in geography, and other related topics. A brief account of the horizontal or superficial forms of the various land-masses forms the concluding chapter of the work.

We trust that this analysis, although of necessity so short, will suffice to awaken the interest of all who are inclined to these new inquiries. Mr. Gage is entitled to acknowledgments for the enthusiasm which he shows in the paths he is treading, and especially in his endeavors to make English readers familiar with the results of German scholarship. The present translation, when compared with that of the "Geographical Studies," evinces a decided improvement. We should prefer, indeed, to have had the volume given to us with judicious editorial notes, particularly with explanations of some of the unusual and technical terms which the author employs, and with more recent information in regard to certain matters of fact than the statements of a writer now several years deceased can possibly convey. Still, Ritter alone is recent enough and good enough to delight and instruct us in a science which he shares with Humboldt the honor of establishing.

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14. — *Physical Geography of the Holy Land.* By EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., LL. D. Boston: Crocker and Brewster. 1865. 8vo. pp. 400.

AMONG all our countrymen who have achieved distinction as explorers, none is more justly and widely honored than Edward Robinson. Indeed, there are few of any land who surpass him in zeal, industry, patience, and protracted devotion to a limited but important field of investigation. In some of his intellectual characteristics it may be thought that he is more of a German than of an American. Though good as an observer, he is even better as a scholar. He is not merely a traveller, he is the assiduous student of books. Over roads which are rough and dreary, where many a writer has preceded him, he patiently plods on, with his measuring-tape in hand, never diverted by that which is only transient or entertaining, but always faithful and persevering in determining that which is characteristic and enduring.

His early studies introduced him into the domain of biblical archæology and linguistics, and an original preference for such pursuits is apparent in all his subsequent researches. At the same time, he is not deficient in a knowledge of the natural sciences, and directs his attention to all the variety of questions which should properly interest the explorer. Notwithstanding that so many have preceded him in the study of Palestine, and so many contemporaneous writers have been engaged upon the same subject, he has secured a pre-eminence of which his countrymen are rightly proud; and although he is wanting in the vivid imagination and the enthusiastic sentiment which distinguish some of the travellers in the Holy Land, he exhibits a degree of thoroughness and accuracy which is of more lasting value.

The results of his two visits to Palestine, and of his collateral researches in the libraries of Europe, have been long before the public, — the first edition of the Biblical Researches having appeared in 1841, and the second, which presents in a supplementary volume his latest views, having appeared in 1856. An excellent collection of maps which was published in connection with the later researches is recommended for use in connection with the volume now first put forth.

Dr. Robinson regarded these Researches, even in their enlarged and revised form, as only preparatory to a more elaborate study of Biblical Geography. To this work he consecrated his life, although he was hampered by the daily duties of an instructor, which engrossed a considerable share of his time and strength. Unfortunately for the world, death terminated his labors when the promised treatise was only begun, and we have in the fragment before us another of those unfinished productions, which remind us, like the broken columns of a churchyard, of the frailty of human expectations. His learned and accomplished widow has rescued the treatise from oblivion by giving it to the press.

Dr. Robinson's habits of literary labor were such that he may be said to have finished his work as he went along. It was not his habit to make a rough and inaccurate sketch, which should be corrected by subsequent revision. Having formed his plan, he wrote each line with care, so that when he laid down the pen another might continue, but none could revise, what he had written. We are not surprised to learn, therefore, that the manuscript of his posthumous volume was found "thorough and complete in itself, without a missing note, without even the omission of a single word to be subsequently inserted." It is only an introduction, but it is harmonious, systematic, and exact.

The scope of the entire work, in the eye of the author, included not only Palestine, but the outlying lands which are closely connected with it. This comprehensive region he proposed to consider in three aspects, — Physical, Historical, and Topographical. He began with Palestine proper, to which his personal observations had been chiefly directed. He lived to finish very nearly his account of the physical characteristics of that limited portion of the field, and was ready to proceed to its history and topography.

The reader must not be disappointed if he finds but little which is new in the volume. All that Dr. Robinson ascertained in his travels is made known in the Researches; and the present work should therefore be regarded as a careful, well arranged, and scientific summary of what before appeared in the somewhat cumbersome form of an itinerary. To use the author's own phrase, the volume contains "a systematic presentation of his own personal observations made in the country itself, and more fully recorded from day to day in his Biblical Researches in Palestine."

As under these circumstances no special criticism seems called for, it only remains for us to point out the plan which has been followed, that the reader may see how convenient a manual is offered to him. The work consists of four chapters, one on the Land, another on the Waters, a third on the Atmosphere and Climate, and a fourth on the Geology of Palestine. Under the first of these heads, the hills, plains, and valleys are carefully described in their relations to one another. Next, the rivers and lakes, the fountains, and the wells, cisterns, and aqueducts are considered. The seasons, the winds, the temperature, and the purity of the atmosphere, form the divisions of the next chapter; and, finally, the geological features of the country and its exposure to earthquakes are briefly discussed. No account is given of the flora and fauna of the land. An Appendix on the Syrian Coast concludes the volume. Throughout, the design is apparent to make the work serviceable to the student of the Bible. In language and style it is sufficiently clear to be widely useful, though it cannot be regarded as a book for the multitude. For reference and study it will long remain without a rival, though the co-operation of various scholars, with proper pecuniary support, will in due time produce a more minute and comprehensive survey of Biblical countries.

15. — *Arctic Researches and Life among the Esquimaux; being the Narrative of an Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin, in the Years* 1860, 1861, *and* 1862. By CHARLES FRANCIS HALL. With Maps and one hundred Illustrations. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 595.

THIS is a very interesting book. It is the narrative of a remarkable expedition, and it holds a distinct and original place among the records of Arctic explorations. Its interest consists not in the importance of discoveries made by its author, or in its containing any great additions to the stock of geographical information respecting the Arctic regions, but is derived from the character, motives, and personal experience of Mr. Hall, and his accounts of the people with whom he dwelt.

For several years Mr. Hall had been deeply moved by the mystery hanging over the fate of Sir John Franklin and his companions. He had lamented the fruitless results of the search for them. He felt that it was a generous and humane work to seek for these missing men until a certain knowledge of their fate was acquired. Some of them might yet be living. Large ships and small ships in magnificent expeditions had been sent out to seek the lost. America had joined her efforts with those of England to recover their traces. But all had been in vain. Might not an individual, proceeding on a different plan from any heretofore followed, yet succeed. "It seemed to me," he says, "as if I had been *called*, if I may so speak, to try and do the work." "Accordingly, after mature consideration, I determined to make the effort. But how? what were my means? what the facilities for reaching the coveted goal of my ambition? What was I to do? I could not resist the desire upon me. I determined, therefore, to try; and, first of all, get what means were in my power, then find a way. Courage and resolution were all that I needed; and though some persons might not concur in the wisdom and prudence of my effort, still, as my mind was upon it, try it I would, and try it I did." This is the genuine spirit of great deeds. Here was a landsman, living in Cincinnati, in the heart of the continent, bound to home by strong ties, but fired with such zeal as to be eager to undertake what to the prudent of the world might well seem a desperate enterprise. But Mr. Hall was no modern Don Quixote. He was a crusader of the ages of faith, bound for his Holy Land. "I need not enter," he says in his Introduction, "upon all the many difficulties I encountered. These fall to the lot of every man who essays to try his hand at something new, and especially so if he starts on a path trodden without success before him. But difficulties sharpen the wit and strengthen the mind. . . . . How I surmounted those difficulties and started upon my voyage cannot be told at any length here."

Zeal is contagious. Mr. Hall found friends willing to aid him in securing the modest outfit he required. "My object," he told them, "is to acquire personal knowledge of the language and life of the Esquimaux, with a view thereafter . . . . to endeavor, by personal investigation, to determine more satisfactorily the fate of the 105 companions of Sir John Franklin, now known to have been living on the 25th day of April, 1848. . . . . The voyage is one I am about to make for the cause of humanity and science, — for geographical discovery, and *with the sole view of accomplishing good to mankind.*"

On the 29th of May, 1860, Mr. Hall set sail from New London, Connecticut, on board the whaling barque George Henry. For his own use he had obtained the little schooner, the Rescue, of celebrity gained in a previous Arctic expedition; and he had had built a boat specially adapted to the purposes for which he required it. These, with a small stock of proper clothing, provisions, some needed arms, instruments, and articles for presents, were his whole outfit. We do not propose to condense the narrative of his experiences and adventures during the two years and more of his residence in the Arctic regions. The loss of the Rescue and of his expedition boat in a storm, in September, 1860, was a calamity of the most serious nature in limiting the results which he had hoped to accomplish. The main object of his voyage was not gained; he learned nothing of the fate of Sir John Franklin's men; but though thus disappointed, he acquired an invaluable knowledge of the habits and thoughts and life of the natives of those Northern regions; he won their sympathy and confidence, he learned their language, and fitted himself to undertake future explorations. No hardship or trial was sufficient to wear out his energy or blunt his zeal. His faith, his hope, his charity, were never wearied. Every fresh test of his courage and endurance was borne with unflinching spirit and resolve.

The literary execution of Mr. Hall's book is of a character that corresponds well to the nature of his enterprise. The author's style is simple and manly, and his descriptions of natural objects and of the persons with whom he was brought in intercourse show a quick eye, a ready intelligence, and a strong power of sympathy. A vein of natural piety runs through the narrative, reminding the reader of a religious spirit often shown in the accounts of their voyages by the best earlier explorers. There are passages in the volume which, in picturesqueness, sincerity, and simplicity, both of description and of feeling, are worthy of Robinson Crusoe. The book wins for the author the cordial respect and sympathy of the reader. Mr. Hall is a man who has done honor to his country, and of whom his countrymen may well be proud. We join our heartiest wishes to those of his other friends for his safe and successful return from the expedition on which, undeterred by the failure of his first attempt, he set forth last year.

A notice of the book would be incomplete without commendation of the great excellence of the wood-cuts with which it is illustrated. In spirit and execution they are alike admirable; and no higher praise can be given them than that which most of them deserve, of being true illustrations of the narrative.

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16. — *Zulu Land, or Life among the Zulu-Kafirs of Natal and Zulu Land.* By Rev. Lewis Grout. Philadelphia. 12mo. pp. 351.

Port Natal, on the southeastern coast of Africa, was discovered by the celebrated navigator, Vasco de Gama, five years after the first voyage of Columbus to this country. He named the region Tierra de Natal, or Land of the Nativity, from the circumstance that he first came upon it on the 25th of December. Around the bay and port of Natal dwell the Zulu-Kafirs, a branch of the great African race which is known sometimes as the Zingian. In late years the land of the Zulus has been brought before the public with some prominence as the see of an eccentric Bishop of the Church of England. Dr. Colenso and Mr. Grout were laborers in the same field, though their notions were so different as to bring on a local controversy of some importance on polygamy, the precursor of the greater discussion which is still exciting the minds of English theologians.

A few of our countrymen have for thirty years been accustomed to watch the progress of events in that remote region of the earth, because an enterprising band of Americans has been there, engaged in promoting the intellectual and moral culture of the natives, and in endeavoring to diffuse among them the principles of Christianity. They have reduced the language to writing; and one of their number, the author of this volume, has prepared a grammar of the Zulu tongue, which is not only a great service to the native people and to the European emigrants, but is an interesting and valuable contribution to general philological science.

But we apprehend that the public generally has no adequate notion of the remarkable infusion of European ideas and institutions which is steadily in progress on the southeastern coast of Africa. Americans have been so much absorbed with the African question at home, that they have paid but little attention to the noteworthy encroachments which the British are making on the continent which has so long been regarded as sealed against the progress of civilization. But to sagacious Englishmen the vision of a new East-Indian empire has already dawned. It has been proved that enterprise alone is necessary to develop an important trade in Southeastern Africa. Commerce has already obtained a firm foothold, new exploring expeditions are continually at work, and her Majesty's government, quick to foresee and protect the interests of her commercial subjects, improves systematically every opportunity to establish the authority of the British on all the confines of Ethiopia. Where these movements will end, no one can foretell. The plan of English supremacy, though not avowed, is obvious; and its results on the welfare of the African must be important. As the fate of the American people seems inevitably intertwined with that of the African, we ought not to be indifferent to the influences which are thus at work across the seas. From this point of view we regard the volume of Mr. Grout as an important contribution, not merely to the religious, but also to the political history of the times. He is known to be a scholar, discriminating and exact. For fifteen years, beginning in 1847, he resided in Zulu Land. He has inquired into the history, laws, and usages of the native people, he has investigated to some extent the geology, the botany, and the animal life of the region, and he has watched the progress of European emigration and civilization. His story is therefore varied and trustworthy; and although the literary structure of his narrative is not as satisfactory as we wish it were, his book gives us much valuable information.

Twenty-two years have now passed since the English extended their jurisdiction over the region immediately around Port Natal, and they are now proposing to include still more of the Zulu country. In 1856, Natal was erected into a separate colony, having a lieutenant-governor, and a legislative council of sixteen members, four of whom the crown appoints, and the rest are chosen by the people. Among the principles laid down by the British government in organizing the colony, slavery in any shape was declared unlawful, and moreover, in the eye of the law there is no disqualification whatever founded on color, origin, language, or creed. These wise political maxims have contributed to the prosperity of all parties, and now the Dutch and English emigrants live harmoniously with the natives. "When Queen Victoria adopted Natal as an English colony," says Mr. Grout, "she came into possession of a gem of no ordinary value; nor is it often that a new land makes a surer, steadier advance than this has done since it came under her benignant rule." From 1846 to 1861, fifteen years, the shipping which arrived at Natal increased from 30 vessels, averaging 117 tons, to 97 vessels, averaging 198 tons. Only one of these 97 vessels came from the United

States. The imports during this period went up from £40,000 to £400,000. The exports in 1861 were, — wool, £33,000; ivory, £23,000; sugar, £20,000; butter, £15,000; and hides, £11,000. Banks, newspapers, a hospital, a library, and churches of several denominations, are all thriving. It is estimated that 12,000 white persons are living in the country.

From these brief statements it is clear that a great work is in progress in Zulu Land. It is true that the missionaries sent out from this and other countries can show but little result as yet from their labors in the way of positive impression upon the natives; but ninety energetic men, laboring in forty stations, and supported by all the influence of European civilization in a large and thriving colony, will certainly accomplish much. This volume gives us the record of the work of pioneers. A few years hence we shall hear from the reapers.

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17. — *Moods.* By Louisa M. Alcott, Author of "Hospital Sketches." Loring, Publisher. Boston. 1865. 12mo.

Under the above title, Miss Alcott has given us her version of the old story of the husband, the wife, and the lover. This story has been told so often that an author's only pretext for telling it again is his consciousness of an ability to make it either more entertaining or more instructive; to invest it with incidents more dramatic, or with a more pointed moral. Its interest has already been carried to the furthest limits, both of tragedy and comedy, by a number of practised French writers: under this head, therefore, competition would be superfluous. Has Miss Alcott proposed to herself to give her story a philosophical bearing? We can hardly suppose it.

We have seen it asserted that her book claims to deal with the "doctrine of affinities." What the doctrine of affinities is, we do not exactly know; but we are inclined to think that our author has been somewhat maligned. Her book is, to our perception, innocent of any doctrine whatever.

The heroine of "Moods" is a fitful, wayward, and withal most amiable young person, named Sylvia. We regret to say that Miss Alcott takes her up in her childhood. We are utterly weary of stories about precocious little girls. In the first place, they are in themselves disagreeable and unprofitable objects of study; and in the second, they are always the precursors of a not less unprofitable middle-aged lover. We admit that, even to the middle-aged, Sylvia must have been a most engaging little person. One of her means of fascination is to disguise herself as a boy and work in the garden with a hoe and wheelbarrow; under which circumstances she is clandestinely watched by one of the heroes, who then and there falls in love with her. Then she goes off on a camping-out expedition of a week's duration, in company with three gentlemen, with no superfluous luggage, as far as we can ascertain, but a cockle-shell stuck "pilgrim-wise" in her hat. It is hard to say whether the impropriety of this proceeding is the greater or the less from the fact of her extreme youth. This fact is at any rate kindly overlooked by two of her companions, who become desperately enamored of her before the week is out. These two gentlemen are Miss Alcott's heroes. One of them, Mr. Geoffrey Moor, is unobjectionable enough; we shall have something to say of him hereafter: but the other, Mr. Adam Warwick, is one of our oldest and most inveterate foes. He is the inevitable *cavaliere servente* of the precocious little girl; the laconical, satirical, dogmatical lover, of about thirty-five, with the "brown mane," the quiet smile, the "masterful soul," and the "commanding eye." Do not all novel-readers remember a figure, a hundred figures, analogous to this? Can they not, one of his properties being given, — the "quiet smile" for instance, — reconstruct the whole monstrous shape? When the "quiet smile" is suggested, we know what is coming: we foresee the cynical bachelor or widower, the amateur of human nature, "Full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard," who has travelled all over the world, lives on a mysterious patrimony, and spends his time in breaking the hearts and the wills of demure little school-girls, who answer him with "Yes, sir," and "No, sir."

Mr. Warwick is plainly a great favorite with the author. She has for him that affection which writers entertain, not for those figures whom they have well known, but for such as they have much pondered. Miss Alcott has probably mused upon Warwick so long and so lovingly that she has lost all sense of his proportions. There is a most discouraging good-will in the manner in which lady novelists elaborate their impossible heroes. There are, thank Heaven, no such men at large in society. We speak thus devoutly, not because Warwick is a vicious person, — on the contrary, he exhibits the sternest integrity; but because, apparently as a natural result of being thoroughly conscientious, he is essentially disagreeable. Women appear to delight in the conception of men who shall be insupportable to men. Warwick is intended to be a profoundly serious person. A species of prologue is prefixed to the tale, in which we are initiated into his passion for one Ottila, a beautiful Cuban lady. This chapter is a literary curiosity. The relations of the two lovers are illustrated by means of a dialogue between them. Considering how bad this dialogue is, it is really very good. We mean that, considering what nonsense the lovers are made to talk, their conversation is quite dramatic. We are not certain of the extent to which the author sympathizes with her hero; but we are pretty sure that she has a secret "Bravo" in store for him upon his exit. He talks to his mistress as no sane man ever talked to a woman. It is not too much to say that he talks like a brute. Ottila's great crime has been, that, after three months' wooing, he has not found her so excellent a person as he at first supposed her to be. This is a specimen of his language. "You allured my eye with loveliness, my ear with music; piqued curiosity, pampered pride, and subdued will by flatteries subtly administered. Beginning afar off, you let all influences do their work, till the moment came for the effective stroke. Then you made a crowning sacrifice of maiden modesty, and owned you loved me." What return does she get for the sacrifice, if sacrifice it was? To have her favors thrown back in her teeth on the day that her lover determines to jilt her. To jilt a woman in an underhand fashion is bad enough; but to break your word to her and at the same time load her with outrage, to call her evil names because she is so provokingly in the right, to add the foulest insult to the bitterest injury,—these things may be worthy of a dissolute adventurer, but they are certainly not worthy of a model hero. Warwick tells Ottila that he is "a man untamed by any law but that of [his] own will." He is further described as "violently virtuous, a masterful soul, bent on living out his aspirations at any cost"; and as possessed of "great nobility of character, great audacity of mind"; as being "too fierce an iconoclast to suit the old party, too individual a reformer to join the new," and "a grand man in the rough, an excellent tonic for those who have courage to try him." Truly, for her courage in trying him, poor Ottila is generously rewarded. His attitude towards her may be reduced to this:—Three months ago, I fell in love with your beauty, your grace, your wit. I took them as a promise of a moral elevation which I now find you do not possess. And yet, the deuse take it, I am engaged to you. *Ergo*, you are false, immodest, and lacking in the "moral sentiment," and I will have nothing to do with you. I may be a sneak, a coward, a brute; but at all events, I am untamed by any law, etc.

Before the picnic above mentioned is over, Warwick and Moor have, unknown to each other, both lost their hearts to Sylvia. Warwick may not declare himself, inasmuch as, to do him justice, he considers himself bound by word to the unfortunate beauty of the Havana. But Moor, who is free to do as he pleases, forthwith offers himself. He is refused, the young girl having a preference for Warwick. But while she is waiting for Warwick's declaration, his flirtation with Ottila comes to her knowledge. She recalls Moor, marries him, and goes to spend her honeymoon among the White Mountains. Here Warwick turns up. He has been absent in Cuba, whether taking back his rude speeches to Ottila, or following them up with more of the same sort, we are not informed. He is accordingly ignorant of the change in his mistress's circumstances. He finds her alone on the mountain-side, and straightway unburdens his heart. Here ensues a very pretty scene, prettily told. On learning the sad truth, Warwick takes himself off, over the crest of the hill, looking very tall and grand against the sun, and leaving his mistress alone in the shadow. In the shadow she passes the rest of her brief existence. She might have lived along happily enough, we conceive, masquerading with her gentle husband in the fashion of old days, if Warwick had not come back, and proffered a visit, — his one natural and his one naughty act. Of course it is all up with Sylvia. An honest man in Warwick's position would immediately have withdrawn, on seeing that his presence only served seriously to alienate his mistress from her husband. A dishonest man would have remained and made love to his friend's wife.

Miss Alcott tries to persuade us that her hero does neither; but we maintain that he adopts the latter course, and, what is worse, does it like an arrant hypocrite. He proceeds to lay down the law of matrimonial duty to Sylvia in a manner which, in our opinion, would warrant her in calling in her husband to turn him out of the house. He declares, indeed, that he designs no "French sentiment nor sin," whatever these may be; but he exerts the utmost power of his "masterful soul" to bully her into a protest against her unnatural union. No man with any sense of decency, no man of the slightest common-sense, would presume to dogmatize in this conceited fashion upon a matter with which he has not the least concern. Miss Alcott would tell us, we presume, that it is not as a lover, but as a friend, that Warwick offers the advice here put into his mouth. Family friends, when they know what they are about, are only too glad to shirk the responsibility of an opinion in matrimonial differences. When a man beats, starves, or otherwise misuses his wife, any judicious acquaintance will take the responsibility of advising the poor woman to seek legal redress; and he need not, to use Miss Alcott's own preposition, have an affinity "for" her, to do so. But it is inconceivable that a wise and virtuous gentleman should deliberately persuade two dear friends — dear equally to himself and to each other — to pick imperceptible flaws in a relation whose inviolability is the great interest of their lives, and which, from the picture presented to us, is certainly one of exceptional comfort and harmony.

In all this matter it strikes us that Sylvia's husband is the only one to be pitied. His wife, while in a somnambulistic state, confesses the secret of her illicit affection. Moor is, of course, bitterly outraged, and his anger is well described. Sylvia pities him intensely, but insists with sweet inflexibility that she cannot continue to be his wife, and dismisses him to Europe, with a most audacious speech about the beautiful eternity and the immortality of love. Moor, who for a moment has evinced a gleam of natural passion, which does something towards redeeming from ludicrous unreality the united efforts of the trio before us, soon recovers himself, and submits to his fate precisely like a morbidly conscientious young girl who is engaged in the formation of her character under the direction of her clergyman. From this point accordingly the story becomes more and more unnatural, although, we cheerfully add, it becomes considerably more dramatic, and is much better told. All this portion is, in fact, very pretty; indeed, if it were not so essentially false, we should call it very fine. As it is, we can only use the expression in its ironical sense. Moor consents to sacrifice himself to the beautiful ethical abstraction which his wife and her lover have concocted between them. He will go to Europe and await the dawning of some new abstraction, under whose starry influence he may return. When he does return, it will not be, we may be sure, to give his wife the thorough rating she deserves.

At the eleventh hour, when the vessel is about to start, Warwick turns up, and thrusts himself, as a travelling companion, upon the man he has outraged. As Warwick was destined to die a violent death, we think Miss Alcott might have here appropriately closed her book by making Moor pitch Adam into the water for his impertinence. But as usual, Warwick has his own way.

During their absence, Sylvia sinks into a rapid decline. After a certain interval they start homeward. But their ship is wrecked; Warwick is lost in trying to save Moor's life; and Moor reaches home alone. Sylvia then proceeds to put him and every one else in the wrong by dying the death of the righteous.

The two most striking facts with regard to "Moods" are the author's ignorance of human nature, and her self-confidence in spite of this ignorance. Miss Alcott doubtless knows men and women well enough to deal successfully with their every-day virtues and temptations, but not well enough to handle great dramatic passions. The consequence is, that her play is not a real play, nor her actors real actors.

But beside these facts are others, less salient perhaps, upon which it is pleasanter to touch. Chief among these is the author's decided cleverness; that quality to which we owe it that, in spite of the absurdities of the action, the last half of her book is replete with beauty and vigor. What shall we call this quality? Imagination does not seem to us too grand a word. For, in the absence of knowledge, our authoress has derived her figures, as the German derived his camel, from the depths of her moral consciousness. If they are on this account the less real, they are also on this account the more unmistakably instinct with a certain beauty and grace. If Miss Alcott's experience of human nature has been small, as we should suppose, her admiration for it is nevertheless great. Putting aside Adam's treatment of Ottila, she sympathizes throughout her book with none but great things. She has the rare merit, accordingly, of being very seldom puerile. For inanimate nature, too, she has a genuine love, together with a very pretty way of describing it. With these qualities there is no reason why Miss Alcott should not write a very good novel, provided she will be satisfied to describe only that which she has seen. When such a novel comes, as we doubt not it eventually will, we shall be among the first to welcome it. With the exception of two or three celebrated names, we know not, indeed, to whom, in this country, unless to Miss Alcott, we are to look for a novel above the average.

18.— *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels. From the German of* GOETHE. By THOMAS CARLYLE. In Two Volumes. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. pp. 399, 388.

THIS new edition of Goethe's great novel will give many persons the opportunity of reading a work which, although introduced to the English public forty years ago, is yet known to us chiefly by hearsay. We esteem it a matter for gratitude that it should now invite some share of attention as a novelty, if on no other ground; and we gladly take advantage of the occasion thus afforded to express our sense of its worth. We hope this republication may help to discredit the very general impression that *Wilhelm Meister* belongs to the class of the great unreadables. The sooner this impression is effaced, the better for those who labor under it. Something will have been gained, at least, if on experiment it should pass from a mere prejudice into a responsible conviction; and a great deal more will have been gained, if it is completely reversed.

To read *Wilhelm Meister* for the first time is an enviable and almost a unique sensation. Few other books, to use an expression which Goethe's admirers will understand, so steadily and gradually *dawn* upon the intelligence. In few other works is so profound a meaning enveloped in so common a form. The slow, irresistible action of this latent significance is an almost awful phenomenon, and one which we may vainly seek in those imaginative works in which the form of the narrative bears a direct, and not, as it appears here to do, an inverse, relation to its final import; or in which the manner appeals from the outset to the reader's sympathy. Whatever may be the lesson which Goethe proposes to teach us, however profound or however sublime, his means invariably remain homely and prosaic. In no book is the intention of elegance, the principle of selection, less apparent. He introduces us to the shabbiest company, in order to enrich us with knowledge; he leads us to the fairest goals by the longest and roughest roads. It is to this fact, doubtless, that the work owes its reputation of tediousness; but it justifies the reputation only when, behind the offensive detail, the patient reader fails to discover, not a glittering, but a steadily shining generality. Frequently the reader is unable to find any justification for certain wearisome *minutiæ;* and, indeed, many of the incidents are so "flat," that the reader who comes to his task with a vague inherited sense of Goethe's greatness is constrained, for very pity, to supply them with a hidden meaning. It would not, therefore, be difficult to demonstrate that the great worth of *Wilhelm Meister* is a vast and hollow delusion, upheld by a host of interested dupes. The book is, indeed, so destitute of the quality of cleverness, that it would be comparatively easy for a clever man to make out any given case whatsoever against it; do anything with it, in short, except understand it. The man who is only clever may do much; but he may not do this. It is perhaps one of the most valuable properties of *Wilhelm Meister* that it does not react against this kind of manipulation. We gladly admit, nay, we assert, that, unless seriously read, the book must be inexpressibly dull. It was written, not to entertain, but to edify. It has no factitious qualities, as we may call them; none of those innumerable little arts and graces by which the modern novel continually and tacitly deprecates criticism. It stands on its own bottom, and freely takes for granted that the reader cannot but be interested. It exhibits, indeed, a sublime indifference to the reader, — the indifference of humanity in the aggregate to the individual observer. The author, calmly and steadily guided by his purpose, has none of that preoccupation of *success* which so detracts from the grandeur of most writers at the present day, and leads us at times to decide sweepingly that all our contemporaries are of the second class.

Of plot there is in this book properly none. We have Goethe's own assertion that the work contains no central point. It contains, however, a central figure, that of the hero. By him, through him, the tale is unfolded. It consists of the various adventures of a burgher youth, who sets out on his journey through life in quest, to speak generally, of happiness, — that happiness which, as he is never weary of repeating, can be found only in the subject's perfect harmony with himself. This is certainly a noble idea. Whatever pernicious conclusions may be begotten upon it, let us freely admit that at the outset, in its virginity, it is beautiful. Meister conceives that he can best satisfy his nature by connecting himself with the theatre, the home, as he believes, potentially at least, of all noble aims and lessons. The history of this connection, which is given at great length, is to our mind the most interesting part of the whole work; and for these reasons: that those occasional discussions by which the action is so frequently retarded or advanced (as you choose to consider it), and of which, in spite of their frequency, we would not forfeit a single one, are here more directly suggestive than in subsequent chapters; and that the characters are more positive. The "Apprenticeship" is, in the first half, more of a story, or, to state it scientifically, more dramatic than in the last. If Goethe is great as a critic, he is at least equally great as a poet; and if *Wilhelm Meister* contains pages of disquisition which cannot be too deeply studied, it likewise contains men and women who cannot be forgotten. Meister's companions bear no comparison with the ingenious puppets produced by the great turning-lathe of our modern fancy.

There is the same difference between them and the figures of last month's successful novel, as there is between a portrait by Velasquez and a photograph by Brady. Which of these creations will live longest in your memory? Goethe's persons are not lifelike; that is the mark of our fashionable photographic heroes and heroines: they are life itself. It was a solid criticism of certain modern works of art, that we recently heard applied to a particular novelist: "He tells you everything except the very thing you want to know." We know concerning Philena, Aurelia, Theresa, Serlo, and Werner none of those things of which the clever story-teller of the present day would have made hot haste to inform us; we know neither their costume, nor their stature, nor the indispensable color of their eyes; and yet, for all that, they *live*, — and assuredly a figure cannot do more than that.

The women in *Wilhelm Meister* are, to our mind, truer even than the men. The three female names above mentioned stand for three persons, which abide in our memory with so unquestioned a right of presence that it is hard to believe that we have not actually known them. Is there in the whole range of fiction a more natural representation of a light-hearted coquette than that of the actress Philena, — she who, at the outset of an excursion into the country, proposes that a law be passed prohibiting the discussion of inanimate objects? Where, too, is there as perfect an example of an irretrievable sentimentalist as her comrade Aurelia, she who, as herself declares, bears hard upon all things, as all things bear hard upon her, and who literally dies for the sake of poetic consistency? What an air of solid truth, again, invests the practical, sensible, reasonable Theresa!

Wilhelm's purpose being exclusively one of self-culture, he is an untiring observer. He listens to every man, woman, and child, for he knows that from each something may be learned. As a character, he is vague and shadowy, and the results of his experience are generally left to the reader's inference. Indeed, as his lessons are mostly gathered from conversations for which he furnishes the original motive, the reader may place himself in the hero's position of an eminently respectful auditor, and judge of the latter's impressions by his own.

Although incidentally dramatic, therefore, it will be seen that, as a whole, *Wilhelm Meister* is anything but a novel, as we have grown to understand the word. As a whole, it has, in fact, no very definite character; and, were we not vaguely convinced that its greatness as a work of art resides in this very absence of form, we should say that, as a work of art, it is lamentably defective. A modern novelist, taking the same subject in hand, would restrict himself to showing the sensations of his hero during the process of education; that is, his hero would be the broad end, and the aggregate of circumstances the narrow end, of the glass through which we were invited to look; and we should so have a comedy or a tragedy, as the case might be. But Goethe, taking a single individual as a pretext for looking into the world, becomes so absorbed in the spectacle before him, that, while still clinging to his hero as a pretext, he quite forgets him as a subject. It may be here objected, that the true artist never forgets either himself or anything else. However that may be, each reader becomes his own Wilhelm Meister, an apprentice, a traveller, on his own account; and as his understanding is large or small, will Wilhelm and the whole work be real or the contrary. It is, indeed, to the understanding exclusively, and never, except in the episode of Mignon, to the imagination, that the author appeals. For what, as we read on, strikes us as his dominant quality? His love of the real. "It will astonish many persons," says a French critic, "to learn that Goethe was a great scorner of what we call the ideal. Reality, religiously studied, was always his muse and his inspiration."

The bearing of *Wilhelm Meister* is eminently practical. It might almost be called a treatise on moral economy, — a work intended to show how the experience of life may least be wasted, and best be turned to account. This fact gives it a seriousness which is almost sublime. To Goethe, nothing was vague, nothing empty, nothing trivial, — we had almost said, nothing false. Was there ever a book so dispassionate, or, as some persons prefer to call it, cold-blooded? In reading it, we learn the meaning of the traditional phrase about the author's calmness. This calmness seems nearly identical with the extraordinary activity of his mind, as they must both indeed have been the result of a deep sense of intellectual power. It is hard to say which is the truer, that his mind is without haste or without rest. In the pages before us there is not a ray of humor, and hardly a flash of wit; or if they exist, they are lost in the luminous atmosphere of justice which fills the book. These things imply some degree of passion; and Goethe's plan was *non flere, non indignari, sed intelligere.*

We do not know that in what we have said there is much to lead those who are strangers to this work to apply themselves to the perusal of it. We are well aware that our remarks are lamentably disproportionate to the importance of our subject. To attempt to throw a general light upon it in the limits here prescribed would be like striking a match to show off the *Transfiguration.* We would therefore explicitly recommend its perusal to all such persons, especially young persons, as feel that it behooves them to attach a meaning to life. Even if it settles nothing in their minds, it will be a most valuable experience to have read it. It is worth reading, if only to differ with it. If it is a priceless book to love, it is almost as important a one to hate; and whether there is more in it of truth or of error, it is at all events *great.* Is not this by itself sufficient? *Wilhelm Meister* may not have much else that other books have, but it has this, that it is the product of a great mind. There are scores of good books written every day; but this one is a specimen of the grand manner.

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19. — *Annals of the American Pulpit, or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of various Denominations, from the early Settlement of the Country to the Close of the Year Eighteen Hundred and Fifty-five. With Historical Introductions.* By William B. Sprague, D.D. Volume VIII. *Unitarian Congregational.* New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 578.

Doctor Sprague's chief design in the work of which the last published volume now lies before us was to introduce the several denominations of American Christians to one another's just appreciation and cordial esteem. He has effected this so naturally, genially, and felicitously, that, while the reader marvels that he never knew before what wise and good men there were in other folds than his own, he fails to trace the loving skill which has converted the dry facts of our ecclesiastical history into arguments for tolerance, charity, and good-fellowship. Bringing in his labor of love a mind admirably fitted for the manipulation of such materials as he sought, our author has made of them by far the most valuable compend of ecclesiastical biography and personal history that has ever appeared in this country, — a work which for breadth of plan and thoroughness of execution has few, if any, rivals in the department to which it belongs.

Dr. Sprague's eight massive volumes condense the patient toil of more than twenty years, the results of a correspondence with thousands of persons in hundreds of places, and the record of what their compiler has seen and heard in his own professional intercourse for nearly half a century. The method adopted in them is one by which the truth with regard to each of the persons commemorated is most likely to have its fair representation. Where there are no accessible living authorities concerning the subject of one of his biographies, Dr. Sprague writes the memoir himself, always referring in a foot-note to his sources of information. In most of the other cases a brief memoir thus compiled forms the first and an essential part of the sketch, which is completed by letters from such persons as are best qualified to bear testimony to the events, incidents, or local traditions connected with the life of the individual treated of. It will be readily seen that this mode needs to be carefully guarded against an excess of eulogy. If intimate friends or warm admirers were encouraged to furnish biographical letters *ad libitum*, the book would be little better than a series of amplified epitaphs. But while Dr. Sprague has sought notices almost always from friendly hands, they are very seldom derived from near kinsmen, or even from coeval intimates. His aim has been as far as possible to place as biographers before the public men of known reputation for discernment and integrity, — men whose names were a sufficient guaranty for the accuracy and impartiality of their narratives. With reference to his more distinguished subjects, he never contents himself with the testimony of a single witness, but adduces several who can present the character in different aspects, and not unfrequently members of different religious sects.

Of the eight volumes the one just issued seems to us the most full of various interest. There are many reasons for this. In the two or three generations preceding our own, there can be no question that the majority of the more gifted and influential Massachusetts clergymen were to a greater or less degree heretical as tried by the established

Calvinistic standards. True, a large proportion of these liberal divines, if living now, would not take their place among the Unitarians. Many of them would find themselves embraced within the looser girth of a less stringent orthodoxy; while many of them would rather associate themselves with the closest adherents of the Westminster creed, than with the rationalistic and naturalistic professors of Unitarianism. And from divines of this class, who failed of entire conformity with the popular faith only because of their rigid integrity of conscience, the volume includes men of all shades of belief down to the Scriptural humanitarianism of these recent times, — without embracing, however, any subjects of the now existing school typified by Theodore Parker, which in 1855 was too young to have a necrology. There was thus a broader range and a wider diversity of theological speculation to be covered by this volume than by any of the preceding seven, with the five powerful denominations to which they are devoted. Then, too, the principal pulpits in Massachusetts, toward the close of the last and for the first quarter of the present century, were occupied almost wholly by ministers of the more liberal party, and nowhere has the minister ever been more emphatically the parson (*persona*), person, or representative man of his parish, than in these very communities, during the period specified, — so that the lives of the clergy comprise important chapters of the local history which they took the lead in making. For similar reasons Dr. Sprague has in this part of his work a very large proportion of collaborators who have borne distinguished names and filled prominent places in their respective communities.

This volume also contains sketches of several men whose fame belongs by no means to their denomination, but to the republic of letters or of science, and of many others who were as extensively known, revered, and beloved beyond the pale of their own sect as within it. At the same time, we cannot find on the list a name that ought to have been omitted, or in the volume a biography which is not worth reading; while many of the sketches are of special interest, sometimes from the quaint character of the subject, sometimes from the skilful painting of the writer.

We feel, too, on the perusal of this book, that it has brought us into intimate communion with many eminently good men, whose lives were a perpetual blessing to those among whom their lot was cast, and who have left enduring and precious fruits and memories of their labor, example, and influence.

We cannot too highly praise Dr. Sprague's integrity and fairness His position as a Presbyterian of the strictest school is perfectly well known, nor is he in a single instance oblivious of it. He probably has as little love of Unitarianism as any of his Calvinistic brethren. Yet in not so much as a word has he permitted sectarian sympathy to affect his biographic impartiality. He is not only perfectly fair, but lavishly generous. No Unitarian will doubt that he has done the denomination full justice; the richness of the volume might lead hostile readers to suppose that he had done it more than justice. Certainly no member of the denomination would have expected from a brother of the same faith a work more entirely free from undue bias and prejudice. In fine, with regard to this, as well as with reference to the preceding volumes, the unanimous verdict is, "There lives no other man who could have done this work so well."

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20. — *Reason in Religion.* By Frederick Henry Hedge. Boston: Walker, Fuller, & Co. 1865. 16mo. pp. 458.

"No more confidential gift can man offer to man, than what he has talked to himself in the innermost chamber of his soul," — such is the motto of this book, taken from Schleiermacher, which we translate as an expression of the spirit in which Dr. Hedge offers his volume to the reader.

The work appears to be in great part — the First Book at least — made up of the sermons of its accomplished author. This fact does not diminish the value of its contents or its construction; for Dr. Hedge's sermons are the studies in philosophy and piety of a mind at once sensible, poetical, and spiritual, alike free and reverent, manly and godly.

Here is a Body of Divinity with the soul of humanity in it, — not like one of those so-called Bodies of Divinity in old time, out of which a meagre ghost of dogma squeaked and gibbered. Here a whole, live, manly man speaks without cant. Few books going over so much ground, and touching on so many of the vexed questions of sceptical speculation and sectarian controversy, will afford the thoughtful reader so much satisfaction, on the whole, as this.

Dr. Hedge's statements and arguments move right on to practical issues with simple directness. He recognizes and reveres the great mystery which to finite minds must ever hang around the infinite; but he sees the limit clearly, he grants no indulgence to mystification. He holds to the much misinterpreted and even misquoted saying of James Foster, that "where the mystery begins, religion ends." Indeed, it is remarkable, with the author's speculative propension and power, how resolutely he subordinates the speculative to the practical.

The tone of thought and the style of writing are both of an excellence rarely met with. Every one must be struck with a singular union of sturdy and homely sense with delicate sensibility. In felicity of statement and fitness of expression Dr. Hedge has few rivals among the clergy. In his very logic, as well as in his rhetoric, there is a poetic beauty. In keenness of view, in candor of judgment, in the creativeness of his criticism, in the argumentative power of his illustrations and in the humanity of his theology, he holds a very high place among living theologians. In his theology and his philosophy alike, he keeps with him that poetic and even humorous element which belongs to the genuine man. Thus what are so often the dry bones of theology live at the touch of his genial nature. He feels that no one can interpret aright the book of Nature, or the books of the inspired men of God, without the imaginative spirit.

The work is divided into two Books, covering the grounds commonly called "Natural Religion," and "Revealed Religion"; but the First Book Dr. Hedge entitles "Religion within the Bounds of Theism." It is introduced by two Essays, one of them on "Being and Seeing," — maintaining that the truth a man needs must be lived out and worked out with the whole soul, not merely fought for in a war of words, and with the naked understanding. Dr. Hedge, hardly inverting, however, the old Scripture saying in spirit, holds that *as a man is, so he thinketh.* His creed grows out of his character. His nature, including what birth made him and what he has made himself, determines his religion, — an argument at once for charity and for carefulness. It seems to us that philology points also to the true philosophy here. That is *believed* which is *beloved.* So that, if it may not be said that *we can believe just what we please*, it may be said that we believe what pleases us, what meets our deepest desires.

In this preliminary Essay of the First Book, Dr. Hedge already foreshadows the position of the corresponding one in Book Second, that Faith and Reason are co-ordinate, co-operative, mutually corrective faculties in religion. In practice, however, he does not forget that *the head is placed above the heart*, and he evidently aims to reach the heart through the intellect. In the higher philosophy, Reason is itself a religious faculty; and the pure and perfect Reason can hardly be conceived as without faith in a Supreme Power and Central Spirit.

In the second preliminary Essay, Dr. Hedge discusses the popular, though inaccurately expressed, distinction of natural and spiritual, eloquently arguing, as we take the liberty to state his ground, that nature is a field of the spirit, that the spiritual is a form and aspect of nature, and that the realm of nature is the realm of *grace.*

He now comes to his main subject, — God and Man, — human life and death and destiny. The first chapter is entitled "The Retreating God," or God hiding himself, as the Scripture expresses it, behind his creation, — in his very garment of light, — by his very nearness, and omnipresence, and immensity.

> "The Eternal no man sees; He modestly
> Veileth Himself in His eternal laws,
> Which, and not Him, the sceptic seeing, exclaims:
> What need is there of God? the universe
> Is surely all-sufficient for itself.
> And never did a Christian's adoration
> So praise Him as this sceptic's blasphemy."

Then follows a counterpart chapter called "The Advancing God," or God gradually revealing himself, which arrives at the point that "the true revelation is internal. The only effectual knowledge of God is the private experience of the individual soul." This is one of the best discourses in the book; and we regard it as an important supplement to the author's recent address on "Anti-Supernaturalism in the Pulpit," in which he reduces the rationalist to the sharp dilemma: "The Bible or the mathematics as the basis of preaching, — in the long run it must come to that."

Chapters Third, Fourth, and Fifth, entitled respectively "The Regent God," "The Answering God," "The Exorable God," treat of Providence and Prayer, and on the latter subject are several striking pages in which occur these sentences: "We may boldly say, that every genuine prayer affects the Deity in proportion to the faith that is in it. Every genuine prayer is a positive force in the universe of things. The Eternal Will — the axis of creation — bows and dips to human entreaty. The world of spirits, subsisting and centred in God, is moved by it as the sea is moved by whatever stirs within its depths."

Then follow chapters called "The Old Enigma" (Evil), "The Old Discord" (Sin), "The Old Fear" (Death), "The Old Hope" (Immortality), compact with fine wisdom and wholesome counsel, the sermon on Death being, perhaps, the most eloquent one to the heart in the whole volume; and this First Book closes happily with "Freedom in Bonds," or, as we might call it, "The Law of Liberty."

The Second Book, for which the First has well prepared us, is entitled "Rational Christianity," and is introduced by that Essay on the relation of Reason to Faith to which we have already referred. The Essays on Christ which follow are eminent examples of candor and catholicity. Dr. Hedge, analogously to the suggestion in the First Book, that evil is good in the making, holds here that error is truth in the making, and accordingly that the Trinitarian creeds were needed *in their day;* and he *seems* to think that the Athanasian, Nicene, and Chalcedonian Creeds are nearer the truth in Christology than the Unitarianism of the Church in the first century.

In the next chapter, on the "Limitation of Personality in Christ," (the first being entitled its "Culmination,") he insists that in prayer (which is the strongest test of our faith) the heart demands one supreme object, a reality undisturbed by discordant words, without "an interposed secondary person, intercepting and superseding the Supreme." In the chapter on Miracles, Dr. Hedge denies that Jesus "ever stormed the senses in order to carry the heart"; he contends that "faith is not the offspring of miracles, but miracles, of faith"; he admits that a miracle cannot be proved, but asserts that it *can* be believed; he thinks the way to prove Christianity is to practise it, and that in view of the great phenomenon of the Gospel itself, as a palpable fact, it is "a small thing" "to quarrel about the record and fight against miracles, with this miracle of all time staring us in the face."

The Essays on the Spirit, the Letter (or Form), on Saving Faith, Grace, Predestination, Immortality, Retribution, renew and carry forward in the light of Revelation and Reason the discussion of corresponding themes in the First Book as "within the bounds of Theism."

Finally, as the work began with thoughts on the influence of character in shaping the creed, followed by a defence of the *natural* as a basis of religion, so it closes with, first, an Essay on "two types" of character, the Jew and the Greek (the conservative and the inquisitive), showing the importance of their co-operation in building the house of our faith; and, secondly, with an admirable discrimination between the spurious saint of the popular religion and the genuine saint of the true religion,—the man of God, such as the faith which this book has depicted would tend to produce.

After this analysis of its contents, we need hardly repeat our opinion of the value of the book. It is a fine expression of the genius of an independent thinker, and a catholic, Christian believer. It is a timely antidote to the sophistries of the latest disparagers of the Christian faith.

21.—*Familiar Words: an Index Verborum or Quotation Handbook, with parallel Passages, of Phrases which have become imbedded in our English Tongue.* By J. HAIN FRISWELL. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston. 1865. 16mo. pp. 434.

IN the Preface to this volume, Mr. Friswell, in a sentence of remarkable verbal ambiguity, says, "The Editor has to return his acknowledgments to many gentlemen; to the Editor of Notes and Queries, the columns of which [sic] he has frequently availed himself [sic]; to a work [is a work a gentleman?] issued in America by Mr. Bartlett, in which all the quotations from one author are placed under the same name, and who [the work or the gentleman?] has omitted nearly twenty English authors here quoted from," etc., etc.

Every reader in America knows Mr. Bartlett's useful and excellent "Familiar Quotations." A smaller volume had been published in England, under the title of "Handbook of Familiar Quotations," but Mr. Bartlett's work was already in progress, and he was little, if at all, indebted to his Transatlantic predecessor. One would judge from Mr. Friswell's words that he owed no special debt to Mr. Bartlett. But in looking over his volume, we find curious evidence that his debt is one of such magnitude that he may well have shrunk from informing the public of it. It is enough to ruin his credit. The truth is, that he owes at least nine tenths of his Familiar Words to Mr. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. Thus under letter A, there are 300 quotations, of which 278 are taken from Mr. Bartlett; and under letter S, there are 308, of which 276 are from Mr. Bartlett. Or, to make a comparison of another sort, there are 378 pages of Mr. Friswell's Familiar Words, of the same size as Mr. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, but a little more closely printed, so that the matter in the two volumes does not greatly differ in amount; and of the passages cited in Mr Bartlett's volume, all but 34, exclusive of some contained in the notes, are transferred to that of Mr. Friswell.

This wholesale borrowing, to call it by an inoffensive name, is moreover frequently very inaccurately and clumsily done. Mr. Bartlett has arranged his extracts under the names of the authors from whom they are taken. It thus often happens that the head-line on a page gives the name of the author, citations from whose writings commence on the page, the upper part of which is occupied by citations from the preceding author. Mr. Friswell, misled by the head-line, has frequently attributed a quotation to a wrong author. For instance, on p. 12, the familiar lines from Longfellow's "Resignation,"

"The air is full of farewells to the dying,
And mournings for the dead,"

are assigned by Mr. Friswell to Holmes, the head-line in Mr. Bartlett's volume giving Dr. Holmes's name. On p. 54,

"Bibles laid open, millions of surprises,"

is in like manner ludicrously assigned to Suckling, instead of to George Herbert. On p. 114, J. R. [sic] Key is credited with a stanza that belongs to J. R. Lowell. Other instances of the same sort occur. At the end of his volume, Mr. Bartlett has arranged various quotations under the general head of "Miscellaneous," giving references, however, to their authors. Mr. Friswell has transferred these quotations to his volume, and contented himself with assigning them to "Miscellaneous," an author at least as voluminous as the "Anonymous" of our Hymn-Books.

We do not know who are the "nearly twenty English authors" citations from whom are declared by Mr. Friswell in his Preface to be "omitted by Mr. Bartlett." The only one whom we have discovered is Mr. J. Hain Friswell himself. He has cited passages from this author, which are undoubtedly "familiar words" to him, but are certainly not so to any one else.

A minor fault of this volume is its incorrectness. It is full of mistakes of all sorts, such as might be expected in a work of such false pretences.

We estimate the acknowledgment by Mr. Friswell of his indebtedness to Mr. Bartlett's book, and his statement in his Preface that his "work has been a long time in hand, line has been added to line, and in its progress it has grown to its present dimensions," as an illustration of Rochefoucauld's maxim, (conveyed from Mr. Bartlett's volume into Mr. Friswell's,) that "Hypocrisy is a sort of homage that vice pays to virtue."

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22. — *The Hillyars and the Burtons: a Story of Two Families.* By HENRY KINGSLEY. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 12mo. pp. xi., 419.

"THE old question between love and duty," says the author in his Preface, "I have in this story used all my best art in putting before the reader." A bad best, we are constrained to say, Mr. Kingsley's best art seems to be.

It is true that, like most other problems given us to solve in this world, the problem of love and duty is so difficult, and so overlaid by confusing circumstances, that we go wrong oftener than right, and as men and women we do little more than repeat in a larger school our experience as children, when, after long puzzling over our sums, we used to work back from the right answer, and discover too late when it was that a false method misled us, making the correct solution thenceforth impossible, and the rest of our labor vain. But in books, in "novels of purpose," which professedly aim to teach, even if we say nothing of the implied obligation resting on them to be artistically constructed, it must be regarded as a fault if there are gathered around the main subject so many extraneous and utterly irrelevant circumstances that it is wholly hidden from view, and we learn only from the Preface that there is a main question at all; and it is a greater fault if the difficulty selected for explication is one so very easy to deal with, and the failure to deal with it correctly so very obvious, as in the novel before us. Picking out the thread of the principal action from the varied mass of foreign material woven up with it, we may say that the problem is thus presented.

Emma Burton is a not very handsome, but very sensible English girl, "who might, I fancy, after a year and a half of boarding-school, have developed into a very noble lady." She loves Erne Hillyar, who in turn, though he is the son and expected heir of a wealthy baronet, and she a working blacksmith's daughter, is much in love with her. To the union of this ill-assorted couple there seems to be no opposition on the part of the parents. But Emma has a brother Joseph. He in consequence of an injury received in childhood is a hunchback. This calamity, however, leaves his physical strength unimpaired, and, on the whole, proves of advantage to him, for he is thereby saved from the necessity of learning his father's trade, and enabled to devote his time to hard reading and attending school. Spite of his deformity, Joseph, as he increases in years and knowledge, becomes possessed of some considerable personal attractions; his frame is herculean, his head is massive and magnificent, his beautiful face is that of a Byron. Better than all, he is a genius, and there is in him a wonderful capacity for work. He is scarcely twenty when his character, talents, and acquirements are such that Sir George Hillyar declares himself his patron, and takes him into his household as private secretary at a salary of two hundred pounds a year. But soon his patron dies, misfortune overtakes his father, and the Burtons emigrate to that land of promise, Mr. Kingsley's Australia. Erne Hillyar has been cheated out of his inheritance, and sails from England in the same vessel that carries his mistress. They are hardly arrived in Cooksland, when Joseph is made second master of the government school at Palmerston, and not long afterwards, having meantime distinguished himself by a masterly report on the condition of his school, and the merits of the compulsory system of education, he is elected to a seat in the Provincial Parliament. Fortune favors his father, and the lucky discovery of a copper mine makes the Burtons the wealthiest people in Cooksland. While Joseph is still a very young man, he finds himself the Honorable Joseph Burton, a famous orator, Minister of Education, a member of the Governor's Council, and the husband of a lady, young, pretty, and rich.

To the work of taking care of this young man Emma Burton for some unaccountable reason insists on dedicating her life. Most people would consider him admirably qualified to take care of himself. But his sister declares that her duty requires the sacrifice of her love, and accordingly sacrifices it. Now if duty demanded the sacrifice, she did well to make it. Doubtless she did well to make it, if in her opinion duty demanded it. We intend to deny neither proposition. But though the willingness to become martyrs to duty be a fine thing, even that willingness confers upon us no right to insult common-sense. Emma Burton's love and life, her lover's health and happiness, were sacrificed, heroically sacrificed perhaps, but not to duty. Self-abnegation is truly the very flower of Christian character. Like the flower, its beauty is an unconscious beauty, and it blooms for delight of others, and not for its own. St. Pierre tells us, that on the banks of the Rhone, when the tide is high, there may be seen under the clear water what appear to be clusters of purple blossoms. Looking closely at them, however, the observer notices that, instead of swaying quietly with the tide, they seem to have an uneasy and self-communicated motion, and, watching intently, he discovers that the seeming flower is a diminutive polyp, busily revolving that it may create a little whirlpool into which is drawn the food to satisfy its greedy appetite. To us the heroine's vaunted devotion to duty seems as little like true sacrifice of self, as the polyp's voracity is like the perfume of the flower it resembles. To act as she acted under the given circumstances, there would be required one of those not uncommon natures, weak yet unfeeling and obstinate, that take delight in actions which indeed wear the semblance of self-sacrifice, but really are done to feed a diseased vanity, and to obtain that morbid pleasure which some minds feel in self-torture.

Emma Burton's character is represented as far removed from all this; she is sensible, loving, and thoroughly truthful. How is it then, that, in the most important affair of her life, she plays the part of the weak-minded, ill-natured girl, — a young lady who will have a mission? Because Mr. Kingsley, though undoubtedly a pleasing and clever writer when he treats of the mere surfaces of things, is altogether incompetent to the task of delineating character. Motives he can conceive, for he is a man; actions he can describe, for he is an observer by nature, and practised with the pen; but to conceive and set before us motives and actions in their relations with each other, and with the character to which he attributes them, — this is something beyond his skill.

In every part of his story, in the details of the plot, in the sentiments, in the language, this defect of inconsequence and incoherence is as marked as we have seen it to be in the main action. For example:

the persons of the story are of course taken to Australia. In that land of anomalies our author is perfectly at home. His strength is never more clearly shown than in the power with which he paints for us the wild, impressive phenomena of nature in that unfamiliar continent, and the easy vigor with which he describes the strange Australian men and manners, — the bush-fight, the siestas, convicts, Cantabs, dragoons, expatriated Irish rebels, the struggles of colonial politics. But setting aside this consideration, the scene of action should have been kept in England, and the problem worked out there. Had the heroine and her brother remained in the country of their birth, where their position in the social scale was low, she might with a shadow of excuse have devoted her life to his service. Conscious of his fitness for higher things, yet deprived of the proper field in which to exert his excellent powers, it is not unlikely that, without the sympathy and tender care of a female friend, Joseph might have developed into a most unhappy and uncomfortable personage. But in the colony the case is different. His foot is hardly on the wharf before his path is made plain and easy to him. He gets first a competency and reputation, then wealth and honors, so that his sister renounces happiness for herself, and ruins the happiness of another, for no visible reason but that Joseph may be spared the infliction of living at a Palmerston boarding-house. In England the heroine's problem might have had a real existence; in Australia nothing but her whim could have galvanized it into any appearance of life.

So, too, in the language and sentiments of his characters our author's best art proves very insufficient. Here is the heroine when, fired with noble rage, she rebukes her lover, because upon hearsay evidence only he believes his brother to be a bad man: —

"I tell you boldly that your duty as a gentleman is to labor night and day to bring your brother into his father's favor. It will ruin you in a pecuniary point of view to do so; but if you wish to be a man of honor and a gentleman, if you wish to be with us all the same Erne Hillyar that we have learnt to love so dearly, you must do so."

This is all well enough; but what shall we say of the following passages? It presents the same young lady when she is very angry with a Jew lad, who brings her a letter, and who requests that for his labor and travel he be kissed, declining indeed to deliver the packet till he has received his just reward. This is refused, and a good deal of preliminary sparring takes place. But suddenly Miss Burton dashes forward on her antogonist, feints cleverly with her left, gets home heavily on the boy's head, at the same moment snatches the letter with swift dexterity, ending the round and the fight with this volley of — what shall we say? — "Chin-music" we venture to call it, borrowing in our exigency a word from the Army of the Potomac:

"I 'LL kiss you! With pepper-my-Barney.
O yes, with capsicums."

But it would be idle to enumerate the many blemishes which in this book destroy all artistic effect. Were it not for the claim made in the Preface, it would perhaps have been hardly fair to notice them at all in a book of this class. On that head, therefore, we will say no more; and our concluding remarks shall touch briefly upon a topic which this history of a poor family's adventures forcibly suggests, though it does not avowedly treat. There are sermons in stones for those who can read them, and in any novel a thorough analysis will find a moral of some sort. In this novel, though, as we have seen, the preachment does little to enforce the particular doctrine of the text, yet the general system of which Mr. Kingsley and his better-known brother are regarded as the expounders is again brought before us. We now refer not to that rather inadequate religious theory which in "manliness" finds divinity, which affects to believe that "quiet pluck," and striking out from the shoulder, and one or two other things more or less offensive in sound or in substance, are all that man needs for anything, — whether to save his soul alive, or to remove impediments in his speech. The household of that faith is not a large one. Although, when it was first preached, it may, in the minds of some young men, have added weight to the maxim *fortiter pecca*, and led some to smoke strong tobacco and practise the manly art, — though some may have followed after Bishop Synesius, the friend of Hypatia, riding hard and drinking strong liquors, — yet but few men at any time, and now-a-days almost none, have attempted to take the kingdom of heaven by violence of that sort. It is of the political and social theories of the gentlemen of this school that we wish to say a word or two, even at the risk of speaking out of season.

No gallery of a fifth-rate theatre ever gave more liberal applause to the bold British tar, whose cutlass had given him the victory over the profligate aristocrat and his minions, than these writers were in the habit of bestowing upon great-hearted gentlemen, who were by occupation journeymen tailors, kingly souls disguised thinly in mechanics' aprons, and accomplished ladies who by birth were slaves. We read their books not without pleasure. The tailor, to be sure, was illogical, and his temper was bad, the blacksmith's magnanimity and virtue were of the intensely self-conscious kind, but much, we thought, should be forgiven to writers who, with whatever weapons, fought bravely in vindication of the nobility of man, and in the cause of manhood against oppressive social and political institutions. In the war for democracy their blows seemed to fall upon our enemies; to our own peculiar and only aristocratic institution they had loudly proclaimed their hostility;

the essential dignity of labor and the sinfulness of slave-holding were tenets common to our faith and theirs. Moreover, when we used to read the gloomy prognostications of the latter-day pamphleteers, and saw some cause to think that their most melancholy forebodings were to some extent justified by the actual condition of things in England, though we knew that the minor prophets are apt to be somewhat too denunciatory, still it was a great consolation to us to think that the other bulwark of liberty among the nations would not be suffered to decay without any note of warning, and that, if England was indeed becoming a waste wilderness, there were not wanting the voices of some crying within it, England's own sons giving words of reproof and counsel that might save her from ruin at the last. To find that all this bravery of words was mere fervid talk, was not pleasant. Yet it could have been nothing more.

A people whose system of government is based upon the nobility of man — the nobility of tailors, and rail-splitters, and tanners, as well as of other men — has for the last four years been defending its national existence against the attacks of a power which believed in a system diametrically opposite. Our humane system is the parent of justice, intelligence, enterprise. Their system encouraged listlessness and indolence and ignorance; the laws permitted them to sell children who had negro blood in their veins, and the customs were such that these children often were their own; their system made it a frequent necessity to whip women; the very life of it was that one half the population should be defrauded of the profits of their labor by the other half; their art of war seems to have included assassination and the poisoning of wells; of their social structure, what Governor McDuffie and Alexander H. Stephens announced as the corner-stone had already been described by John Wesley as the sum of all villanies, — a phrase now somewhat worn, but so true to the terrible fact, that before it shall be worn out the reality must perish.

Surely now, one would have said, the preachers of "manliness," and "honor," and "*hault courage*," they who proclaimed "pluck," the believers in the dignity of honest work, can never hesitate to rush into battle against an enemy so monstrous. These paladins will rejoice to hear the trumpet of the adventurous heathen blown for battle so near to the noblest camp of Christendom. The great and happy opportunity has come to vindicate the faith that is in them, and to show themselves true knights. How this hope and expectation have been answered, we need not say. The disappointment is one that can be borne. But what will those men say for themselves who for one pitiful reason or another have made it impossible for us to believe longer in their honesty or their sense? Nothing, — unless this can be said, that, if they wish to be considered as having any honesty at all, they must submit to be looked upon as, during the past four years, having had neither knowledge nor foresight.

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23. — *Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero.* By WILLIAM FORSYTH, M. A., Q. C. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1865. 2 vols. Sm. 8vo. pp. 364, 341.

THESE two volumes undertake to supply a want that has long been felt by the English-speaking world. There has never been in English an absolutely good life of the great Roman, and for nearly a century there has been no life which was at all acceptable to English scholarship. The researches into Roman history and antiquities so diligently prosecuted during the last hundred years have given us a better knowledge of many things before hidden in complete darkness or lying in doubtful light. But the information thus obtained, so far as it affected our knowledge of Cicero's character, can hardly be said to have been made easily accessible, being either scattered through various reviews, or gathered into articles in Cyclopædias, or to be picked out from the pages of historical works.

Middleton's Cicero has long since been consigned to the list of books which no gentleman's library can do without, and which still less can do without the sort of gentleman's library referred to in the jest. It has fallen under the severe condemnation of the critics, both for its own shortcomings and for the faults and errors of Middleton himself. Nothing is spared. One writer is able to find in it nothing that is good, whether its matter or its manner be looked at. Of the style he says that it is essentially bad: "by weeding away from it whatever is colloquial, you would strip it of all that is characteristic; removing its idiomatic vulgarisms, you would remove its principle of animation."

Certainly Middleton's style is so far from being exact or elegant, as to be always quite unstudied, and sometimes even slovenly. Yet though somewhat involved, it is generally easy, agreeable in its narrative flow, and perspicuous; fully justifying the praise of Gray, a critic perhaps too fastidious, who could say of Middleton, "Though I cannot approve the spirit of his books, methinks 't is a pity the world should lose so rare a thing as a good writer." The spirit alluded to by the poet as having displayed itself in Middleton's polemical writings has been made the foundation of a very grave charge against his Life of Cicero, — namely, that he so depicted Cicero's character as to make him appear a man of pure and scrupulous morality, a model of integrity and uprightness, "to which Christianity could have added no element of value." This allegation could never have been proved, and probably was not suggested by the book itself. We indeed find him given up to that blind idolatry of his subject which constitutes the standing charge against almost all biographers. His zeal is made the more fanatical because he was in dense ignorance of the real point at issue in that tremendous conflict between Cæsar and Pompey, which forms by far the most interesting period of Cicero's life. To him Cicero was not a partisan, but a true patriot. And he was the more ready to take Cicero's view of the contest, because, as he shows throughout his book, he had an awful deference for the mighty Roman names, and an uneasy fear that it was presumptuous in a broad-skirted, bewigged Briton of George the Second's time to sit alone in judgment on the Senators of Rome. Adopting Cicero's likes and dislikes, his judgments of men and affairs are never fearless and impartial. With a false idea of Cicero's times, taking Cicero's account of himself as well as of other men, it is not much to be wondered at if Middleton's biography is panegyrical.

But the defence of Middleton may be based upon another consideration upon which, as it assists us to gain a clearer view of Cicero himself, we shall dwell at some length. More than most men, he lived a double life. Every man's experience teaches him how wide a difference exists, sometimes for better, sometimes for worse, between the valuation which he puts upon himself and that which the world sets upon him. His character, as portrayed to the world by his actions, is a reality; but his character, as he himself reads it in his thoughts and feelings and aspirations, is also a reality, and it often is to him the nearest and most tangible of all real things, and the one in whose existence he most believes.

When we note in the record of Cicero's actions the many so unworthy in themselves, so little consonant with the noble and beautiful nature revealed in his writings, — when we see his mean concessions to a corrupt party, his sacrifices of justice to personal friendship or political ambition, his truckling to base men, his irresolution, his double-dealing and vanity, — we with difficulty avoid holding him in contempt, and wonder how so great a man could fall so far short of the standard which his own hands had set up for himself. But sensitive, imaginative, and given to self-contemplation, the busy life of the senate and the forum never weaned Cicero from his favorite pursuits, and never could have seemed to him so truly his life as those hours of happy leisure when, escaped from the temptations of ambitious Rome, having put off from the real man which he felt himself to be, that outside man which apparently he was, he lived his true life; — was the sage, revolving schemes for his country's good; the philosopher, pondering sweet and solemn thoughts; the instructor of his countrymen in that noble ethical system which seems to declare the whole law of conscience, and to want nothing but that power of conscience which, born of the hopes and fears breathed into the soul of man by revelation, supports and strengthens our moral systems. And moreover his ideal, not, as with the mass of men, floating vaguely in the mind, but reduced to shape and consistency by laborious thought, thus lovingly labored over, became to his own eyes more and more his very self. The Cicero who wrote disgraceful letters to Cœlius and Dolabella, who defended Gabinius at the behest of Pompey, who opened his brother's correspondence, who was a coward in his exile, formed but a small and insignificant part of the true Cicero, who so warmly admired and loved everything great and generous and good, who felt himself fired with the divine spark of genius.

Judging him by his treatises and orations alone, the world might have held of Cicero his own opinion of himself. But the world was disabused. In the familiar letters it found the material for reaching more correct conclusions. But these letters no more than the acts and thoughts which they recorded could undeceive their writer, and until recently the majority of writers have taken his own view of his character, and Middleton is by no means the only biographer whose praises of Cicero are eulogistic and devoid of discrimination.

It may be proper to mention here Abeken's "Cicero in seinen Briefen," a work better described by its German title than by that which Mr. Merivale has prefixed to the English translation which he edited. For it is not so much "An Account of the Life and Times of Cicero," as it is a painstaking and accurate commentary on the familiar epistles. We believe that this valuable translation has never been republished in America. The original work, designed for the use of instructors of youth, while it is admirably adapted to answer the end proposed, and eminently just in its opinions, is yet a dry and unentertaining work.

Of Mr. Forsyth as a biographer, we may say that to the meritorious part of Middleton's work he has joined all of Abeken's fit for transfer into a popular biography, and has added of his own some interesting and valuable reports of all the cases in which Cicero appeared as an advocate and where there is still remaining any part of his argument. In manner he has the advantage of his German predecessor. His style, without being in the least raised or ornamented, yet merits the praise of being free from affectation of any sort; and the language is just such plain, sensible English as one gentleman of good education might write to another about the crops, the weather, home politics, and the news from abroad. The author objects to Middleton's work, that it is too much taken up with a history of Cicero's times, and says that the charm of biography consists in the faithfulness with which domestic details and little traits of personal character are presented. If this be so, it is not for their charm, then, that the world demands biographies of its great men. Cicero was an orator, a philosopher, and a statesman of Rome at the epoch when Roman history was most interesting; and it is these aspects of the man that biography should mainly describe. Let trivial details be admitted only on condition that their presence excludes nothing more important. English literature, which had so long been content with Middleton's Life of Cicero, may for an equal period be satisfied with this work of Mr. Forsyth's. But there is yet room for a comprehensive biography of the great Roman, written by a man of genius and historical insight.

We believe that there is not one typographical error in all the seven hundred pages of this work. The index would have been better if it had been made very much more copious. The outward appearance of the volumes leaves nothing to be desired.

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24. — *Collection De Vries. A Series of French, German, Italian, and Spanish College Text-Books, comprising Tales, Novelettes, Comedies, Poetry, etc.* Boston. 1864, 1865. 12mo.

THIS collection, which now embraces more than fifty separate publications, is of great excellence, both as regards the selection of the works comprised in it and the form in which they appear. Each number of the series is for sale separately, and of many of the numbers there are two editions, one with notes to assist beginners in the languages, and one of the text alone for advanced readers.

In the German series we have Hans Andersen's delightful *Bilderbuch ohne Bilder*, one of the works most characteristic of his pleasant genius; Tieck's story of *Die Elfen*, and his little drama *Das Rothkäppchen;* two amusing comedies by Pultitz; two of Paul Heyse's excellent stories; Herman Grimm's two remarkable essays on *Die Venus von Milo* and *Rafael und Michel Angelo;* and several other works by modern and contemporary authors of the first rank.

The French series contains some of the best stories of George Sand, Balzac, Mme. Reybaud, Jules Sandeau, Théophile Gautier, and others. In the Italian series are Pellico's well-known tragedy of *Francesca da Rimini*; Dall' Ongaro's charming tale of *La Rosa dell' Alpi;* Nota's lively comedy of *La Fiera;* Grossi's *Ulrico e Lida;* and other productions of recent Italian authors, which have heretofore been rarely accessible in this country.

The Spanish series begins with Fernan Caballero's story of *La Familia de Alvareda*, and contains other works well fitted to promote the study of Spanish among us, and very welcome to readers of the language as among the best specimens of the current literature of Spain.

The notes are by competent scholars, and so far as we have examined them are judicious and helpful. All the numbers of the different series are neatly and generally very carefully printed, and form pretty and attractive little volumes. Mr. De Vries deserves great credit for his enterprise in undertaking these publications, and we sincerely trust that he may be encouraged to continue and greatly extend this American library of foreign works.

25.—*The Iliad of Homer rendered into English Blank Verse.* By EDWARD, EARL OF DERBY. In Two Volumes. New York: Scribner. 1865. 8vo. pp. x., 430, and 457.

THERE are two singular superstitions firmly rooted in the English mind,—a belief in the divine efficacy of Greek and of Lords. The one is apparently deemed essential to eternal, as the other to political salvation. To be able to write in the Hellenic character a copy of verses that would have set the teeth of all Athens on edge, is an essential prerequisite for ecclesiastical preferment; comment the Ecclesiazusæ and be a bishop; and yet for a noble to condescend to an acquaintance with the language even thus consecrated adds a new lustre to the coronet, and deserves the national gratitude. For the first Earl in England to know *anything*, indeed, is a concession to popular prejudice as unusual as it is gratifying. It is no wonder, then, if the Earl of Derby's translation has been received in England as the unmerited intervention of a superior being in favor of human imperfection. A god descends again to share in this battle of interpreters upon the windy plains of Troy.

There are two theories of translation,—literal paraphrase, and free reproduction. At best, the translation of poetry is but an imitation of natural flowers in cambric or wax; and however much of likeness there may be, the aroma, whose charm of indefinable suggestion in the association of ideas is so powerful, is precisely what is lost irretrievably. From where it lurked in the immortal verse, a presence divined rather than ascertained, baffling the ear which it enchanted, escaping the grasp which yet it thrilled, airy, evanescent, imperishable, beckoning the imagination with promises better than any fulfilment,

> "The parting *genius* is with sighing sent."

The paraphrase is a plaster-cast of the Grecian urn; the reproduction, if by a man of genius, is like Keats's ode, which makes the figures move and the leaves tremble again, if not with the old life, with a sorcery which deceives the fancy. Of all English poets, Keats was the one to have translated Homer.

In any other than a mere prose version of a great poem, we have a right to demand that it give us at least an adequate impression of force and originality. We have a right to ask, If this poem were published now for the first time, as the work of a contemporary, should we read it, not with the same, but with anything like the same conviction of its freshness, force, and originality, its high level of style and its witchery of verse, that Homer, if now for the first time discovered, would infallibly beget in us? Perhaps this looks like asking for a new Homer to translate the old one; but if this be too much, it is certainly not unfair to insist that the feeling given us should be that of life, and not artifice.

The Homer of Chapman, whatever its defects, alone of all English versions has this crowning merit of being, where it is most successful, thoroughly alive. His mastery of English is something wonderful even in an age of masters, when the language was still a mother-tongue, and not a contrivance of pedants and grammarians. He had a reverential sense of "our divine Homer's depth and gravity, which will not open itself to the curious austerity of belaboring art, but only to the natural and most ingenious soul of our thrice-sacred Poesy." His task was as holy to him as a version of Scripture, and he justifies the tears of Achilles by those of Jesus, and the eloquence of his horse by that of Balaam's less noble animal. He does not always keep close to his original, but he sins no more, even in this, than any of his rivals. He is especially great in the similes. Here he rouses himself always, and if his enthusiasm sometimes lead him to heighten a little, or even to add outright, he gives us a picture full of life and action, or of the grandeur and beauty of nature, as stirring to the fancy as his original. Of all who have attempted Homer, he has the topping merit of being inspired by him. With others translation has been a task, more or less loved, but always a task.

The Earl of Derby has chosen blank verse, as best fitted to express the "simplicity" as well as the "freedom and spirit" of Homer. He seems to think rhyme and simplicity incompatible, and to have no conception of rhymed pentameter unless it be chopped into couplets. His study of the measure has apparently been confined to the school of Pope. In Chaucer it flows with a full current, scarcely rippled by the rhyme; Chapman in his Odyssey never disturbs us with the epigrammatic click of the couplet; and even Dryden harnesses in, now and then, a third courser of "far-resounding pace" and breaks from a trot into a gallop. Lord Derby is evidently under the impression that blank verse is something that can be mastered by any one who can count ten on his finger-ends, whereas it is the most difficult of measures. Thus far, perhaps, only three of our poets, Marlow, Shakespeare, and Milton, have shown its full capacity of force and harmony, of passion and grandeur, have written it in short with originality. With scant exception, it is everywhere else mere ritual and repetition. Cowper gave it an easy familiarity, and Tennyson has infused it with almost too much of sweetness, but neither has added any new variety of pause or modulation. Lord Derby's blank verse is of the kind which Dr. Johnson called "verse to the eye," and, were it really a fair specimen of the power and variety of the measure, would justify the Doctor's antipathy. But it is nothing of the kind, never rising above the dead level of "Ferrex and Porrex." His Lordship either carefully avoids the redundant syllable at the end of the line, which, if it become a trick, as in Fletcher, is no doubt offensive, or he is unaware of the use it serves in the hands of Shakespeare and Milton as an agreeable undulation to save uniformity from sameness, and to keep the march of the verse from falling into the monotonous *goose-step* of the drill-sergeant. Lord Derby's verse is verse by the foot-rule, and not by the ear. It is joiner-work, planed and matched with a dexterity and a stiffness which practice will make possible for any one but a poet.

In the recent discussions of Homeric translation in England, it has always been taken for granted that we had or could have some adequate conception of Homer's metre. Lord Derby, in his Preface, plainly assumes this. But there can be no greater fallacy. No human ears, much less Greek ones, could have endured what, with our mechanical knowledge of the verse, ignorance of the accent, and English pronunciation, we blandly accept for such music as Homer chanted. We have utterly lost the tune and cannot reproduce it. Mr. Newman conjectures it to have been something like Yankee Doodle; Mr. Arnold is sure it was the English hexameter; and they are both partly right so far as we may trust our reasonable impressions; for, after all, an impression is all that we have. No doubt the Homeric verse consented at will to an eager rapidity, and no doubt also its general character is that of prolonged but unmonotonous roll. Everybody says it is like the long ridges of the sea, some overtopping their neighbors a little, each with an independent undulation of its crest, yet all driven by a common impulse, and breaking, not with the sudden snap of an unyielding material, but one after the other, with a stately curve, to slide back and mingle with those that follow. Chapman's measure has the disadvantage of an association with Sternhold and Hopkins, but it has the merit of length, and, where he is in the right mood, is free, spirited, and sonorous. Above all, there is everywhere the movement of life and passion in it. Chapman was a master of verse, making it hurry, linger, or stop short, to suit the meaning. Like all great versifiers, he must be read with study, for the slightest change of accent loses the expression of an entire passage. His great fault as a translator is that he takes fire too easily and runs beyond his author. Perhaps he *intensifies* too much, though this be a fault on the right side; he certainly sometimes weakens the force of passages by crowding in particulars which Homer had wisely omitted, for Homer's simplicity is by no means mere simplicity of thought, nor, as it is often foolishly called, of nature. It is the simplicity of consummate art, the last achievement of poets and the invariable characteristic of the greatest among them. To Chapman's mind once warmed to its work, the words are only a mist, suggesting, while it hides, the divine form of the original image or thought; and his imagination strives to body forth that, as he conceives it, in all its celestial proportions. Let us take a passage where he merely intensifies (Book XIII., beginning at the 86th verse in Lord Derby, the 73d of Chapman, and the 76th of Homer) : —

> " Whom answered thus the son of Telamon :
> ' My hands, too, grasp with firmer hold the spear,
> My spirit, like thine, is stirred ; I feel my feet
> Instinct with fiery life ; nor should I fear
> With Hector, son of Priam, in his might
> Alone to meet, and grapple to the death.' "

Thus Lord Derby. Chapman renders : —

> " This Telamonius thus received : ' So, to my thoughts, my hands
> Burn with desire to toss my lance ; *each foot beneath me stands*
> *Bare on bright fire to use his speed ;* my heart is raised so high,
> That to encounter Hector's self I long insatiably.' "

There is no question which version is the more energetic. Is Lord Derby's nearer the original in being tamer ? He has taken the "instinct with fiery life" from Chapman's hint. The original has simply "restless," or more familiarly "in a fidget." There is nothing about "grappling to the death," and "nor should I fear" is feeble where Chapman with his "long insatiably" is literal. We will give an example where Chapman has amplified his original (Book XVI. v. 426; Derby, 494; Chapman, 405) : —

> " Down jumped he from his chariot ; down leapt his foe as light ;
> And as, on some far-looking rock, a cast of vultures fight,
> Fly on each other, strike and truss, part, meet, and then stick by,
> Tug both with crooked beaks and seres, cry, fight, and fight and cry,
> So fiercely fought these angry kings."

Lord Derby's version is nearer : —

> "He said, and from his car, accoutred, sprang ;
> Patroclus saw and he too leaped to earth,
> As on a lofty rock, with angry screams,
> Hook-beaked, with talons curved, two vultures fight,
> So with loud shouts these two to battle rushed."

Chapman has made his first line out of two in Homer, but, granting the license, how rapid and springy is the verse ! Lord Derby's "withs" are not agreeable, his "shouts" is an ill-chosen word for a comparison with vultures, "talons curved" is feeble, and his verse is, as usual, mainly built up of little blocks of four syllables each. "To battle" also is vague. With whom ? Homer says that they rushed each at other. We shall not discuss how much license is loyal in a translator, but, as we think his chief aim should be to give a feeling of that life and spirit which makes the immortality of his original, and is the very breath in the nostrils of all poetry, he has a right to adapt himself, not to the exactions of art, — whose "*traits sont bien differens à Paris et à Vérone*," as Voltaire absurdly said, — but to the genius of his own language. If he would do justice to his author, he must make up in one passage for his unavoidable shortcomings in another. He may here and there take for granted certain exigencies of verse in his original which he feels in his own case. Even Dante, who boasted that no word had ever made him say what he did not wish, should have made an exception of rhyming ones, for these sometimes, even in so abundant a language as the Italian, have driven the most straightforward of poets into an awkward *détour*. In Homer, for example, surely one need not always repeat the genealogical fact that Hector was the son of Priam.

We give one more passage from Chapman : —

> "And all in golden weeds
> He clothed himself ; the golden scourge most elegantly done
> He took and mounted to his seat ; and then the god begun
> To drive his chariot through the waves. From whirl-pits every way
> The whales exulted under him, and knew their king ; the sea
> For joy did open, and his horse so swift and lightly flew
> The under axle-tree of brass no drop of water drew."

Here the first half is sluggish and inadequate, but what surging vigor, what tumult of the sea, what swiftness, in the last ! Here is Lord Derby's attempt : —

> "All clad in gold, the golden lash he grasped
> Of curious work, and, mounting on his car,
> Skimmed o'er the waves ; from all the depths below
> Gambolled around the monsters of the deep,
> Acknowledging their king ; the joyous sea
> Parted her waves ; swift flew the bounding steeds,
> Nor was the brazen axle wet with spray."

Chapman here is truer to his master, and the motion is in the verse itself. Lord Derby's is description, and not picture. "Monsters of the deep" is an example of the hackneyed periphrases in which he abounds, like all men to whom language is a literary tradition, and not a living gift of the Muses. "*Lash*" is precisely the wrong word. Chapman is always great at sea. Here is another example from the Fourteenth Book: —

> "And as, when with unwieldy waves *the great sea forefeels winds*
> That both ways murmur, and no way her certain current finds,
> But pants and swells confusedly, here goes, and there will stay,
> Till on it air casts one firm wind, and then it rolls away."

He is great, too, in single phrases and lines: —

> "And as, from top of some steep hill, the Lightener strips a cloud
> *And lets a great sky out of Heaven*, in whose delightsome light
> All prominent foreheads, forests, towers, and temples cheer the sight."
> Book XVI. v. 286.

The lion "lets his rough brows down so low they hide his eyes"; the flames "wrastle" in the woods; and so in a hundred other instances.

In a very judicious and discriminating review of Lord Derby's version, we have seen Chapman censured as *extravagant*, and this is perfectly just in the sense that he wanders outside his text. He is often also crabbed and obscure. But we have chosen to cite him only to show the difference between a mechanical and a vivid rendering. Lord Derby is full of the commonplaces of the worst school of English poetry, and often goes as wide of his original as Chapman. He *modernizes* even more. Take a familiar passage of the First Book: —

> "Along Olympus' heights he passed, his heart
> Burning with wrath; behind his shoulders hang
> His bow and ample quiver; at his back
> Rattled the fateful arrows as he moved;
> Like the night-cloud he passed, and from afar
> He bent against the ships and sped the bolt,
> And fierce and deadly twanged the silver bow.
> First on the mules and dogs, on man at last,
> Was poured the arrowy storm."

This is both loose and feeble. Chapman does not rouse himself here, as we should expect, — indeed, he tells us that he did not fairly warm to his work in the first twelve books, — but his "Down from the tops of steep heaven stooped" is better than "Along Olympus' heights he *passed*." "*Burning* with wrath" is a commonplace of his Lordship's. The word of Homer (Χώομαι) means primarily to move violently and hence derivatively to be angry, because anger expresses itself in gesture. So here "throbbing with wrath" would be nearer, and below, where Homer repeats the word, the wrathful movement of the God is implied.

"Fateful" is not in Homer. Lord Derby apparently took it on the suggestion of Dryden, whose "feathered fates," repeated by Pope, is even worse. "Night-*cloud*" darkens the sense. "Like Night" says Homer simply, that is, darkened with anger. "Bolt," if taken in its proper English meaning, arms Apollo with a cross-bow. Perhaps Lord Derby wished to give the Homeric alliteration of βέλος and βάλλ', but even then "shaft" would have answered his purpose, and "shot" would have been better than "sped," which is one of those attempts to avoid the familiar, as if the trite were better, of which Pope set the example. The suddenness of Homer's βάλλ', standing alone at the head of the verse with an abrupt pause after it, and making the phrase *twang*, as it were, is admirable, and should put a translator on his mettle. The "arrowy storm" is as bad as it can be; a single bowman "pours" nothing of the kind. It is one of those common-property phrases too frequent with Lord Derby, the mere shoddy which verse-makers keep at hand for filling-in. Tickell's version of this passage is painfully halting for a man who could write original verses good enough to be favorites with Thackeray; and Pope rivals him, drawing out "the weighty bullion of the line" into "French wire" of rare tenuity. Dryden, who wrote more sensibly than anybody else about translation, flounders helplessly in Homer. Cowper attempts to give the ring of the ἀργυρέοιο βιοῖο by

> "Dread-sounding, bounding on the silver bow,"

which only too fatally recalls the old Scottish dancing-tune, —

> "Amaisit I gaisit
> To see, led at command,
> A strampant and rampant
> Ferss lyon in his hand."

The attempt was in the right direction, however, for Homer, like Dante and Shakespeare, like all who really command language, seems fond of playing with assonances.

We do not mean to say that Lord Derby's translation is comparatively a failure, for it is better than those of his two latest predecessors. Pope's was a piece of job-work, maintained with singular spirit to the end, it is true, and with many fine lines, full of that nervous energy which characterizes his verse; but it was job-work nevertheless. Too often he vapors and rants where he should be passionate, and puts us off with tumidity as cheaper than simple grandeur. The bass-drum plays too large a part in his rather limited orchestra. There is something incongruous with the true Homeric sentiment in his style, an anachronism of costume, as it were, like Garrick playing Macbeth in a major-general's uniform. Cowper's translation, whatever its merits, and it has many, is not easy reading. His own "John Gilpin" is more Homeric. That, at least, gallops; but here he seems to have mounted an elephant by mistake for Pegasus, and he whose own blank verse has the ease of prose is as stiff and unwieldy in the armor of Milton as the champion on a Lord Mayor's day. In comparing Lord Derby with Chapman, we did not mean to put the old poet above him for mere closeness of rendering, but to bring into strong relief the difference between the soul and the body of poetry, and to hint that it takes a poet to translate a poet. Which should we prefer, — a cast taken unmistakably after death, or a likeness, less obviously true, perhaps, to the mere features, but instinct with the expression and genius of the original? With all his faults, Chapman has made for us the best poem that has yet been Englished out of Homer, and in so far gives us a truer idea of him. Of all translators he is farthest removed from the fault with which he charges others, when he says that "our divine master's most ingenious imitating the life of things (which is the soul of a poem) is never respected nor perceived by his interpreter's only standing pedantically on the grammar and words, utterly ignorant of the sense and grace of him." The Earl of Derby has achieved, on the other hand, a most fatally respectable translation, a Homer toned down to the decorum of the drawing-room, shaved, with irreproachable candor of neck-tie, and speaking the too faultless English of the House of Lords after it has been groomed by the "Times" reporter. In spite of his Lordship's contempt for the English hexameter, we are inclined to think that *the* translation is yet to be made in that measure by some young poet, who has not so far stiffened into a mannerism of his own, as insensibly to sophisticate Homer with it. We have said that Keats might have done it. Perhaps the late Mr. Clough, with his thorough Greek scholarship and his exquisitely pliant genius, would have been even more competent. Among his manuscripts are some fragments of a version full of promise. The hexameter is as alien to German as to English, yet it grows supple and homely to the master-hand of Goethe. Even Voss makes it give a better notion of Homer than Lord Derby's blank verse. His Lordship's concluding line,

"Such were the rites to glorious Hector paid,"

hardly comes so near the original as even the following attempt at an hexameter by a sleepy reviewer who never wrote one before, —

"So paid they funeral-rites to Hector, the tamer of horses."

LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. History of England from the Fall of Woolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By John Antony Froude, M. A. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1865. 2 vols. Sm. 8vo. pp. 447, 501.

[These are the first two volumes of a reprint of Mr. Froude's well-known work. The style in which they are issued does credit to the American publishers. We shall hereafter have occasion to speak at length of the mixed character of the book as an historical treatise.]

2. History of Julius Cæsar. [By Napoleon III.] Vol. I. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. xv., 463.

[A very handsome reprint of the English translation of the most noted historical treatise of the day. It is by an emperor who is also a scholar, — and whose learning is of much better quality than his principles. The book would have been read, even if its author had been a less notorious character.]

3. Travels in Central Asia; being the Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarcand. Performed in the Year 1863. By Arminius Vámbéry. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 493.

[An interesting narrative of curious adventures in a part of Asia rarely visited by Europeans.]

4. History of Congregationalism from about A. D. 250 to the Present Time. By George Punchard. Second Edition. Rewritten and greatly enlarged. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1865. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. xvi., 562; xiii., 519.

5. Life of Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy. From the German of W. A. Lampadius. With Supplementary Sketches by Julius Benedict, Henry F. Chorley, Ludwig Rellstab, Bayard Taylor, R. S. Willis, and J. S. Dwight. Edited and Translated by William Leonhard Gage. New York and Philadelphia: Frederick Leypoldt. 1865. 16mo. pp. 271.

6. Canada: its Defences, Condition, and Resources. Being a second and concluding Volume of "My Diary, North and South." By W. Howard Russell, LL. D. Boston: T. O. H. P. Burnham. 1865. 12 mo. pp. xii., 311.

7. Our Country: its Trial and its Triumph. A Series of Discourses by George Peck, D. D. New York: Carleton and Porter. 1865. 16mo. pp. 300.

8. The Promises of the Declaration of Independence. Eulogy on Abraham Lincoln, delivered before the Municipal Authorities of the City of Boston, June 1, 1865. By Charles Sumner. Boston. 8vo. pp. 67.

[An eloquent, feeling, and discriminating discourse.]

9. An Address upon the Life and Services of Edward Everett; delivered before the Municipal Authorities and Citizens of Cambridge, February 22, 1865. By Richard H. Dana, Jr. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. 8vo. pp. 70.

[Of permanent value for its historic character and its just appreciations.]

10. Know the Truth; a Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, including some Strictures upon the Theories of Rev. Henry L. Mansel

and Mr. Herbert Spencer. By Jesse H. Jones. New York: Published for the Author by Hurd and Houghton. 1865. 16mo. pp. ix., 225.

11. Methods of Instruction. That part of the Philosophy of Education which treats of the Nature of the several Branches of Knowledge and the Methods of teaching them according to that Nature. By James Ryle Wickersham, A. M. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. 496.

12. A View at the Foundations; or, First Causes of Character, as operative before Birth, from Hereditary and Spiritual Sources, being a Treatise on the Organic Structure and Quality of the Human Soul as determined by pre-natal Conditions in the Parentage and Ancestry, and how far we can direct and control them. By Woodbury M. Fernald. Boston: Willlam V. Spencer. 1865. 16mo. pp. 210.

13. Hypodermic Injections in the Treatment of Neuralgia, Rheumatism, Gout, and other Diseases. By Antoine Ruppaner, M. D. Boston: T. O. H. P. Burnham. 1865. 16mo. pp. 160.

14. Affixes in their Origin and Application, exhibiting the Etymologic Structure of English Words. By S. S. Haldeman, A. M. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co. 1865. 16mo. pp. 271.

15. A Grammar of the Anglo Saxon Tongue from the Danish of Erasmus Rask. By Benjamin Thorpe. Second Edition, corrected and improved. London: Trübner & Co. 1865. 16mo. pp. 192.

16. Remember Me; or the Holy Communion. By Ray Palmer. Boston: The American Tract Society. 16mo. pp. 102.

17. A Commentary on the Lord's Prayer. By Rev. W. Denton, M. A. Edited and enlarged by Rev. Henry J. Fox, M. A. New York: Carleton and Porter. 1865. 16mo. pp. 208.

18. The Ideal Attained. By Eliza W. Farnham. New York: C. M. Plumb & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. 510.

19. A Son of the Soil. A Novel. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 241.

20. The Gayworthys; a Story of Threads and Thrums. By the Author of "Faith Gartney's Girlhood." Boston: Loring. 1865. 12mo. pp. 399.

21. A Book of Golden Deeds of all Times and all Lands, gathered and narrated by the Author of "The Heir of Redclyffe." Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1862. 16mo. pp. xi., 466. (Golden Treasury Series.)

22. The Jest Book. The choicest Anecdotes and Sayings, selected and arranged by Mark Lemon. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. 16mo. pp. viii., 389. (Golden Treasury Series.)

23. Sybil: a Tragedy, in five Acts. By John Savage. New York: James B. Kirker. 1865. 12mo. pp. 100.

24. Companion Poets for the People. Illustrated. — Household Poems, by Henry W. Longfellow. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 16mo. pp. 96.

25. Poems. By R. W. Emerson. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 32mo. pp. 254. (Blue and Gold.)

26. Essays. By R. W. Emerson. First and Second Series. Boston· Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 32mo. pp. 515. (Blue and Gold.)

27. Walt Whitman's Drum Taps. New York. 1865. pp. 72.

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ART. I.—*The Life of Thomas Jefferson.* By HENRY S. RANDALL, LL. D. In Three Volumes. New York: Derby and Jackson. 1858. 8vo.

THE civil war which has changed the current of our ideas, and crowded into a few years the emotions of a lifetime, has in a measure given to the preceding period of our history the character of a remote state of political existence. We ought to be able to look at it with something like historic impartiality. The better part of mankind will always be attracted by that magnificent spectacle of everything that constitutes the substantial well-being of a community, and will look to those who have witnessed and lived in it for information regarding it. Indeed, as we are ourselves the best explanation and monument of our history, a tolerably faithful record from time to time of our current impressions in regard to the characters and events of the past cannot fail of at least an unconscious truthfulness and value.

Whatever importance is assigned to favorable physical and external conditions, the real difference between our history and condition and that of other nations is to be found in the difference of social and political institutions. The combination we have exhibited of the utmost freedom of action and acquisition with security of possession, and the consequent degree of individual happiness, is possible only because the structure of society is adapted to produce such results. Our political institutions, strictly speaking, being in their nature striking and visible, have attracted special attention. But we incline to the opinion that their share in our national development has been immensely exaggerated. Considering the rapid expansion of interests in this country, the variety of pursuits and the activity of invention and discovery, together with the complaints so general in the early history of the government among ourselves, and since then so assiduously repeated abroad, of the difficulty of engaging the higher class of minds in the public service, we think it evident that politics have engrossed by no means the greater or the better part of our national life. At least in an equal degree with any other people we have a right to complain of the common fate by which all other branches of history are swallowed up in the political.

With this protest we submit to the general law. The examination and explanation of the opinions of Jefferson which we propose, leads us into the heart of American politics. No institution of a political nature has such claims on Americans, in connection with the history of our progress, as that great party with which his name is identified, which first comprehended and expressed the mind of the American people, first gave the government a confident march in harmony with their aspirations, which has controlled it almost without intermission, and whose fatal complication with a particular interest furnished the opportunity for the attempt at its overthrow. The established Constitution and laws are the bones and tissues; they determine the form and furnish the channels through which the national life-blood is poured. Without it they perish and decay. But, as in all vital organisms, while it preserves their existence, it subjects them to constant change. Parties, on the other hand, enlist the active and vigorous spirits of a nation in efforts for some unattained object, always the aim of a more ardent desire than what we have already in secure possession; their history is the history of popular enthusiasm, their movement the measure of what they can impart to the mass.

The character of party-leader was pointedly disclaimed by Mr. Jefferson at the time of his first election to the Presidency. But this declaration is one which at a later period, after he and his followers had risked and accomplished so much, he might well have revised. High as were the stations he held in the official service of the country, his place in the Democratic party would be the object of a grander ambition. Here he was the object, not only of more than obedience, but of a reverence and devotion surpassing party fealty. Not only during his lifetime, but for more than a generation after his death, his lightest opinions were studied and regarded with a religious veneration singularly at variance with our national tendencies, as well as with the sturdy independence of his own character. Merit apart, they still stand for authority with that large class to which authority is a necessity. Nor can merit be denied to that system which gave rise to so long and successful an administration of the government, nor, above all, can political power be denied to ideas which have stamped themselves so deeply on the intellect of the country as to lead to that political habitude and that incapacity to escape beyond their charmed circle of which we of this generation have seen such striking manifestations.

Different minds and two schools of writers are divided upon the point whether the great movements of society are traceable to the guidance of individual minds, or to the unconscious gravitating tendencies of the whole. All, however, may unite in the recognition of Jefferson's greatness. Every possible influence seems to have been exerted by him, that of oratory alone excepted. On the other hand, by a curious felicity too deep for calculation, and apparently attributable to innate sympathy or instinct, he was always, from the beginning to the end of his career, in the midst of the most shifting and uncertain circumstances, on the winning side and the representative of the prevailing opinion, — or at least of that opinion which was going to prevail. Regardless of momentary aberrations, and disdaining the inferior ground of mere argument, he trusted in the impulse of the popular heart. Whether creating the current or borne along in it, he and it were equally in unison.

This fact is the more important in the case of Jefferson, inasmuch as, after playing a principal part in the overthrow of the old government, he became more prominent than any of his contemporaries in finally settling the policy of the new. Few indeed have been, like him, eminent in those widely different capacities. It is with the latter department that we are principally concerned. And the fundamental ideas of the Democratic party cannot be better elucidated than by disclosing their origin in the mind of Jefferson.

With this purpose in view, we shall have but little opportunity within our limits for a general estimate of his character and actions. This alone, and not a want of sense of their merit and importance, precludes us from giving a grateful testimony in favor of his eminent public services, of his abilities proved in so many departments of business, of his capacity in the wide field of philosophy, statesmanship, and speculation, and of his strong and in the main honorable personal character, which seems to shine like a beacon-light over the heads of his successors.

The course of events has given a particular prominence to three subjects, or three branches of one subject, of a political nature, with which he had to deal: —

I. The powers of the Federal Constitution, and the relation to it of the several States;

II. Extension of the national territory; and

III. Its possible division.

I. The idea has been sedulously inculcated for political purposes, that the Convention which met to form the Federal Constitution was perfectly free from all existing obligations as to the course it was to pursue, and that the result it wrought was due to nothing but the original unbiassed judgment and superior wisdom of its members. This position is necessary to support the claim that the system of government they formed was of a purely original character. It is not surprising that many of those who composed that Convention should have been unconscious of reasons which had in reality the force of compulsion upon the determination of the questions submitted to them. No constraint is so absolute, and at the same time so imperceptible, as that of ideas which pervade the whole community. The Constitution appeared to them to be entirely their own work. But in truth probably no scheme of government was ever elaborated in which so little was left to the caprice or personal choice of its immediate authors. The Convention was the creature of a general popular movement. The people of the thirteen Colonies, lately become States, were determined to confirm and secure the union which the previous confederacy had notoriously proved itself incompetent to maintain. But in each State there was already a government in full operation. It was the only government known, and had complete possession of the field. The people were everywhere attached to it, and had no idea of putting it at risk by having its operation disturbed. The thirteen State governments themselves had also as little intention of abdicating. Connected with them were the men of note in every State, who looked to them as a field of advancement and distinction. How important were these influences may be discerned by the course of events in regard to the adoption of the Constitution by the States. The Convention came together and acted in the main in a consolidating sense. If it had anything to do this was it, — to draw tighter the bonds of union. This is the thesis of the Federalist on this point, — that union is necessary, and that it is provided by the Constitution. But when the proposed system came to be debated before the Conventions of the separate States, — in Virginia and New York for instance, — it was attacked on the ground that the work had been overdone, and the new system of government savored too strongly of centralization. The reply by the friends and authors of the Constitution was a denial of this charge, and the exposition of the unimpaired autonomy of the States. So that, in fact, it was framed for consolidation, and adopted because it did not consolidate. To make assurance doubly sure, it was made in effect a condition of the adoption that certain amendments in the *un*-consolidating sense, one of which in particular has been since the hobby-horse of the State Rights party, should be carried along with it, and they were accordingly passed at the first session of Congress.

These facts make it evident how narrow was the field of action of the Convention, and how little it was its own master. It was both urged on and held back by outside pressure. The people of the United States, acting together and therefore under the prevalence of ideas of union, supplied the main action and prescribed the plot; the same people acting as separate States, and therefore under different influences, criticised the piece and finally accepted it. The writers were held to a strict account. Nothing was permitted to depart too far from existing political traditions. Under these conditions, the place of every public man was determined in advance by his habits, his associations, and natural turn of mind.

Jefferson's public life is divided into three distinct periods, — that preceding and during the early stages of the Revolution, his residence abroad, and that after his return. The approaching separation from Great Britain was heralded in the Old Dominion by perhaps the most remarkable change, its manner and rapidity considered, that ever took place in a political body, — that from an aristocratic to a democratic form of government. Jefferson's entrance into political life was identified with this powerful revolution, his subsequent course was deeply affected by it. So far as the work of organization went, he had a greater right than any other to look upon the regenerated commonwealth as the work of his hands, and in return he was ever the darling of her heart. Apart from other considerations, such a relationship could not fail to produce on him the most favorable impressions regarding the State governments in general. In addition to this, in trying the first experiment of Union the Confederate Congress was hardly more than a committee to give expression to public sentiment, and still it had borne with success the highest strain to which any government can be subjected, — that of carrying on war.

With these things in mind, Jefferson assumed the embassy to France, and necessarily, under the difficulties of communication at that time, severed his connection with the changes of public opinion at home. The general movement brought about in the course of the war and at its end in favor of a closer union, could not have been felt by him in its full power. Though on the whole an interval of leisure in his busy life, his residence abroad was destined powerfully to affect his opinions, and it is not too much to say his country and the world. Coming with a great reputation from the country which was the fashion at the moment, the doors of society were thrown open, and he was received into intimate association with the first minds of the French capital at one of the most exhilarating periods in the history of the world. In this intercourse there was no cause for a feeling of inferiority on his part. If he met with a higher cultivation and a more universal philosophy than his own, the knowledge he contributed of practical politics and experience in revolutionary crises was at least of equal value. But the deepest impression on his mind was not the result of association with learned or courtly circles. The cottages and workshops, and the daily life of the peasants and people, were the chosen field of his studies; and in several extended journeys he acquired a knowledge of the condition of European society, and of the actual working of the different governments, equalled by few travellers. By this examination all his original ideas in favor of popular institutions were not only confirmed and expanded, but his mind was filled with a mingled feeling of indignation and horror at the misery he everywhere encountered. The institution of monarchy, the governing classes, and the whole machinery of oppression, became the objects of the intensest detestation. No words but his own can convey a notion of this feeling. He speaks habitually of the Continental nations as composed of "sheep and wolves," and deliberately declares "that it would be better that the race of man should be reduced to a single pair, like Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, than to go on suffering what they endure from their governments." His sympathies were of course warmly enlisted on the popular side in the opening scenes which he witnessed of the French Revolution, while his tastes and affections, touched and won, as they might be still, by the amenity and practised kindness of the French, ever afterward pleaded strongly in their favor.

In the mean time his native country was preparing a new model for governments, and a new aspect of civilization. The short and dangerous apathy which followed the Revolutionary war had passed, and the Federal Constitution arose at the voice of the people. Jefferson returned to take a place in the Cabinet of General Washington, and to become the leader of that policy which was finally to prevail in the administration. His diaries and correspondence give a fair picture of his own views and of the general state of affairs. All political subjects connected with the general government were open questions. Every one followed what seemed good in his own eyes. For once, at least, in our history, there was neither tyranny of the majority nor subserviency to party policy. Even on the question of the adoption of the Constitution itself, which had just been determined, the best men of all parties and the truest patriots were divided in opinion. Jefferson's own opinion had wavered between an immediate adoption and a postponement. In common with everybody else, he found things in that instrument to be admired, and others which would be the better for a change. In common with everybody else, he said so. People disagreed as to what ought to be altered and what maintained, nor was there any authority in a settled construction or in public opinion which as yet asserted a claim to superior attention. There is no reference to be found for years in Jefferson's writings to constitutional decisions or to a standard of party faith. Such expressions as "the true friends of the Constitution," "the pure republican doctrine," creep in slowly.

Such an anarchy of opinion could not endure. The government which was to arise out of it must be the government of the strongest idea, the ruling tendency of the nation. As to the Constitution which had just been launched on such an uncertain sea, without the support of the custom or tradition of a moment, it could not pretend to control the course of events. Few politicians accepted it as a finality, and the paramount question in relation to it was to what does it lead? Looking back at the steady march of democratic triumph, it appears at this time that there was never a foothold for monarchical institutions among us. In our day such inclinations, whenever they have ventured into the light, have been only a laughing-stock entertained by no one above the dignity of a *petit-maitre*. Such was not always the case or the appearance. Notwithstanding the political separation, the popular habits, associations, and education were mainly English. The mass of lawyers and politicians knew nothing beyond the circle of English ideas; if by any chance they had imbibed other notions, the people were not prepared to receive them. The many injuries inflicted, the daily insult renewed in the retention of the frontier posts at the hands of the British government, were insufficient to overcome the sympathy of race. The weight of historical example since the days of Greece and Rome seemed to open no avenues, except through monarchical institutions, to that security and good order which after the storms of war were the universal demand. For other reasons besides the unlimited confidence in the administration of Washington, the opponents of the Constitution were unwilling and unable to criticise its first steps. For a short time it was a government without an opposition. If this was to endure, the issue was certain under whatever forms it might be veiled. Perhaps under republican forms a monarchy in fact might be more impregnably intrenched. The administration was not long in showing signs of the tendency to aggrandizement natural and inevitable in such circumstances. Personal ambitions had their effect in the same direction. The United States functionaries, engaged in duties new to themselves and to the people, imagined themselves superior to the rest, and inclined to a concert of official action. It is certain that occupants of its highest posts calculated privately the duration of the government. Society was more outspoken. It is impossible to refuse assent to such specific testimony as that of Jefferson, who declares that, to his astonishment, on his return he rarely heard in the society of Philadelphia and New York, except from some government official, an expression in favor of republican principles, and that the prevailing tone was entirely monarchical. The Federal government, it is true, was elective; but its functions were new, and what is new is apt to be uncomfortable. From the nature of the case they must have been mainly an affair of the office-holders. So that it is easily understood how it soon came to represent the principle of authority, while the course of popular institutions was identified with the State governments, to which the people were accustomed. A Federal triumph could have been nothing short of the triumph of political organization over popular sentiments and traditions.

Against these things his whole soul revolted. Filled with one overwhelming sentiment, the hatred of monarchy and the determination that the curse of other lands should never desolate his country, the state of opinion, the acts of the government, and the projects of some of the political leaders, left no doubt on his mind of the prevalence of an intention, too widespread for a conspiracy, of the subversion of the republic. Within a few months he begins, and thenceforth continued to speak of those with whom he differed as the monarchical party, as decisively as if this was the point of an open political canvass. With him there was no other distinction of consequence besides that of monarchists and republicans. He was far from being of that temper of mind to yield without a struggle. But despite his great reputation, his position was singularly isolated. His residence in France had emancipated him almost alone among our statesmen from the prejudices of an English education. It is a proof of no common strength of mind, that he withstood the temptation to betray the contempt of a superior cultivation for the narrower range of ideas within which the destiny of the country was to be decided. Helpless as a member of the administration to restrain the government on the path it was entering, and oppressed by the loneliness of his situation in the Cabinet, he was forced to look abroad for support. The only efficient check to authority is in the spirit and energy of the people. Had he been driven to that necessity, it would probably have been a hopeless attempt, in the then condition of the country, to appeal directly to an unorganized resistance. In such cases success is revolution and anarchy, and of these the people had had enough. But the double nature of our institutions then, for the first time, enabled him to take up a vantage-ground of opposition. The State governments were, what the general government was not yet, in immediate connection and full sympathy with popular impulses, and afforded the organized means of operations, without any of the dangers of irregular opposition. Here Jefferson made his main stand. In the midst of an abundance of popular agitation, he evoked the more authoritative voice of the State legislatures, commencing with that of Virginia and of Kentucky, then almost a dependency upon her parent State. Occasions were not hard to find. The exercise of authority by two organizations on the same soil puts them by political instinct at variance, and on this question the general opinion was decisively on the side of the States.

For the manner of organizing the first opposition, and carrying on the first political campaign against the administration, the highest and most grateful credit is due to Jefferson. Then in its early weakness it was to be decided whether the government was to be administered and assailed within the boundaries of law and civil peace, or with violence and lawlessness. The contest was so conducted that even in victory, when the policy and direction of the government were completely changed, none of its forms were violated, and the attachment of the people not only confirmed to their ancient institutions, but secured to the new. Such a success is the highest proof of wisdom and policy joined hand in hand with the most elevated ideas of duty. Of all governments only one — that of Virginia and her sister States — had been found worthy of Jefferson's approval, because those alone were formed to secure the well-being of their citizens. Standing erect through all the convulsions of the times, they had shown themselves possessed of the elements of stability and of a capacity for indefinite improvement. With hopes for the future of mankind, and an idea of the dignity of human nature, then, it may be believed, more rare than now, at stake in the issue, no considerations could have justified, in his view, the subordination of those approved institutions to the unpromising experiment of administrative consolidation.

We do not propose to follow the steps of the contest. Notwithstanding unfounded charges of proscription, Jefferson's moderation in victory long softened the rudeness of party strife. His success assured the popular liberties, and opened the subsequent career of the United States. Of course it is impossible to say what it might have been, or what unknown dangers were escaped, but there is one fatal necessity that lies in wait for nations, — that of making a choice between order and internal peace and the sacrifice of freedom. In this case both were saved. The first Presidents were inaugurated with such pomp and ceremony as the invention, or perhaps the humor, of the country would admit. When Jefferson rode alone through the streets of Washington, and tied his horse with his own hands to the railings of the Capitol to deliver that Inaugural Address whose phrases are a part of American speech, a new era commenced. He undertook to administer the government; not to extend, but to restrain its powers within the narrowest limits of national safety. If the surrender of great power is so much easier, as it is said to be, than its temperate use, this was an act of heroism which has not received its due meed of praise beside the celebrated resignation of Washington.

In speaking of the extension of the authority of the States, which was the germ of the Democratic party, as a measure of policy, adopted by Jefferson in view of an immediate danger, and because it was in accordance with popular traditions, we have not forgotten that elaborate scheme of Constitutional doctrine to which submission has been claimed as to the faith delivered to the saints. That party became a magnificent creation, inferior to no organization that ever existed in all appliances for acting on the popular mind, with an expansive and all-embracing faith, an uncompromising discipline and devotion, which has had much to do in preparing the way for that sentiment of national unity which now presents one of the most remarkable exhibitions that has appeared in history. But we are following at present the course of Jefferson's ideas. The evidence now accessible is contained in his correspondence and contemporary writings. And so far from the whole democratic theory having been derived in the first instance from an understanding of the Constitution, or from having sprung full-armed from his brain, he is entirely silent in regard to a compact between the States when the subject first comes under discussion. His criticism of the Constitution and his objection to it are founded on another ground. This was the absence of a Bill of Rights, — an objection so deeply seated in his mind, that it seems to have been surrendered only through lack of sympathy among a practical people. Now a Bill of Rights applied to sovereign states is an absurdity, and the stress laid on it shows that the relation established by the Constitution between the governing power and the individuals under its sway was the paramount consideration which then occupied his thoughts. Nor did he even give any countenance to that party which, when the Constitution was under discussion in the State Conventions, and particularly in Virginia, under the lead of Patrick Henry, contended that it ought to form simply a league between different sovereignties. It was not until after the necessity of a check upon the central supremacy had been demonstrated in fact, that its friends declared it to be what its enemies had maintained that it ought to have been. The doctrine also of the Virginia Resolutions, when they first make their appearance in the correspondence of Jefferson and Madison, by no means presents itself with the firmness of an established belief, but rather as something important to be established, a thesis to be proved.

There is abundant evidence to show that the early Democratic doctrines, instead of being mere closet speculation, grew with the party out of the requirements of the times. In fact, its measures preceded its distinctive principles. This is not to declare these the less true, but the more so. For it should be recollected that the Constitution was and remains essentially dual, including the two principles of subdivision and of union. When either predominates, it is but shifting the weight to one end of the beam. As long as it reflects the spirit of an active people, such fluctuations will occur. In every such movement there is a tendency to correct itself. Political wisdom consists in aiding and directing all favorable circumstances to this end. As men are so much quicker to appreciate what is to their advantage than what is true, it would appear that in practical politics measures take precedence of principles. Indeed, their beneficent influence is capable of correcting the principles by the aid of which they are carried, and to eliminate from too general a statement what merely belongs to variable conditions. According to the character of his mind, Jefferson was not slow to cast his ideas into the form of a system. This is set forth in brief in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, written by him or under his immediate inspiration. To the development of their doctrine of State rights and local self-government, the remainder of his political life was devoted, and upon it will depend his reputation as statesman and philosopher. If in the application he mistook the circumstances of his own times for necessary and universal conditions, this is only a part of human infirmity. In a candid estimate, his position as a party leader ought also to be taken into account. Unquestioning faith among masses, the most powerful engine of government, is only to be secured to doctrines promulgated under all possible sanctions.

After an ascendency longer than the lifetime of most governments, the name and principles of Jefferson are now in danger of discredit, in consequence of evils attributed to them, and of the traitorous actions they have been invoked to defend. We shall have occasion to speak more at large of his general philosophy, and at present are not inclined to quarrel with the logic which draws from it the whole doctrine of nullification and secession. This is all beside the issue; the springs of political movements do not lie in argumentative demonstrations. The logic of events is the only kind by which statesmen are guided or nations disturbed. Pretences are never lacking for evil designs; nor do political errors, without the spur of interest or ambition, precipitate revolutions. Their final cause is in the future, not in the past. None of these evil consequences occurred during Jefferson's life. What antidote his statesmanship may have contained is undisclosed; but his success in discovering one for those of his own day is a favorable augury of what he might have done in ours. That he was no devotee to any political system as a panacea of universal application, is evident from his counsel to the French reformers to be satisfied with the concessions of the King, even before the meeting of the States-General, as sufficient for the time, as well as by his distrust of the capacity of the South American states for republican institutions.

II. Extension of territory. Never were professed maxims more promptly put to the test. The course of European politics had put the resources of France under the control of one man, and among them the vast possession of Louisiana. The acquisition of this territory, together with the command of the mouth of the Mississippi, was felt to be a necessity as vital to the physical development of the nation as its continued possession has since been regarded. Jefferson's despatches had given it to be understood by the government of France, that upon the retention or relinquishment of this colony depended the virtual alliance of this country with England or France. Suddenly the First Consul proposed to cede it upon the payment of fifteen millions. Every consideration of national policy dictated the prompt acceptance of the offer. But one objection stood in the way. All the powers not expressly ceded to the Federal government remaining vested in the several States, and no authority to acquire territory having been granted, of course none existed to conclude the treaty. In these circumstances, Jefferson hinted at an alteration of the Constitution, but obtained the cession. Some explanation was necessary. The explanation offered was to the effect that, there being no question of the advantage of the bargain, there could be none as to its acceptance. It was merely the case of an agent anticipating the certain instructions of his principal. Whether such an exercise of ingenuity avoids the recognition of the fact that the forms of government are in their nature indefinable, may still be a question. We have heard nothing more of a change of the Constitution. The question has never been submitted to the people. The practice of the government has as effectually altered or defined the Constitution, as could any act of theirs. Still those who have profited the most by this departure from their own principles, who by means of it alone attained a despotic rule, would have departed still more widely from the nature of party, if they had not constantly appealed to the inviolability and immobility of the Constitution for its continuance. Once admitted, no serious question as to the government of the territory arose until the admission of Missouri. At that time Jefferson had long been living in retirement at Monticello, surrounded by pleasant neighbors and admiring worshippers; resistance to the universal current of his Southern associations was not to be expected. However interesting the conversation or valuable the reflections of a retired statesman in the decline of life, Nature asserts her prerogatives and recollection supplies both the pleasantest and the most profitable exercise of the faculties.

III. Disunion. In undisturbed satisfaction at the success of his policy and the prosperity of the country, he loved to cast a prophetic glance into the mystery and grandeur of the future. No keener eye had anticipated its revelations. But the vision of a united nation stretching from ocean to ocean was too vast to engage his confidence, or even his hopes. During his active career, it was in New England that the phantom of disunion had reared, or appeared to rear, its head; and it was only in relation to his opponents that he had been called to regard it. There are expressions in his earlier references to this subject which seem to contain the idea of a resort to force, in case of such an attempt, soon subsiding, however, into the repeated declaration of a well-grounded confidence that all such projects could be disposed of in no way so summarily and effectively as by vote of the people. The treatment of Burr shows what reception they met with when directed against the unsettled parts of the territory. In no actual case did he ever countenance the idea or place himself in any position except that of unqualified support of the Union. In the speculations of his later years, however, the difficulty of accommodating such vast spaces and populations under one government made him contemplate the possibility of division. But alas for the vaticinations of prophets! That great river which, as the outlet of a continent, proves the strongest bond of union, was to be the dividing-line between the people who should dwell along its banks and throng its head-waters. The separation presented no terrors to his imagination. Instead of being the work of discord at the bidding of cupidity and pride, and attended by the horrors of war, it was to be an act of general consent, and in itself the highest confirmation of popular rights. Like a convention of philosophers, the people of the two sections were to meet and part without a heart-break or the sacrifice of anything worth a moment's regret. This was the last result of the Jeffersonian philosophy, the picture of its political millennium. Without pretending to have reached a state nearer perfection, we shall endeavor to show, before we have done, the omission of what elements of human nature from his calculations, and what mistakes in the teachings of history, led to so lamentable an error.

There is another subject, the gravest in our national existence, upon which Jefferson's opinions are often discussed. Placed throughout his life in a situation to observe the effect of slavery in both its moral and political relations, a decisive and important conclusion might have been expected from him. No stronger declarations against its injustice have ever been made by man than those so often quoted from his pen; and the truthfulness of his observation is exhibited by the denunciation, in advance of any other observer, of its greatest evil in its influence upon the master and the education of children. But the Notes on Virginia, where these sentiments are found, were prepared and published in Europe, where certainly they could not operate against him, and where the expression of such ideas was the necessary defence of the commonwealth he was seeking to recommend against a charge which already dampened the enthusiasm of the friends of America. Not that there is any doubt as to his early opinions. The alterations in the draft of the Declaration of Independence are well known. Nor are we aware of any evidence that these opinions, in the abstract, as the phrase is, were ever changed. But we fear it must be acknowledged that, in the course of a life occupied with other things, and in obedience to political expediency, they passed into the class of luxuries and ornaments never intended for use. Between the time of his first intimate connection with Virginia and his residence there after his Presidency, the change of Southern feeling had begun. Instead of excusing, the Southern States embraced the institution. The active business of this later period of his life was the completion of the plan of free education for the citizens of Virginia, which he had conceived before the Revolution. With much mouth honor, but with little real support, and that accorded to his personal claims, the University of Virginia, the department intended for the highest studies and the richest class of students, and which he regarded as only the capital of the edifice, was established at Charlottesville. But the provision to which he was most devoted, for the education of the poor, failed, evidently in consequence of the state of society induced by slavery, and the impossibility of co-operation in the body of the people. He accepted the defeat without attacking the cause, leaving the remedy to the labors of a younger or future generation. His speculations on the removal of the evil were at all times based on the necessity of the expatriation of the blacks on account of the assumed impossibility of the peaceful occupancy of the same soil by two races upon terms approaching equality. As the impossibility of dispensing with the productive labor by which the whole community is supported is at least equally evident, all such speculations may be dismissed as futile.

Leaving these points, we shall devote a few words to his general views of the science of government. His line of action was determined at an early period by the circumstances of the times, the temper of youth, and the impulse of personal character, and it was never essentially varied. Few public men have ever led so consistent a career. Notwithstanding the temptations of a life spent in official stations, his steady aim was to diminish the powers of government and enlarge the freedom of the individual. The ideal and favorite system of his thoughts was something so remote from authority, that it is hardly too much to deny him the conception of an ideal of government. We have both his own declaration and evidence stronger than that to the effect that nothing but some invasion of liberty and natural rights ever induced him to mingle in political affairs and step forth in their defence. With him government exists for the sake of the governed, and their good is attained when each is left free to go his own way. Natural rights are always rights of the individual, never of the community, from which they are always in danger. The restraints rendered necessary by living in society are best when reduced to the lowest limit.

It so happened that his advocacy was enlisted in behalf of popular claims, which were only to be carried by the union of many against the few in unjust possession; and hence in his writings there is frequent reference and appeal to the people. But the democracy of Jefferson can never be reckoned in aid of the tyranny of the majority. An attack from any quarter upon individual liberty of thought and action finds in him an equally determined opponent. From the people, however, and from the rights of man, he naturally believed such an attack impossible. To him its own business is the chief business of government, and to see that it is done the first affair of the citizen. When private rights are secure, there can be no interest in which all do not share. A government can have none of its own, and becomes the expression of the prevailing sentiment. Above this there is nothing. Within its sphere there is no appeal to anything higher than the popular will. The nearer it approaches the source of authority, the more perfectly the functions of government are performed. In the large communities of nations, universal interests are to be treated by the people as a whole, — those of its subdivisions separately by each; and the smaller the organization, the more immediate the impression of the individual mind, the more complete was the realization of his idea. From the great concerns of nations, and problems of statesmen which, by their nature, are removed from the understanding and immediate interests of the people, he turned in preference to the spectacle of the working of village democracies. No political machinery impressed him with such admiration of its excellence as that of the New England townships, and there is no power of which he speaks with so much dread as this, which he says forced him when President to abandon the policy of his administration. With an ardor which the grander display of national politics entirely failed to elicit, he pursued the project of introducing a similar organization into Virginia under the name of Hundreds, and almost despairs over its failure.

With so exact and comprehensive a thinker, political principles are only a fragment of a philosophical system embracing the moral and social relations of men, and constructed according to the received laws of thought. Jefferson's philosophy has been ascribed to French influence, but references to French authors are not frequent in his writings, nor does he seem to have been acquainted with them at a time when his principles were fixed. As the French philosophy of the eighteenth century is generally conceded to be an offshoot of the preceding English speculations, the coincidence of Jefferson's opinion appears rather to be that of an independent deduction. The same feature which characterizes his political system belongs also to the philosophy of Locke and his school in all its applications. Its method, by which consciousness, instead of the experiment and observation on which other sciences depend, is made the subject of investigation, brings into prominence the operations of the individual mind; and if we look to results, the sturdy individualism of England and America appears to be its most remarkable product. Following its method, it would seem that, when the operations of one mind — and that one's own — are understood, then all minds are known; when one's own duties and relations are determined, those of a whole society are included. That men are made to live in society, is a fact too plain to be denied, but the point of connection it is difficult to discover. In all cases the analysis of thoughts, motives, and actions is carried to the point where personal requirements are satisfied, and no further; if there is anything else, it is omitted. Man in a state of nature, if not at war, is at least not in fellowship with his kind. The theory of the social compact by which political rights were regulated, places men like grains of sand in juxtaposition, but without affinity. For that deeper law of duty and of unity which even with the most superficial and self-absorbed is still the basis of all human intercourse, there is hardly a place in the system; and accordingly the theories of morals seem far more like attempts to account for its existence, than to declare and develop the primal law of association between human beings.

To this school, which bore undisputed rule for a hundred years wherever the English language was spoken, and which, whether cause or effect, is the mirror of the Anglo-Saxon mind, Jefferson belonged by natural selection. If it had not existed, he must have invented something like it for himself. In some indefinable way personal character is a law to opinion. A patient and self-reliant will, a temper capable of being heated to a white heat without escaping control, a mind and heart both able to make or find their own enjoyments, — it is to qualities like these, which were united in him, that this train of thought is suited. Locke was his master in philosophy; and to him, along with Bacon and Newton, he paid a somewhat ostentatious reverence as the chiefs of the human intellect. In all directions his speculations were marked by the same tendency to individualism which we have noticed in his politics. The proposition of the inability of one generation to bind another to the payment of debts or the observance of treaties, is but a natural and logical consequence of the groundwork of his reasonings. His best and most serious thoughts were given to moral subjects; but they led to no further theory of morals than this, that benevolence is the instinct of good men, who receive pleasure from conferring good on others. This is a fact, but neither a reason nor a generalization.

His personal habits and condition in life were brought into accordance with his principles, and added their weight to the strength of his convictions, which is what can be said of few philosophers. In theory, the agricultural state is taken to be the most favorable to independence and the robust virtues; accordingly he was himself a farmer, and looked with a distrustful eye upon manufacturing industry and its concentration in towns. No influence is so potent as that of money in the framework of modern society, which depends upon capital and credit for its daily bread. These are also eventually dependent, and not always easily distinguishable. Not only so, but the condition and advance of any people at the present time is pretty accurately measured by its financial system. Constantly creating new relations and binding all nations more closely together, commerce and credit are justly regarded as indispensable instruments of the actual civilization. Now all the mysteries of credit not only were unintelligible to Jefferson, but suspected by him, and his dislike extended to the persons and classes by whom financial operations are transacted. This was undisguisedly declared regarding merchants, and the creation of an American debt was the occasion of the gravest distrust of the republicanism of Hamilton. Personally he had laid it down as a rule never to allow himself to make any pecuniary profit out of operations in stock, or generally in any way except as a farmer; and as he professedly never studied the subject of public credit, it is no injustice to ascribe his aversion to its use in any form to the same spirit that influenced his private conduct.

In comparing the general tone of thought which we have set forth as belonging to Jefferson, in common with his school, with that which now prevails, we think this distinction is to be observed. For the last half-century the effort of reason and of science, as applied to what was formerly matter of speculation, has not been contented with resolving phenomena into separate elements, but has sought out the law of their unity and higher generalizations to connect them together. Those metaphysical theories which remove the human conscience from the domain of the understanding, extinguish individuality by absorption in the universal reason. Everywhere this great truth is acknowledged, that, if men exist as individuals, mankind is a society. The diversities of that complex organism are too vast to be unfolded in a single breast. New methods of inquiry, looking outwards rather than inwards, the accumulation and comparison of statistics, have thrown a new light upon the past, and upon human nature itself. The rewriting of history which those discoveries have necessitated has been directed to the elucidation of the great movements, whether of populations or of ideas, which have included large portions of the human family. Among the foremost appear the fact and the laws of the origin and growth of nationalities. Continued association under favorable conditions is powerful enough to fuse even the diversities of race, and to create a new birth,—the genius of a nation. The universal misery and oppression over which Jefferson groaned in spirit is a witness, not only to the reckless abuse of power, but to the universal tendency to combination. It has its compensation too in the pride and satisfaction of general development in harmony with the unconscious element which each contributes to the whole. The immense scale of modern enterprises, the stores of wealth which they create and demand, and the expenses attending them, have contributed, to a degree hitherto unknown, to the force of this innate attraction. This is the day of great nations. The achievements in which the age delights, as well as that kind of progress with which its hopes are associated, are possible only among them; and probably there is no blessing to mankind so great, considering how widely it is diffused, no such alleviation of the lot of humanity at the present time, as that feeling which springs from the glow of patriotism and the consciousness of membership of one of the great nations of the earth.

No example of the strength of this law of attraction has ever been presented equal to this nation of eighty years' growth. It has not only impressed a national character upon a population of different races and languages, but has shown the surrender of a national life to be impossible, except at the sacrifice of one of the dearest instincts of the heart. Not a new body only, but a new soul, has been added to the family of nations. We are at an immeasurable distance from the times when Jefferson could describe us as "one nation towards others, separate governments among ourselves." Our own experience has been added to the almost universal experience before us, to prove the continuance of such a state contrary to the laws of our social nature. The most casual acquaintance with our recent history will disclose the perfect difference in the undercurrents of thought prevailing at the time when our government commenced its experiment and at present. Beginning in darkness and doubt, national interests and policy have insensibly conquered the first place in the estimation of the people. Although not contemplated in his philosophy, Jefferson's natural sympathies and acquired principles would have led him to observe this great change more quickly, and to regard it more profoundly, than any other of our statesmen. His was the policy of his time; its success was in the completeness with which it was adapted to existing circumstances, and in no case do his principles allow a success derived from any other source. The Constitution, to which there was at first no way open to secure the affections of the people except through the States in which their political life was centred, is now in immediate connection with them. The change has been accomplished without diminution of the personal freedom which he prized; and his authority can never be rightfully invoked in support of a construction no longer vitalized by the popular breath, and only retained as a shackle upon the movements of a free and progressive people.

ART. II. — FAITH AND SCIENCE.

THE controversy between head and heart, between letter and spirit, goes back to the days of Cain and Abel; and though happily the sanguinary fruit it then bore, in the violent suppression of the higher interest by the lower one, is no longer possible, inasmuch as the question is removed from a personal, to a purely intellectual ground, still the controversy endures in unabated vigor, and demands of every candid mind its best efforts to reconcile it. Nothing, indeed, but a hope of doing this to some extent, could induce us to ask the reader's attention to the observations which follow; but whether our hope in this respect be fully vindicated to his judgment or not, we are sure he will in the end acquit us of having said anything to aggravate the existing contention.

Ever since the dawn of our intellectual history, two rival hypotheses in regard to man's being and destiny have striven for the mastery of the human mind; which we may name severally the religious and the sceptical hypothesis, or, in modern parlance, the spiritualist and the materialist hypothesis: the one basing itself upon revelation, and having it in view as a practical result to subordinate Nature to Man; the other basing itself upon actual knowledge or experience, and having it in view as a practical result to subordinate Man to Nature. This controversy profoundly agitates, at the present moment, the entire world of thought; but it exists, perhaps, in most concentrated form in France, whence it is overspreading with new impetus the general mind of England and our own country. Much, no doubt, had been done by previous disputants to familiarize the literary consciousness in both countries with the controversy; but none of these persons approached it with that tone of authority and that air of competence which belong to the combatants of the present hour. The battle is now far more definitely urged than it has ever been before. Kant and Sir William Hamilton, having become the adopted philosophic sponsors of the sceptical cause, endow it with arms of superior temper to any it has yet wielded; while Cousin and his followers, who are now confessed champions of supernaturalism, impart to the opposite camp an unwonted intellectual grace and dignity.

What is the ostensible ground of the controversy? It is whether human history is a strictly natural phenomenon, or a strictly supernatural one; whether man's origin and destiny transcend nature, or whether they fall exclusively under the dominion of natural law. Faith maintains that man's origin and destiny are strictly supernatural; while Science implicitly, if not always explicitly, regards him as essentially a subject of Nature, and a sharer consequently of her fortunes, whatsoever they may be. Faith says that man is made out of nothing, being summoned into being by a literal creative fiat. Science, on the other hand, insists that man is essentially natural, being formed as to his body out of Nature's substances, as to his mind out of her knowledges, as to his heart out of her appetencies and affections; and that no theology therefore can account scientifically for man, unless it account at the same time for Nature as well. Such is the substance of the dispute,—to know whether man is God's creature irrespectively of natural law, or in strict dependence upon it. The one party holds creation to have been a purely arbitrary, or at least immethodical, procedure on the part of God, having no sanction but that of his own omnipotent will. The other holds it to be a strictly rational proceeding, having the most unswerving reference to the methods and order of Nature. The believer is very much afraid that, if Science have her way on this point, the *heart* of man will grow cold towards God, and his devotion disown at last any higher inspiration than the intellect. The *savant* is concerned, on his side, lest, if Faith establish her ascendency, the *mind* of man may grow disinterested in the highest themes, and so allow his affections and conduct to fall a gradual prey to superstition.

At bottom, the matter disputed between Faith and Science is the measure of respect we owe to Nature. The meaning of Nature is the pivotal point of the controversy; and whosoever can shed any light upon that subject may reasonably claim an attentive hearing. Nature, as illustrated by Science, seems to be offering every day some new and more startling complication of the religious problem, as that problem is envisaged by faith. The realm of law is seen to be infringing upon the hitherto inviolable realm of freedom to such an extent that fear is felt lest the principle of responsibility be weakened in the human breast, and man learn erelong to confess himself the mere sport of his organization. To allay these fears and give repose once more to human hope, what will suffice? Evidently nothing short of a new insight into the meaning of Nature. Nothing but this promises to end the contention which grows every day more embittered. Faith, whose sole business has ever been to affirm the creative substance of things, and not at all their phenomenal constitution, now more than ever insists that we come from God exclusively and return to God exclusively; and hence that, so far as we are complicated with any third thing, as Nature, we are really estranged from God, and liable to be eternally separated from him. To the devout conscience, accordingly, the play of the natural life seems intrinsically dangerous, and no condition of the soul so safe as one in which Nature's force is kept in stern abeyance to self-denying practices or multiplied ritual observances. No doubt that there is an abundant leaven of wilfulness in the fussy ecclesiastical tendencies of the day, and that very much of the formal rituality which has overgrown our plain Protestant consciousness is flagrantly aggressive, insincere, or histrionic. Still, a certain logic attaches to and dignifies the entire ecclesiastical conception of human life, which is, that Nature is positively evil, evil *in se*, and hence productive of irretrievable disaster to all who do not voluntarily renounce her sway.

Science, whose business, on the other hand, is never with the creative substance of things, but only with their phenomenal apparition, has come to affirm with more or less emphasis a contrary doctrine. We say *more or less* emphasis, for Science is by no means definitely constituted as yet, having arrived at no adequate or authentic self-consciousness in any of her representatives. We use the word Science, then, only to indicate a general agreement among scientific men, as we use the word Faith to indicate a general agreement among religious men; and scientific men agree as a general thing in disowning the antithesis which Faith alleges between Man and Nature; while they insist that Nature, relatively to herself alone and independently of all theologic considerations, furnishes not only a legitimate field of inquiry to the mind, but a direct avenue possibly to the highest knowledge. They insist that man has a manifest constitutional identity with all other existence, in spite of his inextinguishable individuality or difference, and therefore is not to be spiritually interpreted without due regard being had to this natural subjection of his. However the theologian may read our spiritual origin and destiny, he has thus not the least right, according to Science, to make Nature enter into those relations as a foreign element, but only as a domestic one. Science shows us that we have not the slightest ground of self-consciousness, not the slightest basis of identity, but what Nature affords us: thus, that our spiritual individuality, to whatever heights it may subsequently soar, always claims anchorage in Nature, and can never afford to disclaim it. It alleges, therefore, a substantive, and no longer reflected, worth in Nature; not merely an indirect, but a direct, testimony to the Divine power and glory; and exacts accordingly in effect that Man range himself in line with Nature, if he would have his own testimony accepted as valid. Within these limits, it is true, the difference between Faith and Science has been one of understanding rather than of principle, the attitude of the one combatant being really, though not conventionally, as devout as that of the other; and we perceive consequently all along the course of history a certain amity and fellow-feeling kept up between the partisans of revealed and those of natural religion.

But in our day the quarrel has grown very much envenomed. From being a mere intellectual disagreement, it has become a highly practical one, involving the most lively personal issues. Faith is no longer content to dwell with Science, nor does Science care any longer to conciliate Faith. Faith, from having once been sincerely speculative, shrinks now evermore within the timidest limits of tradition or authority. Science, from having been once sincerely theistic, is fast becoming either frankly pantheistic or boldly atheistic. From having once encouraged ontological and metaphysical research, it now authoritatively restricts inquiry to the field of the senses. From having once recognized infinite and finite, God and man, as substantive cognitions, it now recognizes Nature alone; and does not hesitate to avow by the voice of her bolder disciples, MM. Comte and Taine in France, Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and Mr. Spencer in England, that neither infinite nor finite, neither absolute nor relative, have any reality to us, save as signs of our own mental imbecility; and hence that all legitimate inquiry restricts itself to the realm of Nature, the realm of the phenomenal or the indefinite.

We repeat, then, that, the warfare between Faith and Science having assumed this portentous aspect, there can be no hope of bringing it to an equitable termination, unless we find a meaning in Nature which both combatants have hitherto failed to discover. Both of them regard Nature without any misgiving as a positive quantity, able according to Faith to embarrass the intercourse of God and man with eternal complications, able according to Science to give man a sensible existence quite irrespective of any presumable spiritual relation he may be under to God. Faith affirms the creative paternity of God towards man, in utter indifference to the constitutional uses Nature renders him. Science affirms the constitutive maternity of Nature towards us, in utter disregard of the creative issues to which such maternity is subservient. Faith does not know how to deal with the natural or generic element in existence; Science does not know how to deal with its spiritual or specific element. They neither of them, in short, suspect the true logic of Nature, which is her strictly *constitutional* subserviency to the human consciousness, and hence are incapable of ever coming to a mutual understanding. For this is the sole secret of their future possible reconciliation, — that Nature be seen to resolve itself utterly into Man, and hence to avouch a purely phenomenal disjunction on his part with God, in the interest exclusively of their real and permanent spiritual conjunction. Neither Faith nor Science has the least title to invalidate the other's claim to our respect, — no more title than the heart of the body has to dominate the lungs, or the lungs the heart. And it is idle, therefore, to think of bringing about any friendship between them, save upon the frankest recognition of their joint and equal validity in respect to the perfected evolution of the mind; which recognition is impossible, unless we find a doctrine of Nature deep enough, on the one hand, to justify the devout mind without affronting the scientific instinct, and broad enough, on the other, to affirm the scientific instinct without wounding the tenderest legitimate susceptibility of the religious conscience.

We are sure, then, that our readers will not refuse us their attention, if our effort to interest them take the shape of a doctrine of Nature with which their own previous thought may not have familiarized them, but which tends practically to reconcile Faith and Science by showing Nature to be indeed the hyphen which logically disunites man and God, creator and creature, but only in order that they may be spiritually united in eternal harmony. We shall aim at no rigidly formal exposition of our theme, but study to make a popular statement. It seems to us, indeed, that the simple rectification we propose to make, both of religious and scientific thought, is very easy to follow;

will only require ordinary attention and good-will on the reader's part perfectly to master it; and then it will open to him, unless we greatly deceive ourselves, such novel and engaging horizons of thought, that he will not deem his attention and good-will to have been ill-bestowed.

A famous controversy — the beginnings of which date from Plato's idealism and the opposition that doctrine encountered in Aristotle — raged among the schoolmen as to the import to be accorded to general or universal terms; as to whether they denoted real existences or mere mental abstractions. The one party contended that the generic term *horse*, *hog*, or *rose*, for example, implied a real existence independent of all particular horses, hogs, or roses. The other insisted that these generic terms were mere mental generalizations, expressing what to our perception all horses, all hogs, all roses, have in common, and were otherwise devoid of substance. This battle of realist and nominalist waxed very furious, involving church and state alike at last in its folds;* but although nominalism, or the Aristotelian doctrine that universals were only mental abstractions clad with names, while individuals alone exist, eventually claimed the ascendency, no advantage at all commensurate with the vigor of the debate resulted to the practical intellect from it, for the simple reason that both parties to it were alike blind to the profound philosophic issues involved in it. The fundamental question which underlay that long and fierce encounter, and which yet never came to the surface of it, was this: whether quantity determined quality, or quality quantity; whether identity involved individuality, or individuality identity, — because on the former of these hypotheses, existence would be scientifically unintelligible; and on the latter, claim a truth past all sophistry to subvert or even enfeeble. In other words, the true question in dispute was a question about the absolute reality of things; namely, whether such reality inhered in the form of things, in what gives them name, quality, character, and so objectively individualizes or differences them from other things; or whether, on the contrary, it inhered in the nature of things, in what gives them consciousness or selfhood, and so subjectively identifies them with all other things. For in the former case, Science, which is a research of the universal *quale* that subtends all quantity, of the unitary form that animates all substance, would be fully authenticated; in the latter, sense would rightfully claim to dominate, and the progress of human society or brotherhood bring up at last in a filthy monasticism.

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* It is pleasant and touching to see the enthusiasm with which M. Cousin, in his edition of Abelard's literary remains, celebrates the renown which this metaphysical dispute enjoyed in its day, and the hubbub it excited in church and state. "Behold," he cries, "the power of principles! A problem scarcely worthy, you would say, to occupy the reveries of philosophers begets divers metaphysic systems. These systems agitate the schools, but at first produce no further result. Before long, however, they pass from metaphysics into religion, and thence into politics. Thus they become launched upon the historic scene. William the Conqueror espouses the quarrel of the English clergy against Roscelinus, and Louis VII. presides over the assembly in which St. Bernard, the hero of the period, controverts the conceptualist Abelard, master of Arnold of Brescia," &c., &c. — *Petri Abelardi Opera*, Preface. (Paris, 1849.)

For example, the realist contended that the hog was a universal rational quantity before it was a particular sensible one; that there was not only any number of particular hogs extant to sense, but also, and much more, a grand generic hog extant to the soul or reason; thus, that the individuality of the hog, or what gives it name, quality, or being as hog, is not anything above the hog, as human reason, human logic, human science, but simply the very nature, selfhood, or identity of the animal, or what he possesses in common with all other animals. Obviously, then, the fault of realism, as it called itself, was to confound the absolute being of things with their phenomenal form; to merge, for example, the logical individuality of the hog, its characteristic quality which makes it hog instead of horse or rose, in its mere material identity, which makes it a quantitative fact of existence, like all other facts. Else why be at the trouble to construct this preposterous ideal hog in order to realize all particular hogs? Manifestly the ideal or generic hog can present no qualitative difference to the actual or particular hog, under penalty of voiding his function, but only a quantitative difference. He is much more of a hog than the particular one; while the particular one is much less of a hog than he. This is all the difference. If, then, the particular inhere in the general; if it derive from the latter its distinctive quality or individuality, all that makes it hog instead of horse or rose; and if the general be yet no way qualitatively, but only quantitatively, distinct from the particular, — why, it becomes instantly evident that there is and can be no particular existence, no individuality or difference among things, but only a wide-weltering community or chaos. Thus realism practically ended by sinking the ideal in the actual; the spiritual in the natural; individuality or difference in identity or sameness; or, what is the same thing, confounding form with substance, being with existence, object with subject, cause with effect, and so virtually annihilating both. For if you confound things which exist only by each other's oppugnancy, you of course deprive them of existence.

The nominalist had at least a lively instinct, if by no means a clear intellection of these disastrous issues to the idealist doctrine, and he met it accordingly by a broad, emphatic denial. For if, said he, there be this grand generic hog, from which all particular hogs, this grand generic horse or rose, from which all particular horses or roses exist, — if there be, in fine, a grand generic everything from which every particular thing descends, — why, then it is plain that all our science turns out to be an everlasting seesaw between being and existence, between genus and species, substance and form; and Philosophy, or the mental progress of the race, undergoes a decisive arrest. For Philosophy is nothing but a voucher of the absolute unitary being which underlies and is yet most distinct from all phenomenal existence, — of the qualitative form which underlies, and is yet most distinct from, all quantitative substance; and if, therefore, you make this absolute being — this qualitative form — of things only an exaggerated ghost of the things themselves, you stultify philosophy by reducing it to a puny, pedantic idealism. I find myself constrained accordingly, pursued the nominalist, to take contrary ground to the realist, and maintain inviolate the scientific instinct, which is, that all existence or subjectivity is particular; consequently that all generals or universals have a purely logical or nominal force, as denoting the substantial community or identity which the mind itself assigns to these particulars as the necessary background or purchase of its recognition of them.

Unquestionably the nominalist fought a good fight. He had a dim instinctive perception of the truth that nature and spirit, genus and species, substance and form, were not directly, but inversely, related; and he determined that the ideal or spiritual reality of things should never be vindicated, if he could help it, at the expense of their natural identity. He saw in short, however dimly, that the material constitution of existence offered the basis of fact which was necessary to the truth of its spiritual creation; and he insisted, therefore, with an unerring instinct, that no disparagement should befall the minor interest, without an instant fatal reaction upon the major one.

Now, why have we recalled this old controversy? Merely with a view to poise, and, if we may so say, posit, the reader's judgment for a more intelligent survey of our existing controversies. The war now waging between Faith and Science is substantially the same as that which engaged realist and nominalist; the fundamental question in debate, now as then, being how to reconcile nature and spirit, fact and truth. The ecclesiastic of our day is only the realist of a former generation, who claims that an ideal realm, or realm of substance, be found subtending this natural realm, or realm of appearance, wherein everything which is here phenomenally good or evil, beautiful or ugly, stands energized in absolute lineaments. And the sceptic of this age, in like manner, is but the nominalist of a departed one, who claims for Nature a positive Divine life or substance, not to be invalidated nor invaded by any more positive; and to this end insists that phenomenal good and evil can never, from the nature of the case, attain to absolute dimensions, but must always remain phenomenal or relative, since their existence is totally contingent upon each other's coexistence. Such is the pass, then, at which the intellect has arrived: half the intellectual world contending in effect that sense is absolute, and controls reason; the other half, that it is relative, and demands the constant supervision of reason. And this pass turns out practically an *impasse* for the intellect; for although Science is perfectly competent to renounce Faith when Faith complacently degrades itself to sense, or confesses itself superstitious, yet Science is but the normal, robust, untiring handmaid of Faith, when Faith itself is spiritual and seeks only to promote Divine peace on earth and good-will towards men.

But now, at last, let us see whether this controversy is really as desperate as it has the air of being. Let us inquire whether a doctrine of Nature cannot be compassed, which shall effectually vacate this vexatious rivalry between Faith and Science, by proving natural existence to be at least no less real than spiritual existence, so satisfying the man of science; and yet, as such reality, forever subordinate to spiritual existence, so placating the man of faith. Our readers have only to accord us a placid half-hour's attention, then, and we shall discharge our duty to them with as few unnecessary words as may be found practicable.

Since the dawn of the speculative intellect, there has been but one question at bottom seriously agitated among men, — a question as to Nature's reality. The interest of this question to the devout mind turns upon the fact, that, if Nature's existences prove to be real, faith in the supernatural will necessarily fall into disuse. Its interest to the sceptical mind, on the other hand, turns upon the fact, that, if Nature's existences prove to be unreal, Science, of course, which is an investigation of the laws of natural existence, falls to the ground, and with Science all hope of an ultimate Divine order upon earth. The reader sees then, at a glance, what an immense significance this word *reality* has to Philosophy, and how important it is at the outset to ascertain what real existence is.

By *real* existence men mean what exists in itself, or has selfhood; that is to say, a form of existence in which the specific or formal and objective element is not overborne by the generic or substantial and subjective element, but is at least equal to it, as in the moral form of existence, if not superior, as in the spiritual form. Now undoubtedly the very term Nature excludes the conception of this sort of reality as pertinent either to mineral, vegetable, or animal; because these are types of existence in which what is generic or substantial dominates what is specific or formal; so that no freedom or rationality, and consequently no real selfhood, can be ascribed to the subject. To this extent, accordingly, Plato and Kant are both right in stigmatizing Nature as unreal, as a ceaseless flux in which nothing ever attains to being, but only to seeming. But they both exhibit an inexcusable pusillanimity in abandoning the pursuit of reality here; an inexcusable philosophic timidity in supposing that this state of things in mineral, plant, and animal reflects any such discredit upon Nature's reality as justifies them in laboriously substituting for this phenomenal flux of things, the one a world of ideal, the other of intellectual substance, in which every forlorn Benedick of a phenomenon shall ultimately find himself mated and fated to an absolute, inexorable Beatrice. For clearly man claims a natural genesis no less valid than that of mineral, plant, or animal; and moral existence, which is the distinctively human form of Nature, presents that precise equilibrium or balance of the two constitutive elements of all existence, — namely, genus and species, identity and individuality, subject and object, body and soul, flesh and spirit, — upon which selfhood or personality is irresistibly contingent; and selfhood or personality is the only philosophic reality. Moral existence, or human nature, is constituted of an exact and indissoluble *marriage* between the two elements of universality and individuality, which make up indeed all existence, but are conjugally related in no form below the human; since in every other form the generic or masculine element coerces the specific or feminine element, and makes it the slave of its lusts. And wherever this marriage exists, we have personal consciousness as a result; that is to say, the consciousness of a life as real as God's life, since it enables us to comprehend, aspire after, and finally conjoin ourselves with his infinite perfection. Now it was their complete oversight of this hierarchical or conjugal distribution of the two constitutive elements of all natural existence, in the moral or human form of such existence, that led Kant and Plato to idealize Nature, and so provoke the scientific protest and reaction which befell their speculations, — the former in the Hegelian, the latter in the Aristotelian logic.

But leaving both Kant and Plato to their honored repose, the goal to which we invite our readers' thought is, on the one hand, the recognition of man, or moral existence, as constituting Nature's true reality; and, on the other, the recognition of human society, or brotherhood, as the true Divine destiny of man on earth, and the comprehensive answer consequently to every doubt suggested by Faith or by Science. But let us do all things in an orderly manner. Let us, for example, first of all satisfy the reader's just expectation, in justifying what we have said as to the constitution of Nature in general, or showing it to be made up of two warring forces,—genus and species, race-force and family-force, force of identity or extension and force of individuality or intension,—the former of which rules and the latter obeys,—until we come to man, in whom the two hitherto warring forces are reconciled in eternal amity, and by such reconciliation afford the basis of a new or spiritual evolution of life.

What is Nature? What meaning does the word convey when we reflectively examine it? Let us endeavor to fix this meaning by an exact analysis of its habitual contents.

The word has two meanings,—one specific, which is its meaning to sense; the other generic, which is its meaning to reason. And it is only by rightly adjusting these that we are able to master the total force of the word.

Nature, as specifically defined, means whatsoever the senses discern, whatsoever can be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched. It means whatsoever we see around us unappropriated by art; so much of earth and air as falls within the periphery of our sensuous organization. It means the rocks, the lake, the river, the grass, the flowers, the trees, the birds, the beasts, the insects, we actually behold by sense; in short, the realm of specific form or individuality.

Generically defined, Nature means more than this. For we no sooner grow familiar with the various forms our senses enfold, than we begin to perceive that there is not one of them absolutely isolated, not one of them but acknowledges some bond of connection with every other; thus, that everything embraced within the scope of our senses claims a something in common with all other existence, as well as a something of difference: the former giving the thing body or generic identity with all other things, the latter giving it soul or specific diversity from all other things. We may say, then, that Nature, viewed rationally, means the realm of generic substance or identity; sensibly regarded, it means the realm of specific things; rationally regarded, it means what is generic, common, or universal in those things.

Thus Nature presents two faces to us, according as we make a sensible or a rational judgment of its contents.

But now there can be no doubt that the abstract use of the word allies it with the latter, rather than the former signification, — allies it with the substantial or universal element in existence, rather than the specific or differential one. For whenever we make an abstract judgment of Nature, we separate in thought what is common to all existence from what is particular, and call that Nature; while we call the latter horse, tree, mountain, cloud, water, or whatever else circumstances appoint. Rather let us say that the word expresses *primarily* the common or substantial element in existence, and the specific or formal element quite subordinately. It implies, of course, when carefully scrutinized, the alliance of a common substance with a specific form; but then unquestionably it emphasizes the former element in the alliance, and leaves the latter a purely reflected or derivative force.

If we should be called upon in these circumstances to hazard a philosophic description of Nature, we might characterize it as a style of existence in which what is generic or relatively universal dominates what is specific or relatively individual. Or, better still, we might say that Nature is what universalizes or identifies all existence, even while allowing it the utmost specific variety.

For example, when we conceive or speak of "the universe of Nature," we mean by the phrase the community of existing things, or that substantial identity which each has with all, and all with each, underlying and antedating all their formal or visible differences. We mean, in short, the sum of all existence; the sum of all the things which are actually or potentially embraced in our varied senses. We suppose that there is an actual whole answering somehow to the particulars which we see and hear and smell and taste and touch; and this whole we quietly postulate as subjectively or organically existing under the name of "the universe of Nature."

So, also, when we say "the nature" of a diamond, of a rose, of a sheep, the word in these applications designates the community of existence, the identity of substance, which the sheep, the rose, the diamond, has with all other sheep, all other roses, all other diamonds. It denotes what universalizes, and therefore identifies every sheep as sheep, in spite of its specific differences from all other sheep; every rose as rose, in spite of its specific contrast to other roses, as tea-rose, moss-rose, china-rose, and so forth; every diamond as diamond, in spite of its sensible variation from all other diamonds. Thus the word expresses in every case what gives the thing identity of substance, community of existence, with its kind, and through that with everything else. In short, Nature is what to our imagination gives objectivity or logical background to everything that exists, and so allows it its subjective or phenomenal apparition.

We repeat, that we should be authorized, by all that has gone before, to accept the above as a philosophic account of Nature. But then it is to the last degree important to observe, that, although Nature has this intellectual use, or furnishes to our thought an objective ground for all the shifting phenomena of our senses, *it is only to our thought that she does this*, inasmuch as she is utterly destitute of subjective existence, existence in herself, her total subjectivity being constituted by her specific forms. There is no such actuality as we ascribe to Nature when we give her an existence over and above her particular forms; and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of the superstition, the better, for it is the outbirth exclusively of the sensuous imagination, and is fatal to a spiritual discernment of creation. Nature has no subjectivity or existence in herself, as the rock has, or the horse, or the tree, but only to our infirm thought, which, being incapable of abiding God's direct spiritual effulgence in the phenomena of our senses, is obliged to veil or obscure it under this imaginary substance called Nature, and so accommodate it to recognition. It is the logical drapery under which our intelligence instinctively cloaks the splendor of the creative name in order to save its tender eyes from blight, and has not the slightest pretension to substantive validity. Being thus rigidly impersonal, thus utterly destitute of spiritual or subjective quality, Nature is able to offer herself with equal readiness to the demands of the most opposite styles of existence. She is herein like the letter of Revelation, which lends itself with equal ease to every interpretation which the highest wisdom, or the baldest folly, may put upon it. She is, in short, the realm of the indefinite, of what escapes definition, being neither infinite nor finite, neither God nor man, neither creative nor created, but a *tertium quid*, or transient neutral quantity effectually separating between the two.

Any definition we may give of Nature, consequently, must be purely abstract, expressing the mental conception we frame of her, but having no answering external reality. We may, for example, call her the unity of all her forms. But this is a purely mental conception, besides being very inexact even as such. For, in the first place, there is no concrete reality nor ghost of a concrete reality answering to the designation, since all of Nature's forms are more or less antagonistic to each other; and what natural or concrete substance can you conceive of as uniting and so neutralizing these antagonisms? What actual thing can you conceive of as the unity of arsenic and chalk, hemlock and wheat, tiger and sheep, serpent and dove? Evidently the unity of these things forces you at once upon the recognition of *human* nature, upon the conception of *moral* existence, as alone adequate to justify it. Thus the bare question as to Nature's personality or selfhood takes you instantly out of the mineral, vegetable, and animal realm, and confronts you with man.

Viewed apart from man, Nature presents, and must always present, a mere coexistence of opposites; never their disappearance or resolution into a higher form of being, which their concrete unity would imply. The unity of the gases gives us water or air, which are less diffuse, more concentrated, more individualized, and therefore superior forms of existence to the gaseous. The unity of air and water is not found in themselves, but in the mineral. The unity of the mineral kingdom, in like manner, is not found in any universal mineral substance, but in the vegetable form of existence, to the production of which all mineral forms aspire or are subservient. The unity of the vegetable kingdom again refers itself, not to any universal vegetable form, but to the exigencies of the animal form exclusively; and the unity of the animal kingdom, in its turn, is to be found only in man, or moral existence. Thus the unity of opposing substances is never to be sought upon the same plane with the substances themselves, but a degree above them, in some higher form of existence. These opposing mineral, vegetable, and animal substances are so many preliminary analyses, addressed to our infantile intelligence, of some grander synthetic forms of life successively to appear; their whole use in every case being to predict the advent, and educate us to the discernment, of a higher style of existence than they themselves disclose. The deepest or most sacred of all unities, that of the sexes, avouches its truth only in prolification; nothing being more opposite in aspect, in manners, in character, in function, than the male *in se* and the female *in se*, especially in the higher forms of being. And so, indeed, of all unity: it never means a mere mental aggregation of particulars, but the evolution of a distinctly higher form of life than the particulars themselves, taken together, supply. And yet this impracticable unity is really all we have in our thought, when we term Nature the unity of all her particular forms. We make her the mere summing up or aggregation of the contents of our senses actual and possible; which summing up or aggregation is a purely mental product, having no particle of actuality out of our own thought.

But in the second place, the statement, besides being philosophically untrue, is even, as we have already said, scientifically inexact, inexact within its own limits. For so far is what we call Nature from constituting the concrete mental unity of all her forms, that she is the exact and total opposite of such unity, being in strictness of speech their utmost conceivable community, identity, or indifference. The term includes whatsoever the senses discern; it is whatsoever can be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched. Rationally defined, therefore, we should say Nature was the *community* of existing things, their point of identity, in which they are all alike and equally comprehended, whatever individual disagreements sever them from each other. Nothing exists to our perception which does not exist specifically; which does not report itself in some grosser or subtler form to our senses. And Nature, when generically defined, means what all these existences, thus reporting themselves to our senses, *possess in common;* the widest mental generalization or impersonation which has yet been given to this community by Science being gravitation.

Of course, in ordinary speech, we mean by Nature what we see around us, — so much of earth and air as falls within the circumference of our sensitive organization. We give all these various contents of our senses a unitary appellation as *natural*, because, whatever diversities of form and structure they present to our intelligence, these diversities are not moral or conscious, as inferring any individual complicity on their part, but strictly physical, as imposed upon them by their kind. Mineral, vegetable, and animal have only a natural subjectivity, a subjectivity accruing to them from their race or kind, being precisely what that makes them to be: so that if some higher unity than they themselves supply did not compel them into its orderly subservience, by giving them hierarchical distribution, they would instantly forfeit their various individuality; i. e. would relapse into their original community, indistinction, chaos, non-existence, — for absolute community is spiritual non-existence.*

To sum up: Nature is a pure fantasy of our rudimentary intelligence, permitted by the Divine wisdom in the interest of our eventual and perfect spiritual sanity. What we call Nature is no *thing*, but a most strict process or functioning of the creative love toward our spiritual manhood. It is nothing more nor less than the living method which the creative energy adopts in order to spiritual prolification. Spiritual or individual existence cannot be directly propagated, — requires some mediator between itself and the paternal source. The bare conception of an opposite possibility is nugatory, since the existence so propagated, as we have seen, would be without selfhood or identity, while the fundamental postulate of spiritual existence is, that its proper objectivity fall within, and not without, its proper subjectivity. But spiritual existence can be propagated indirectly by the medium of what we call Nature. For Nature having a most unquestioned and unquestionable existence to our sensuous thought, the Divine wisdom accepts and uses these rational *data* as the mould of His own more real and perfect communication. *Omne vivum*, say the physiologists, *ex ovo;* which means, that no form exists to our apprehension without some previous ground of existence, that nothing can be sensibly objective to us save in so far as it is first subjectively constituted. No farmer expects next year's crop, unless he sows this year's wheat. No father expects to become a father but by the intervention of a mother. Could the father beget offspring, and the farmer produce a crop directly from themselves, the product in both cases would evidently be visionary; because there would be no basis of discrimination possible in either case between product and producer. In like manner, precisely, the Architect of the spiritual creation accomplishes his work, not by the exhibition of magical * or instantaneous power, not by any idle and ostentatious incantation addressed to empty air, but solely by the inward fecundation of natural germs existing in our sensuous intelligence, and the consequent orderly development of a spiritual progeny every way commensurate with his own perfection.

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* The same law governs all our restricted scientific applications of the word. The nature of the horse means what all horses possess in common and without regard to their specific diversities, — whatsoever makes them horses instead of camels or asses; that is to say, what identifies them as horses in spite of their individual differences, as roadster and racer, cart-horse and coach-horse, mountain pony and lady's saddle-horse, and so individualizes them from all other existence. That this nature of the horse has any subjectivity in itself and apart from its specific forms, that it is anything more than a mental generalization on our part by which our reason identifies all the objects that our sense presents as individual, must strike every reader as absurd. But nothing can be alleged against such a superstition, which is not true in grander measure of universal Nature regarded as having any subjective existence or reality *in se.*

In short, Nature, when philosophically regarded, expresses the lowest form of the human intelligence; what in early Christian speech was wont to be denominated "the natural *mind*." For it has no reality out of the mind. It is a mere hallucination of our nascent intelligence, which, having as yet no discernment of God's creative presence in the things of sense or the lowest sphere of the mind, as well as in the things of spirit or its highest sphere, is driven meanwhile to attribute the former things to a universal mother called Nature, who lets none of their wants go unsatisfied. This is a necessary condescension of the creative Truth to our ignorance and imbecility, because the very existence of our reason is contingent upon it. For if, while we were spiritually incompetent to the Divine recognition, we had not the privilege of superstition even, or never felt ourselves haunted by the presence of a something in life more than meets the senses, these latter would of course control us, and our understanding die out, since fact in that case would no longer image or reveal Truth to us, but simply extinguish it, as with the animals.

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* Magic is the pretended power of instantaneous creation, — the art of producing things immethodically or without the use of means, thus by sheer force of will and without any aid from the understanding. It is the pretension to produce offspring without maternity, form without substance, soul without body, spirit without flesh, individuality without identity, life without existence. And by attributing this pretension to God, as we do when we suppose him to create spiritual existence directly from himself, or without the intervention of Nature and History, we not only virtually turn him into a mere flashy showman or conjurer, but we stigmatize the existence so created as an arrant imposture without rational depth or truth; for manifestly the stream cannot transcend its source, and if the Creator be a magician the creature must *à fortiori* prove a deception.

But we are digressing; for the opportunity to ventilate the prejudice which besets us at the threshold of philosophic inquiry, as to Nature's autonomy or being *in se*, was too inviting to be resisted. Let us return, then, to our proper task, which was to show that all natural form or existence is made up of two movements; — one of which may be called generic or descending, as matriculating the thing or giving it body; the other, specific or ascending, as fecundating the thing, animating it, or giving it soul. Everything that naturally exists, everything that exists in any mode appreciable to our senses, is a composite of these two forces, a child of a double parentage; — one statical, giving it existence, which is fixity or rest; the other dynamical, giving it life, which is infinitude or motion. In short, Nature, whether in general or particular, is nothing but a living unit of two forces; — one of which we may name identity, as giving everything that exists subjective indistinction with all other existence; the other, individuality, as giving it objective and inextinguishable diversity from everything else. But now, in every natural form of existence below the human, — and this is what must forever make them lower forms, — the generic force, or force of identity, rules, and the specific force, or force of individuality, force of difference, serves. The resultant form, consequently, is without personality or selfhood, and hence destitute of that reality which the mind craves in Nature, when Nature is alleged as a proper basis of spiritual existence.

Now we want our readers to observe very closely here what is the true ground of Nature's unreality in all these lower forms of existence. It is that their individuality, or what gives them objective distinction from all other forms, is not one with their identity, or what gives them subjective consciousness. The iron is not cognizable to itself as iron, or in what distinguishes it from quartz or sulphur; the tree does not know itself as tree, or in what objectively distinguishes it from shrub or grass; the horse does not recognize himself as horse, or in what distinguishes him objectively from hog or sheep or tortoise. No; the total individuality, character, or being of these lower forms of existence obstinately refuses any subjective recognition or authentication on their part, and refers itself wholly to a higher intelligence. We are the Adam that gives name, quality, character, to all these lower things, and without whom they would instantly sink into chaotic indistinction. Hence it is that we call them and feel them unreal. They have no subjective apprehension of their objective or characteristic being; hence no aspiration to ally themselves with what is above themselves; in other words, no capacity of spiritual life.

If the reader have sufficiently weighed the observation here made, he will at once perceive that there is a vast interval between the absolute being of things and their phenomenal consciousness; that the former or objective element allies them with whatsoever is above themselves, the latter with whatsoever is below themselves. The two interests are as distinct as heaven and earth, day and night, and are never for an instant to be confounded, but only married in some new form of nature, like the human. Thus what *identifies* a thing, what gives it generic substance, what makes it subjectively or consciously exist, is never what *individualizes* it, is never what gives it specific form or character, never, in short, what makes it objectively to be; but, on the contrary, is most distinctly opposite, and even repugnant, to that. Why? Manifestly because the one function is material, constitutive, maternal, as giving the thing outward incorporation merely; the other, spiritual, creative, paternal, as giving it inward animation exclusively: and inward and outward are not directly but inversely related, the one beginning where the other ends, and ending where the other begins. Thus what I consciously or subjectively am, I am by virtue exclusively of my natural organization, or what identifies me with my kind, and consequently alienates me from my creator. My absolute or unconscious being — my total spiritual possibility — refers itself of course directly to my creator; but my phenomenal or conscious existence — that generic subjectivity which is *implied* in my specific objectivity — separates me from my creator, identifies me or gives me community with whatsoever is *not*-him. Thus much is essential to the bare conception of existence, — a conscious selfhood or subjectivity which shall alienate it from (make it other than) its objective ground of being. For what alone identifies a thing to its own consciousness is its *proper* form; and unless, therefore, you first of all invest it with some *property* in itself, something inalienably its own, and hence inextinguishably opposed to what is the creator's in it, no basis can possibly exist for any subsequent creative communication to it. Now this property of things is exclusively natural; is what we call their *nature*, what makes them *themselves*, or gives them identity, and so projects them from their creator. You may conceive of an excellent cistern to catch rain-water; but if you have no materials wherein to project your conception, or give it outward body, the cistern of course will never exist, but remain an idea. That is, it can have no actual existence, no existence *in itself*, save in so far as it becomes sensibly dissociated with you, and endowed with its own indefeasible lineaments. The ideal form or being it has in you is one thing, and, of course, the essential or creative thing; but the substantial existence or projection it craves *in itself*, by virtue of the wood or other material out of which it is fashioned, forever separates or alienates it from you, makes it forever incapable of being resumed in your æsthetic personality. Its actual identity, in other words, forever absorbs or swallows up the real or ideal individuality it has in you.

We cite this illustration only for the purpose of hinting to the reader what we wish to make distinctly intelligible to him, namely, that just as the wood or iron or stone that enters into the works of our hands gives them subjective or phenomenal constitution only, and by no means objective or real being, so

Nature fulfils a precisely similar *constitutive* function with respect to the human consciousness, and has no pretension to the slightest creative efficacy. Nature pertains to man only on his subjective side, or what makes him self-conscious; and is wholly impertinent to him on his objective side, or what makes him really to be. The marble is pertinent or existential to the statue as a mere subjective fact of existence identical with all other facts, but is wholly impertinent or unessential to it in its objective or individual aspect as a form of ideal beauty in the artist's soul. The works of a watch and its case give it subjective identity, or make it a fact of existence, equally with all other facts; but what makes it a watch, what gives it individuality or distinctive form, what makes it, in a word, objectively to be, is exclusively its function as a time-keeper. Now Nature stands in this purely subjective or constitutional relation to man, which the marble is under to the statue, or the works of a watch to its proper uses. It constitutes him to his own consciousness merely, and so furnishes a basis for his subsequent spiritual extrication; but it no more creates or gives him spiritual being, than the marble inspires the sculptor, or the works of a watch generate its dial-plate.

The truth of the analysis here made is almost obvious. It is the postulate of all logic, the implication of all thought, that what is common in existence must base whatsoever is proper, what is generic must base what is specific; in short, that the broadest identity must enter into, fill out, or subjectively constitute the sharpest diversity. Conceive, if you can, a form of existence so purely individual or different from every other form as to have absolutely nothing in common with it. You perceive at once that the conception must be a pure fantasy of your own brain, without the slightest basis in experience, incapable of being thought or named. What makes everything either thinkable or namable, what makes everything that exists *to* exist in subjective form, that is, what makes it *itself* either to its own or to others' perception, is exclusively what it possesses in common with all other existence, and by no means what it possesses in distinction from such existence. For example, what objectively characterizes the watch as a watch, what creates it or gives it spiritual individuality or distinction from all other forms of existence, is its function of measuring time. But this function is not inherent in the watch subjectively regarded, is no way assignable to it so far merely as it is materially constituted, but is imposed upon it exclusively by its objective relations to its maker. The ideal or objective being of all watches as watches is to keep time, which they do never to their own intelligence or consciously, but to that of some superior power. But what gives every watch subjectivity, what makes it a specific or cognizable existence like everything else, is its material organization; and this organization causes it to differ specifically from all other watches, while giving it generic identity with all other things, watches included.

Or, instead of an artificial existence, take a natural one, say a horse, and you will observe the operation of the same necessity. For what makes the horse cognizable to you or to himself as an existing thing or fact of sense is by no means the functional activity which characterizes him to your rational regard, and leads you, therefore, to name him by some appropriate name which shall distinguish him from the ox, the ass, the elephant, and so forth; but exclusively his material or visible organization, which, while it individualizes him from all other horses as horses, gives him community or identity with all other things, horses included, as facts of existence.

Let the reader distinctly bear in mind, then, not only that every natural form or existence is made up of two inversive movements, one maternal or incorporative, the other paternal or enlivening, but also that the identity of the thing, its selfhood so to speak, whatsoever makes it a conscious or cognizable fact of existence, is constituted exclusively by the former or maternal element, and is thereby forever projected or alienated from the latter or paternal spiritual element, with which, consequently, it can come only into objective alliance or communion. Everything in nature, and indeed in art, claims a double parentage, one inward or from above, the other outward or from below; but the very thing *itself* generated by these invariable factors, its identity or total actuality, is referable exclusively to the inferior element, and separates it *toto cælo* from the superior one. Its selfhood or subjectivity is intensely material in short, while it is spiritual only in its objective aspects and relations. Take again the watch for illustration, which claims both a body and a soul. Its body consists in its visible organization, which distinguishes it individually from all other watches, and identifies it with all other things. Its soul consists in the use or function it enacts as a time-keeper, and therefore gives it generic identity with all other watches, while giving it individuality or difference from all other things. I, the maker of the watch, have no regard for it, of course, save on its functional or soul-side, so that, however finely wrought and richly jewelled the watch may be in comparison with other watches or on its subjective material side, if it *does not keep time*, these lower or subjective qualifications will only stamp it, to my judgment, with a profounder objective imbecility. But the watch itself — if we could imagine it a living or conscious existence — *would recognize itself* only on its organic or constitutional side; and though it might be to my eyes all the while the poorest time-keeper extant, and therefore totally devoid of æsthetic justification or objective worth, it would yet — provided only it possessed a more showy subjective organization than other watches which better fulfilled the idea of a watch — be amply justified to its own eyes in assuming any amount of superiority to them. Its consciousness would identify it with its material body, or what it possessed in common with all existence; while its spiritual function as a time-keeper, or what individualizes it from all other existence, would forever transcend its consciousness, for the simple reason that, being imposed upon it *ab extra* or as a law of its objective being purely, it does not ask the concurrence or privity of its will. So my selfhood or identity always allies me in consciousness with my finite organization, with what I derive from Nature or my race; while my spiritual individuality, or what gives me as to my heart and mind enlargement or emancipation from that bondage, invariably refers itself away from me to a higher and infinite source, God. And so we may say of everything that exists, not only that it is an invariable product of two antagonistic movements, one finiting it, giving it subjectivity or projection from its kind in giving it substantial community or identity with all lower things; the other *in*-finiting it, so to speak, or giving it objective unity with its kind, in giving it formal diversity from all other existence; but also that the former of these movements is most strictly in order to the latter.

But a truce to illustration. The reader by this time perfectly understands what we mean when we say that Nature is implied in man, just as the bodily viscera are implied in the body, as the works of a watch are implied in the watch, words in thought, or thought itself in affection. That is to say, it gives him phenomenal existence, existence to his own consciousness, but has not the slightest pretension to give him absolute being, which is being irrespective of his own consciousness. The Church has never had a misgiving as to the negative import of this proposition, namely, that Nature is not *essential* to man, does not give him real, but only apparent, individuality. But it wholly overlooks its positive import, which is, that Nature is nevertheless *existential* to man, that it constitutes him or makes him cognizable to himself, and hence is indissolubly involved in his moral evolution. And the sceptic, on his side, perfectly discerns the constitutional efficacy Nature is under to man, understands perfectly that we should be wholly lifeless or unconscious without her maternal mediation; but he goes no step beyond this, nor ever dreams apparently that what constitutes a thing or gives it phenomenal existence must of necessity be *inversely* related to what creates it or gives it absolute being: inasmuch as the one operation is purely subjective and falls below the thing, the other purely objective and transcends it. And yet Philosophy claims no more fundamental deliverance than this. The constitution of a thing — what gives it phenomenal body, and so renders it appreciable either to itself or to others — has no direct, but only an inverse relevancy to its creative substance, or what gives it rational soul; has precisely the same relevancy to it, in fact, that the shell of an oyster or an egg has to the nourishment which the contents of such shell, *when consumed*, afford to my life.

We may say, then, that the religious hypothesis of existence is philosophically vicious, in that it takes, or rather makes, no account of the *identity* of things, of what makes them *appear* either to themselves or others; and the scientific hypothesis similarly vicious, in that it takes no account of the *individuality* of things, or what makes them to be irrespectively both of their own consciousness and the cognizance of others. The one makes no account of the subjective or constitutive element in all existence. The other makes no account of its objective or creative element. Thus Faith has been always impotent to suspect that our moral freedom really expresses the unswerving spiritual dependence we are under to God, and is sure to explicate it by some hypothesis of our acquired independence. It never suspects, in other words, what is literally true, that our moral — which is our natural — history is a pure *incident* of the spiritual being we have in God; but regards it rather as an *accident* of some subsequent inexplicable departure we have made from such being. In a word, it has never been content to view our moral experience as befalling our spiritual individuality *ab intra* exclusively, but represents it as rigidly supervening *ab extra*. And Science, in her turn, complacently ignores this spiritual *evolution* in us, which the bare fact of Nature's involution in our consciousness forces upon the gaze of Philosophy, and restricts her observation to the phenomena which attest our natural subjectivity. In short, Faith asserts our individuality with such emphasis as practically to deny the truth of our constitutional identity with all other existence; while Science, in its turn, is so intent upon the latter more obvious and superficial interest, as practically to blink out of sight the subtler and more dazzling one.

In this state of things, of course, both Faith and Science confess themselves alike obnoxious to philosophic rebuke. For Philosophy, rightly conceived, contemplates a scheme of cosmical order, which makes the subjective identity of things a most strict incident of their objective individuality, or turns our natural existence into a rigid implication, and no longer explication, of our spiritual being; so forever discharging Nature of the preposterous creative burden which our sensuous reason is wont to lay upon it. What a boon, then, he would confer on the intellect, who, on the one hand, should persuade the man of faith to see in Nature the purely subjective imagery which God allows to man, in order that he may eventually come to the knowledge of himself as spiritually created; and, on the other, should persuade the man of science to see in man the objective reality which God bestows on Nature in order eternally to connect mineral, vegetable, and animal with himself! For then, doubtless, he would persuade them both, erelong, to abandon their fruitless rivalry, and unite to honor in Nature and History the literal statics and dynamics of a great creative operation, which has for its sole possible issue the perfect spiritual conjunction or fellowship of man with God.

But such high themes, however seducing, are not ours today. Our logical and urgent business for the present is very simple. It is to show the reader how Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, regarded as an involution of our moral consciousness, promotes the evolution of that consciousness. We set out with a design to convince the reader, in spite of the devotee on one hand and the sceptic on the other, that Nature offered a basis of reality to the spiritual creation. We undertook to show him that moral existence or human nature alone afforded that incontestable reality which is at bottom the desideratum of all true Faith and true Science. We have completed one part of our task only. We have shown him that Nature, mineral, vegetable, or animal, is a mere implication or involution of human nature; that all the individuality, all the distinctive form, quality, character, of the lower tribes, — all, in short, that makes them absolutely *to be*, irrespective of their phenomenal and fleeting consciousness of existence, — refers itself to man, is but an appanage of his intelligence, and never to be cognized as existing apart from his intelligence. But now one thing more remains for us to do. This is to show how Nature, being thus regarded as an appanage of man, as involved in his comprehensive personality, does nevertheless distinctly *evolve* him, distinctly decline the honor both of his origin and his destiny. For this is her sole philosophic interest and justification, that she evolves Man, just as the marble evolves the statue or the mother the child, and has consequently no power to involve — which would be to defeat — that result. The marble says in effect: The being of the statue, its ideal form or quality, its characteristic individuality, all that makes it statue, in fact, and not mere stone, is not in me, but in the genius of the artist that conceives it. The mother says in effect: The being of the child, its moral form or quality, all that makes it man, in short, and not animal, is not in me, but in the father who begets it. So Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, says in effect: The being of man is not in me, but in something whereof I have no intelligence. On the contrary, her being is confessedly involved in his, as the cloth is involved in the coat, the trunk in the branches, the branches in the leaves, the leaves in the fruit; and has no more ability accordingly to determine the issue, than the material upon which we work has power to determine the æsthetic issues we propose. It is true that any given piece of marble may prove refractory to the statuary's skill, or any given marriage prove unfruitful, just as any given man may drown his moral faculty in animal delights.* But the general truth of the proposition is, nevertheless, incontestable, that the material element, both in art and nature, is bound to the service of the formal one; and that Nature herself analogically in man's evolution, and however it may fare with this or that exceptional man, occupies a rigidly servile or secondary position, while the creative Spirit shapes it to what issues he will.

How, then, does Nature evolve man? This is the question we are bound to answer to the reader's entire satisfaction, or else fail of the purpose with which we set out. Let us begin at once by frankly avowing that it will be quite impossible to do this, unless we can first establish a normal and complete distinction between man and all lower forms of existence, — unless we can prove, in other words, that human nature, instead of being the development which it is loosely supposed to be of all lower natures, is in truth their decisive arrest and confutation. For our logical purpose is to obviate the cavils which a superstitious faith and a sceptical science urge against the truth of a spiritual creation, and which they both alike base upon the illusoriness of Nature, by resolving Nature itself into man. And if, therefore, it can be legitimately replied to us, that man himself is a veritable child of Nature, a normal development of mineral, vegetable, and animal, our labor, of course, ends in naught. We base the spiritual creation upon man, who is a conscious subject of Nature. If, then, Nature be illusory in its human form of administration, as well as in its mineral, vegetable, and animal forms, why then undoubtedly human nature claims only a phenomenal truth, and affords no real basis to the spiritual creation. We might, indeed, evade the difficulty by resorting to the feeble quibble in vogue among disingenuous theologians, who sometimes pretend that man, being a moral existence, is so far not a natural one. But this pretension is a sheer insult to Science, which declares morality to be just as real, though not so palpable, a form of natural existence as either gravitation in the mineral, sensibility in the vegetable, or volition in the animal. Morality is the express badge of human *nature*, properly speaking; i. e. of what distinguishes man generically or as man, and not specifically as Paul, John, Peter. We have no right, consequently, to make morality a supernatural qualification in its subject, nor shall we have recourse to any such violent subterfuge. We frankly admit, nay we insist, that morality furnishes that common bond of identity between one man and every other which constitutes just what we call human *nature*. And what we maintain is, that this nature itself, in place of its being an orderly progress or development of lower natures, is, on the contrary, their decisive and eternal *arrest*. And now to make this clear.

The peculiarity of every lower form of Nature, mineral, vegetable, and animal, is that its generic element, or what gives it community of substance with other existence, is primary or commanding, while its specific element, or what gives it formal diversity from other existence, is secondary and subservient: so that, however distinguished or individualized any specific mineral, vegetable, or animal may be, the distinction is wholly congenital, inferring no inward consciousness in its subject's bosom responsive to the outward fact, and confessing itself, therefore, a purely natural phenomenon. Throughout the entire realm of Nature, including man himself *so far as his physical attributes go*, the specific or distinctively individual force always puts on more or less generic or common form; and it is only in moral existence that absolute individuality is reached, or the formal, feminine, spiritual element in existence confesses itself one and equal with the substantial, masculine, natural element. Unless, therefore, man supervened upon mineral, vegetable, and animal, the generic element, becoming ever more and more domineering as it proceeds from lower to higher existences, would end by organizing some gigantic forms of animation adequate to its own overwhelming might; such as are only faintly shadowed by the monstrous birds, beasts, and reptiles which desolated the earth previous to man's advent, and whose fossil remains we shudder over in our scientific museums.

Moral existence, and that alone, arrests this downward tendency of Nature. How? Simply by equilibrating in itself the two forces of Nature, genus and species, race-force and family-force, force of universality and force of individuality. In man, viewed morally, the hitherto oppressed or overborne specific element becomes released from the clutch of the hitherto dominant generic force,—becomes lifted out of its previous abasement, and put on a footing of equality with its master; his distinctively moral consciousness being contingent upon his ability to appropriate to himself individually, or make his own, the good and evil which in truth pertain to him only as a partaker of human nature, only as associated with all other men. The animal may be beautiful or powerful or vivacious as compared with other animals, or it may be ugly, feeble, and torpid; yet it has no interior or individual consciousness of the fact as man has, does not grow elated or depressed thereupon, but betrays an utter unconsciousness alike of its good and its evil fortune. The manifest reason is, that the relation between his specific form and universal Nature is not a conjugal one, implying the essential equality of the parties to it, but a relation at most of chance concubinage, in which one party is tyrant and the other slave.

With man the case is wholly otherwise. In him genus and species, substance and form, nature and spirit, body and soul, are perfectly mated and married beyond all chance of divorce, so that every man who has come to manhood or moral consciousness claims an individual property in all the motions of his nature. If he compare favorably in outward respects with his fellow-men, he cannot help being inwardly enamored of himself; if unfavorably, he cannot help being dejected and unhappy. If his natural temperament be harsh, passionate, revengeful, and express itself in corresponding actions, or if his intellect be of a subtle, sinuous quality, inclining him to concealment, intrigue, or diplomacy, he feels himself personally identified with the character, and exposed to whatever discredit it involves. And if he be of a gentle natural disposition, inclining him to conciliatory methods of action, he makes that inheritance his own personal possession, and would sadly forego the revenue of esteem it brings him. Now all this, we say, takes place with man only because a strictly conjugal tie — a tie of complete equality — obtains between the generic and specific elements of his consciousness; only because the Divinely-breathed Eve of his spirit is indissolubly married to the coarse Adam of his flesh, and brings forth fruit to him no longer passively or perforce, but with passionate love and desire.

Our readers now perceive the inextinguishable difference between human nature and all lower natures. Man is never directly, but only inversely, related to any of these forms. What we call nature in the mineral, vegetable, and animal, the generic principle, principle of kind or identity, becomes in man exquisitely individual or specific; so that the very nature of man, or what universally identifies him as man, is not any mere organic sameness, such as identifies the animals, but a wholly inorganic freedom. The natural principle, or principle of identity with him, is no longer animality, or passive subjection to his physical organization, but morality, or active insubjection to it, being the power of independent action. Nature, from being merely physical or instinctual in lower forms, becomes rational or moral in man; hence we may say that man's very nature, or what he has in common with all men, implies his uncompromising consciousness of individuality or difference from them. His most abject identification with his kind, or his natural humanity, consists in this, that he is inexpugnably himself, sole arbiter of his own actions, and rightfully subject to no extraneous power. As we have already and amply seen, Nature strictly speaking, and with reference to any and all given existence, limits itself to a constitutional function as giving material or common substance to things, and utterly disavows any creative efficacy as giving them also ideal or objective form. Now the logical *differentia* of man from all lower existences is, that even this natural constitution of his endows him with selfhood, or relates him negatively to God; so that without selfhood he would really not possess common or generic manhood, but remain forever mere tiger or sheep, mere serpent or dove.

Such is the wondrous transformation Nature undergoes in its human form of administration. No sooner does man appear upon the scene than this generic force, which in mineral, plant, and animal holds itself so aloof from the specific force, and coerces it at its own pleasure, hastens to make over to the latter all its substance, woos it, wins it, weds it, commits its happiness and guidance unmisgivingly to it; so that the word Nature in application to man loses the import it claims in reference to all other existence as utterly dominating the subject's individuality, and becomes itself a voucher of the intensest individuality. In every form of existence below the human, the generic element rules, or is absolute, while the specific element is utterly servile or subservient. The generic element is everything, in other words, and the specific nothing, save as an illustration of the other. In man, on the contrary, and exactly in so far as his human quality, which is his moral force, asserts itself, the specific element is everything, and the race element comparatively nothing. This is a marvellous difference, going to the length of demonstrating that human nature or moral existence, in place of being a development of animal nature or physical existence, is in fact its palpable inversion. Man is man in the most *generic* sense of the word even, not by virtue of his evincing the highest animal qualities, but by virtue simply of his evincing the intensest contrast to the animal type of existence. What is highest in the animal, namely, appetite or passion, is lowest in man. And what is highest, or alone distinctive in man, namely, spontaneous action, does not exist in the animal, or exists only in instinctual automatic form. In the lower forms of existence the specific principle, principle of individuality, is utterly overborne by that of universality, and no breath of moral life consequently diversifies their monotonous existence. To eat and sleep and propagate each his various kind, is the law of their being; and to attribute any selfhood or individuality to them, apart from these purely natural functions, is the height of sentimental folly.

Man, on the other hand, is all selfhood or individuality, so that when we find his physical nature overbearing or coercing his moral quality, we no longer call him man, but idiot.

The idiot is a very good animal man; indeed, his physical vigor, as a general thing, exceeds that of average manhood; but no one deems him a man, because he is destitute of the human quality which is moral force, force of selfhood, implying a perfect fusion or marriage between the constitutive elements of Nature, individuality and universality, or self and the neighbor. No matter how perfect the idiot's animal quality may be, the principle of individuality is even more dormant in him than it is in the animal proper, so that he is incapable even of obeying his own instincts or ministering to his own physical necessities. While in man, however puny or infirm his animal development may be, the individual force is so vivacious and free, so every way equal and adequate to the generic force, that the latter instinctively aspires to conciliate it, covets its possession, forsakes father and mother for it, cleaves to it as one flesh with itself, calls it wife and mother of all that truly lives.

In short, man is the Sabbath of Nature, because in human nature the specific force is not only every way equal to the generic force, but is indissolubly married or united with it, so that every man personally appropriates or makes his own, without any misgiving, whatever good or evil he naturally inherits. What is so strong and overpowering in all the lower forms of existence, nature, race-force, the communistic element, puts on in man specific form, becomes swallowed up in fact and reproduced in intensely personal or characteristic lineaments. Hence our feeling of responsibility, our sense of right and wrong, of truth and falsity, our recognition of law, our hope of reward, our fear of punishment. For if human nature thus resumes or presents in itself the unity and consummation of all lower natures, it becomes at once evident, not only that man is not a subject of Nature in any such sense as animal and plant are, but also that the very form of his nature turns it into a mere basis for a higher or spiritual manhood, for an inward individuality or character intensely opposite to his natural one, being made up of his relations to infinite goodness and truth.

Thus in man or moral existence Nature lets go her hold upon her nursling, discharges him of the long unconscious bondage he has been under to her appetites and passions as the supreme law of his activity, and puts him under law exclusively to himself, that is, hands him over to the admonition of an inward law, which is the law of conscience, the law of our spiritual life. Human nature — humanity as opposed to animality — means what all men possess in common; thus what distinguishes man as man, namely, selfhood or moral power, which is the power of rationally determining his own action. And this moral power in man, this natural selfhood or freedom which he enjoys, constituting him his own arbiter between good and evil, between true and false, implies, of course, an inward law or light telling him what good and evil, truth and falsity, respectively are, and so insuring all the possibilities of his spiritual destiny. And this law or light is what we call conscience, the law of our immortal conjunction with God, the light which illumines every man that comes into the world, and without which he is spiritually not a man.

How absurd, then, to talk of man as if he were developed out of lower natural forms! It is not a whit less absurd than it would be to talk of the statue as a development of the marble, or the picture as a development of the canvas and the paint which go to its phenomenal constitution. No, human nature is not the development, but the authoritative arrest, of all lower natures; and as the authority for such arrest plainly does not derive from man himself, or inhere in the human consciousness, we are not only free, but we feel ourselves forced, to attribute it to a Divine power in our nature. And if human nature itself can rightfully claim a Divine vivification and administration, it is not unreasonable to anticipate for every partaker of that nature, who livingly recognizes and reverences the divinity enshrined in it, an individual or spiritual expansion which shall ally him in immortal intimacy with God.

We have now, as we conceive, fairly made out our point, which was, that it was totally unphilosophic to attempt compassing a science of Nature without taking man as its starting-point rather than its fruit, and making universal Nature fall within, and not without, his majestic unity, as the furniture of a house falls within, and not without, its walls. No doubt a great deal of excellent scientific drudgery may be accomplished without any recourse being had to man. But every attempt to universalize Nature, or construct a purely scientific cosmogony, must confess itself a puerile imitation of the builders of Babel, and end in a clashing of systems no less fatal to true intelligence than that typical confusion of tongues. No one would lightly question the consciously devout temper of mind which is likely to urge every such attempt; but the attempt itself is in flagrant opposition to the philosophic spirit. For every one who pretends to argue from Nature directly up to God, must deliberately leave out Man, in whom alone the two terms meet and mutually embrace. He is like an engineer who should project a bridge from earth to heaven, or from anywhere to nowhere, without any intervening substance or middle ground of contact in which to sink his piles. The natural theologian who proposes to go from Nature *directly* up to God, ignores the while that, as Nature's descent from God takes place only through man, so any subsequent ascent to Him on her part will be practicable only through the same channel; and hence his labors always fail of engaging any popular enthusiasm. For it is impossible that man should ever find himself so lacking in self-respect as not to grow jocund over every cosmology, whose beggarly necessities compel it to profane his capital significance in making him the mere perfected tail-piece of creation, the all-accomplished progeny of a long line of illustrious mud-turtles and monkeys.

But our space presses, and however seductive our theme, and however much we leave unsaid, we must at once return to our beginnings, and apply the light we have gained to the adjustment of the relations between Faith and Science.

Science is doubtless the impassioned enemy of the supernatural, whenever that word is used to signify a Divine power exerted in opposition to the methods of Nature. This is the popular theologic sense of the word, to signify a Divine power exerted, not *through* Nature, which would be a spiritual power, but *upon* Nature or from without, and hence capable on occasion of arresting her processes and deranging her order. Science does not hesitate devoutly to denounce every such conception as puerile and fallacious. For it discerns such unmistakable marks of an infinite power exerted through the methods of Nature, as needs make it revolt at the notion of the same power exerting itself at the same time in contradictory methods. Science has no vocation, of course, to reconstruct our existing theologies and philosophies. But she has every right to insist that these latter, in their turn, shall learn to respect her domain, in ceasing to affirm an outward interference with Nature's order, of which Nature herself preserves no memorial. She declares it to be essential to her integrity, to her existence even, that all the phenomena of Nature and all the events of History be regarded as *inherent* in Nature and History, and not *adherent* as imposed by some outward power. And as self-preservation is the supreme law, no one can reasonably complain of Science making this demand. What, then, hinders Faith conceding thus much to her?

Nothing, we suspect, but a lingering naturalism, of which Faith herself had better every way be rid,—a naturalistic habit of thought which she inherits from the past, and which has no longer any congruity with the best life of the world. It cannot be doubted, we think, that supernaturalism as a dogma implies naturalism as a mental habit in those who zealously cherish it. The dogma originally rose as a check upon those naturalistic or materialist conceptions of the *summum bonum*, which belong to our spiritual or intellectual infancy, and which, if left unchecked, would consign us to permanent disorder and death. While our intellect is still immersed in sense, and we are incapable of any living or spiritual approximation to the Divine name, we must either soon outgrow all remembrance of that name, or else be permitted to acknowledge it in a form level to our sensuous perceptions. Our instinctive reverence forbids us to regard God as a denizen of Nature. It is in fact our own overpowering want of some adequate egress from her iron sway which makes us cleave with tenacious faith to a Divine existence transcending Nature, and capable of giving *us* also eventual extrication. Nature holds us by our moral endowments, our instinct of freedom or personality, in remorseless bondage to her will; and unless, therefore, some higher or interior law intervene to dispute her dominion and challenge our obedience, we should live and die as the animals do, without hope. She endows us *alone* with selfhood, or the sentiment of an individual power and responsibility commensurate with all the demands of our identity with our kind, — a power and responsibility of self-maintenance and self-government co-extensive with all the exactions of our social constitution; and hence she subjects us to an inward or spiritual disease and blight which the lilies of the field and the birds of the air are all unconscious of. By an indomitable instinct accordingly of our creative source, of the creative infinitude, we resent Nature's tyranny, or insist upon the existence of a power superior to hers, and capable of giving us, if not universal, at least individual, redemption from her doom; and religion accordingly assumes the form of an affirmation of such existence.

Now, manifestly, there are but two ways open to religion of postulating the Divine existence, — one characteristic of it in its living form of administration, the other in its ritual form; namely, *first*, as a *spiritual* power, giving an exclusively inward being to things, and *to that end alone* consecrating their outward form, or endowing them with self-consciousness; *secondly*, as a *supernatural* power, operating upon Nature from without, and moulding it to His will, as we mould our dependents to our will, by motives addressed to their hopes and fears. The former of these conceptions belongs obviously only to the perfected stature of the mind, and is impossible to us so long as the claims of a mere physical subsistence occupy and absorb the attention of the race. The second conception accordingly is the inevitable one; so that religion in the infancy of our mental development never means the ascription of properly spiritual attributes to God, but, at most, of supernatural ones. Having, then, this legitimate root in our mental necessities, the dogma of supernaturalism, as a sufficing theory of creation, will remain valid and unquestionable only so long as the demand for it keeps up; only so long, that is to say, as the mind is *contentedly* naturalistic. Whenever the disease abates which the dogma is intended to keep within bounds, the dogma itself will decline or fall into disuse, and not before. As soon as our mental conceptions from sensual become rational and spiritual, we shall unlearn our superstitious regard for Nature; and unlearning that, we shall discern God's literally creative presence and power in all the life of our senses, no less than in that of our souls.

But the mind *is* no longer contentedly naturalistic. Science itself is the irrefragable evidence of the fact; for it is doing its unconscious best all the while to spiritualize Nature, or discharge the mind of its chronic naturalism, by resolving all existence into a mode of motion, that is, converting it from a fixed to a purely functional quantity. Naturalism is the mental habit in which sense governs reason, and we infer, not as the spiritual man does, from within to without, or from reality to appearance, but contrariwise, from appearance to reality, or without to within; and so conclude that everything really is as finite as it seems. We may say that naturalism consists in our conceiving of being as essentially finite and unrelated; while to the spiritual understanding it is essentially infinite and one. Now Science, or our rational development, bridges over the interval between these opposite states of intelligence. It furnishes the transition between the sensuous and the spiritual judgments of the mind, by showing us the ratio or relationship which binds every form of existence to every other. It completely denies the judgment of sense, which declares all existence to be fixed or absolute, by proving everything fluid and relative to everything else; or, what is the same thing, by resolving universal Nature from a finite to an indefinite quantity, and so preparing the way for an ultimate recognition of infinite and finite, God and man, creator and creature, as indissolubly one. It is an inappreciable service which Science is thus rendering to Faith itself, if Faith itself were only cognizant of the boon, and did not dispose itself rather to deny and deride its reality. But the real or living Faith of the world is scarcely compromised by this infidelity on the part of its official representatives. However persistently the defenders of our various ritual systems may turn a deaf ear to the voice of Science, the common people are by no means indifferent to the hopes it inspires, but on the contrary gladly listen to it. They at least are no longer contentedly naturalistic, but are reverently striving to trace out and acknowledge the footsteps of Deity in every most familiar field of our secular experience.

The characteristic phenomenon of the era in which we live is the extraordinary activity of the social conscience, is the enhanced and indeed irresistible might accruing to the sentiment of human society, fellowship, equality. The sentiment presupposes an augmented sense of our proper or spiritual individuality on the one hand, and of our common or natural identity on the other; and is itself the perfect reconciliation or marriage of these hitherto warring elements. This social consciousness, it is important to observe, is no mere intellectual inspiration by any means confined to a few advanced thinkers here and there, but a living instinct of the popular heart. It is an outbirth of the advancing spiritual life of the world, and demands, therefore, a living Faith and a living Science to do it justice. Our present Faith and Science have to do, not with the life, but the memory. The one is fast anchored in the letter of revelation, and is wholly indifferent to the Divine spirit which animates that letter. The other is fast anchored in the facts of knowledge or observation, and is indifferent to the human truth which alone sanctifies and illumines those facts. Neither of these, consequently, furnishes an adequate vehicle to God's living or spiritual commerce with the soul. They are neither of them life, but only a preparatory discipline or education for it; so that when life itself appears they disappear, to be reproduced in superior vital form. It much behooves our existing Faith and Science, accordingly, to unlearn their idle jargoning, and betake themselves hand in hand to the new fountain of the water of life upspringing from the truth of our associated destiny. The intellect must otherwise altogether disown them in the interest of a Faith and Science which shall have no longer any time for mutual recrimination and slaughter, but shall be livingly and lovingly blent in the promotion of all order, peace, and innocence in every field of human action.

A living Faith and a living Science are of course impossible so long as we continue to view Nature in the light shed upon it by our prevalent devout and rationalistic habits of thought.*

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* According to our current theology we become cognizable to God only in so far as we become discharged, practically, of our natural identity, or what ties us to other men. According to our immature science we become cognizable to God only in so far as we become discharged of our spiritual individuality, or what differences us from our kind. Either of these pretensions, it hardly needs to be said, is pre-

Nature is in truth a purely logical quantity, having no *raison d'être* beyond the necessities of our rational subjectivity. The reason why we spiritually attribute ourselves to her, or regard her as having an absolute objectivity, is that we are without any living apprehension as yet of creative order, and are consequently unprepared to see in the various realms of sense, so overpowering to our untutored imagination, a purely subjective imagery and correspondence of the spiritual creation, a mere mute revelation of our objective or spiritual relations with God. If we could only know the highest truth intuitively, or without the mediation of a scientific experience, of course we should need no revelation upon the subject, any more than a ship requires a purchase upon the land to warp it out of its harbor, when the wind is fairly filling its sails. In that case, indeed, we should be spiritual animals, not men, realizing our spiritual destiny as the animal realizes natural existence; that is, without a fibre of personal concurrence or privity on our part. But the thing is impossible. Our intellect is of necessity for a long time in abject bondage to the senses; that is, takes for granted some *noumenal* reality called Nature, and answerable to the various phenomena our senses enfold; and hence it remains closed to the entrance of a spiritual idea. The fœtus is wholly unconscious of the moral force — force of selfhood — which shall yet emancipate it from the maternal bosom, and endow it with the freedom of a new world. Instincts — prophecies — of the coming event announce themselves in the restlessness it often betrays under the maternal bonds; but it is the mother alone who is conscious of them. It is the mere unconscious swelling of the bud preparatory to its blossoming, — the inflorescence necessary to its subsequent efflorescence, — and awakens no sensibility in the subject. So we, while our intellect is wholly unspiritualized, or still in abeyance to sense, have no adequate

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posterously untrue; and the Faith and Science of the future accordingly will insist upon such a rectification of prevalent modes of thought as shall show the Divine name alike bound up with the interests of our natural identity and those of our spiritual individuality; as will show it capable indeed of endowing us with the latter supreme gift, only because it was first able to endow us wtth the infinitely more adorable former one.

apprehension, nor any shrewd suspicion even, of the great social destiny to which we are providentially hastening, and which will eventually elevate us out of Nature's thraldom, by showing her to be at bottom our own unlimited servant. And all those fitful involuntary motions and signs by which meanwhile the truth solicits our philosophic recognition, motions and signs of disease, of vice and crime, of what we call misfortune even, make no impression upon our properly spiritual consciousness, but at most leave our moral sensibilities wounded and bleeding. We have no idea that such things have a unitary universal root, and hence we never dream of anything but the most partial and egotistic extrication from them. While this puerile and yet conceited state of the intellect lasts, Nature operates as a complete superstition upon the imagination, spiritually alienating us from God, and dwarfing our recognition of him to the dimensions, at most, of some literal symbols of his creative name. But these literal symbols themselves are only so many ultimate forms or expressions of the great unconscious personality of the race, providentially projected athwart our historic pathway with a view to educate the individual consciousness into harmony with universal principles, by stimulating and fixing its reverent worship. And they are consequently sure sooner or later, that is, after they shall have been sufficiently coerced and solicited, to collapse, and in so doing reveal to our very senses the ineffable Divine-and-Human substance with which this stupendous fiction called Nature has been all along spiritually charged.

Revelation, — the gradual induction of the created intelligence into the apprehension of spiritual existence, — such, we do not hesitate to affirm, is the only sufficing explication of the mystery and function of Nature. We are born, of course, in the densest ignorance and imbecility with respect to spiritual things, and owe our entire education to the majestic forms of truth garnered up in the experience of the race, and thence handed down to our reverent homage. Nature and history are obviously the only avenues of such experience. They alone reveal to man all that he can ever know of spiritual things prior to a living experience of them; and this knowledge at its highest is not life, but only the rude earth or mould, out of which life is eventually to flower. Nature accordingly has not the least right to control our thought, but only to aid or serve it; just as the boat does not control, but only aids or serves the voyager, whom it brings to his destined haven. We may, no doubt, infer from the lower to the higher, but have no right to *conclude*, under penalty of eventually closing the mind against spiritual verities. At best, Nature is but a subjective correspondence of eternal Truth, as realized by our infirm understanding; if, therefore, we mistake her for the objective Truth itself, as it exists to the Divine mind, we are in danger of shutting ourselves up spiritually in impenetrable night. The law of a rigid correspondence between natural and spiritual things is the only sane instrument of philosophic thought. The relation between Spirit and Nature is not one of continuity, but of the strictest correspondence, like that between a cause and its effect, or between a man's face and the image of that face in a glass; and palpably, therefore, the only witness we can expect, or indeed allow, from Nature to Spirit is a reflex, not a direct one. Nature answers to Spirit as body to soul, not as being a prolongation of it, but only its echo or repercussion, whereby whatsoever is spiritually highest becomes naturally lowest, and what is spiritually lowest is presented as naturally highest. It is a subtle, not a frank witness, telling the truth fully, but telling it after its own manner or law of inversion, whereby whatsoever is good and lovely in the original becomes evil and unlovely in the copy; that so the reciprocal integrity of the factors may be secure.

Revelation, viewed strictly, is a veiling over or obscuration of the essential Divine Truth, in order to accommodate it to the needs of our nascent intelligence. You would not uncover the eyes of a new-born babe to the light of the mid-day sun. It would be wanton cruelty to do so. But the eyes of our dawning spirituality are equally sensitive to the direct rays of the sun of truth. They would shrivel like a scroll in a furnace if exposed to its unclouded splendor, and absolutely exact, therefore, that it come tempered or diminished to our recognition through this dense mask of fallacious natural appearance, which may *negatively* induct us into its knowledge. We have, therefore, no right to look upon Nature as a direct manifestation of Divine Truth, which would be intolerable, but only as a mystical correspondence or revelation of it in accommodation to the needs of our sensuous understanding. It is not truth absolutely, but truth as it descends to creative manifestation, or submits to the coercion and imprisonment of the created consciousness. It is the truth shorn of its eternal lustre, dimmed to the needs of our phenomenal or passing subjectivity, taking upon it the burden of our sins and infirmities, consenting to appear in all points such as we are, that we, through its unparalleled humiliation unto death, may become exalted into the participation of its life. In short, it is a mirror, not of the direct creative effulgence, but only of that effulgence as necessarily clouded, distorted, and refracted through the medium of our dense carnality.

Let us make up our minds, then, that the good we derive from Nature is not positive or final, but simply educative or provisional. She constitutes us provisionally to our own perception by giving us seeming existence, *quasi* selfhood, and so renders us inwardly practicable to the Divine manipulation. But she confers no jot of true being upon us. She furnishes us the needful sphere of identity, — the solid ground of consciousness, — whereupon we forever separate ourselves from the infinite, in assigning ourselves finite proportions. But she gives us no most transient breath of spiritual life or individuality. She is indeed as utterly involved in us as substance is involved in form, body in soul, seeming in being; so conferring upon us that fixed or conscious subjectivity which forever projects or morally alienates us from God, only that we may thereby become spiritually conjoined with him, — that domestic or private selfhood, that home sanctity, which in actual or moral regards disjoins us with our kind, only that we may become in all real or social regards united with it. She is thus, as we have said before, neither creative nor created, neither properly Divine nor properly human; but all simply an indefinite neutral quantity, whose use is to insure us the amplest objective conjunction with God and our fellows, by first of all avouching our amplest subjective inequality or difference both with him and with them.

ART. III. — 1. *The Works of* JOHN C. CALHOUN. Edited by RICHARD K. CRALLÉ. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1856. 6 vols. 8vo.

2. *Thirty Years' View: or a History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from* 1820 *to* 1850; *chiefly taken from the Congress Debates, the Private Papers of General Jackson, and the Speeches of ex-Senator Benton, with his actual View of Men and Affairs. With Historical Notes and Illustrations, and some Notices of eminent deceased Cotemporaries.* By a Senator of Thirty Years. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1856. 2 vols. 8vo.

3. *Life of Andrew Jackson.* By JAMES PARTON. New York: Mason Brothers. 1860. 3 vols. 8vo.

4. *Retrospect of Northern Travel.* By HARRIET MARTINEAU. New York: Harper Brothers. 1838. 2 vols. 12mo.

THERE were two ways of getting to South Carolina in Colonial times. The first immigrants, many of whom were men of capital, landed at Charleston, and, settling in the fertile low country along the coast, became prosperous planters of rice, indigo, and corn, before a single white inhabitant had found his way to the more salubrious upper country in the western part of the Province. The settlers of the upper country were plain, poorer people, who landed at Philadelphia or Baltimore, and travelled southward along the base of the Alleghanies to the inviting table-lands of the Carolinas. In the lower country, the estates were large, the slaves numerous, the white inhabitants few, idle, and profuse. The upper country was peopled by a sturdier race, who possessed farms of moderate extent, hewn out of the wilderness by their own strong arms, and tilled by themselves with the aid of few slaves. Between the upper and the lower country there was a waste region of sandy hills and rocky acclivities, uninhabited, almost uninhabitable, which rendered the two sections of one Province separate communities scarcely known to one another. Down almost to the beginning of the Revolutionary war, the farmers of the upper country were not represented in the Legislature of South Carolina, though they were then as numerous as the planters of the lower country.

Between the people of the two sections there was little unity of feeling. The lordly planters of the lower country regarded their Western fellow-citizens as provincial or plebeian; the farmers of the upper country had some contempt for the planters as effeminate, aristocratic, and Tory. The Revolution abased the pride, lessened the wealth, and improved the politics of the planters; a revised Constitution, in 1790, gave preponderance to the up-country farmers in the popular branch of the Legislature; and thenceforth South Carolina was a sufficiently homogeneous commonwealth.

Looking merely to the public career of Calhoun, the special pleader of the Southern aristocracy, we should expect to find him born and reared among the planters of the low country. The Calhouns, on the contrary, were up-country people, — farmers, Whigs, Presbyterians, men of moderate means, who wielded the axe and held the plough with their own hands, until enabled to buy a few "new negroes," cheap and savage; called new, because fresh from Africa. A family party of them (parents, four sons, and a daughter) emigrated from the North of Ireland early in the last century, and settled first in Pennsylvania; then removed to Western Virginia; whence the defeat of Braddock, in 1755, drove them southward, and they found a permanent abode in the extreme west of South Carolina, then an unbroken wilderness. Of those four sons, Patrick Calhoun, the father of the Nullifier, was the youngest. He was six years old when the family left Ireland; twenty-nine, when they planted the "Calhoun Settlement" in Abbeville District, South Carolina.

Patrick Calhoun was a strong-headed, wrong-headed, very brave, honest, ignorant man. His whole life, almost, was a battle. When the Calhouns had been but five years in their forest home, the Cherokees attacked the settlement, destroyed it utterly, killed one half the men, and drove the rest to the lower country; whence they dared not return till the peace of 1763. Patrick Calhoun was elected to command the mounted rangers raised to protect the frontiers, a duty most heroically performed by him. After the peace, the settlement enjoyed thirteen or fourteen years of tranquillity, during which Patrick Calhoun was married to Martha Caldwell, a native of Virginia, but the daughter of an Irish Presbyterian emigrant. During this peaceful interval, all the family prospered with the settlement which bore its name; and Patrick, who in his childhood had only learned to read and write, availed himself of such leisure as he had to increase his knowledge. Besides reading the books within his reach, which were few, he learned to survey land, and practised that vocation to advantage. He was especially fond of reading history to gather new proofs of the soundness of his political opinions, which were Whig to the uttermost. The war of the Revolution broke in upon the settlement, at length, and made deadly havoc there; for it was warred upon by three foes at once, — the British, the Tories, and the Cherokees. The Tories murdered in cold blood a brother of Patrick Calhoun's wife. Another of her brothers fell at Cowpens under thirty sabre-wounds. Another was taken prisoner, and remained for nine months in close confinement at one of the British Andersonvilles of that day. Patrick Calhoun, in many a desperate encounter with the Indians, displayed singular coolness, courage, adroitness, and tenacity. On one memorable occasion, thirteen of his neighbors and himself maintained a forest fight for several hours with a force of Cherokees ten times their number. When seven of the white men had fallen, the rest made their escape. Returning three days after to bury their dead, they found upon the field the bodies of twenty-three Indian warriors. At another time, as his son used to relate, he had a very long combat with a chief noted for the certainty of his aim, — the Indian behind a tree, the white man behind a fallen log. Four times the wily Calhoun drew the Indian's fire by elevating his hat upon his ramrod. The chief, at last, could not refrain from looking to see the effect of his shot; when one of his shoulders was slightly exposed. On the instant, the white man's rifle sent a ball through it; the chief fled into the forest, and Patrick Calhoun bore off as a trophy of the fight his own hat pierced with four bullets.

This Patrick Calhoun illustrates well the North-of-Ireland character; one peculiarity of which is the possession of *will* disproportioned to intellect. Hence a man of this race frequently appears to striking advantage in scenes which demand chiefly an exercise of will; while in other spheres, which make larger demands upon the understanding, the same man may be simply mischievous. We see this in the case of Andrew Jackson, who at New Orleans was glorious; at Washington, almost wholly pernicious. For these Scotch-Irishmen, though they are usually very honest men, and often right in their opinions, are an uninstructable race, who stick to a prejudice as tenaciously as to a principle, and really suppose they are battling for right and truth, when they are only wreaking a private vengeance or aiming at a personal advantage. Patrick Calhoun was the most radical of Democrats; one of your despisers of conventionality; an enemy of lawyers, thinking the common sense of mankind competent to decide what is right without their aid; a particular opponent of the arrogant pretensions of the low-country aristocrats. When the up-country people began to claim a voice in the government, long since due to their numbers, the planters, of course, opposed their demand. To establish their right to vote, Patrick Calhoun and a party of his neighbors, armed with rifles, marched across the State to within twenty-three miles of Charleston, and there voted in defiance of the plantation lords. Events like this led to the admission of members from the up-country; and Patrick Calhoun was the first to represent that section in the Legislature. It was entirely characteristic of him to vote against the adoption of the Federal Constitution, on the ground that it authorized other people to tax Carolinians; which he said was taxaation without representation. That was just like a narrow, cranky, opinionative, unmanageable Calhoun.

Devoid of imagination and of humor, a hard-headed, eager politician, he brought up his boy upon politics. This was sorry nourishment for a child's mind, but he had little else to give him. Gambling, hunting, whiskey, and politics were all there was to relieve the monotony of life in a Southern back settlement; and the best men naturally threw themselves upon politics. Calhoun told Miss Martineau that he could remember standing between his father's knees, when he was only five years old, and listening to political conversation. He told Duff Green that he had a distinct recollection of hearing his father say, when he was only nine, that that government is best which allows to each individual the largest liberty compatible with order and tranquillity, and that improvements in political science consist in throwing off needless restraints. It was a strange child that could remember such a remark. As Patrick Calhoun died in 1795, when his son was thirteen years old, the boy must have been very young when he heard it, even if he were mistaken as to the time. Whether Patrick Calhoun ever touched upon the subject of slavery in his conversations with his children, is not reported. We only know that, late in the career of Mr. Calhoun, he used to be taunted by his opponents in South Carolina with having once held that slavery was good and justifiable only so far as it was preparatory to freedom. He was accused of having committed the crime of saying, in a public speech, that slavery was like the "scaffolding" of an edifice, which, after having served its temporary purpose, would be taken down, of course. We presume he said this; because *everything* in his later speeches is flatly contradicted in those of his earlier public life. Patrick Calhoun was a man to give a reason for everything. He was an habitual theorizer and generalizer, without possessing a hundredth part of the knowledge requisite for safe generalization. It is very probable that this apology for slavery was part of his son's slender inheritance.

John Caldwell Calhoun — born in 1782, the youngest but one in a family of five children — was eighteen years old before he had a thought of being anything but a farmer. His father had been dead five years. His only sister was married to that famous Mr. Waddell, clergyman and schoolmaster, whose academy in North Carolina was for so many years a great light in a dark place. One of his brothers was a clerk in a mercantile house at Charleston; another was settled on a farm near by; another was still a boy. His mother lived upon the paternal farm; and with her lived her son John, who ploughed, hunted, fished, and rode, in the manner of the farmers' sons in that country. At eighteen he could read, write, and cipher; he had read Rollin, Robertson, Voltaire's Charles XII., Brown's Essays, Captain Cook, and parts of Locke. This, according to his own account, was the sum of his knowledge, except that he had fully imbibed his father's decided republican opinions.

He shared to some degree his father's prejudice, and the general prejudice of the upper country, against lawyers; although a cousin, John Ewing Calhoun, had risen high in that profession, had long served in the Legislature of South Carolina, and was about to be elected United States Senator on the Jeffersonian side. As late as May, 1800, when he was past eighteen, preference and necessity appeared to fix him in the vocation of farmer. The family had never been rich. Indeed, the great Nullifier himself was a comparatively poor man all his life, the number of his slaves never much exceeding thirty; which is equivalent to a working force of fifteen hands or less.

In May, 1800, Calhoun's elder brother came home from Charleston to spend the summer, bringing with him his city notions. He awoke the dormant ambition of the youth, urged him to go to school and become a professional man. But how could he leave his mother alone on the farm? and how could the money be raised to pay for a seven years' education? His mother and his brother conferred upon these points, and satisfied him upon both; and in June, 1800, he made his way to the academy of his brother-in-law, Waddell, which was then in Columbia County, Georgia, fifty miles from the home of the Calhouns. In two years and a quarter from the day he first opened a Latin grammar, he entered the Junior Class of Yale College. This was quick work. Teachers, however, are aware that late beginners, who have spent their boyhood in *growing*, often stride past students who have passed theirs in stunting the growth of mind and body at school. Calhoun, late in life, often spoke of the immense advantage which Southern boys had over Northern in not going so early to school, and being so much on horseback and out of doors. He said one day, about the year 1845: "At the North you overvalue intellect; at the South we rely upon character; and if ever there should be a collision that shall test the strength of the two sections, you will find that character is stronger than intellect, and will carry the day." The prophecy has been fulfilled.

Timothy Dwight, Calvinist and Federalist, was President of Yale College during Calhoun's residence there, and Thomas Jefferson, Democrat and freethinker, was President of the United States. Yale was a stronghold of Federalism. A brother of the President of the College, in his Fourth-of-July oration delivered at New Haven four months after the inauguration of Jefferson and Burr, announced to the students and citizens, that " the great object " of those gentlemen and their adherents was " to destroy every trace of civilization in the world, and to force mankind back into a savage state." He also used the following language : " We have now reached the consummation of democratic blessedness. We have a country governed by blockheads and knaves ; the ties of marriage, with all its felicities, are severed and destroyed ; our wives and daughters are thrown into the stews ; our children are cast into the world from the breast forgotten ; filial piety is extinguished ; and our surnames, the only mark of distinction among families, are abolished. Can the imagination paint anything more dreadful this side hell ?" These remarkable statements, so far from surprising the virtuous people of New Haven, were accepted by them, it appears, as facts, and published with general approval. From what we know of President Dwight, we may conclude that he would regard his brother's oration as a pardonable flight of hyperbole, based on truth. He was a Federalist of the deepest dye.

Transferred to a scene where such opinions prevailed, it cost the young republican no great exertion either of his intellect or his firmness or his family pride to hold his ground. Of all known men, he had the most complete confidence in the infallibility of his own mind. He used to relate, that in the Senior year, when he was one of very few in a class of seventy who maintained republican opinions, President Dwight asked him, " What is the legitimate source of power ?" " The people," answered the student. Dr. Dwight combated this opinion ; Calhoun replied ; and the whole hour of recitation was consumed in the debate. Dr. Dwight was so much struck with the ability displayed by the student, that he remarked to a friend that Calhoun had talent enough to be President of the United States, and that we should see him President in due time. In those innocent days, an observation of that nature was made of every young fellow who showed a little spirit and a turn for debate. Fathers did not *then* say to their promising offspring, Beware, my son, of self-seeking and shallow speaking, lest you should be consigned to the White House, and be devoured by office-seekers. People then regarded the Presidency as a kind of reward of merit, the first step toward which was to get "up head" in the spelling-class. There is reason to believe that young Calhoun took the prediction of the Doctor very seriously. He took everything seriously. He never made a joke in his life. He was totally destitute of the sense of humor. It is doubtful if he was ever capable of unbending so far as to play a game of football.

The ardent political discussions then in vogue had one effect which the late Mr. Buckle would have pronounced most salutary; they prevented Dr. Dwight's severe theology from taking hold of the minds of many students. Calhoun wholly escaped it. In his speeches we find, of course, the stock allusions of a religious nature with which all politicians essay to flatter their constituents; but he was never interested in matters theological. A century earlier, he might have been the Jonathan Edwards of the South, if there had been a South then. His was just the mind to have revelled in theological subtilties, and to have calmly, closely, unrelentingly argued nearly the whole human race into endless and hopeless perdition. His was just the nature to have contemplated his argument with complacency, and its consequences without emotion.

Graduating with credit in 1804, he repaired to the famous Law School at Litchfield in Connecticut, where he remained a year and a half, and won general esteem. Tradition reports him a diligent student and an admirable debater there. As to his moral conduct, that was always irreproachable. That is to say, he was at every period of his life continent, temperate, orderly, and out of debt. In 1806, being then twenty-four years of age, he returned to South Carolina, and, after studying a short time in a law-office at Charleston, he went at last to his native Abbeville to complete his preparation for the bar. He was still a law student at that place when the event occurred which called him into public life.

June 22d, 1807, at noon, the United States frigate Chesapeake, thirty-eight guns, left her anchorage at Hampton Roads, and put to sea, bound for the Mediterranean. The United States being at peace with all the world, the Chesapeake was very far from being in proper man-of-war trim. Her decks were littered with furniture, baggage, stores, cables, and animals. The guns were loaded, but rammers, matches, wadding, cannon-balls, were all out of place, and not immediately accessible. The crew were merchant sailors and landsmen, all undrilled in the duties peculiar to an armed ship. There had been lying for some time at the same anchorage the British frigate Leopard, fifty guns; and this ship also put to sea at noon of the same day. The Leopard being in perfect order, and manned by a veteran crew, took the lead of the Chesapeake, and kept it until three in the afternoon, when she was a mile in advance. Then she wore round, came within speaking distance, lowered a boat, and sent a lieutenant on board the American ship. This officer bore a despatch from the admiral of the station, ordering any captain who should fall in with the Chesapeake to search her for deserters. The American commander replied that he knew of no deserters on board his ship, and could not permit a search to be made, his orders not authorizing the same. The lieutenant returned. As soon as he had got on board, and his boat was stowed away, the Leopard fired a full broadside into the American frigate. The American commodore, being totally unprepared for such an event, could not return the fire; and therefore, when his ship had received twenty-one shot in her hull, when her rigging was much cut up, when three of her crew were killed and eighteen wounded, the commodore himself among the latter, he had no choice but to lower his flag. Then the search was made, and four men, claimed as deserters, were taken; after which the Leopard continued her course, and the crippled Chesapeake returned to Hampton Roads. The American commander was sentenced by a court-martial to five years' suspension for going to sea in such a condition. The English government recalled the admiral who ordered, and deprived of his ship the captain who committed, this unparalleled outrage, but made no other reparation.

No words of ours could convey any adequate idea of the rage which this event excited in the people of the United States. For a time, the Federalists themselves were ready for war. There were meetings everywhere to denounce it, and especially in the Southern States, always more disposed than the Northern to begin the shedding of blood, and already the main reliance of the Republican party. Remote and rustic Abbeville, a very Republican district, was not silent on this occasion ; and who so proper to draw and support the denunciatory resolutions as young Calhoun, the son of valiant Patrick, fresh from college, though now in his twenty-sixth year ? The student performed this duty, as requested, and spoke so well that his neighbors at once concluded that he was the very man, lawyer as he was, to represent them in the Legislature, where for nearly thirty years his father had served them. At the next election, in a district noted for its aversion to lawyers, wherein no lawyer had ever been chosen to the Legislature, though many had been candidates, he was elected at the head of his ticket. His triumph was doubtless owing in a great degree to the paramount influence of his family. Still, even we, who knew him only in his gaunt and sad decline, can easily imagine that at twenty-six he must have been an engaging, attractive man. Like most of his race, he was rather slender, but very erect, with a good deal of dignity and some grace in his carriage and demeanor. His eyes were always remarkably fine and brilliant. He had a well-developed and strongly set nose, cheek-bones high, and cheeks rather sunken. His mouth was large, and could never have been a comely feature. His early portraits show his hair erect on his forehead, as we all remember it, unlike Jackson, whose hair at forty still fell low over his forehead. His voice could never have been melodious, but it was always powerful. At every period of his life, his manners, when in company with his inferiors in age or standing, were extremely agreeable, even fascinating. We have heard a well-known editor, who began life as a " page " in the Senate-chamber, say that there was no Senator whom the pages took such delight in serving as Mr. Calhoun. " Why ? " — " Because he was so democratic." — " How democratic ? " — " He was as polite to a page as to the President of the Senate, and as considerate of his feelings." We have heard another member of the press, whose first employment was to report the speeches of Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, bear similar testimony to the frank, engaging courtesy of his intercourse with the corps of reporters.

It is fair, therefore, to conclude that his early popularity at home was due as much to his character and manners as to his father's name and the influence of his relatives.

He served two years in the Legislature, and in the intervals between the sessions practised law at Abbeville. At once he took a leading position in the Legislature. He had been in his seat but a few days when the Republican members, as the custom then was, met in caucus to nominate a President and Vice-President of the United States. For Mr. Madison the caucus was unanimous, but there was a difference with regard to the Vice-Presidency, then filled by the aged George Clinton of New York, who represented the anti-Virginian wing of the party in power. Mr. Calhoun, in a set speech, opposed the re-nomination of Governor Clinton, on the ground that in the imminency of a war with England the Republican party ought to present an unbroken front. He suggested the nomination of John Langdon of New Hampshire for the second office. At this late day we cannot determine whether this suggestion was original with Mr. Calhoun. We only know that the caucus affirmed it, and that the nomination was afterwards tendered to Mr. Langdon by the Republican party, and declined by him. Mr. Calhoun's speech on this occasion was the expression of Southern opinions as to the foreign policy of the country. The South was then nearly ready for war with England, while Northern Republicans still favored Mr. Jefferson's non-intercourse policy. In this instance, as in so many others, we find the Slave States, which used to plume themselves upon being the conservative element in an else unrestrainable democracy, ready for war first, though far from being the worst sufferers from England's piracies. We should have had *no* war from 1782 to 1865, but for them. We also find Mr. Calhoun, in this his first utterance as a public man, the mouth-piece of his "section." He has been styled the most inconsistent of our statesmen; but beneath the palpable contradictions of his speeches, there is to be noticed a deeper consistency. Whatever opinion, whatever policy, he may have advocated, he always spoke the sense of what Mr. Sumner used to call the Southern oligarchy. If *it* changed, *he* changed. If he appeared sometimes to lead it, it was by bending it in the direction in which it wanted to go. He was doubtless as sincere in this as any great special pleader is in a cause in which all his powers are enlisted. Calhoun's mind was narrow and provincial. He could not have been the citizen of a large place. As a statesman he was naturally the advocate of something special and sectional, something not the whole.

Distinguished in the Legislature, he was elected, late in 1810, by a very great majority, to represent his district in Congress. In May, 1811, he was married to a second-cousin, Floride Calhoun, who brought a considerable accession to his slender estate. November 4th, 1811, he took his seat in the House of Representatives. Thus, at the early age of twenty-nine, he was fairly launched into public life, with the advantage, usually enjoyed then by Southern members, of being independent in his circumstances. Though unknown to the country, his fame had preceded him to Washington; and the Speaker, Mr. Clay, gave him a place on the Committee on Foreign Relations. This Committee, considering that Congress had been summoned a month earlier than usual for the express purpose of dealing with foreign relations, was at once the most important and the most conspicuous committee of the House.

Mr. Calhoun's first session gave him national reputation, and made him a leader of the war party in Congress. We could perhaps say *the* leader, since Mr. Clay was not upon the floor. After surveying the novel scene around him for six weeks, he delivered his maiden speech, — a plain, forcible, not extraordinary argument in favor of preparing for war. It was prodigiously successful, so far as the reputation of the speaker was concerned. Members gathered round to congratulate the young orator; and Father Ritchie (if he was a father then) "hailed this young Carolinian as one of the master spirits who stamp their names upon the age in which they live." This speech contains one passage which savors of the "chivalric" taint, and indicates the provincial mind. In replying to the objection founded on the expenses of a war, he said: "I enter my solemn protest against this low and 'calculating avarice' entering this hall of legislation. It is *only fit for shops and counting-houses*, and ought not to disgrace the seat of power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches sovereign power, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is a compromising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation. Sovereign power is never safe but under the shield of honor." This was thought very fine talk in those simple days among the simple Southern country members.

As the session progressed, Mr. Calhoun spoke frequently, and with greater effect. Wisely he never spoke. In his best efforts we see that something which we know not what to name, unless we call it *Southernism.* If it were allowable to use in this dignified periodical a slang expression, we should style the passages to which we refer effective bosh. The most telling passage in the most telling speech which he delivered at this session may serve to illustrate our meaning. Imagine these short, vigorous sentences uttered with great rapidity, in a loud, harsh voice, and with energy the most intense: —

> "Tie down a hero, and he feels the puncture of a pin: throw him into battle, and he is almost insensible to vital gashes. So in war. Impelled alternately by hope and fear, stimulated by revenge, depressed by shame, or elevated by victory, the people become invincible. No privation can shake their fortitude; no calamity break their spirit. Even when equally successful, the contrast between the two systems is striking. War and restriction may leave the country equally exhausted; but the latter not only leaves you poor, but, even when successful, dispirited, divided, discontented, with diminished patriotism, and the morals of a considerable portion of your people corrupted. Not so in war. In that state, the common danger unites all, strengthens the bonds of society, and feeds the flame of patriotism. The national character mounts to energy. In exchange for the expenses and privations of war, you obtain military and naval skill, and a more perfect organization of such parts of your administration as are connected with the science of national defence. Sir, are these advantages to be counted as trifles in the present state of the world? Can they be measured by moneyed valuation? I would prefer a single victory over the enemy, by sea or land, to all the good we shall ever derive from the continuation of the Non-importation Act. I know not that a victory would produce an equal pressure on the enemy; but I am certain of what is of greater consequence, it would be accompanied by more salutary effects to ourselves. The memory of Saratoga, Prince-

ton, and Eutaw is immortal. It is there you will find the country's boast and pride, — the inexhaustible source of great and heroic sentiments. But what will history say of restriction? What examples worthy of imitation will it furnish to posterity? What pride, what pleasure, will our children find in the events of such times? Let me not be considered romantic. This nation ought to be taught to rely on its courage, its fortitude, its skill and virtue, for protection. These are the only safeguards in the hour of danger. Man was endued with these great qualities for his defence. There is nothing about him that indicates that he is to conquer by endurance. He is not incrusted in a shell; he is not taught to rely upon his insensibility, his passive suffering, for defence. No, sir; it is on the invincible mind, on a magnanimous nature, he ought to rely. Here is the superiority of our kind; it is these that render man the lord of the world. Nations rise above nations, as they are endued in a greater degree with these brilliant qualities."

This passage is perfectly characteristic of Calhoun, whose speeches present hundreds of such inextricable blendings of truth and falsehood.

We have the written testimony of an honorable man, still living, Commodore Charles Stewart, U. S. N., that John C. Calhoun was a conscious traitor to the Union as early as 1812. In December of that year, Captain Stewart's ship, the Constitution, was refitting at the Washington Navy Yard, and the Captain was boarding at Mrs. Bushby's, with Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, and many other Republican members. Conversing one evening with the new member from South Carolina, he told him that he was "puzzled" to account for the close alliance which existed between the Southern planters and the Northern Democracy.

"You," said Captain Stewart, "in the South and Southwest, are decidedly the aristocratic portion of this Union; you are so in holding persons in perpetuity in slavery; you are so in every domestic quality, so in every habit in your lives, living, and actions, so in habits, customs, intercourse, and manners; you neither work with your hands, heads, nor any machinery, but live and have your living, not in accordance with the will of your Creator, but by the sweat of slavery, and yet you assume all the attributes, professions, and advantages of democracy."

Mr. Calhoun, aged thirty, replied thus to Captain Stewart, aged thirty-four: —

"I see you speak through the head of a young statesman, and from the heart of a patriot, but you lose sight of the politician and the sectional policy of the people. I admit your conclusions in respect to us Southrons. That we are essentially aristocratic, I cannot deny; but we can and do yield much to democracy. This is our sectional policy; we are from necessity thrown upon and solemnly wedded to that party, however it may occasionally clash with our feelings, for the conservation of our interests. It is through our affiliation with that party in the Middle and Western States that we hold power; but when we cease thus to control this nation through a disjointed democracy, or any material obstacle in that party which shall tend to throw us out of that rule and control, we shall then resort to the dissolution of the Union. The compromises in the Constitution, under the circumstances, were sufficient for our fathers, but, under the altered condition of our country from that period, leave to the South no resource but dissolution; for no amendments to the Constitution could be reached through a convention of the people under their three-fourths rule."

Probably all of our readers have seen this conversation in print before. But it is well for us to consider it again and again. It is the key to all the seeming inconsistencies of Mr. Calhoun's career. He came up to Congress, and took the oath to support the Constitution, secretly resolved to break up the country just as soon as the Southern planters ceased to control it for the maintenance of their peculiar interest. The reader will note, too, the distinction made by this young man, who was never youthful, between the "statesman" and the "politician," and between the "heart of a patriot" and "the sectional policy of the people."

Turning from this loathsome and despicable exposition to the Congressional career of Mr. Calhoun, we find no indication there of the latent traitor. He was merely a very active, energetic member of the Republican party; supporting the war by assiduous labors in committee, and by intense declamation of the kind of which we have given a specimen. In all his speeches there is not a touch of greatness. He declared that Demosthenes was his model, — an orator who was a master of all the arts, all the artifices, and all the tricks by which a mass of ignorant and turbulent hearers can be kept attentive, but who has nothing to impart to a member of Congress who honestly desires to convince his equals. Mr. Calhoun's harangues in the supposed Demosthenean style gave him, however, great reputation out of doors, while his diligence, his dignified and courteous manners, gained him warm admirers on the floor. He was a messmate of Mr. Clay at this time. Besides agreeing in politics, they were on terms of cordial personal intimacy. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House, was but five years older than Calhoun, and in everything but years much younger. Honest patriots pointed to these young men with pride and hope, congratulating each other that, though the Revolutionary statesmen were growing old and passing away, the high places of the Republic would be filled, in due time, by men worthy to succeed them.

When the war was over, a strange thing was to be noted in the politics of the United States: the Federal party was dead, but the Republican party had adopted its opinions. The disasters of the war had convinced almost every man of the necessity of investing the government with the power to wield the resources of the country more readily; and, accordingly, we find leading Republicans, like Judge Story, John Quincy Adams, and Mr. Clay, favoring the measures which had formerly been the special rallying-cries of the Federalists. Judge Story spoke the feeling of his party when he wrote, in 1815: "Let us extend the national authority over the whole extent of power given by the Constitution. Let us have great military and naval schools, an adequate regular army, the broad foundations laid of a permanent navy, a national bank, a national bankrupt act," etc., etc. The strict-constructionists were almost silenced in the general cry, "Let us be a Nation." In the support of *all* the measures to which this feeling gave rise, especially the national bank, internal improvements, and a protective tariff, Mr. Calhoun went as far as any man, and farther than most; for such at that time was the humor of the planters.

To the principle of a protective tariff he was peculiarly committed. It had not been his intention to take part in the debates on the Tariff Bill of 1816. On the 6th of April, while he was busy writing in a committee-room, Mr. Samuel D. Ingham of Pennsylvania, his particular friend and political ally, came to him and said that the House had fallen into some confusion while discussing the tariff bill, and added, that, as it was "difficult to rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill," he wished Mr. Calhoun would speak on the question in order to keep the House together. "What can I say?" replied the member from South Carolina. Mr. Ingham, however, persisted, and Mr. Calhoun addressed the House. An amendment had just been introduced to leave cotton goods unprotected, a proposition which had been urged on the ground that Congress had no authority to impose any duty except for revenue. On rising to speak, Mr. Calhoun at once, and most unequivocally, committed himself to the protective principle. He began by saying, that, *if the right to protect had not been called in question, he would not have spoken at all.* It was solely to assist in establishing *that* right that he had been induced, without previous preparation, to take part in the debate. He then proceeded to deliver an ordinary protectionist speech; without, however, entering upon the question of constitutional right. He merely dwelt upon the great benefits to be derived from affording to our infant manufactures "immediate and ample protection." That the Constitution interposed no obstacle, was assumed by him throughout. He concluded by observing, that a flourishing manufacturing interest would "bind together more closely our widely-spread republic," since "it will greatly increase our mutual dependence and intercourse, and excite an increased attention to internal improvements, — a subject every way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment of national strength and the perfection of our political institutions." He further observed, that "the liberty and union of this country are inseparable," and that the destruction of either would involve the destruction of the other. He concluded his speech with these words: "Disunion, — this single word comprehends almost the sum of our political dangers, and against it we ought to be perpetually guarded."

The time has passed for any public man to claim credit for "consistency." A person who, after forty years of public life, can truly say that he has never changed an opinion, must be either a demigod or a fool. We do not blame Mr. Calhoun for ceasing to be a protectionist and becoming a free-trader; for half the thinking world has changed sides on that question during the last thirty years. A growing mind must necessarily change its opinions. But there *is* a consistency from which no man, public or private, can ever be absolved, — the consistency of his statements with fact. In the year 1833, in his speech on the Force Bill, Mr. Calhoun referred to his tariff speech of 1826 in a manner which excludes him from the ranks of men of honor. He had the astonishing audacity to say: "I am constrained in candor to acknowledge, for I wish to disguise nothing, that the protective principle was recognized by the Act of 1826. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. *It escaped my observation*, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject." The charitable reader may interpose here, and say that Mr. Calhoun may have forgotten his speech of 1816. Alas! no. He had that speech before him at the time. Vigilant opponents had unearthed it, and kindly presented a copy to the author. We do not believe that, in all the debates of the American Congress, there is another instance of flat falsehood as bad as this. It happens that the speech of 1816 and that of 1833 are both published in the same volume of the Works of Mr. Calhoun (Vol. II. pp. 163 and 197). We advise our readers who have the time and opportunity to read both, if they wish to see how a false position necessitates a false tongue. Those who take our advice will also discover why it was that Mr. Calhoun dared to utter such an impudent falsehood: his speeches are such appallingly dull reading, that there was very little risk of a busy people's comparing the interpretation with the text.

It was John C. Calhoun who, later in the same session, introduced the bill for setting apart the dividends and bonus of the United States Bank as a permanent fund for internal improvements. His speech on this bill, besides going all lengths in favor of the internal improvement system, presents some amusing contrasts with his later speeches on the same subject. His hearers of 1835 to 1850 must have smiled on reading in the speech of 1817 such sentences as these: —

> "I am no advocate for *refined arguments* on the Constitution. The instrument was not intended as a thesis for the logician to exercise his

ingenuity on. It ought to be construed with plain good-sense." "If we are restricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers, on what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?" "The uniform sense of Congress and the country furnishes better evidence of the true interpretation of the Constitution than the most refined and subtle arguments."

Mark this, too: —

"In a country so extensive and so various in its interests, what is necessary for the common interest may apparently be opposed to the interest of particular sections. *It must be submitted to as the condition of our greatness.*"

Well might he say, in the same speech: —

"We may reasonably raise our eyes to a most splendid future, if we only act in a manner worthy of our advantages. If, however, neglecting them, we permit a low, sordid, selfish, *sectional* spirit to take possession of this House, this happy scene will vanish. We will divide; and, in its consequences, will follow misery and despotism."

With this speech before him and before the country, Mr. Calhoun had not the candor to avow, in later years, a complete change of opinion. He could only go so far as to say, when opposing the purchase of the Madison Papers in 1837, that, "at his entrance upon public life, he had *inclined* to that interpretation of the Constitution which favored a latitude of powers." Inclined! He was a most enthusiastic and thorough-going champion of that interpretation. His scheme of internal improvements embraced a network of post-roads and canals from "Maine to Louisiana," and a system of harbors for lake and ocean. He kindled, he glowed, at the spectacle which his imagination conjured up, of the whole country rendered accessible, and of the distant farmer selling his produce at a price not seriously less than that which it brought on the coast. On this subject he became animated, interesting, almost eloquent. And, so far from this advocacy being confined to the period of his "entrance upon political life," he continued to be its very warmest exponent as late as 1819, when he had been ten years in public life. In that year, having to report upon the condition of military roads and fortifications, his flaming zeal for a grand and general system of roads and canals frequently bursts the bounds of the subject he had to treat. He tells Congress that the internal improvements which are best for peace are best for war also; and expatiates again upon his dazzling dream of "connecting Louisiana by a durable and well-finished road with Maine, and Boston with Savannah by a well-established line of internal navigation." The United States, he said, with its vast systems of lakes, rivers, and mountains, its treble line of sea-coast, its valleys large enough for empires, was "a world of itself," and needed nothing but to be rendered accessible. From what we know of the way things are managed in Congress, we should guess that he was invited to make this report for the very purpose of affording to the foremost champion of internal improvements an opportunity of lending a helping hand to pending bills.

Mr. Calhoun served six years in the House of Representatives, and grew in the esteem of Congress and the country at every session. As it is pleasing to see an old man at the theatre entering into the merriment of the play, since it shows that his heart has triumphed over the cares of life, and he has preserved a little of his youth, so is it eminently graceful in a young man to have something of the seriousness of age, especially when his conduct is even more austere than his demeanor. Mr. Clay at this time was addicted to gaming, like most of the Western and Southern members, and he was not averse to the bottle. Mr. Webster was reckless in expenditure, fond of his ease, and loved a joke better than an argument. In the seclusion of Washington, many members lived a very gay, rollicking life. Mr. Calhoun never gambled, never drank to excess, never jested, never quarrelled, cared nothing for his ease, and tempered the gravity of his demeanor by an admirable and winning courtesy. A deep and serious ambition impelled and restrained him. Like boys at school, Clay and Webster were eager enough to get to the head of the class, but they did not brood over it all the time, and never feel comfortable unless they were conning their spelling-book; while little Calhoun expended all his soul in the business, and had no time or heart left for play. Consequently he advanced rapidly for one of his size, and was universally pointed at as the model scholar. Accidents, too, generally favor a rising man. Mr. Calhoun made an extremely lucky hit in 1815, which gave members the highest opinion of his sagacity. In opposing an ill-digested scheme for a national bank, he told the House that the bill was so obviously defective and unwise, that, if news of peace should arrive that day, it would not receive fifteen votes. News of peace, which was totally unexpected, did arrive that very hour, and the bill was rejected the next day by about the majority which he had predicted. At the next session, he won an immense reputation for firmness. An act was passed changing the mode of compensating members of Congress from six dollars a day to fifteen hundred dollars a year. We were a nation of rustics then; and this harmless measure excited a disgust in the popular mind so intense and general, that most of the members who had voted for it declined to present themselves for re-election. Calhoun was one of the guilty ones. Popular as he was in his district, supported by two powerful family connections, — his own and his wife's, — admired throughout the State as one who had done honor to it upon the auspicious scene of Congressional debate, — even he was threatened with defeat. Formidable candidates presented themselves. In these circumstances he mounted the stump, boldly justified his vote, and defended the odious bill. He was handsomely re-elected, and when the bill was up for repeal in the House he again supported it with all his former energy. At the conclusion of his speech, a member from New York, Mr. Grosvenor, a political opponent, with whom Calhoun had not been on speaking terms for two years, sprang to his feet, enraptured, and began to express his approval of the speech in ordinary parliamentary language. But his feelings could not be relieved in that manner. He paused a moment, and then said: —

> "Mr. Speaker, I will not be restrained. No barrier shall exist which I will not leap over for the purpose of offering to that gentleman my thanks for the judicious, independent, and national course which he has pursued in this House for the last two years, and particularly upon the subject now before us. Let the honorable gentleman continue with the same manly independence, aloof from party views and local prejudices, to pursue the great interests of his country, and fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born. The buzz of popular applause may not cheer him on his way, but he will inevitably arrive at a high and happy elevation in the view of his country and the world."

Such scenes as this enhance the prestige of a rising man. Members weak at home envied at once and admired a man who was strong enough to bring over his constituents to his opinion. He was fortunate, too, in this, that a triumph so striking occurred just before he left the House for another sphere of public life. He had what the actors call a splendid exit.

The inauguration of Mr. Monroe on the 4th of March, 1817, ushered in the era of good feeling, and gave to Henry Clay the first of his long series of disappointments. As Secretaries of State had usually succeeded their chiefs in the Presidency, the appointment of Mr. Adams to that office by Mr. Monroe was regarded almost in the light of a nomination to the succession. To add to Mr. Clay's mortification, he was tendered the post of Secretary of War, which he had declined a year before, and now again declined. The President next selected General Jackson, then in the undimmed lustre of his military renown, and still holding his Major-General's commission. He received, however, a private notification that General Jackson would not accept a place in the Cabinet. The President then offered the post to the aged Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky, who had the good sense to decline it. There appear to have been negotiations with other individuals, but at length, in October, 1817, the place was offered to Mr. Calhoun, who, after much hesitation, accepted it, and entered upon the discharge of its duties in December. His friends, we are told, unanimously disapproved his going into office, as they believed him formed to shine in debate rather than in the transaction of business.

Fortune favored him again. Entering the office after a long vacancy, and when it was filled with the unfinished business of the war, — fifty million dollars of deferred claims, for one item, — he had the same easy opportunity for distinction which a steward has who takes charge of an estate just out of chancery, and under a new proprietor who has plenty of money. The sweeping up of the dead leaves, the gathering of the fallen branches, and the weeding out of the paths, changes he aspect of the place, and gives the passer-by a prodigious idea of the efficiency of the new broom. The country was alive, too, to the necessity of coast and frontier defences, and there was much building of forts during the seven years of Mr. Calhoun's tenure of place. Respecting the manner in which he discharged the multifarious and unusual duties of his office, we have never heard anything but commendation. He was prompt, punctual, diligent, courteous, and firm. The rules which he drew up for the regulation of the War Department remained in force, little changed, until the magnitude of the late contest abolished or suspended all ancient methods. The claims of the soldiers were rapidly examined and passed upon. It was Mr. Calhoun who first endeavored to collect considerable bodies of troops for instruction at one post. He had but six thousand men in all, but he contrived to get together several companies of artillery at Fortress Monroe for drill. He appeared to take much interest in the expenditure of the ten thousand dollars a year which Congress voted for the education of the Indians. He reduced the expenses of his office, which was a very popular thing at that day. He never appointed nor removed a clerk for opinion's sake. In seven years he only removed two clerks, both for cause, and to both were given in writing the reasons of their removal. There was no special merit in this, for at that day to do otherwise would have been deemed infamous.

Mr. Calhoun, as a member of Mr. Monroe's Cabinet, still played the part of a national man, and supported the measures of his party without exception. Scarcely a trace of the sectional champion yet appears. In 1819, he gave a written opinion favoring the cession of Texas in exchange for Florida; the motive of which was to avoid alarming the North by the prospective increase of Slave States. In later years, Mr. Calhoun, of course, wished to deny this; and the written opinions of Mr. Monroe's Cabinet on that question mysteriously disappeared from the archives of the State Department. We have the positive testimony of Mr. John Quincy Adams, that Calhoun, in common with most Southern men of that day, approved the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and gave a written opinion that it was a constitutional measure. That he was still an enthusiast for internal improvements, we have already mentioned.

The real difficulty of the War Department, however, as of the State Department, during the Monroe administration, was a certain Major-General Andrew Jackson, commanding the Military Department of the South. The popularity of the man who had restored the nation's self-love by ending a disastrous war with a dazzling and most unexpected victory, was something different from the respect which we all now feel for the generals distinguished in the late war. The first honors of the late war are divided among four chieftains, each of whom contributed to the final success at least one victory that was essential to it. But in 1815, among the military heroes of the war that had just closed General Jackson stood peerless and alone. His success in defending the Southwest, ending in a blaze of glory below New Orleans, utterly eclipsed all the other achievements of the war, excepting alone the darling triumphs on the ocean and the lakes. The deferential spirit of Mr. Monroe's letters to the General, and the readiness of every one everywhere to comply with his wishes, show that his popularity, even then, constituted him a power in the Republic. It was said in later times, that "General Jackson's popularity could stand anything," and in one sense this was true: it could stand anything that General Jackson was likely to do. Andrew Jackson could never have done a cowardly act, or betrayed a friend, or knowingly violated a trust, or broken his word, or forgotten a debt. He was always so entirely certain that he, Andrew Jackson, was in the right, his conviction on this point was so free from the least quaver of doubt, that he could always convince other men that he was right, and carry the multitude with him. His honesty, courage, and inflexible resolution, joined to his ignorance, narrowness, intensity, and liability to prejudice, rendered him at once the idol of his countrymen and the plague of all men with whom he had official connection. Drop an Andrew Jackson from the clouds upon any spot of earth inhabited by men, and he will have half a dozen deadly feuds upon his hands in thirty days.

Mr. Calhoun inherited a quarrel with Jackson from George Graham, his *pro tempore* predecessor in the War Department. This Mr. Graham was the gentleman ("spy," Jackson termed him) despatched by President Jefferson in 1806 to the Western country to look into the mysterious proceedings of Aaron Burr, which led to the explosion of Burr's scheme. This was enough to secure the bitterest enmity of Jackson, who wholly and always favored Burr's design of annihilating the Spanish power in North America, and who, as President of the United States, rewarded Burr's followers, and covertly assisted Houston to carry out part of Burr's project. Graham had sent orders to Jackson's subordinates directly, instead of sending them through the chief of the Department. Jackson, after due remonstrance, ordered his officers not to obey any orders but such as were communicated by or through himself. This was a high-handed measure; but Mr. Calhoun, on coming into power, passed it by without notice, and conceded the substance of Jackson's demand, — as he ought. This was so exquisitely pleasing to General Jackson, that he was well affected by it for many years towards Mr. Calhoun. Among the younger public men of that day, there was no one who stood so high in Jackson's regard as the Secretary of War.

The Florida war followed in 1818. When the report of General Jackson's invasion of Florida, and of the execution of Arbuthnot and Armbrister reached Washington, Mr. Calhoun was the only man in the Cabinet who expressed the opinion that General Jackson had transcended his powers, and ought to be brought before a court of inquiry. This opinion he supported with ardor, until it was overruled by the President, who was chiefly influenced by Mr. Adams, the Secretary of State. How keenly General Jackson resented the course of Mr. Calhoun on this occasion, when, eleven years afterwards, he discovered it, is sufficiently well known. We believe, however, that the facts justify Calhoun and condemn Jackson. Just before going to the seat of war, the General wrote privately to the President, strongly recommending the seizure of Florida, and added these words: "This can be done without implicating the government. Let it be signified to me through any channel (say, Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished." General Jackson dwells, in his "Exposition" of this matter, upon the fact that Mr. Calhoun was the first man in Washington who read this letter. But he does not say that Mr. Calhoun was aware that Mr. Rhea had been commissioned to answer the letter, and had answered it in accordance with General Jackson's wishes. And if the Rhea correspondence justified the seizure of Florida, it did not justify the execution of the harmless Scottish trader Arbuthnot, who, so far from "instigating" the war, had exerted the whole of his influence to prevent it. It is an honor to Mr. Calhoun to have been the only man in the Cabinet to call for an inquiry into proceedings which disgraced the United States and came near involving the country in war. We have always felt it to be a blot upon the memory of John Quincy Adams, that he did not join Mr. Calhoun in demanding the trial of General Jackson; and we have not been able to attribute his conduct to anything but the supposed necessities of his position as a candidate for the succession.

Readers versed in political history need not be reminded that nearly every individual in the Cabinet of Mr. Monroe had hopes of succeeding him. Mr. Adams had, of course; for he was the premier. Mr. Crawford, of course; for it had been "arranged" at the last caucus that he was to follow Mr. Monroe, to whose claims he had deferred on that express condition. Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and De Witt Clinton of New York, had some expectations. All these gentlemen had "claims" which both their party and the public could recognize. Mr. Calhoun, too, who was forty-two years of age in Mr. Monroe's last year of service, boldly entered the lists; relying upon the united support of the South and the support of the manufacturing States of the North, led by Pennsylvania. That against such competitors he had any ground at all to hope for success, shows how rapid and how real had been his progress toward a first-rate national position. If our readers will turn to the letters of Webster, Story, Wirt, Adams, Jackson, and others of that circle of distinguished men, they will see many evidences of the extravagant estimation in which he was held in 1824. They appear to have all seen in him the material for a President, though not yet quite mature for the position. They all deemed him a man of unsullied honor, of devoted patriotism, of perfect sincerity, and of immense ability, — so assiduously had he played the part of the good boy.

How the great popularity of General Jackson was adroitly used by two or three invisible wire-pullers to defeat the aspirations of these too eager candidates, and how from the general wreck of their hopes Mr. Calhoun had the dexterity to emerge Vice-President of the United States, is related, with the amplest detail, in Parton's Life of Jackson, and need not be repeated here. Mr. Calhoun's position seemed then to combine all the advantages which a politician of forty-three could desire or imagine. By withdrawing his name from the list of candidates in such a way as to lead General Jackson to suppose that he had done so in *his* favor, he seemed to place the General under obligations to him. By secretly manifesting a preference for Mr. Adams (which he really felt) when the election devolved upon the House of Representatives, he had gained friends among the adherents of the successful candidate. His withdrawal was accepted by the public as an evidence of modesty becoming the youngest candidate. Finally he was actually Vice-President, as John Adams had been, as Jefferson had been, before their elevation to the highest place. True, Henry Clay, as Secretary of State, was in the established line of succession; but, as time wore on, it became very manifest that the re-election of Mr. Adams, upon which Mr. Clay's hopes depended, was itself exceedingly doubtful; and we accordingly find Mr. Calhoun numbered in the ranks of the opposition. Toward the close of Mr. Adams's Presidency, the question of real interest in the inner circle of politicians was, not who should succeed John Quincy Adams in 1829, but who should succeed Andrew Jackson in 1833; and already the choice was narrowing to two men, — Martin Van Buren and John C. Calhoun.

During Mr. Calhoun's first term in the Vice-Presidency, — 1825 to 1829, — a most important change took place in his political position, which controlled all his future career. While he was Secretary of War, — 1817 to 1824, — he resided with his family in Washington, and shared in the nationalizing influences of the place. When he was elected Vice-President, he removed to a plantation called Fort Hill, in the western part of South Carolina, where he was once more subjected to the intense and narrow provincialism of the planting States. And there was nothing in the character or in the acquirements of his mind to counteract that influence. Mr. Calhoun was not a student; he probed nothing to the bottom; his information on all subjects was small in quantity, and second-hand in quality. Nor was he a patient thinker. Any stray fact or notion that he met with in his hasty desultory reading, which chanced to give apparent support to a favorite theory or paradox of his own, he seized upon eagerly, paraded it in triumph, but pondered it little; while the weightiest facts which controverted his opinion he brushed aside without the slightest consideration. His mind was as arrogant as his manners were courteous. Every one who ever conversed with him must remember his positive, peremptory, unanswerable "*Not at all, not at all,*" whenever one of his favorite positions was assailed. He was wholly a special pleader; he never summed up the testimony. We find in his works no evidence that he had read the masters in political economy; not even Adam Smith, whose reputation was at its height during the first half of his public life. In history he was the merest smatterer, though it was his favorite reading, and he was always talking about Sparta, Athens, and Rome. The slenderness of his fortune prevented his travelling. He never saw Europe; and if he ever visited the Northern States, after leaving college, we have not discovered any evidence of the fact. The little that he knew of life was gathered in three places, all of which were of an exceptional and artificial character, — the city of Washington, the up-country of South Carolina, and the luxurious, reactionary city of Charleston. His mind, naturally narrow and intense, became, by revolving always in this narrow sphere and breathing a close and tainted atmosphere, more and more fixed in its narrowness and more intense in its operations.

This man, moreover, was consumed by a poor ambition: he lusted after the Presidency. The rapidity of his progress in public life, the high offices he had held, the extravagant eulogiums he had received from colleagues and the press, deceived him as to the real nature of his position before the country, and blinded him to the superior chances of other men. Five times in his life he made a distinct clutch at the bawble, but never with such prospect of success that any man could discern it but himself and those who used his eyes. It is a satisfaction to know that, of the Presidency seekers, — Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Douglas, Wise, Breckenridge, Tyler, Fillmore, Clinton, Burr, Cass, Buchanan, and Van Buren, — only two won the prize, and those two only by a series of accidents which had little to do with their own exertions. We can almost lay it down as a law of this Republic, that no man who makes the Presidency the principal object of his public life will ever be President. The Presidency is an accident, and such it will probably remain.

Mr. Vice-President Calhoun found his Carolina discontented in 1824, when he took up his abode at Fort Hill. Since the Revolution, South Carolina had never been satisfied, and had never had reason to be. The cotton-gin had appeased her for a while, but had not suspended the operation of the causes which produced the stagnation of the South. Profuse expenditure, unskilful agriculture, the costliest system of labor in the world, and no immigration, still kept *Irelandizing* the Southern States; while the North was advancing and improving to such a degree as to attract emigrants from all lands. The contrast was painful to Southern men, and to most of them it was mysterious. Southern politicians came to the conclusion that the cause at once of Northern prosperity and Southern poverty was the protective tariff and the appropriations for internal improvements, but chiefly the tariff. In 1824, when Mr. Calhoun went home, the tariff on some leading articles had been increased, and the South was in a ferment of opposition to the protective system. If Mr. Calhoun had been a wise and honest man, he would have reminded his friends that the decline of the South had been a subject of remark from the peace of 1783, and therefore could not have been caused by the tariff of 1816, or 1820, or 1824. He would have told them that slavery, as known in the Southern States, demands virgin lands, — must have, every few years, its cotton-gin, its Louisiana, its Cherokee country, its *something*, to give new value to its products or new scope for its operations. He might have added that the tariff of 1824 was a grievance, did tend to give premature development to a manufacturing system, and was a fair ground for a national issue between parties. The thing which he did was this: he adopted the view of the matter which was predominant in the extreme South, and accepted the leadership of the extreme Southern, anti-tariff, strict-constructionist wing of the Democratic party. He echoed the prevailing opinion, that the tariff and the internal improvement system, to both of which he was fully committed, were the *sole* causes of Southern stagnation; since by the one their money was taken from them, and by the other it was mostly spent where it did them no good.

He was, of course, soon involved in a snarl of contradictions, from which he never could disentangle himself. Let us pass to the year 1828, a most important one in the history of the country and of Mr. Calhoun; for then occurred the first of the long series of events which terminated with the surrender of the last Rebel army in 1865. The first act directly tending to a war between the South and the United States bears date December 6th, 1828; and it was the act of John C. Calhoun.

It was the year of that Presidential election which placed Andrew Jackson in the White House, and re-elected Mr. Calhoun to the Vice-Presidency. It was the year that terminated the honorable part of Mr. Calhoun's career and began the dishonorable. His political position in the canvass was utterly false, as he himself afterwards confessed. On the one hand, he was supporting for the Presidency a man committed to the policy of protection; and on the other, he became the organ and mouthpiece of the Southern party, whose opposition to the protective principle was tending to the point of armed resistance to it. The tariff bill of 1828, which they termed the bill of abominations, had excited the most heated opposition in the cotton States, and especially in South Carolina. This act was passed in the spring of the very year in which those States voted for a man who had publicly indorsed the principle involved in it; and we see Mr. Calhoun heading the party who were electioneering for Jackson, and the party who were considering the policy of nullifying the act which he had approved. His Presidential aspirations bound him to the support of General Jackson; but the first, the fundamental necessity of his position was to hold possession of South Carolina.

The burden of Mr. Calhoun's later speeches was the reconciliation of the last part of his public life with the first. The task was difficult, for there is not a leading proposition in his speeches after 1830 which is not refuted by arguments to be found in his public utterances before 1828. In his speech on the Force Bill, in 1834, he volunteered an explanation of the apparent inconsistency between his support of General Jackson in 1828, and his authorship of the "South Carolina Exposition" in the same year. Falsehood and truth are strangely interwoven in almost every sentence of his later writings; and there is also that vagueness in them which comes of a superfluity of words. He says, that for the strict-constructionist party to have presented a candidate openly and fully identified with their opinions would have been to court defeat; and thus they were obliged either to abandon the contest, or to select a candidate "whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on the subject which divided the two sections," — a candidate "who, at best, was but a choice of evils." Besides, General Jackson was a Southern man, and it was hoped that, notwithstanding his want of experience, knowledge, and self-control, the advisers whom he would invite to assist him would compensate for those defects. Then Mr. Calhoun proceeds to state, that the contest turned chiefly upon the question of protection or free trade; and the strife was, which of the two parties should go farthest in the advocacy of protection. The result was, he says, that the tariff bill of 1828 was passed, — "that disastrous measure which has brought so many calamities upon us, and put in peril the liberty and union of the country," and "poured millions into the treasury beyond the most extravagant wants of the country."

The passage of this tariff bill was accomplished by the tact of Martin Van Buren, aided by Major Eaton, Senator from Tennessee. Mr. Van Buren was the predestined chief of General Jackson's Cabinet, and Major Eaton was the confidant, agent, and travelling manager of the Jacksonian wire-pullers, besides being the General's own intimate friend. The events of that session notified Mr. Calhoun that, however manageable General Jackson might be, he was not likely to fall into the custody of the Vice-President. General Jackson's election being considered certain, the question was alone interesting, who should possess him for the purposes of the succession. The prospect, as surveyed that winter from the Vice-President's chair, was not assuring to the occupant of that lofty seat. If General Jackson could not be used as a fulcrum for the further elevation of Mr. Calhoun, would it not be advisable to begin to cast about for another ?

The tariff bill of 1828 was passed before the Presidential canvass had set in with its last severity. There was time for Mr. Calhoun to withdraw from the support of the man whose nearest friends had carried it through the Senate under his eyes. He did not do so. He went home, after the adjournment of Congress, to labor with all his might for the election of a protectionist, and to employ his leisure hours in the composition of that once famous paper called the "South Carolina Exposition," in which protection was declared to be an evil so intolerable as to justify the nullification of an act founded upon it. This Exposition was the beginning of our woe, — the baleful egg from which were hatched nullification, treason, civil war, and the desolation of the Southern States. Here is Mr. Calhoun's own account of the manner in which what he correctly styles "*the double operation*" was "pushed on" in the summer of 1828 : —

> "This disastrous event [the passage of the tariff bill of 1828] opened our eyes (I mean myself and those immediately connected with me) as to the full extent of the danger and oppression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to effect the reform intended through the election of General Jackson. With these disclosures, it became necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more certain measure of protection. We turned to the Constitution to find this remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its provisions, in order to understand fully the nature and character of our political system. We found a certain and effectual remedy in that great fundamental division of the powers of the system between this government and its independent co-ordinates, the separate governments of the States, — to be called into action to arrest the unconstitutional acts of this government by the interposition of the States, — the paramount source from which both governments derive their power. But in relying on this our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the Presidential canvass ; we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the necessary re-

form, and thereby supersede the necessity for calling into action the sovereign authority of the State, which we were anxious to avoid. With these views the two were pushed with equal zeal at the same time; which double operation commenced in the fall of 1828, but a few months after the passage of the tariff act of that year; and at the meeting of the Legislature of the State, at the same period, a paper known as the South Carolina Exposition was reported to that body, containing a full development, as well on the constitutional point as on the operation of the protective system, preparatory to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the State necessary in order to protect her rights and interest, and to stay a course of policy which we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of liberty and the Constitution." — *Works*, II. 396.

Mr. Calhoun omits, however, to mention that the Exposition was not presented to the Legislature of South Carolina until after the Presidential election had been decided. Nor did he inform his hearers that the author of the paper was Mr. Vice-President Calhoun. Either there was a great dearth of literary ability in that body, or else Mr. Calhoun had little confidence in it; for nearly all the ponderous documents on nullification given to the world in its name were penned by Mr. Calhoun, and appear in his collected works. If the Legislature addressed its constituents or the people of the United States on *this* subject, it was he who prepared the draft. The South Carolina Exposition was found among his papers in his own handwriting, and it was adopted by the Legislature with only a few alterations and suppressions. There never was a piece of mischief more completely the work of one man than the nullification troubles of 1833 – 34.

The South Carolina Exposition, when Mr. Calhoun had completed it, was brought before the public by one of the usual methods. The Legislature of South Carolina passed the following resolutions: —

"*Resolved*, That it is expedient to protest against the unconstitutional and oppressive operation of the system of protective duties, and to have such protest entered on the journals of the Senate of the United States. Also, to make a public exposition of our wrongs, and of the remedies within our power, to be communicated to our sister States, with a request that they will co-operate with this State in procuring a repeal of the tariff for protection, and an abandonment of the principle; and if the repeal be not procured, that they will co-operate in such measures as may be necessary for averting the evil.

"*Resolved*, That a committee of seven be raised to carry the foregoing resolution into effect."

The resolution having been carried, the following gentlemen were appointed to father Mr. Calhoun's paper: James Gregg, D. L. Wardlaw, Hugh S. Legaré, Arthur P. Hayne, William C. Preston, William Elliott, and R. Barnwell Smith. The duty of this committee consisted in causing a copy of Mr. Calhoun's paper to be made and presenting it to the Legislature. This was promptly done; and the Exposition was adopted by the Legislature on the 6th of December, 1828. Whether any protest was forwarded to the Secretary of the United States Senate for insertion in the journal does not appear. We only know that five thousand copies of this wearisome and stupid Exposition were ordered to be printed, and that in the hubbub of the incoming of a new administration it attracted scarcely any attention beyond the little knot of original nullifiers. Indeed, Mr. Calhoun's writings on this subject were "protected" by their own length and dulness. No creature ever read one of them quite through, except for a special purpose.

The leading assertions of this Exposition are these: — 1. Every duty imposed for protection is a violation of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to impose taxes for revenue only. 2. The *whole* burden of the protective system is borne by agriculture and commerce. 3. The *whole* of the advantages of protection accrue to the manufacturing States. 4. In other words, the South, the Southwest, and two or three commercial cities, support the government, and pour a stream of treasure into the coffers of manufacturers. 5. The result must soon be, that the people of South Carolina will have either to abandon the culture of rice and cotton, and remove to some other country, or else to become a manufacturing community, which would only be ruin in another form.

Lest the reader should find it impossible to believe that any man out of a lunatic asylum could publish such propositions as this last, we will give the passage. Mr. Calhoun is endeavoring to show that Europe will at length retaliate by placing high duties upon American cotton and rice. At least that appears to be what he is aiming at.

"We already see indications of a commercial warfare, the termination of which no one can conjecture, though our fate may easily be. The last remains of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in the conflict. In the first instance we will * be thrown on the home market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and, instead of supplying the world, as we would with free trade, we would be compelled to abandon the cultivation of three fourths of what we now raise, and receive for the residue whatever the manufacturers, who would then have their policy consummated by the entire possession of our market, might choose to give. Forced to abandon our ancient and favorite pursuit, to which our soil, climate, habits, and peculiar labor are adapted, at an immense sacrifice of property, we would be compelled, without capital, experience, or skill, and with a population untried in such pursuits, to attempt to become the rivals, instead of the customers, of the manufacturing States. The result is not doubtful. If they, by superior capital and skill, should keep down successful competition on our part, we would be doomed to toil at our unprofitable agriculture, — selling at the prices which a single and very limited market might give. But, on the contrary, if our necessity should triumph over their capital and skill, if, instead of raw cotton, we should ship to the manufacturing States cotton yarn and cotton goods, the thoughtful must see that it would inevitably bring about a state of things which could not long continue. *Those who now make war on our gains would then make it on our labor.* They would not tolerate that those who now cultivate our plantations, and furnish them with the material and the market for the product of their arts, should, by becoming their rivals, take bread from the mouths of their wives and children. The committee will not pursue this painful subject; but as they clearly see that the system, if not arrested, must bring the country to this hazardous extremity, neither prudence nor patriotism would permit them to pass it by without raising a warning voice against an evil of so menacing a character." — *Works*, VI. 12.

The only question which arises in the mind of present readers of such passages (which abound in the writings of Mr. Calhoun) is this: Were they the chimeras of a morbid, or the utterances of a false mind? Those who knew him differ in opinion on this point. For our part, we believe such passages to have been inserted for the sole purpose of alarming the people of South Carolina, so as to render them the more subservient to his will. It is the stale trick of the demagogue, as well as of the false priest, to subjugate the mind by terrifying it.

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* Mr. Calhoun had still Irish enough in his composition to use "will" for "shall."

Mr. Calhoun concludes his Exposition by bringing forward his remedy for the frightful evils which he had conjured up. That remedy, of course, was nullification. The State of South Carolina, after giving due warning, must declare the protective acts "null and void" in the State of South Carolina after a certain date; and then, unless Congress repealed them in time, refuse obedience to them. Whether this should be done by the Legislature or by a convention called for the purpose, Mr. Calhoun would not say; but he evidently preferred a convention. He advised, however, that nothing be done hastily; that time should be afforded to the dominant majority for further reflection. Delay, he remarked, was the more to be recommended, because of "the great political revolution which will displace from power, on the 4th of March next, those who have acquired authority by setting the will of the people at defiance, and which will bring in an eminent citizen, distinguished for his services to his country and his justice and patriotism"; under whom, it was hoped, there would be "a complete restoration of the pure principles of our government." This passage Mr. Calhoun could write *after* witnessing the manœuvres of Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Eaton! If the friends of Mr. Adams had set the will of the people at defiance on the tariff question, what had the supporters of General Jackson done? In truth, this menace of nullification was the second string to the bow of the Vice-President. It was not yet ascertained which was going to possess and use General Jackson, — the placid and flexible Van Buren, or the headstrong, short-sighted, and uncomfortable Calhoun. Nullification, as he used daily to declare, was a "reserved power."

At the time of General Jackson's inauguration, it would have puzzled an acute politician to decide which of the two aspirants had the best chance of succeeding the General. The President seemed equally well affected toward both. One was Secretary of State, the other Vice-President. Van Buren, inheriting the political tactics of Burr, was lord paramount in the great State of New York, and Calhoun was all-powerful in his own State and very influential in all the region of cotton and rice. In the Cabinet Calhoun had two friends, and one tried and devoted ally (Ingham), while Van Buren could only boast of Major Eaton, Secretary of War; and the tie that bound them together was political far more than personal. In the public mind, Calhoun towered above his rival, for he had been longer in the national councils, had held offices that drew upon him the attention of the whole country, and had formerly been distinguished as an orator. If any one had been rash enough in 1829 to intimate to Mr. Calhoun that Martin Van Buren stood before the country on a par with himself, he would have pitied the ignorance of that rash man.

In despotic governments, like those of Louis XIV. and Andrew Jackson, no calculation can be made as to the future of any public man, because his future depends upon the caprice of the despot, which cannot be foretold. Six short weeks — nay, not so much, not six, — sufficed to estrange the mind of the President from Calhoun, and implant within him a passion to promote the interests of Van Buren. Our readers, we presume, all know how this was brought to pass. It was simply that Mr. Calhoun would *not*, and that Mr. Van Buren *would*, call upon Mrs. Eaton. All the other influences that were brought to bear upon the President's singular mind were nothing in comparison with this. Daniel Webster uttered only the truth when he wrote, at the time, to his friend Dutton, that the "Aaron's serpent among the President's desires was a settled purpose of making out the lady, of whom so much has been said, a person of reputation"; and that this ridiculous affair would "probably determine who should be the successor to the present chief magistrate." It had precisely that effect. Mr. Parton has shown, in his Life of Jackson, the successful manœuvres by which this was effected, and how vigorously but unskilfully Calhoun struggled to avert his fate. We cannot and need not repeat the story; nor can we go over again the history of the Nullification imbroglio, which began with the South Carolina Exposition in 1828, and ended very soon after Calhoun had received a private notification that the instant news reached Washington of an overt act of treason in South Carolina, the author and fomenter of that treason would be arrested and held for trial as a traitor.

One fact alone suffices to prove that, in bringing on the Nullification troubles, Calhoun's motive was factious. When General Jackson saw the coming storm, he did two things. First, he prepared to maintain the authority of the United States by force. Secondly, he used all his influence with Congress to have the cause of Southern discontent removed. General Jackson felt that the argument of the anti-tariff men, in view of the speedy extinction of the national debt, was unanswerable. He believed it was absurd to go on raising ten or twelve millions a year more than the government could spend, merely for the sake of protecting Northern manufactures. Accordingly, a bill was introduced which aimed to do just what the nullifiers had been clamoring for, that is, to reduce the revenue to the amount required by the government. If Mr. Calhoun had supported this measure, he could have carried it. He gave it no support; but exerted all his influence in favor of the Clay Compromise, which was expressly intended to save as much of the protective system as could be saved, and which reduced duties gradually, instead of suddenly. Rather than permit the abhorred administration to have the glory of pacificating the country, this lofty Roman stooped to a coalition with his personal enemy, Henry Clay, the champion and the soul of the protectionist party.

No mere words can depict the bitterness of Calhoun's disappointment and mortification at being distanced by a man whom he despised so cordially as he did Van Buren. To comprehend it, his whole subsequent career must be studied. The numerous covert allusions to the subject in his speeches and writings are surcharged with rancor; and it was observed that, whenever his mind reverted to it, his manner, the tone of his voice, and every gesture testified to the intensity of his feelings. "Every Southern man," said he on one occasion, "who is true to the interests of his section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be forever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this government, which will be reserved only for those who have qualified themselves by political prostitution for admission into the Magdalen Asylum." His face, too, from this time, assumed that haggard, cast-iron, intense, introverted aspect which struck every beholder.

Miss Martineau, in her Retrospect of Western Travel, has given us some striking and valuable glimpses of the eminent men of that period, particularly of the three most eminent, who frequently visited her during her stay in Washington. This passage, for example, is highly interesting.

"Mr. Clay, sitting upright on the sofa, with his snuff-box ever in his hand, would discourse for many an hour in his even, soft, deliberate tone, on any one of the great subjects of American policy which we might happen to start, always amazing us with the moderation of estimate and speech which so impetuous a nature has been able to attain. Mr. Webster, leaning back at his ease, telling stories, cracking jokes, shaking the sofa with burst after burst of laughter, or smoothly discoursing to the perfect felicity of the logical part of one's constitution, would illuminate an evening now and then. Mr. Calhoun, the cast-iron man, who looks as if he had never been born and could never be extinguished, would come in sometimes to keep our understandings on a painful stretch for a short while, and leave us to take to pieces his close, rapid, theoretical, illustrated talk, and see what we could make of it. We found it usually more worth retaining as a curiosity, than as either very just or useful. His speech abounds in figures, truly illustrative, if that which they illustrate were true also. But his theories of government (almost the only subject upon which his thoughts are employed), the squarest and compactest that ever were made, are composed out of limited elements, and are not, therefore, likely to stand service very well. It is at first extremely interesting to hear Mr. Calhoun talk; and there is a never-failing evidence of power in all that he says and does, which commands intellectual reverence; but the admiration is too soon turned into regret, into absolute melancholy. It is impossible to resist the conviction, that all this force can be at best but useless, and is but too likely to be very mischievous. *His mind has long lost all power of communicating with any other.* I know of no man who lives in such utter intellectual solitude. He meets men and harangues by the fireside as in the Senate; he is wrought like a piece of machinery, set going vehemently by a weight, and stops while you answer; he either passes by what you say, or twists it into a suitability with what is in his head, and begins to lecture again. Of course, a mind like this can have little influence in the Senate, except by virtue, perpetually wearing out, of what it did in its less eccentric days; but its influence at home is to be dreaded. There is no hope that an intellect so cast in narrow theories will accommodate itself to varying circumstances; and there is every danger that it will break up all that it can in order to remould the materials in its own way. Mr. Calhoun is as full as ever of his Nullification doctrines; and those who know the force that is in him, and his utter incapacity of modification by other minds, (after having gone through as remarkable a revolution of political opinion as perhaps any man ever experienced,) will no more expect repose and self-retention from him than from a volcano in full force. Relaxation is no longer in the power of his will. I never saw any one who so completely gave me the idea of possession. Half an hour's conversation with him is enough to make a necessitarian of anybody. Accordingly, he is more complained of than blamed by his enemies. His moments of softness by his family, and when recurring to old college days, are hailed by all as a relief to the vehement working of the intellectual machine, — a relief equally to himself and others. These moments are as touching to the observer as tears on the face of a soldier."

Of his appearance in the Senate, and of his manner of speaking, Miss Martineau records her impressions also: —

"Mr. Calhoun's countenance first fixed my attention; the splendid eye, the straight forehead, surmounted by a load of stiff, upright, dark hair, the stern brow, the inflexible mouth, — it is one of the most remarkable heads in the country."

"Mr. Calhoun followed, and impressed me very strongly. While he kept to the question, what he said was close, good, and moderate, though delivered in rapid speech, and with a voice not sufficiently modulated. But when he began to reply to a taunt of Colonel Benton's, that he wanted to be President, the force of his speaking became painful. He made protestations which it seemed to strangers had better have been spared, 'that he would not turn on his heel to be President,' and that 'he had given up all for his own brave, magnanimous little State of South Carolina.' While thus protesting, his eyes flashed, his brow seemed charged with thunder, his voice became almost a bark, and his sentences were abrupt, intense, producing in the auditory a sort of laugh which is squeezed out of people by the application of a very sudden mental force. I believe he knew not what a revelation he made in a few sentences. *They were to us strangers the key, not only to all that was said and done by the South Carolina party during the remainder of the session, but to many things at Charleston and Columbia which would otherwise have passed unobserved and unexplained.*"

This intelligent observer saw the chieftain on his native heath: —

"During my stay in Charleston, Mr. Calhoun and his family arrived from Congress, and there was something very striking in the welcome he received, like that of a chief returned to the bosom of his clan. He stalked about like a monarch of the little domain, and there was certainly an air of mysterious understanding between him and his followers."

What Miss Martineau says of the impossibility of Calhoun's mind communicating with another mind, is confirmed by an anecdote which we have heard related by Dr. Francis Lieber, who, as Professor in the College of South Carolina, was for several years the neighbor and intimate acquaintance of Mr. Calhoun. The learned Professor, upon his return from a visit to Europe, called upon him, and in the course of the interview Mr. Calhoun declared, in his positive manner, that the slaves in the Southern States were better lodged, fed, and cared for than the mechanics of Europe. Dr. Lieber, being fresh from that continent, assured the Secretary of State that such was not the fact, as he could testify from having resided in both lands. "Not at all, not at all," cried Calhoun dogmatically, and repeated his wild assertion. The Doctor saw that the poor man had reached the condition of absolute unteachableness, and dropped the subject. There could not well be a more competent witness on the point in dispute than Dr. Lieber; for, besides having long resided in both continents, it was the habit and business of his life to observe and ponder the effect of institutions upon the welfare of those who live under them. Calhoun pushed him out of the witness-box, as though he were an idiot.

A survey of the last fifteen years of Calhoun's life discloses nothing upon which the mind can dwell with complacency. On the approach of every Presidential election, we see him making what we can only call a *grab* at a nomination, by springing upon the country some unexpected issue designed to make the South a unit in his support. From 1830 to 1836, he exhausted all the petty arts of the politician to defeat General Jackson's resolve to bring in Mr. Van Buren as his successor; and when all had failed, he made an abortive attempt to precipitate the question of the annexation of Texas. This, too, being foiled, Mr. Van Buren was elected President. Then Mr. Calhoun, who had for ten years never spoken of Van Buren except with contempt, formed the notable scheme of winning over the President so far as to secure his support for the succession. He advocated all the test measures of Mr. Van Buren's administration, and finished by courting a personal reconciliation with the man whom he had a hundred times styled a fox and a political prostitute. This design coming to naught, through the failure of Mr. Van Buren to reach a second term, he made a wild rush for the prize by again thrusting forward the Texas question. Colonel Benton, who was the predetermined heir of Van Buren, has detailed the manner in which this was done in a very curious chapter of his "Thirty Years." The plot was successful, so far as plunging the country into a needless war was concerned; but it was Polk and Taylor, not Calhoun, who attained the Presidency through it. Mr. Calhoun's struggles for a nomination in 1844 were truly pitiable, but they were not known to the public, who saw him, at a certain stage of the campaign, affecting to decline a nomination which there was not the slightest danger of his receiving.

We regret that we have not space to show how much the agitation of the slavery question, from 1835 to 1850, was the work of this one man. The labors of Mr. Garrison and Mr. Wendell Phillips might have borne no fruit during their lifetime, if Calhoun had not made it his business to supply them with material. "I mean to *force* the issue upon the North," he once wrote; and he did force it. On his return to South Carolina after the termination of the Nullification troubles, he said to his friends there, (so avers Colonel Benton, "Thirty Years," Vol. II. p. 786,) "that the South could never be united against the North on the tariff question; that the sugar interest of Louisiana would keep her out; and that the basis of Southern union must be shifted to the slave question." Here we have the key to the mysteries of all his subsequent career. The denial of the right of petition, the annexation of Texas, the forcing of slavery into the Territories,—these were among the issues upon which he hoped to unite the South in his favor, while retaining enough strength at the North to secure his election. Failing in all his schemes of personal advancement, he died in 1850, still protesting that slavery is divine, and that it must rule this country or ruin it. This is really the sum and substance of that last speech to the Senate which he had not strength enough left to deliver.

We have run rapidly over Mr. Calhoun's career as a public man. It remains for us to notice his claims as a teacher of political philosophy, a character in which he influenced his countrymen more powerfully after he was in his grave than he did while living among them.

The work upon which his reputation as a thinker will rest with posterity is his Treatise on the Nature of Government. Written in the last year of his life, when at length all hope of further personal advancement must have died within him, it may be taken as the deliberate record or summary of his political opinions. He did not live to revise it, and the concluding portion he evidently meant to enlarge and illustrate, as was ascertained from notes and memoranda in pencil upon the manuscript. After the death of the author in 1850, the work was published in a substantial and elegant form by the Legislature of South Carolina, who ordered copies to be presented to individuals of note in science and literature, and to public libraries. We are, therefore, to regard this volume, not merely as a legacy of Mr. Calhoun to his countrymen, but as conveying to us the sentiments of South Carolina with regard to her rights and duties as a member of the Union. Events since its publication have shown us that it is more even than this. The assemblage of troublesome communities which we have been accustomed to style "the South," adopted this work as their political gospel. From this source the politicians of the Southern States have drawn all they have chosen to present to the world in justification of their course which bears the semblance of argument; for, in truth, Mr. Calhoun, since Jefferson and Madison passed from the stage, is almost the only thinking being the South has had. His was a very narrow, intense, and untrustworthy mind, but he was an angel of light compared with the men who have been recently conspicuous in the Southern States.

This treatise on government belongs to the same class of works as Louis Napoleon's Life of Cæsar, having for its principal object one that lies below the surface, and the effect of both is damaged by the name on the title-page. The moment we learn that Louis Napoleon wrote that Life of Cæsar, the mind is intent upon discovering allusions to recent history, which the author has an interest in misrepresenting. The common conscience of mankind condemns him as a perjured usurper, and the murderer of many of his unoffending fellow-citizens. No man, whatever the power and splendor of his position, can rest content under the scorn of mankind, unless his own conscience gives him a clear acquittal, and assures him that one day the verdict of his fellow-men will be reversed; and even in that case, it is not every man that can possess his soul in patience. Every page of the Life of Cæsar was composed with a secret, perhaps half-unconscious reference to that view of Louis Napoleon's conduct which is expressed with such deadly power in Mr. Kinglake's History of the Crimean War, and which is so remarkably confirmed by an American eyewitness, the late Mr. Goodrich, who was Consul at Paris in 1848. Published anonymously, the Life of Cæsar might have had some effect. Given to the world by Napoleon III., every one reads it as he would a defence by an ingenious criminal of his own cause. The highest praise that can be bestowed upon it is, that it is very well done, considering the object the author had in view.

So, in reading Mr. Calhoun's disquisition upon government, we are constantly reminded that the author was a man who had only escaped trial and execution for treason by suddenly arresting the treasonable measures which he had caused to be set on foot. Though it contains but one allusion to events in South Carolina in 1833, the work is nothing but a labored, refined justification of those events. It has been even coupled with Edwards on the Will, as the two best examples of subtle reasoning which American literature contains. Admit his premises, and you are borne along, at a steady pace, in a straight path, to the final inferences: that the sovereign State of South Carolina possesses, by the Constitution of the United States, an absolute veto upon every act of Congress, and may secede from the Union whenever she likes; and that these rights of veto and secession do not merely constitute the strength of the Constitution, but *are* the Constitution, — and do not merely tend to perpetuate the Union, but are the Union's self, — the thing that binds the States together.

Mr. Calhoun begins his treatise by assuming that government is necessary. He then explains why it is necessary. It is necessary because man is more selfish than sympathetic, feeling more intensely what affects himself than what affects others. Hence he will encroach on the rights of others; and to prevent this, government is indispensable.

But government, since it must be administered by selfish men, will feel more intensely what affects itself than what affects the people governed. It is, therefore, the tendency of all governments to encroach on the rights of the people; and they certainly will do so, if they can. The same instinct of self-preservation, the same love of accumulation, which tempts individuals to overreach their neighbors, inclines government to preserve, increase, and consolidate its powers. Therefore, as individual selfishness requires to be held in check by government, so government must be restrained by *something*.

This something is the constitution, written or unwritten. A constitution is to the government what government is to the people: it is the restraint upon its selfishness. Mr. Calhoun assumes here that the relation between government and governed is naturally and inevitably "antagonistic." He does not perceive that government is the expression of man's love of justice, and the means by which the people cause justice to be done.

Government, he continues, must be powerful; must have at command the resources of the country; must be so strong that it can, if it will, disregard the limitations of the constitution. The question is, How to compel a government, holding such powers, having an army, a navy, and a national treasury at command, to obey the requirements of a mere piece of printed paper?

Power, says Mr. Calhoun, can only be resisted by power. Therefore, a proper constitution must leave to the governed the *power* to resist encroachments. This is done in free countries by universal suffrage and the election of rulers at frequent and fixed periods. This gives to rulers the strongest possible motive to please the people, which can only be done by executing their will.

So far, most readers will follow the author without serious difficulty. But now we come to passages which no one could understand who was not acquainted with the Nullification imbroglio of 1833. A philosophic Frenchman or German, who should read this work with a view to enlightening his mind upon the nature of government, would be much puzzled after passing the thirteenth page; for at that point the hidden loadstone begins to operate upon the needle of Mr. Calhoun's compass, and he is as Louis Napoleon writing the Life of Cæsar.

Universal suffrage, he continues, and the frequent election of rulers, are indeed the primary and fundamental principles of a constitutional government; and they are sufficient to give the people an effective control over those whom they have elected. But this is all they can do. They cannot make rulers good, or just, or obedient to the constitution, but only faithful representatives of the majority of the people and executors of the will of that majority. The right of suffrage transfers the supreme authority from the rulers to the body of the community, and the more perfectly it does this, the more perfectly it accomplishes its object. Majority is king. But this king, too, like all others, is selfish, and will abuse his power if he can.

So, we have been arguing in a circle, and have come back to the starting-point. Government keeps within bounds the selfishness of the people; the constitution restrains the selfishness of the government; but, in doing so, it has only created a despot as much to be dreaded as the power he displaced. We are still, therefore, confronted by the original difficulty. How are we to limit the sway of tyrant Majority?

If, says Mr. Calhoun, all the people had the same interests, so that a law which oppressed one interest would oppress all interests, then the right of suffrage would itself be sufficient; and the only question would be as to the fitness of different candidates. But this is not the case. Taxation, for example: no system of taxation can be arranged that will not bear oppressively upon some interests or section. Disbursements, also: some portions of the country must receive back, in the form of governmental disbursements, more money than they pay in taxes, and others less; and this may be carried so far, that one region may be utterly impoverished, while others are enriched.

King Majority may have his favorites. He may now choose to favor agriculture; now, commerce; now, manufactures; and so arrange the imports as to crush one for the sake of promoting the others. "Crush" is Mr. Calhoun's word. "One portion of the community," he says, "may be crushed, and another elevated on its ruins, by systematically perverting the power of taxation and disbursement, for the purpose of aggrandizing or building up one portion of the community at the expense of the other." *May* be. But will it be done? Has not the most relentless despot an interest in the prosperity of his subjects? And can one interest be crushed without manifest and immediate injury to all the others? Mr. Calhoun says, That this fell power to crush important interests *will* be used, is exactly as certain as that it *can* be.

All this would be unintelligible to our foreign philosopher, but American citizens know very well what it means. Through this fine lattice-work fence they discern the shining countenance of the colored person.

But now, what remedy? Mr. Calhoun approaches this part of the subject with the due acknowledgment of its difficulty. The remedy, of course, is Nullification; but he is far from using a word so familiar. There is but one mode, he remarks, by which the majority of the whole people can be prevented from oppressing the minority, or portions of the minority, and that is this: "By taking the sense of each interest or portion of the community, which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the government, separately, through its own majority, or in some other way by which its voice can be expressed; and to require the consent of each interest, either to put or to keep the government in motion." And this can only be done by such an "organism" as will "give to each division or interest either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or *a veto on their execution.*"

This is perfectly intelligible when read by the light of the history of 1833. But no human being unacquainted with that history could gather Mr. Calhoun's meaning. Our studious foreigner would suppose by the word "interest," that the author meant the manufacturing interest, the commercial and agricultural interests, and that each of these should have its little congress concurring in or vetoing the acts of the Congress sitting at Washington. *We*, however, know that Mr. Calhoun meant that South Carolina should have the power to nullify acts of Congress and give law to the Union. He does not tell us how South Carolina's tyrant Majority is to be kept within bounds; but only how that majority is to control the majority of the whole country. He has driven his problem into a corner, and there he leaves it.

Having thus arrived at the conclusion, that a law, to be binding on all "interests," i. e. on all the States of the Union, must be concurred in by all, he proceeds to answer the obvious objection, that "interests" so antagonistic could never be brought to unanimous agreement. He thinks this would present no difficulty, and adduces some instances of unanimity to illustrate his point.

First, trial by jury. Here are twelve men, of different character and calibre, shut up in a room to agree upon a verdict, in a cause upon which able men have argued upon opposite sides. How unlikely that they should be able to agree unanimously! Yet they generally do, and that speedily. Why is this? Because, answers Mr. Calhoun, they go into their room knowing that nothing short of unanimity will answer; and consequently every man is *disposed* to agree with his fellows, and, if he cannot agree, to compromise. "Not at all." The chief reason why juries generally agree is, that they are not interested in the matter in dispute. The law of justice is so plainly written in the human heart, that the fair thing is usually obvious to disinterested minds, or can be made so. It is interest, it is rivalry, that blinds us to what is right; and Mr. Calhoun's problem is to render "antagonistic" interests unanimous. We cannot, therefore, accept this illustration as a case in point.

Secondly, Poland. Poland is not the country which an American would naturally visit to gain political wisdom. Mr. Calhoun, however, repairs thither, and brings home the fact, that in the turbulent Diet of that unhappy kingdom every member had an absolute veto upon every measure. Nay, more: no king could be elected without the unanimous vote of an assembly of one hundred and fifty thousand persons.

Yet Poland lasted two centuries! The history of those two centuries is a sufficient comment upon Mr. Calhoun's system, to say nothing of the final catastrophe, which Mr. Calhoun confesses was owing to "the extreme to which the principle was carried." A sound principle cannot be carried to an unsafe extreme; it is impossible for man to be too right. If it is right for South Carolina to control and nullify the United States, it is right for any one man in South Carolina to control and nullify South Carolina. One of the tests of a system is to ascertain where it will carry us if it *is* pushed to the uttermost extreme. Mr. Calhoun gave his countrymen this valuable information when he cited the lamentable case of Poland.

From Poland the author descends to the Six Nations, the federal council of which was composed of forty-two members, each of whom had an absolute veto upon every measure. Nevertheless, this confederacy, he says, became the most powerful and the most united of all the Indian nations. He omits to add, that it was the facility with which this council could be wielded by the French and English in turn, that hastened the grinding of the Six Nations to pieces between those two millstones.

Rome is Mr. Calhoun's next illustration. The *Tribunus Plebis*, he observes, had a veto upon the passage of all laws and upon the execution of all laws, and thus prevented the oppression of the plebeians by the patricians. To show the inapplicability of this example to the principle in question, to show by what steps this tribunal, long useful and efficient, gradually absorbed the power of the government, and became itself, first oppressive, and then an instrument in the overthrow of the constitution, would be to write a history of Rome. Niebuhr is accessible to the public, and Niebuhr knew more of the *Tribunus Plebis* than Mr. Calhoun. We cannot find in Niebuhr anything to justify the author's aim to constitute patrician Carolina the *Tribunus Plebis* of the United States.

Lastly, England. England, too, has that safeguard of liberty, "an organism by which the voice of each order or class is taken through its appropriate organ, and which requires the concurring voice of all to constitute that of the whole community." These orders are King, Lords, and Commons. They must all concur in every law, each having a veto upon the action of the two others. The government of the United States is also so arranged that the President and the two Houses of Congress must concur in every enactment; but then they all represent the *same* order or interest, the people of the United States. The English government, says Mr. Calhoun, is so exquisitely constituted, that the greater the revenues of the government, the more stable it is; because those revenues, being chiefly expended upon the lords and gentlemen, render them exceedingly averse to any radical change. Mr. Calhoun does not mention that the majority of the people of England are not represented in the government at all. Perhaps, however, the following passage, in a previous part of the work, was designed to meet their case:—

> "It is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike;—a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous, and deserving; and not a boon to be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded, and vicious to be capable either of appreciating or of enjoying it."

Mr. Calhoun does not tell us who is to *bestow* this precious boon. He afterwards remarks, that the progress of a people "rising" to the point of civilization which entitles them to freedom is "necessarily slow." How very slow, then, it must be, when the means of civilization are forbidden to them by law!

With his remarks upon England, Mr. Calhoun terminates his discussion of the theory of government. Let us grant all that he claims for it, and see to what it conducts us. Observe that his grand position is, that a "numerical majority," like all other sovereign powers, will certainly tyrannize if it can. His remedy for this is, that a local majority, the majority of each State, shall have a veto upon the acts of the majority of the whole country. But he omits to tell us how that local majority is to be kept within bounds. According to his reasoning, South Carolina should have a veto upon acts of Congress. Very well; then each county of South Carolina should have a veto upon the acts of the State Legislature; each town should have a veto upon the behests of the county; and each voter upon the decisions of the town. Mr. Calhoun's argument, therefore, amounts to this: that one voter in South Carolina should have the constitutional right to nullify an act of Congress, and no law should be binding which has not received the assent of every citizen.

Having completed the theoretical part of his subject, the author proceeds to the practical. In his first essay he describes the "organism" that is requisite for the preservation of liberty; and in his second, he endeavors to show that the United States *is* precisely such an organism, since the Constitution, rightly interpreted, *does* confer upon South Carolina the right to veto the decrees of the numerical majority. Mr. Calhoun's understanding appears to much better advantage in this second discourse, which contains the substance of all his numerous speeches on nullification. It is marvellous how this morbid and intense mind had brooded over a single subject, and how it had subjugated all history and all law to its single purpose. But we cannot follow Mr. Calhoun through the tortuous mazes of his second essay; nor, if we could, should we be able to draw a corporal's guard of readers after us. We can only say this: Let it be granted that there *are* two ways in which the Constitution can be fairly interpreted; — one, the Websterian method; the other, that of Mr. Calhoun. On one of these interpretations the Constitution will work, and on the other it will not. We prefer the interpretation that is practicable, and leave the other party to the enjoyment of their argument. Nations cannot be governed upon principles so recondite and refined, that not one citizen in a hundred will so much as follow a mere statement of them. The fundamental law must be as plain as the ten commandments, — as plain as the four celebrated propositions in which Mr. Webster put the substance of his speeches in reply to Mr. Calhoun's ingenious defence of his conduct in 1833.

The author concludes his essay by a prophetic glance at the future. He remarks, that with regard to the future of the United States, as then governed, only one thing could be predicted with absolute certainty, and that was, that the Republic could not last. It might lapse into a monarchy, or it might be dismembered, — no man could say which; but that one of these things would happen was entirely certain. The rotation-in-office system, as introduced by General Jackson, and sanctioned by his subservient Congress, had rendered the Presidential office a prize so tempting, in which so large a number of men had an interest, that the contest would gradually cease to be elective, and would finally lose the elective form. *The incumbent would appoint his successor;* and "thus the absolute form of a popular, would end in the absolute form of a monarchical government," and there would be no possibility of even rendering the monarchy limited or constitutional. Mr. Calhoun does not mention here the name of General Jackson or of Martin Van Buren, but American readers know very well what he was thinking of when he wrote the passage.

Disunion, according to Mr. Calhoun, was another of our perils. In view of recent events, our readers may be interested in reading his remarks on this subject, written in 1849, among the last words he ever deliberately put upon paper: —

> "The conditions impelling the government toward disunion are very powerful. They consist chiefly of two; — the one arising from the great extent of the country; the other, from its division into separate States, having local institutions and interests. The former, under the operation of the numerical majority, has necessarily given to the two great parties, in their contest for the honors and emoluments of the government, a geographical character, for reasons which have been fully stated. This contest must finally settle down into a struggle on the part of the stronger section to obtain the permanent control; and on the part of the weaker, to preserve its independence and equality as members of the Union. The conflict will thus become one between the States occupying the different sections, — that is, between organized bodies on both sides, — each, in the event of separation, having the means of avoiding the confusion and anarchy to which the parts would be subject without such organization. This would contribute much to increase the power of resistance on the part of the weaker section against the stronger in possession of the government. With these great advantages and resources, it is hardly possible that the parties occupying the weaker section would consent quietly, under any circumstances, to break down from independent and equal sovereignties into a dependent and colonial condition; and still less so, under circum-

stances that would revolutionize them *internally*, and put their very existence as a people at stake. Never was there an issue between independent States that involved greater calamity to the conquered, than is involved in that between the States which compose the two sections of the Union. The condition of the weaker, should it sink from a state of independence and equality to one of dependence and subjection, would be more calamitous than ever before befell a civilized people. It is vain to think that, with such consequences before them, they will not resist; especially, when resistance *may* save them, and cannot render their condition worse. That this will take place, unless the stronger section desists from its course, may be assumed as certain; and that, if forced to resist, the weaker section would prove successful, and the system end in disunion, is, to say the least, highly probable. But if it should fail, the great increase of power and patronage which must, in consequence, accrue to the government of the United States, would but render certain and hasten the termination in the other alternative. So that, at all events, to the one or to the other — to monarchy or disunion — it must come, if not prevented by strenuous or timely efforts."

This is a very instructive passage, and one that shows well the complexity of human motives. Mr. Calhoun betrays the secret that, after all, the contest between the two sections is a "contest for the honors and emoluments of the government," and that all the rest is but pretext and afterthought, — as General Jackson said it was. He plainly states that the policy of the South is rule or ruin. Besides this, he intimates that there is in the United States an "interest," an institution, the development of which is incompatible with the advancement of the general interest; and either that one interest must overshadow and subdue all other interests, or all other interests must unite to crush that one. The latter has been done.

Mr. Calhoun proceeds to suggest the measures by which these calamities can be averted. The government must be "restored to its federal character" by the repeal of all laws tending to the annihilation of State sovereignty, and by a strict construction of the Constitution. The President's power of removal must be limited. In earlier times, these would have sufficed; but at that day the nature of the disease was such that nothing could reach it short of an organic change, which should give the weaker section a negative on the action of the government. Mr. Calhoun was of opinion that this could best be done by our having two Presidents, — one elected by the North and the other by the South, — the assent of both to be necessary to every act of Congress. Under such a system, he thought, —

> "The Presidential election, instead of dividing the Union into hostile geographical parties, the stronger struggling to enlarge its powers, and the weaker to defend its rights, as is now the case, would become the means of restoring harmony and concord to the country and the government. It would make the Union a union in truth, — a bond of mutual affection and brotherhood; and not a mere connection used by the stronger as the instrument of dominion and aggrandizement, and submitted to by the weaker only from the lingering remains of former attachment, and the fading hope of being able to restore the government to what it was originally intended to be, — a blessing to all."

The utter misapprehension of the purposes and desires of the Northern people which this passage betrays, and which pervades all the later writings of Mr. Calhoun, can only be explained by the supposition that he judged them out of his own heart. It is astounding to hear the author of the annexation of Texas charging the North with the lust of dominion, and the great Nullifier accusing Northern statesmen of being wholly possessed by the mania to be President.

Webster, Clay, and Calhoun, — these were great names in their day. When the last of them had departed, the country felt a sense of bereavement, and even of self-distrust, doubting if ever again such men would adorn the public councils. A close scrutiny into the lives of either of them would, of course, compel us to deduct something from his contemporary renown, for they were all, in some degree, at some periods, diverted from their true path by an ambition beneath an American statesman, whose true glory alone consists in serving his country well in that sphere to which his fellow-citizens call him. From such a scrutiny the fame of neither of those distinguished men would suffer so much as that of Calhoun. His endowments were not great, nor of the most valuable kind; and his early education, hasty and very incomplete, was not continued by maturer study. He read rather to confirm his impressions than to correct them. It was impossible that he should ever have been wise, because he refused to admit his liability to error. Never was mental assurance more complete, and seldom less warranted by innate or acquired superiority. If his knowledge of books was slight, his opportunities of observing men were still more limited, since he passed his whole life in places as exceptional, perhaps, as any in the world, — Washington and South Carolina. From the beginning of his public career there was a canker in the heart of it; for, while his oath, as a member of Congress, to support the Constitution of the United States, was still fresh upon his lips, he declared that his attachment to the Union was conditional and subordinate. He said that the alliance between the Southern planters and Northern Democrats was a false and calculated compact, to be broken when the planters could no longer rule by it. While he resided in Washington, and acted with the Republican party in the flush of its double triumph, he appeared a respectable character, and won golden opinions from eminent men in both parties. But when he was again subjected to the narrowing and perverting influence of a residence in South Carolina, he shrunk at once to his original proportions, and became thenceforth, not the servant of his country, but the special pleader of a class and the representative of a section. And yet, with that strange judicial blindness which has ever been the doom of the defenders of wrong, he still hoped to attain the Presidency. There is scarcely any example of infatuation more remarkable than this. Here we have, lying before us at this moment, undeniable proofs, in the form of "campaign lives" and "campaign documents," that, as late as 1844 there was money spent and labor done for the purpose of placing him in nomination for the highest office.

Calhoun failed in all the leading objects of his public life, except one; but in that one his success will be memorable forever. He has left it on record (see Benton, II. 698) that his great aim, from 1835 to 1847, was to force the slavery issue on the North. "It is our duty," he wrote in 1847, "to force the issue on the North." "Had the South," he continued, "or even my own State, backed me, I would have forced the issue on the North in 1835"; and he welcomed the Wilmot

Proviso in 1847, because, as he privately wrote, it would be the means of "enabling us to force the issue on the North." In this design, at length, when he had been ten years in the grave, he succeeded. Had there been no Calhoun, it is possible — nay, it is not improbable — that that issue might have been deferred till the North had so outstripped the South in accumulating all the elements of power, that the fire-eaters themselves would have shrunk from submitting the question to the arbitrament of the sword. It was Calhoun who forced the issue upon the United States, and compelled us to choose between annihilation and war.

ART. IV. — 1. *Lectures on the Science of Language, delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in April, May, and June*, 1861. By MAX MÜLLER, M. A. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863. 12mo.

2. *Die Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft. . . .* Von AUG. SCHLEICHER. Weimar. 1863. 8vo. pp. 29.

IT is no long time since those who are engaged in the study of language have begun to arrogate to it the rank and title of a science. For the philology even of the beginning of the present century no such claim had been advanced, and with reason: it was still mainly a special branch of historical investigation, engaged in eliciting information respecting the men and institutions of bygone days, from documents in which their deeds and fates had been deliberately recorded. Grammar was pursued for the practical end of gaining acquaintance with the language of these records. Etymology was the handmaid of lexicography, an aid in determining the meaning of words, and the history of their meaning. A little phonology helped the orderly exposition of the orthographical and orthoepical laws of the languages studied. It is not, indeed, to be denied that these and the various other constitutive and accessory departments of philology had their occasional outlooks toward something higher and broader. All the rudiments of linguistic science were already in being. General phonology, general etymology, general grammar, the relationships of languages in their varying degrees, and their bearing upon the genealogy of races, the historical development and origin of language, — all these had attracted the attention and engrossed the effort of human minds. They were matters of too engaging an aspect, of too pressing an interest, not to have absorbed a certain share of regard, from the time when men first began to inquire into things and their causes. But the attention had been fitful only, the effort too little sustained and too ill-directed to yield a science as their result. Empty hypotheses, baseless assumptions, inconclusive argumentation, were as rife in the study of language as in that of astronomy or of chemistry while yet in their preliminary stages of astrology and alchemy. To converge and concentrate the scattered inquiries and give them their true direction, to show the possibility of a science and make its growth practicable, there were wanting both the material and the method. The circumstances and tendencies of our time at length furnished both. The unequalled literary, commercial, and philanthropic activity of the nineteenth century opened the numberless dialects of the ancient and modern world to the knowledge of the student. He had but to assemble and arrange the facts thus put within his reach, and to draw conclusions from them in the now well-known manner of the other inductive sciences, to be guided to the results he was seeking. The collectors and first rude classifiers of languages, like Adelung and Vater, led the way. But of vastly more telling importance were the labors of those who, instead of skimming superficially the whole field, threw themselves upon a single limited part of it, and showed how language was to be fruitfully investigated. Such men were Grimm, who with incredible toil worked out the history of the Germanic dialects, making each explain the growth and character of all, and all of each; and Bopp, who solved a like problem in the higher terms of the Indo-European tongues, the tongues of Europe and Southwestern Asia. Here was the true beginning of linguistic science. The great mass of the languages of this family — descendants of a common original, covering a period of four thousand years in the past, with their numerous converging lines of linguistic development — supplied just the foundation that was needed for the science to grow up upon, elaborating its methods, getting fully into view its ends, and finding out the means of attaining them. The discovery of the Sanscrit came in at the right time to help the work notably forward. The great antiquity of this venerable mother of the dialects of India, its remarkable conservation of primitive material and forms, and its unrivalled transparency of structure, gave it the first place among all the tongues of the Indo-European family. Upon their comparison, already begun, it cast a new and brilliant light; showing forth clearly their hitherto obscure relations, rectifying their uncertain etymologies, and illustrating the laws of research which must be followed in their study, and in that of all other forms of human speech. What linguistic science might have become without such a basis as that afforded it in the Indo-European dialects, what Indo-European philology might have become without the Sanscrit, it is needless to speculate; certain it is that they could not have grown so fast, nor have reached the state of advancement in which we now behold them. But how ripe the age was for the birth of this new branch of human knowledge, how necessary an outgrowth it was of the circumstances amid which it arose, is shown by the fact that its principles were, more or less fully, worked out independently, at so nearly the same period, by several different scholars, — by Rask, Bopp, Grimm, Burnouf.

To follow out in detail the history of linguistic science, or to show what it is and what it attempts, is not, however, our present purpose. We wish rather to discuss a question, of no slight importance, bearing upon the position and relations of the science; a question respecting which there is great difference of opinion among those even who are its eminent cultivators. In the works whose titles are placed at the head of this article, it is distinctly claimed and argued that the study of language is a physical science, to be ranked along with zoölogy, botany, chemistry, geology; that it is not to be placed among those branches of knowledge which we are accustomed to call historical or moral. Now this is, at least, contrary to the popular impression prevalent through the community of scholars and cultivated men. General opinion classes the linguistic student with the philologist, the archæologist, the historian, the mental philosopher; nor have we yet observed that the physicists have hastened to welcome the linguists, in compliance with the claim set up in their behalf, into their own body, as engaged in pursuing the same end by like means with themselves. If the public mind is mistaken upon this point, the error should be pointed out and rectified; if the votaries of physical science are unreasonably exclusive and recalcitrant, they should be won over to a better disposition. But least of all can it be borne, that students of language should remain in doubt, or should differ among themselves, as to where and among whom their science and they belong. For the question is one which touches the very foundations of linguistic study; its decision must rest upon the view we take of the nature of language itself, and the nature of the power by which it is sustained in existence, changed, and developed. Is speech a natural product, and does it grow by forces inherent in itself, and independent of those by whom it is used? or is it the work of us who speak it, maintained, extended, altered, by our consenting action? — this is the real point involved in the discussion. Nor do the writers whose views we are to examine fail to see and distinctly state it thus. Müller acknowledges that if language is produced and changed by human agency, its study must be an historical science, not a physical; but he denies the premises, and asserts that, while "art, science, philosophy, and religion all have a history, language, or any other production of nature, admits only of growth." (p. 47.) And the text upon which Schleicher's whole exposition is founded runs as follows: "Languages are natural organisms, which, without being determinable by the will of man, arose, grew, and developed themselves, and again grow old and die out, according to determinate laws: to them, too, belongs that series of phenomena which we are wont to signify by the name 'life.' Glottic, accordingly, the science of language, is a natural science." (pp. 6, 7.)

This is also, as must be confessed, a view which finds an obvious support in much of our popular phraseology respecting language. We are accustomed often to speak of it as of something possessing an independent existence, apart from those who use it. We talk of living and dead languages, of the growth and decay of language, of its organic structure, of its laws of development; we refer to it as feeling tendencies, as adapting itself to the wants of a people, and much more of the same sort. What is the real meaning of all this? are we talking in plain facts, or are we, with an excusable inaccuracy, employing tropes and figures, not misled by them, but recognizing upon reflection the bare truths which they cover and adorn? Do we actually believe language a being, with a growth, or do we all the time know it to be an institution, with a history?

Nothing, it is believed, can lead us more directly and surely to distinctness of apprehension respecting these points than an inquiry into the way in which we came into possession of our own language, and the tenure by which we hold it. Why do we ourselves speak English as our native language, or mother tongue, instead of any other of the thousand varying forms of speech prevalent on the earth?

There can be but one answer to this question: we speak English because we learned it of those who surrounded us in our infancy and growing age. It is our mother tongue, because we caught it from the lips of our mothers; our native language, because we were born — not, indeed, into the possession of it, but — into the company of those who themselves already spoke it, having acquired it in the same manner before us. We were not left to work out by our own powers the great problem of how to talk. In our case, there was no development of language out of internal resources, by the reflection of phenomena in consciousness, by the action of a natural impulse, shaping ideas and creating suitable expression for them. No sooner were our minds so far matured that we were able intelligently to associate an idea and its sign, than we learned, first, to recognize the persons and things about us by the names which others applied to them, and then to apply to them the same names ourselves. Thus, in the beginning, we learned to stammer the names of father and mother, put, for our convenience, in the easiest accents which infant lips can frame. As we grew on, we gained daily more and more, partly by direct instruction, partly by imitation; those who had the care of us contracted their ideas and simplified their speech, to suit our feeble capacities; they watched with interest every new vocable we mastered, corrected our numberless errors, explained what we but half understood, laughed at us when we used longer words and more ambitious phrases than we could employ correctly or wield adroitly, and drilled us in the utterance of sounds which come hard to the beginner. The kind and degree of the training thus given, indeed, varied greatly in different cases, as did the provision made for the wants of childhood in respect to other matters; as, for instance, the food, the dress, the moral nurture. Just as some have to rough their way by the hardest paths through the scenes of early life, beaten, half starved, clad in scanty rags, while yet some care and provision were wholly indispensable, and no child could have lived through infancy without them, — so, in respect to language, many get but the coarsest and most meagre instruction, and yet instruction enough to help them through the first stages of learning how to speak, even if it consist merely in an example furnished for imitation. In the worst case, there must have been constantly before and around every one of us in our earliest years an amount and style of speech surpassing our acquirements and beyond our reach, but of which we constantly appropriated more and more, as we were able. In proportion as our minds increased in activity and power of comprehension, and our knowledge was augmented, our notions and conceptions were brought into shapes agreeing with those which they took in the minds about us, and were called by appellations already in familiar use. When we made acquaintance with certain common liquids, colorless or white, we had not to study their properties in order to devise suitable titles for them; we were taught that these were "water" and "milk." The one of them, when standing stagnant in patches, or sparkling between green banks, we styled, at the bidding of our instructors, "puddle" and "brook." An elevation rising blue in the distance, or towering nearer above our heads, struck our attention, and drew forth the staple inquiry of childhood, "What is that?" — the answer, "A mountain," "A hill," brought to our vocabulary one of the innumerable additions which it gained in a like way. Certain actions, incident to even the best-regulated childhood, much reproof taught us to know by the names "cry," "strike," "kick," "bite," and so on. Among the feelings of which we were conscious, we learned to signify one by the expression "I love"; an inferior degree of the same feeling we were made to distinguish by "I like," and their opposite by "I hate." Long before any process of analysis and combination carried on in our own minds would have given us the distinct conceptions of true and false, of good and naughty, they were carefully set before us, and their reception enforced by faithful admonition, or something yet more serious. The appellations of hosts of objects, of places, of beings, which we had never seen, and perhaps have not even yet seen, were made known to us by hearing or by reading, and direct instruction enabled us to attach to them some distinctive conception, more or less complete and adequate. Thus, for instance, we had not to cross the seas and traverse and coast about a certain island, in order to know that there is a country "England," and to hold it apart, by specific attributes, from other countries of which we obtained like knowledge by like means.

But enough of this illustration. It is already sufficiently clear that the acquisition of language was one of the steps of our early education. We did not make our own language, or any part of it; we implicitly received and appropriated, as well as we could, whatever was set before us. Independence of the general usages of speech was neither encouraged nor tolerated in us; nor did we feel tempted toward independence. Our object was to communicate with those among whom our lot was cast, to understand them and be understood by them. In order to this, we had to think and talk as they did, and we were content to do so. Why such and such a complex of articulations was applied to designate such and such an idea was to us a matter of indifference; it was enough that others so applied it; questions of etymology, of fitness of appellation, concerned us not. What knew or cared we, for instance, when the answer came to one of our inquiries after names, that *mountain* was brought into our speech from the Latin, and was originally an adjective, meaning "hilly, mountainous," while *hill* was of Germanic descent, and once had a *g* in it, which proved its relationship with the adjective *high?* We recognized no tie between any word and the idea represented by it, excepting a mental association, which we had ourselves established, under the guidance of others. Thus every vocable was an arbitrary and conventional sign: arbitrary, because any one of a thousand other vocables could have been just as easily learned by us and associated with the same idea; conventional, because the one we adopted had its sole ground and sanction in the consenting usage of the community of which we formed a part. Inheritance, then, had nothing to do with the transmission of speech to us. English descent would never have made us talk English. No matter of what race we were, if those about us had said *wasser* and *milch*, or *eau* and *lait*, instead of "water" and "milk," we should have done the same. It would have been no harder for us to learn *lieben* or *aimer* than "love," *Wahrheit* or *vérité* than "truth." An American or English mother, anxious that her child should grow up duly accomplished, gives it a French nurse, and takes care that no English be spoken in its hearing; and, though all its ancestors back to the Mayflower, or to the Conqueror, have been only Smiths, Browns, and Robinsons, it inevitably talks French first, as if this were its own "mother" tongue. An infant is taken alive from the arms of its drowned mother, the only waif cast upon the shore from the wreck of a strange vessel, and it acquires the tongue of its foster-parents: no outbreak of natural and hereditary speech ever betrays whence it derived its birth. The child of parents of different race and native speech learns the tongue of either, as circumstances and their choice may determine; or it learns both, and is equally at home in them, hardly knowing which to call its native language. The bands of Africans, stolen from their homes and imported into America, forget in a generation their Congo or Mendi, and learn a *patois* in which they can communicate with their fellow-slaves and with their masters. The Irish peasantry, mingled with and domineered over by English colonists, governed by English laws, feeling the whole weight, for good and for evil, of a superior English civilization, incapacitated from rising above a condition of poverty and ignorance without command of English speech, unlearn by degrees their native Celtic tongue, and substitute for it the dialect of the ruling and cultivated class.

Our acquisition of English, however, has as yet been but imperfectly described. In the first place, not only do we thus learn English, but we learn that peculiar form or local variety of English which is current among our instructors and models. Few can have been surrounded from birth by those only whose speech is wholly conformed to standards recognized as perfect. Few, then, can escape acquiring in their youth some tinge of local dialect, of slang characteristic of grade or occupation, of personal peculiarities even, belonging to their initiators into the mysteries of speech. These may be mere inelegances of pronunciation, appearing in individual words or in the general tone of utterance, like the nasal twang, and the flattening of *ou* into *ău*, which common fame injuriously ascribes to the Yankee; or they may be ungrammatical modes of expression, or uncouth and unusual turns and forms of construction; or favorite recurrent phrases, such as "I guess," "I calculate," "I reckon," "I expect," each having its own region of prevalence; or colloquialisms and vulgarisms, which ought to hide their heads in good English society; or words of dialectic currency, unknown to the general language; or other the like. All these we innocently learn along with the rest of our speech, not knowing how to distinguish the evil from the good. And often, as many find out to their cost, errors and infelicities are thus so deeply imprinted upon us in our childhood's years, that not all the instruction and care of after life can wholly wipe out their traces. It is not alone true that he who has thoroughly learned his mother tongue is thereby almost disqualified from ever attaining a native facility, correctness, and elegance in any foreign language; one may also so thoroughly acquire a bad style, a corrupt dialect of his native speech, as never to be able to ennoble it into a pure and cultivated diction. Yet, with us, the influences which tend to repress and eradicate local peculiarities and errors are numerous and powerful. School instruction, intercourse with correct speakers, reading of books,—which is but another form of such intercourse,—are the great safeguards which keep the popular speech what it ought to be. Our language is improved and perfected, as it was at first learned, by care and study, by the consulting of authorities, by following the example of those who speak better than ourselves.

Again, while the process of training thus described may give general correctness and ease, it does not confer universal command of the resources of the language. The vocabulary which the young child has learned to use is a very scanty one; it includes only the most indispensable part of speech, names for the commonest objects, the most ordinary and familiar conceptions, the simplest relations. You can talk with a child only on a certain limited range of subjects; a book not written especially for his benefit is in great part unintelligible to him. He has not yet learned its signs for thought, and they must be translated into others with which he is acquainted; or the thought is itself beyond the reach of his apprehension, the statement is outside the sphere of his knowledge. But in this regard we are all of us more or less children. Who ever yet got through learning his mother tongue, and could say, "The work is done"? The encyclopedic English language, as we may term it, the English of the great dictionaries, contains more than a hundred thousand words; and these are only a selection out of a greater mass. If all the signs for thought employed for purposes of communication by those who have spoken and who speak no other tongue than English were gathered together, the number stated would be vastly augmented. Of the one hundred thousand, it has been reckoned by careful observers that a considerable part of the English-speaking community, comprising the lowest and most ignorant class, learn to use not more than three thousand, which are, of course, like the child's vocabulary, the most necessary portion of the language, signs for the commonest and simplest ideas. To a nucleus like this, every artisan, though otherwise uninstructed, must add the technical language of his own craft, — names for tools, and processes, and products, which his every-day experience makes familiar to him, but of which the vast majority, perhaps, of those outside his own line of life know nothing. Ignorant as he may be, he can talk to you of a host of matters which you shall not understand. No insignificant part of the hundred-thousand-word list consists of a selection from such technical vocabularies. Every department of labor, of art, of science, has its special dialect, fully known only to those who have made themselves masters in that department. The world requires of every well-informed and educated person a certain amount of knowledge in many of them, along with a corresponding part of their peculiar languages; but he must be an Admirable Crichton indeed who has mastered them all. Where is the man who will not find, on each page of the comprehensive dictionaries now in vogue, many strange words, which need defining to his apprehension, which he could not be sure of employing in the right place and connection? And this, not in the technical portions only of our vocabulary. There are words, or meanings of words, no longer in familiar use, antiquated or obsolescent, which yet may not be denied a place in the English language. There are objects which almost never fall under the notice of great numbers of people, or of whole classes of the community, and to whose names, accordingly, when met with, these are unable to attach any definite idea. There are cognitions, conceptions, feelings, which have not come up before the minds of all, which all have not had occasion nor acquired power to express. Hence we cannot fail to draw the conclusion that there is no less difference between the vocabularies at the command of different classes and individuals, than between their modes of pronunciation and tones of utterance. It might be hard to find two persons, the limits of whose speech were precisely correspondent.

Once more, not all who speak the same tongue attach the same meaning to the words they utter. So far, indeed, as words are designations of definite objects, cognizable by the senses, there is little danger of our misapprehending one another when we speak of them. Yet there is room for no little discordance even here, as the superior knowledge or the more vivid imagination of one person gives to the idea called up by a name a far richer content than another can put into it. Two men talk of the sun; but to the one he is a mere ball of light and heat, which rises in the sky every morning, and goes down again at night; to the other, all that science has taught us respecting the nature of the great luminary, and its influence upon our little planet, is more or less distinctly present every time he utters its name. I feel a tolerable degree of confidence that the impressions of color made on my sense are the same with those made upon my friend's sense, so that, when we use the word "red," or "white," or "blue," we do not mean different things; and yet even here there is the possibility that one of us may be afflicted with some degree of color-blindness, so that we do not apprehend the same shades precisely alike. But just so is the personality of the speaker liable to make itself felt in the use of every part of language; most of all, of course, where matters of more subjective apprehension are concerned. The voluptuary, the passionate and brutal, the philosophic, and the sentimental, for instance, mean very different feelings when they speak of "love," or of "hate." Not half the words in our familiar speech, surely, would be identically defined by any considerable number of those who use them every day. It is needless to multiply illustrations. Who knows not that verbal disputes, discussions turning on the meaning of words, are the most frequent, bitter, and interminable of controversies? Words are not images of ideas, reflected in a faultless mirror, nor are sentences colored photographs of thoughts; they are but imperfect and fragmentary sketches, giving just outlines enough to enable the sense before which they are set up to seize the view intended, and to fill it out to a complete picture; while yet, as regards the completeness of the filling out, the details of the work, and the finer shades of coloring, no two minds will produce pictures perfectly accordant with one another, nor will any precisely reproduce the original.

Hence we are guilty of no paradox in maintaining that, while we all speak the English language, the English of each individual among us is different from that of every other: it is different in form; it is different in extent; it is different in meaning.

What, then, is the English language? We answer: It is the immense aggregate of the articulated signs for thought accepted by and current among a certain vast community, which we call the English-speaking people, embracing the principal portion of the inhabitants of our own country and of Great Britain, with all those who elsewhere in the world talk like them. It is the sum of the separate languages of all the members of this community. Or, as each one says some things, or says them in a way not to be accepted as in the best sense

English, it is their average rather than their sum; it is that part of the aggregate which is supported by the usage of the majority, — a majority not counted by numbers alone, but in great part also by culture and education. It is a mighty region of speech, of somewhat fluctuating and uncertain boundaries, of which each one occupies a portion, while a certain central tract is included in the portions of all. There they meet on common ground; off it, they are strangers to one another. Though one language, it includes numerous varieties, of greatly differing kind and degree, — individual varieties, class varieties, local varieties. Almost any two individuals who speak it may talk so as to be unintelligible to one another. The fact which gives it unity is, that all the individuals who speak it may, to a considerable extent, and on subjects of the most general and pressing interest, talk so as to understand each other.

How the language is kept in existence is clear from the foregoing exposition. It is preserved by an uninterrupted tradition. Each generation hands it down to the generation following. Every one is an actor in the process; in each separate person the language has, as we may say, a separate and independent existence, and each does what in him lies to propagate it, — that is, his own part of it, affected by his individual and inherited peculiarities. And weak and limited as may be the share of each one in the work, the sum of all constitutes the force which effects the transmission of the whole language. In the case of a language like ours, too, these private labors are powerfully aided and supplemented by the influence of a literature. Each book is a kind of undying individual, who talks often with much larger numbers than any living person can find access to, and teaches them to speak as he speaks. A great body of literary works of recognized merit and authority, in the midst of a people fond and proud of it, is an agent in the preservation and transmission of any tongue, the importance of which cannot easily be overestimated, and must be taken into account in all our inquiries into the history of languages. But each work is, after all, only a single person, with his limitations aud deficiencies, and with his restricted influence. Even Shakespeare, with his unrivalled wealth and variety of expression, uses but about fifteen thousand words, and Milton little more than half so many, — mere fragments of the encyclopedic English tongue. Nothing less than the combined effort of a community, with all its variety of needs, circumstances, and dispositions, is equal to the task of keeping instinct with life a dialect capable of answering the purposes of a community. A language would be soon shorn of its strength, if placed exclusively in the keeping of any individual or of any class.

No one, we are sure, can fail to allow that this is a true and faithful description of the process by which we acquire and transmit our "mother tongue." But the facts and conditions of which we have been treating are of no exceptional character; on the contrary, they are common to all the forms of speech current among the sons of men. Throughout the world, the same description, in all its essential features, will be found to hold good. Every spoken language is a congeries of individual signs, called words; and each word, with the exception of new creations, of which we shall take account later, was learned by every person who employs it from some other person who had employed it before him. He adopted it as the sign of a certain idea, because it was already in use by others as such. Inner and essential connection between idea and word, whereby the mind which conceives the one at once recognizes and produces the other, there is none in any language upon earth: it is all a matter of convention and tradition. The most important part of every spoken tongue, that which the child acquires, is received implicitly, without thought of a reason other than the authority of usage. In later life, in a greater or less degree, according as his curiosity happens to be turned in that direction, the man pleases himself with etymological inquiries, with tracing out why this and that word which he has learned or learns is used in the sense it bears; but the reason he discovers is only an external one, founded in history and tradition. It amounts to this, that other words had been previously used in certain other senses. He never arrives at an ultimate and necessary cause. As far as its history can be traced, — for we need not enter here into the recondite and difficult question of the absolute origin of human speech, — every existing language is a body of arbitrary and conventional signs for thought, handed down by tradition from one generation to another, no individual in any generation receiving or transmitting the whole body, but the sum of all the separate givings and takings being effective to maintain the language in essentially unimpaired integrity.

Hitherto, certainly, we have found nothing which should suggest to us the opinion that language has an independent life of its own; that it exists at all save in the minds of those who speak it, or can be subject to any influence which does not proceed from them. But we have been leaving out of sight one very important part of linguistic life, or linguistic history, whichever it may finally appear to be, and to this it becoms us next to turn our attention.

The process of transmission of speech is not a perfect one; it never succeeds in keeping any language entirely pure and unaltered. On the contrary, every spoken tongue is and always has been undergoing a slow process of alteration, — enough to effect, in course of time, a considerable change in its constitution, rendering it to all intents and purposes a new language, unintelligible to its former speakers. The modifications introduced are of every possible kind. The vocabulary is changed by the loss of part of its old substance and the acquisition of new; words already in use receive new meanings, in addition to, or in substitution for, those which they formerly possessed; words change their form and mode of pronunciation; the spoken alphabet is increased by elements heretofore unknown; means of grammatical expression are lost, others, perhaps, taking their places. Incessant change and growth are the inseparable accompaniment and sign of life in language, as everywhere else. By way of example, let us look at the history of our own tongue during the period of our historical knowledge of it. How much is there in our present familiar speech which would have been strange and unintelligible to a contemporary of Shakespeare! No well-informed man of that day could understand otherwise than very imperfectly what one of us might write or say upon matters of which our whole community are thinking and talking. How much, again, do we find in Shakespeare that is no longer good current English! — forms of construction, terms of expression, which never fall from our lips now except in quotation; scores of words which are obsolete, or not employed by us in their ancient signification. Go back still further, from half-century to half-century, and the case grows rapidly worse; and when we arrive at Chaucer, who is separated from us by a paltry interval of five hundred years, only fifteen or twenty descents from father to son, we meet with a dialect which has a half foreign look, and can only be read by careful study and with the aid of a glossary. Another like interval of five hundred years brings us to the Anglo-Saxon of King Alfred, which is absolutely a strange tongue to us, — not less unintelligible than the German of the present day, and nearly as hard to learn. And yet every one of those thirty or forty generations of Englishmen through whom we are descended from the contemporaries of King Alfred was as simply and single-mindedly engaged to transmit to its children the same language which it had received from its ancestors, as is the generation of which we ourselves form a part. Are we, then, compelled to acknowledge that there is in language a principle of growth, a tendency to variation, independent of the action of those who speak it, and too powerful for them to resist?

In order to answer the question intelligently and surely, we must examine a little more particularly the modes of change which together make up the growth of language.

The most rapid and noticeable of these is the variation which goes on without ceasing in the extent and meaning of the vocabulary of every spoken tongue. As the stock of words at the command of each individual is an approximate measure of the sum of his knowledge, so the stock of words composing a language is the expression of all that is known in the community. Speech which signifies more, or which indicates less, than is in the minds of its speakers, would be alike impossible. But every trade and handicraft, every science, every art, is constantly changing its materials, its processes, and its products; and its technical dialect must be modified accordingly, while so much of the results of the change as concerns the general public inevitably works its way into the common speech. As our material condition varies, as our ways of life, our institutions, private and public, become other than they have been, all is found reflected in our language. In these days of railroads, steamboats, and telegraphs, of sun-pictures, of chemistry and geology, of improved wearing-stuffs, furniture, styles of building, articles of food, and luxury of every description, how many words and phrases are in every one's mouth which would be utterly unintelligible to the most learned man of a century ago, were he to rise from his grave and walk our streets! Nor is it only in these grosser and more material ways that the necessity for the expansion of language arises. New views of the fundamental relations of things, new ideas in philosophy, in politics, in morals, in religion, equally, from time to time, demand and obtain their appropriate expression. Language, in short, expands and contracts in adaptation to the circumstances and needs of those who use it; it is enriched or impoverished along with the enrichment or impoverishment of their minds. Put an unlettered English family on a coral islet in the Pacific, and cut it off from intercourse with the rest of the world, and in two or three generations half the vocabulary with which it used to discuss the varied nature and the changeful experiences of its Northern life will have decayed and become extinct. Transfer, on the other hand, a tribe of savages from such an islet to a country like Iceland, and how rapidly will its speech grow in names and expressions for objects, processes, experiences, emotions, relations!

What agency, now, is efficient in bringing about the adaptation of human language to human circumstance? To maintain that it is any other than that of men themselves, would be the height of absurdity. Or is it to be believed that, when some individual has brought forth a product of any of the modes of activity, physical or intellectual, of which man is capable, language spontaneously extrudes a word for its designation? When an acute and learned Italian physician, in the last century, discovered a new physical agency, it got, we presume, the name "galvanism" in no other way than that some one christened it after its discoverer. Most of us remember how, not many years ago, a French *savant* devised a novel and universally interesting application of certain chemical processes, and, by some person whose authority the community ratified, the product was called a "daguerrotype"; and these two words are now as genuine and well-established parts of the English language as are "sun" and "moon," or "father" and "mother." The students of the earth's crust, since the beginning of the present century, have elicited a host of new facts in its history, have divided and classified its strata and their contents, have brought to light numberless relations, of cause and effect, of succession, of origin and value, which had hitherto lain hidden in it; and language has compliantly furnished the means for their expression. The whole technical vocabulary of geology has been brought into the English language within a few years past; but it would be hard to convince the geologists that the work was accomplished by any other instrumentality than their own. So with botany; so with metaphysics; so with any other branch of science or art whatever. Those who see are also those who say: the ingenuity that could find the thing was never at a loss to devise also the appellation. How the appellation is obtained is a matter not concerning our present question: whether it be merely a compound word or phrase; or an old member of our own vocabulary, turned to a new use without change of form; or a member of the vocabulary of another community, ancient or modern, pressed into our service with mutilation of form and tone, and with distortion of meaning, — it is equally an addition made by human means to the stores of expression of our mother tongue.

Nor is it otherwise with the rarer and obscurer cases in which are produced grammatical forms, those aids of another character to our resources for the distinct expression of thought. The student of linguistic science holds that all such forms are generated by the combination of two independent vocables: every formative element, whether suffix or prefix, was originally a separate word, which has grown on, as we often term it, to the root or theme of which it comes to form an appendage. The phrase "grown on" blinds to the true character of the process no one who has an open sense. It means only that men spoke the two words together until habit made them seem to belong to one another, and to constitute a single instead of a double entity. As *can* and *not* have "grown" into *cannot*, *fourteen* and *night* into *fortnight*, as *full* has been added to a long list of nouns, forming such compounds as *fearful*, *truthful*, *hopeful*, until it has almost come to seem to us a mere adjective suffix, like the *ous* of *duteous*, *perilous*, *piteous;* as the adverbial ending *ly* has "grown," by a succession of slight changes of form, meaning, and application, out of an oblique case of the adjective *like*, during the modern period of development of our language, — just so has it been back to the very beginning of the history of conjugations and declensions. Men said *je aimer ai*, "I have to love," until they found it easier and more convenient to say *j'aimerai*, "I shall love"; they said *I love did*, until it seemed to them desirable to convert it into *I love-d.* To suppose a force in action other than the human mind seeking means to its ends, — to assume any kind of vocabulary attraction, drawing the two elements together and making them coalesce into one, — were as palpably gratuitous here as we have found it in the other cases considered.

We have thus far given our attention chiefly to the causes which lead to the production of new words and phrases, or to the way in which a language is built up. But a not less important part of linguistic history depends upon the action of forces of a contrary character, — those which pull down a language, tending to the defacement and destruction of its existing material. The actual loss, indeed, of words and meanings of words from the outer or inner content of a vocabulary is too common and simple a phenomenon to require that we dwell upon it. It is sufficient that a word or phrase come to appear to those who have been accustomed to use it unnecessary and superfluous, whether as denoting something belonging only to a bygone time, or as superseded by a more acceptable expression, and they cease to employ and transmit it; it drops out of memory and out of existence, — unless, indeed, there be a literature to keep up its remembrance, and its memory, with due record of its history and departed worth, be deposited, labelled "obsolete," in a dictionary. Of vastly greater consequence, and demanding a more detailed exposition and illustration, are those wearing-out processes which, while they leave the identity of a word undestroyed, yet metamorphose and mutilate it, changing its substance, clipping off its members, until it is as unlike its former self, and as unrecognizable by its ancient acquaintance, as is the maimed and withered old cripple, grown out of the whole-limbed and blooming boy. Our own language is one of the most remarkable examples known in linguistic history of the excessive prevalence of these destructive tendencies. Thus, our verbs had once a declension as rich as that found in Greek or Sanskrit; our *am*, *art*, *is*, are the lineal descendants of *asmi*, *assi*, *asti*, used by our remote ancestors; where we say *we lie*, *ye lie*, *they lie*, they said *lagamasi*, *lagatasi*, *laganti*. Our adjectives, only a thousand years ago, were varied as fully as *bonus* or *agathos*, each in two different declensions, with three genders, and four or five cases in each number. The monosyllables, of which the Anglo-Saxon portion especially of our daily speech is in so great measure composed, are the scanty relics of long polysyllabic forms. Thus, to take one or two rather extreme examples, our *had*, in "we had," can be shown to stand for an original *habaidedeima*, our *alms* is an abbreviation of the Greek *eleēmosunē*. And, as in the case of *alms*, our written words are sown not sparingly with silent letters, relics of their latest changes of utterance, once essential elements of their phonetic structure, now dead and unfortunately not buried: take as instances *gnaw*, *psalm*, *doubt*, *plough*, *sword*, *chestnut*. Others are just through, or trying to pass through, a like process: in *often* and *soften*, good usage sides with the corruption, and accuses of being old-fashioned or affectedly precise the not insignificant class who still pronounce the *t*; while, on the other hand, it stigmatizes as vulgar those who presume to say *cap'n* for *captain*. So far has our spelling become divorced from our pronunciation, that we have hardly a letter that is not uttered in from two to a dozen different ways, hardly a sound that is not written in as many. And, strangest of all, our sense of the fitness of things has become so debauched by our training in the midst of vicious surroundings, that the great majority of us seriously believe and soberly maintain that this is a happy condition of things; that it is far better to spell our words as somebody else pronounced them, a long time since, than as we pronounce them ourselves!

But we are suffering ourselves to be enticed away from the conclusion at which we were aiming, which is this: as it is most conspicuously and universally true in English, so it is generally true in all language, that words do not maintain themselves unchanged in the form and semblance which belonged to them at the outset of their linguistic life. To trace upward the alterations which they have undergone, to determine the shapes they have successively worn, back, if possible, to the beginning, — and, at the same time, to discover their mutations of meaning, which are not less extensive and surprising, — is the business of the etymologist; and the labors of the etymologist are the foundation upon which rests the whole structure of the science of language.

This process of mutilation and corruption, of wearing out, of structural disintegration, of phonetic decay, or whatever else we may choose to style it, is one, accordingly, to which each separate constituent of every spoken tongue is, in varying degree and manner, alike exposed. And the reason is everywhere substantially the same, being inherent in the character of a word, as it has been already here defined. A word is not the natural counterpart of an idea, nor its depiction, nor even its definition; it is only its designation, an arbitrary and conventional sign with which we learn to associate it. Hence, when a word is originated as the sign of a conception, it is only necessary that there should be something accompanying it — as its connection with other signs, already accepted and understood, the circumstances in which it is used, an explanation given along with it, — any or all of these — which shall show clearly what it is meant to designate. The tie between sound and sense, always an external one, may be either close and obvious, or trivial and obscure. But when once the sign is accepted and its meaning recognized, — when once the association is established between it and the idea, — then the reason which prompted its selection is no longer a matter of consequence, and is willingly lost sight of; the original and proper meaning of the term, perhaps, remains for a time apparent to the mind that reflects upon it, but fades out and disappears altogether, or is recoverable only by an effort. Let us look at an example. There is a certain class of insects, the most brilliant and beautiful which the entomologist knows. Its most common species, both in the Old World and the New, are of a yellow color; clouds of these yellow flutterers, at certain seasons, swarm upon the roads and fill the air. Because, now, butter is or ought to be yellow, our simple and unromantic ancestors called the insect in question the "butterfly," as they called a certain familiar yellow flower the "buttercup." In our usage, this word has become the name, not of the yellow species only, but of the whole class. No one now invests it with the paltry and prosaic associations which would naturally cluster about it; it is, from long alliance in our thoughts with the elegant creatures which it designates, instinct with poetic beauty and grace. And, though its form is unmutilated, and its composition as clear as on the day when the words were first put together to make it, probably not one person in ten thousand of those who employ it has ever thought of its origin, or inquired why it was applied to the use in which it serves him.

Thus it is that in practice we disencumber our terms of the traditional remembrances which, if kept up, would draw off the attention desirable to be concentrated upon the sign and the thing signified. We tend to accept each word as an integral representative of the object or conception to which we attach it, and give our mind to that, not concerning ourselves with questions of etymologies. Practical convenience is made the paramount consideration, to which every other is obliged to give way. Hence follow those consequences which we are now considering, the mutilations and mutations of form to which every item of language is subjected. No sooner have we coined a word than we begin — not, of course, with deliberate forethought, but spontaneously, and as it were unconsciously — to see how the muscular effort expended in its utterance can be economized, how it can be contracted into a briefer form, how any difficult combination of sounds which it presents can be mouthed over into a shape better adapted for fluent utterance, what part of it can be spared without loss of intelligibility. We have put together, to form the title of a petty naval officer, the two words *boat* and *swain;* but the sailors have no leisure for a full pronunciation of such cumbrous compounds as *bōatswāin*, — they call it simply *bos'n;* and it is a chance if a single one among them who has not learned to read and write can tell you why he of the whistle goes by such a name. How many in the community would have a thought of the composition of *forehead*, if they did not see and spell as well as hear and speak it? Thousands of years ago, the forefathers of our division of the human family formed a termination for the first person plural for their verbs in a manner akin with that in which we, within the past thousand, have formed our adverbial ending *ly*, in *truly*, *fairly*, and so on; they compounded with their verbal root two pronouns, *ma*, meaning "me, I," and *si*, meaning "thou." *Laga-masi*, then, signified at first, in a manner patent to every speaker's apprehension, "lie — I and thou," that is to say, "we lie." But the consciousness of the origin and independent meaning of the ending soon becoming dimmed, its native condition being forgotten in its new office, it began to undergo the process of reduction to simpler form. In Latin it appears abbreviated of its final vowel; thus, *legi-mus*. In the ancient Gothic, it has been cut down to its initial letter, thus, *liga-m*, in which condition it is still sufficiently distinctive. But the growing habit of prefixing the pronouns to the verb in speaking had rendered the endings not indispensable; accordingly, the Anglo-Saxon had reduced the three plural terminations to a single norm, saying *licgath* for all; and we, finally, in that general decay of forms which attended the elaboration of our mixed speech out of the two discordant elements of Anglo-Saxon and Norman French, have carried the process of mutilation to its farthest possible limit, by casting off the suffixes altogether, and with them, in this particular verb, the final consonant of the root itself; we say "I lie, we lie, ye lie, they lie," without variation of form, and yet not feeling that we have given up any essential part of that distinctness which the fuller forms were at first created to secure.

It would be easy to offer much more abundant illustration, but what has been given is sufficient for our present purpose. To set forth and exemplify all the varieties of phonetic change would require much more space than we can spare for it. The main motive efficient in bringing them about is everywhere nearly the same, — the desire to make things easier, or, it were perhaps better to say, to make things convenient. What the phonetic history of language shows to have been more convenient to the speakers of this and that tongue is not always what to us may seem in itself easier. It is the part of the linguistic student to trace out all phonetic mutations, and to recognize, so far as he may, their ground, in the physical character and relations of the sounds concerned, in the positions and motives of the articulating organs by which those sounds are produced. But his power to account for the phenomena which he is treating has its limits. He can point out, in a host of cases, why certain sounds, in this or that position or combination, might easily and naturally pass over into such and such other sounds; but he can offer no real explanation of why the phonetic development of different languages takes so different a course; why sounds are found in the alphabet of one tongue which are unutterable by the speakers of another; why combinations which come easily from the organs of one people are painfully avoided by its neighbor and next of kin; why this race will tolerate no final consonant, that one no conjoined consonants, that other no hiatus between vowels; why here the final syllable of a word is always accented, and there the last but one, while yonder again quantity determines the place where the stress of voice shall rest, or it seems bound by no rule. These and their like are national idiosyncrasies, results of such subtile differences of organization, influences of circumstance and habit, whim and accident even, that they will ever baffle the study of the investigator. But he will not think of ascribing them in his perplexity to any other agency than that which brings about such phonetic changes as are most obviously a relief to the human organs; it is still the speakers of language who mouth over the words they utter, suiting them to their convenience and their caprice. We at present write *knight*, and pronounce it *nīt;* our ancestors spelled it *cniht*, and made every written element distinctly audible (giving the *i* our short *i*-sound, as in *pin*), just as the Germans even now both write and speak the same word *knecht*. It has undergone in our mouths a triple alteration; two of its changes are alleviations of the effort of utterance, and such as have numerous analogies in other constituents of our vocabulary: we have silenced *k* and *g* initial before *n* in not a few other words, as also everywhere the guttural *b* after a vowel. The third change, the conversion of the simple *i*-sound into the diphthongal *âi*, of which that sound is only the final element, is also so common with us that we have come to know the diphthong by the name of "long *i*." The original *u*'s of the Anglo-Saxon have in almost equal number been made over into *ou*'s, as in our *hound* for Anglo-Saxon *hund*, also *mouth* for *mûth*, etc., by a precisely similar process. These last are cases of an increase and strengthening, instead of a diminution, of the sound; while yet it is impossible to look upon the augmentation of the vowel in *knight* as due to the action of one kind of force, and the loss of two of its consonantal elements as caused by another. It is very hard to see why the Armenian language has converted its ancient surd mutes into sonants, and its sonants into surds, just as it is hard to see why the London dialect drops its initial *h*'s and aspirates its initial vowels; it is yet more mysterious that, in all Germanic speech, the surd, aspirate, and sonant mutes should have been made to exchange places with one another. We have no reason to doubt, however, that the Armenians and Germans were the real agents in bringing about the first and last mutations, any more than that the cockneys are to blame for the other.

It was necessary to dwell and insist a little upon this point, because some eminent linguistic authorities, while fully acknowledging that most of the phenomena of phonetic change are to be referred to the action of human beings, endeavoring to economize the muscular effort expended in articulation, yet seek to make exceptions of all cases which are not distinctly traceable to such a tendency, and to ascribe them to some mysterious and indefinable force inherent in language itself.

We have now completed our cursory review of the processes of linguistic life, — the birth of language in the individual, the mode of its propagation, and the growth and development which attend its continued existence. And we have found nowhere any phenomena requiring for their explanation the assumption of an agency apart from that of the users of language. Such an assumption is uncalled for by the facts which the research of the student brings to light; it is emphatically excluded by the fundamental view of language which those facts force upon his acceptance. What independent life, what effective force, can there be in a system of words, each one of which is a mere complex of articulated sounds, learned by us by imitation of the utterance of some one else, and applied as the sign of an object or conception in obedience to another's authority, or altered in the using, according to the exigencies of practical life, under the impulse of motives which are for the most part distinctly traceable? On what foundation, then, can rest the opinion of those who deny that language is or can be changed by men, and attribute to it the possession of inherent vital forces?

Professor Scleicher does not enter into a discussion of the doctrine, either in the little pamphlet which we have already cited, or in the fuller exposition of his linguistic philosophy given in the Introduction to his book on the German Language,* — a most interesting and instructive work, though not a little marred, in our opinion, by some such fundamentally erroneous views as the one now under discussion. He only assumes its truth as incontrovertible and unquestioned, and repeatedly asserts it in strong and confident terms. One of his statements of it has been quoted above. In the larger work he speaks, in a certain place (p. 118), of "language, supplied by Nature, subjected to unalterable laws of development, and possessing a constitution as wholly beyond the reach of the individual, as, for instance, it is out of the power of the nightingale to change her song." And again (p. 39): "One can no more invent a language than a rose or a nightingale." Now it was not intended, doubtless, that the comparisons here made should be taken as arguments; nevertheless, as they are the nearest approach to arguments which our author furnishes us, it is hardly possible to avoid scanning them a little closely, to see what force they may have as analogies. If the nightingale's song expressed knowledge, experience, reflection, instead of being a mere instinctive outburst of enjoyment of life; if it changed its character from generation to generation, and varied greatly among the birds of different districts; if the callow philomel learned it painfully from his parents while fledging, and perfected it by after intercourse with others of his race; if the young nightingale brought up by hand in a cage, alone, would never know how to sing, and, if nursed by a crow, a quail, or a canary-bird, would caw, or whistle, or trill, like his foster-parents, — then would there be an analogy between the song of the bird and the language of a human being, and it would become our duty seriously and earnestly to inquire — as Professor Schleicher does not think it worth while to do in the case of language — whether the nightingale had not something to do with determining her own notes, instead of their being airy entities, which lived and grew and changed of themselves in her throat. As the matter stands, the comparison is utterly meaningless; it has not so much ground to rest upon as could be covered with the point of a needle. That which in man can be paralleled with the bird's song is his laugh, his cry, his cough, his sneeze; these he can, in truth, no more change than the nightingale can change her note.

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* *Die Deutsche Sprache.* Von August Schleicher. Stuttgart, 1860. 8vo. pp. vi., 340.

Professor Müller is more explicit, and allows us to see not only his opinion, but the reasons on which he founds it. After saying (p. 47) that, "although there is a continuous change in language, it is not in the power of man either to produce or to prevent it: we might think as well of changing the laws which control the circulation of our blood, or of adding an inch to our height, as of altering the laws of speech, or inventing new words according to our own pleasure," — he goes on to cite cases in which two famous Emperors, Tiberius of Rome, and Sigismund of Germany, committed blunders in their Latin, and were taken to task and corrected by humble grammarians, who informed their imperial Majesties that, however great and absolute their power might be, it was not competent to produce an alteration in the Latin language. The argument and conclusion we may take to be of this character: if so high and mighty a personage as an Emperor could not do so small a thing as alter the gender and termination of a single word, — not even, as Sigismund attempted, in a language which was dead, and might therefore be supposed incapable of defending itself against the indignity, — much less can any one of inferior consideration hope to accomplish such a change, or any other of the changes, of greater or less account, which make up the history of speech; therefore, language is incapable of alteration by its speakers.

The futility of drawing so important a conclusion from this pair of anecdotes, or from a score or a thousand like them, is almost too obvious to be worth pointing out, and the philosophy deserves to be called shallow which can blind itself with such a fallacy. We could readily counterbalance them with ten times as many, in which the *fiat* of an individual should be seen to have established or altered for all time some constituent of language. Let us refer to one or two familiar cases. As the first schooner ever built, here on the coast of Massachusetts, slid off her stocks and swam gracefully on the water, the chance exclamation of an admiring by-stander, "O, how she *scoons!*" drew from her contriver and builder the answer, "A *scooner* let her be, then," and made a new English word,—one invented, Müller to the contrary notwithstanding, "according to the own pleasure" of an individual. Ethnologists well know that the name of the so-called "Tartar" race is properly *Tatar*, and they are now endeavoring to restore this, its more correct orthography. The intrusion of the *r* has been accounted for in the following manner. When, in the reign of St. Louis of France, the hordes of this savage race were devastating Eastern Europe, the tale of their ravages was brought to the pious king, who exclaimed with horror, "Well may they be called *Tartars*, for their deeds are those of fiends from Tartarus!" The appositeness of the metamorphosed appellation made it take; and from that time French authors—and, after their example, the rest of Europe—called the *Tatars* "Tartars." Whether the story is incontestably authentic or not is of little account; any one can see that it might be true, and that such causes may have produced such effects times innumerable.

The error under which our authors labor is a fundamental and highly important one, and vitiates no small part of the linguistic philosophy of the present generation of writers on language. They do not sufficiently recognize the fact, that language, in its inception and through its whole history, is the work of a community; that the ideas of language and community are everywhere inseparable. Speech is not a personal, but a social possession; it belongs, not to the individual, but to the member of society. A solitary man would never form a language; a pair, a family, a tribe, a race, could not live a lifetime without one, though they began as mute as the young nightingales. A Robinson Crusoe almost loses through disuse his own once familiar tongue; a Swiss Family Robinson not only keep up theirs, but enrich it with expressions for all the new and strange places and products with which their novel circumstances bring them in contact. Speech does not, as is wont to be assumed, grow up within the individual as a natural reflex of his thoughts; he neither evokes nor produces it for his private benefit, that his ideas may stand more distinct before his own sense, that he may know them better and combine them more effectually: it is called out by his wish to communicate with his fellows. The first word was no spontaneous outburst, realizing to the mind of the utterer the conception with which he was swelling; it was the successful result of an endeavor to arrive at a sign by which his conception should be called up also in the mind of another. The desire of communication called forth speech; the possibility of communication, as we have already seen, is the only tie which makes the unity of a spoken tongue; the necessity of communication is the force which restrains the indefinite variation of language, and makes the individual, while he alone acts upon it, to preserve or alter it, act through and by the community of which he forms a part. Every sign which I utter, I utter by a voluntary effort of my organs, over which my will has indefeasible control; I may alter the sign to any extent I please, and as I please, even to the extent of substituting for it some other wholly new sign; only, if I shock by so doing the sense of those about me, or make myself unintelligible to them, I defeat the very end for which I speak at all. It constitutes no argument against the view we are defending, to urge that the individual mind, without language, would be a dwarfed and powerless organ. This is indeed true, but it means simply that man could develop his powers, and become what he was meant to be, only in society, by converse with his fellows. He is by his essential nature a social being, and his most precious individual possession, his speech, he gets only as a social being.

The maxim, *Usus norma loquendi*, "Usage is the rule of speech," is old and trite enough. But we are apt to look upon it as applying rather to the minor proprieties of speech, the niceties of expression, than to anything higher and deeper; while, in fact, it is the fundamental and universal law of language: we can give no other reason for anything we say than that "such is the usage." He who can direct usage, accordingly, can make language. Against what law more mighty than themselves did Müller's two Emperors offend? Against the immemorial and well-defined usage of those who wrote and had ever written Latin, — nothing else. What was their individual authority against this? An Emperor's grammatical blunders have no title to become the law of language, any more than those of the private man, except as fawning courtiers may imitate them, or conspicuous station may give them a more advantageous start toward the currency which they must win before they are language. The users of speech constitute a republic, or rather a democracy, in which authority is conferred only by general suffrage and for due cause, and is exercised under constant supervision and control. The builder of the first schooner was allowed to determine what it should be called by all the world, because the new thing wanted a new name, and there was no one else so well entitled as he to name it. If he had assumed to rebaptize a man-of-war a "schooner," no one but his next neighbors would ever have heard of the attempt. The discoverer of a new asteroid is permitted to select its title, provided he choose the name of a classical divinity, as is the established precedent for such cases; though, even then, he is liable to have the motives of his choice somewhat sharply looked into. The English astronomer who, a few years since, sought, with a more than becomingly obsequious loyalty, to call his planetling "Victoria," was compelled to retract the appellation and offer another.

If — to recur to our former illustrations — Galvani had denominated his new principle "popsticks," or if Daguerre had styled his sun-pictures "Aldiborontiphoscophornios," although these names would have been not less suitable than *galvanism* and *daguerrotype* in the apprehension of the masses, who never heard of the learned discoverers, and could not appreciate the etymological aptness of *type*, yet those who are accustomed to direct public opinion in such matters would have revolted, and substituted other titles which seemed to them to possess an apparent reason and applicability. In a language circumstanced like ours, a conscious and detailed discussion not infrequently arises on the question of admitting some new word into its recognized vocabulary. We all remember the newspaper controversy, not long since, as to whether we ought to call a message sent by telegraph a "telegraph" or a "telegram"; and many of us, doubtless, are waiting to see how the authorities settle it, that we may govern our own usage accordingly. Again, we have a suffix *able*, which, like a few others that we possess, we employ pretty freely in forming new words. Within no very long time past, some writers and speakers have added it to the verb *rely*, forming the adjective *reliable*. The same thing must have happened at nearly the same time with other verbs, awakening neither question nor objection; while *reliable* is still shut out from the best, or at least from the most exclusive, society in English speech. And why? Because, in the first place, say the objectors, the word is unnecessary; we have already *trustworthy*, which means the same thing: further, it is formed improperly and falsely; as we say "to rely *on*" anything, the derivative adjective, if one is made, ought to be *relionable*, not *reliable:* finally, the word is low-caste; A, B, and C, those prime authorities in English style, are careful never to employ it. The other side, however, are obstinate, and do not yield the point. The first objection, say they, is insufficient, for no one can justly oppose the enrichment of the language by a synonyme, which may yet be made to distinguish a valuable shade of meaning, — nay, which already shows signs of doing so, as we tend to say "a *trustworthy* witness," but "*reliable* testimony." The second is false; English grammar is by no means so precise in its treatment of the suffix *able* as the objectors claim: it admits *laughable*, meaning "worthy to be laughed *at*," *unaccountable*, "not to be accounted *for*," *indispensable*, "not to be dispensed *with*," with many others of the same sort; and even *objectionable*, "liable to objection," *marriageable*, "fit for marriage," and so forth. As for the third objection, whatever A, B, and C may do, D, F, and H, with most of the lower part of the alphabet, including nearly all the Xs, Ys, and Zs, the unknown quantities, use the new form freely, and it is in vain to stand out against the full acceptance of a word which is supported by so much and so respectable authority. How the dispute is likely, or ought, to terminate, need not concern us here ; it is referred to only because, while itself carried on consciously, and on paper, it is a typical illustration of a whole class of discussions which go on silently, and even more or less unconsciously, in every mind before which is presented, for acceptance or rejection, any proposed alteration in the usages of spoken speech. Is it called for ? Is it accordant with the analogies of the language ? Is it offered or backed by good authority ? These are the considerations by which general consent is won or repelled ; and general consent decides every case without appeal.

Those gradual changes which bring about the decay of grammatical structure, or the metamorphosis of phonetic form, in a language, go on in a yet more covert and unacknowledged way than the augmentations of its vocabulary. They are by their origin, almost universally, of the nature of blunders, inaccuracies of speech, vulgarisms, neglect or confusion of customary distinctions, mispronunciations. Their final prevalence attests the power and influence of that immense numerical majority among the speakers of almost every language who are not careful to speak correctly, but whose errors are by degrees forced upon the better-instructed class and adopted by them, so that they become the rule of good speech. We have seen that the transmission of language is by tradition. But traditional transmission is by its inherent character defective. If a story cannot pass a few times from mouth to mouth and maintain its integrity, neither can a word pass from generation to generation and keep its original form. Very young children, as every one knows, so mutilate their words and phrases that only those who are most familiar with them can understand them. But even an older child, who has learned to speak in general with tolerable correctness, has a special inaptness to utter a particular sound, and either omits it altogether or puts a substitute in its place. It drops a syllable or two from a long and cumbrous word. Having learned by prevailing experience that the past tense of a verb is formed by the addition of a *d*, it imagines that, because it says "I loved," it must also say "I bringed"; or else, perhaps, remembering *I sang* from *I sing*, it says "I brang." It says "foots" and "mouses"; it says "gooder" and "goodest"; it confounds *sit* and *set*, *lie* and *lay* (which confusion, indeed, is most disgracefully common even among the adult and educated). Care, on its part and that of others, corrects by degrees such childish errors; but the care is often wanting or insufficient. And so long as the learning of language continues, so long continues the liability to this uncorrected misapprehension or inaccurate reproduction. Hence there always lies, in full vigor and currency, in the lower regions of language-speaking, as we may term them, a great host of deviations from good usage, sins against the proprieties of speech, kept down in the main by the combating influence of good speakers, yet all the time threatening to rise to the surface, and now and then succeeding, and forcing recognition from even the best authorities. He *spoke* was doubtless long a prevalent vulgarism, like he *come* or he *done* among us, before it finally crowded out of use he *spake*. Only two or three centuries ago, *its* was as shocking to the ear of the correct English speaker as *she's*, for *her*, would be at present; but few of us now read our Bibles so closely as to find out that they contain no such word. *You are* for *ye are*, and yet more for *thou art*, was once as detestable an offence against grammar as is the Quaker's *thee is* in our ears.

The circumstances among which we live are more favorable to the faithful transmission of language than any that have been known before, in any age or country of the world. The almost universal diffusion of instruction, the reading of the same books, the hearing of the same speakers, the social and public intercourse among all classes of our community, give an unprecedented force to the influences conservative of the English tongue, and there is no reason to fear that its structure will suffer during the next thousand years a tithe of the change of the past thousand. But, rapid or slow, its growth is always due to the same causes. Each one of us tries his series of experiments in the modification of his mother tongue, from the time when, as a child, he mutilates his words and frames inflections upon false analogies, to that when, as a man, he is guilty of slang and bad grammar, or indulges in mannerisms and artificial conceits, or diverts words from their true uses, through ignorance or caprice. But his individual authority is too weak to prevail against general usage; his proposals, unless in special cases and for special reasons, are passed unnoticed, and he is forced to conform his speech to that of the rest; or, if he insist on his independence, he is contemned as a blunderer or laughed at as a humorist.

Thus it is indeed true, as claimed by our authors, that the individual has no power to change language. It is true, however, otherwise than as they understand it; not in any sense that denies the agency of the individual, but only as that agency is confessed to be inoperative save so far as it is accepted and ratified by those about him. Speech and the changes of speech are the work of the community; but there is no way in which the community can act except through the initiative of its individual members, which it follows or rejects. The fluent and shallow decriers of the conventionality of language are accustomed to maintain that the doctrine implies an assembling together of language-makers, and a deliberate discussion as to what shall be expressed, and how; and their opposition to it is grounded upon this absurd misrepresentation of its meaning. But that one man proposes, and that his comrade, his family, his locality, or his country accepts, and that the proposed sign or modification of a sign is understood and passes current, is language as far as it is accepted and no farther, — this is linguistic convention, the convention which makes and changes language, from its primitive inception down to the very latest stages of its history.

It must not be left unobserved that those even who hold the general view that man has nothing to do with the making of speech, yet in detail abundantly admit his interference. Thus Schleicher himself (German Language, p. 49) teaches that all phonetic change in language is the immediate result of the impulse to make things easy for our organs of speech; whether this is not more than the nightingale does to her song, we must leave him to settle. Still more does Müller, in numerous passages, put forth and defend opinions which are utterly opposed to his fundamental dogma. He has frequent glimpses of the truth, more or less clear; but he is unable to hold them steadily in view, to see how they stand related to one another, and to combine them into a whole. He speaks, for instance (p. 50), of the first impulse to a new formation in language as given by an individual, while yet "the results apparently produced by him depend on laws beyond his control, and on the co-operation of all those who form together with him one class, one body, or one organic whole." Leave out here the "laws," or understand them to be merely the laws of man's own individual and social nature and the laws imposed by the circumstances in which he is placed, — laws which govern his action in all other respects as well as in regard to language, — and we could ask nothing truer or more telling. But, in the next sentence, he conceives himself to have "just shown that language cannot be changed or moulded by the taste, the fancy, or the genius of man." Again, on the following page, he most justly denounces, as sheer mythology, our speaking "of language as a thing by itself, as living a life of its own, as growing to maturity, producing offspring, and dying away." And so, as he has denied the only two possibles, — the growth of language by itself, and the agency of man in producing its seeming growth, — we are not surprised when he declares that "it is very difficult to explain what causes the growth of language." In the presence of such confusion and uncertainty of thought as this, we can only judge him by the opinion which he holds and asserts with most confidence, namely, that language is not and cannot be affected by man, and that therefore its study is a physical science.

Our own conclusion is precisely the opposite of this. In our view, every creation or alteration in human speech, of whatever kind and of whatever degree of importance, goes back to some individual or individuals, who set it in circulation, from whose example it gained a wider and wider currency, until it finally won that general assent which is alone required to make anything in language proper and authoritative. The work of each individual is, indeed, done unpremeditatedly, or as it were unconsciously; each is intent only on using the common possession for his own benefit, serving therewith his individual ends;

but each is thus at the same time an actor in the great work of shaping and of perpetuating the general speech. So each separate polyp on a coral-bank devotes himself simply to the securing of his own food, and to the excretion of calcareous matter which is of no service to him; but, as the joint result of the isolated labors of all, there slowly rises in the water the enormous coral-cliff, a barrier for the waves to dash themselves against in vain. No one ever set himself deliberately at work to invent or improve language, or did so, at least, with any valuable and abiding result; it is all accomplished by a continual satisfaction of the need of the moment, by ever yielding to an impulse and grasping a possibility which the already acquired treasure of words and forms, and the habit of their use, suggest and put within reach. In this sense is language a growth; it grows with the expansion of human needs and capacities, and in adaptation to them.

Of the same purely figurative character is all the phraseology to which we referred at the outset of our discussion as popularly current in regard to human speech. It is founded on analogies, striking and instructive; its use is to be deprecated only when it is mistaken, as is too often the case, for the expression of simple objective truth. A language, like an organized body, is no mere aggregate of particles; it is a complex of related and mutually helpful parts. As such a body grows by the accretion of something homogeneous with its own structure, as its already existing organs form the new addition, and form it for a determined purpose, — to aid in the general life, and to help the performance of the natural functions of the organized being, — so is it also with language; its new stores are formed from, or assimilated to, its already existing material; it enriches itself with the evolutions of its own internal processes, and in order to secure more fully the end of its being, the expression of the thought of those to whom it belongs. Its rise, development, decline, and extinction are like the birth, increase, decay, and death of a living creature. But there is a still closer parallelism between the life of language and that of the animal kingdom at large. The speech of each individual is, as it were, an individual of a species, with its general inherited conformity to the specific type, but also with its individual peculiarities, its tendencies to variation and the formation of new species. The dialects, languages, groups, families, stocks, set up by the linguistic student, correspond with the varieties, species, genera, and so on, of the zoölogist. And the questions which the students of nature are so excitedly discussing at the present day, — the nature of specific distinctions, the derivation of species from one another by individual variation and natural selection, the unity of animal life in its inception,—all bear the nearest resemblance to those of which the linguistic student has constant occasion to treat. We cannot here dwell upon the comparison; it may be found drawn out by Lyell, in his work on the Antiquity of Man (Chapter XXIII.), with admirable skill, and an insight into the phenomena of speech which might shame many a professed philologist; and it is made by him the foundation of a highly interesting analogical argument bearing on the mutation of species. It is also the groundwork of Schleicher's little work, of which the title is placed at the head of this article. The author, who had been urged to the perusal of Darwin's book on the Origin of Species by one of his colleagues, an ardent Darwinian, here renders the latter an account of the results of his study. He, too, fully accepts the new theory of the development of species, and not upon Darwin's grounds alone, but because he regards it as proved true by the parallel and essentially similar facts of the development of language. It is unnecessary to point out that the proof is nugatory, because the correspondence is not essential, but analogical only: we cannot but be surprised at finding a sounder appreciation of the nature of linguistic phenomena in the English geologist than in the German philologist.

Again, a noteworthy and often-remarked similarity exists between the facts and methods of geology and those of linguistic study. The science of language is, as it were, the geology of the latest period, the Age of Man, having for its task to construct the history of development of the earth and its inhabitants from the time when the geological record becomes silent; when man, no longer a mere animal by the aid of language, begins to bear witness respecting his own progress and that of the world about him. The remains of ancient speech are like strata deposited in bygone ages, telling of the forms of life then existing, and of the circumstances which determined or affected them; while words are as rolled pebbles, relics of yet more ancient formations; or as fossils, whose grade indicates the progress of organic life, and whose resemblances and relations show the correspondence or succession of the different strata; while, everywhere, extensive denudation has marred the completeness of the record, and rendered impossible detailed exhibition of the whole course of progress.

Yet farther analogies, hardly less striking than these, might doubtless be found by a mind curious of such things. But they would be, like these, analogies merely, interesting as illustrations, but becoming fruitful of error when, letting our fancy run away with our reason, we allow them to determine our fundamental views respecting the nature of language and of its study; when we call human speech a living and growing organism, or pronounce linguistics a physical science, because zoölogy and geology are such. Language is, in fact, an institution, — the word is an awkward one, but we can find none better, — the work of those whose wants it subserves; it is in their sole keeping and control; it has been by them adapted to their circumstances and wants, and is still everywhere undergoing at their hands such adaptation; every separate item of which it is composed is the product of a series of changes, effected by the will and consent of men, working themselves out under historical conditions, and conditions of man's nature, and by the impulse of motives, which are still more or less traceable. These considerations determine the character of the study of language as an historical or moral science. It is a branch of the history of the human race and of human institutions. It calls for aid upon various other sciences, both moral and physical; upon mental and metaphysical philosophy, for an account of the associations which underlie the developments of signification, and of the laws of thought, the universal principles of relation, which fix the outlines of grammar; upon physiology, for explanation of the structure and mode of operation of the organs of speech, and the physical relations of articulate sounds, which determine the laws of euphony, and prescribe the methods of phonetic change; upon physical geography and meteorology, for information respecting material conditions and climatic aspects, which have exerted their influence upon linguistic growth. But the human mind, seeking and choosing expression for human thought, stands as middle term between all determining causes and their results in the development of language. It is only as they affect man himself, in his desires and tendencies or in his capacities, that they can affect speech. The immediate agent is the will of man, working under the joint direction of impelling wants, governing circumstances, and established habits. What makes a physical science is, that it deals with material substances, acted on by material forces. In the formation of geological strata, the ultimate cognizable agencies are the laws of matter; the substance acted on is tangible matter, the product is inert, insensible matter. In language, on the other hand, the ultimate agencies are intelligent beings, the material is sound made significant of thought, and the product is of the same kind, a system of sounds with intelligible content, expressive of the slowly accumulated treasure of the human race in wisdom, experience, comprehension of itself and of the rest of creation. What but an analogical resemblance can there possibly be between the studies of things so essentially dissimilar?

There is a certain school of modern philosophers who are trying to *naturalize* all science, to eliminate the distinction between the physical and the intellectual and moral, to declare for naught the free action of the human will, and to resolve the whole story of the fates of mankind into a series of purely material effects, produced by assignable physical causes, and explainable in the past, or determinable for the future, by an intimate knowledge of those causes, by a recognition of the action of compulsory motives upon the obedient nature of man. With such, language will naturally pass, along with the rest, for a physical product, and its study for a physical science; and however we may dissent from their general classification, we cannot criticise its application in this particular instance. But by those who still hold to the grand distinction of moral and physical sciences, who think the action of intelligent beings, weighing motives and selecting courses of conduct, seeing ends and seeking means for their attainment, to be fundamentally different from that of atoms moved by gravity, chemical affinity, and the other invariable forces of nature, as we call them, — by such, the study of language, whose dependence upon voluntary action is so absolute that not one word ever was or will be uttered without the distinct exertion of the human will, cannot but be regarded as a moral science; its real relationship is with those branches of human knowledge among which common opinion is wont to rank it, — with mental philosophy, with philology, with history.

One motive — in great part, doubtless, an unconscious one — impelling certain students of language to claim for their favorite branch of investigation a place in the sisterhood of physical sciences, has been, we cannot but think, an apprehension lest otherwise they should be unable to prove it entitled to the rank of a science at all. There is a growing disposition on the part of the devotees of physical studies, — a class greatly and rapidly increasing in numbers and influence, — to restrict the honorable title of science to those departments of knowledge which are founded on the immutable laws of material nature, and to deny the possibility of scientific method and scientific results where the main element of action is the varying and capricious will of man. The apprehension, however, is needless, as the tendency which calls it forth is unreasonable and erroneous. The name *science* admits no such restriction. The vastness of a field of study, the unity in variety of the facts it includes, their connection by such ties that they allow of strict classification and offer fruitful ground for deduction, and the value of the results attained, the truth deduced, — these things make a science. And, in all these respects, the study of language need fear a comparison with no one of the physical sciences. Its field is the speech of all mankind, cultivated or savage, the thousands of existing dialects, and all their recorded predecessors, with the countless multitudes of details furnished by them, each significant of a fact in human history, external or internal. The wealth of languages is like the wealth of species in the animal creation. Their tie of connection is the unity of human nature in its wants and capacities, the unity of human knowledge, of the universe and its relations, to be apprehended by the mind and reflected in speech, — a bond as infinite in its ramifications among all the varieties of human language, and as powerful in its binding force, as is the unity of plan of vegetable or animal life. The results, finally, for human history, the history of mind, of civilization, of ethnic descent, for the comprehension of man in his high endowments and his use of them, are of surpassing interest. To compare their worth with that of the results derivable from other sciences were to no good purpose; all truth is valuable, and that which pertains to the nature and history of man himself is, to say the least, not inferior in interest to that which concerns his surroundings.

Linguistic science, then, has in itself enough of dignity and true scientific character not to need to borrow aught of either from association with other branches of inquiry which differ from it in subject and scope, while yet they seek the same objects, the increase of knowledge and the advancement of the human race.

ART. V. — *Messages of the President of the United States to Congress, with accompanying Documents.* Washington. 1861 – 1865.

A CAREFUL study of these volumes will show the greater certainty and precision which the events of the last four years have given to those rules of international law which determine the rights and duties of neutral and belligerent nations.

International law is nothing else than the practice, the usages of nations. To find its rules, the archives of states must be searched. Treaties between nations must be examined, not to show what the law is, but how it has been defined, and what exceptions particular nations have made to it; for treaties are to the law of nations what statutes are to the common law. The decisions of judges must be read, who, like Lord Stowell, have felt that in their own country they were really deciding for the world. When these authorities have been examined, there will still remain the large number of books which have been written to show what the usage of nations has been, or what the author thinks it should be.

Bynkershoek, in his preface *Ad Lectorem,* after having announced the sources of the law, says: "*Ut mores Gentium mutantur, sic etiam mutatur Jus Gentium. Atque inde est quod exempla, quod Pacta Gentium, quilus hic utor, maluerim depromere ex recentiori quam antiquiori memoria, quia enim, quæ hic scribo, ad usum pertinere volui, major ratio erat habenda nostri, quam veteris ævi.*" As the customs of nations were then changing, so they are still changing, though the changes are hardly so rapid as might be infered from the words of Mr. Goldwin Smith, who in a recent letter says: "As charges against English honor, cases half a century old are irrelevant. You cannot push the personality of a nation so far."

The history of the law of nations shows, not only that many of the principles announced by Grotius have now become settled law by the practice of nations, but that an advancing civilization has established new rights and duties, and so new laws. The laws which Story and Scott gave to us on tables of stone, each successive war has cut deeper and deeper; while the new demands of belligerents and the increasing claims of neutrals have marked the tablet with other rules and other exceptions. Mr. Seward recognizes this element of change when he writes to Mr. Adams: "The principles which shall regulate the maritime conduct of neutral states hereafter, are quite likely to be settled by the precedents which arise during the present civil war." The English government, through Earl Russell, have expressed the same thought as influencing their acts.

When Lord Stowell, in the belligerent, maintained the same rule that Judge Story did in the neutral nation, that rule has been thought well established; and now, when the United States have been a party to a war, and England has claimed to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, whatever rules have stood the test of this change of position may be accepted without hesitation. The present practice of these two powerful nations is also the best authority for new rules. The United States hopes hereafter to be a neutral, while Great Britain fears that she must again become a belligerent; and each is therefore anxious to claim nothing which it would not itself grant, when neutral has become belligerent, and our country is at peace. France and England have acted as one on most of the important questions that have arisen, and other nations have only waited for their lead.

It is sometimes said, that diplomatic correspondence is not a trustworthy source for the rules of international law. Each nation is thought to grasp for all the privileges it can obtain, and so it is not safe to judge from what it claims as to what it would or ought to grant. This may be true in wars of larger with smaller nations, where the knowledge of power or the consciousness of weakness has influenced their actions, but it will hardly be claimed that either neutrals or belligerents have been led by fear to make any concessions during the recent war; and as we shall not in the present paper make use of the demands of any nation, but only of what they have granted, no better authority can be found.

It is proposed in this article to draw from the published correspondence between England, France, and the United States those rules that have been established, and to discuss those questions which are yet unsettled, in regard to the rights and duties of neutrals in respect to the armed vessels of belligerents while within neutral waters.

To show what are the rights of neutrals, we shall adduce examples of what the United and Confederate States have granted; while, to show their duties, we shall cite what England and France have granted to the belligerents. Whatever may have been the war relation between the United States and the Rebels, to foreign nations they were both belligerents. Each had the same rights, and each the same duties.

To express the general duty of a neutral nation, no better words can be found than those of President Washington, in his Proclamation of Neutrality issued April 22d, 1793: "The duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers." Such being the duty of neutrals, it is their right to demand a corresponding conduct on the part of the belligerents.

Armed vessels are of two classes, — public vessels or men-of-war, and privateers. The former are owned, officered, and under the control of the government; while privateers are owned and directed by private citizens, to whom the government has given letters of marque, or permits to capture lawful prizes. Privateering is usually accompanied by abuses and enormous excesses, and, though still allowed by international law, will be soon altogether suppressed.

The parties to the Declaration of Paris, in 1856, declared that "Privateering is, and remains abolished." The United States at that time objected to the provision, unless enemy's property might be declared wholly exempt from seizure on the sea. In 1861, she declared her willingness to waive her objection.* The Confederate States, in the same year, refused to give up this mode of warfare.†

Practically this question has not arisen during the present war, as neither party has made use of vessels which neutrals have considered as privateers.‡

No case has as yet arisen to show what would be the action of the parties to the Declaration of Paris, if either of them should at any time send out privateers against a nation also a party. Was this Declaration a contract, which gave to the parties a right to enforce its provisions, or was it simply an agreement, from which either nation could withdraw at its pleasure? Each party agreed that it would abstain from certain acts, and did not directly promise to enforce the agreement against the others; but a right to enforce would seem to be implied. Each nation may be supposed to have given up some right, in order that it might obtain some advantage from the agreement of the whole. This promised advantage was the consideration for which it gave up its rights. This may be a legal way of looking at this question which will hardly apply to contracts between nations; but there must be an implied promise of the whole to punish the violation of one party against another, or else the Declaration, which has been thought to lessen the evils of war so much, will be found to be worse than useless, and only a trap to catch the weaker nations. In the English House of Lords, the right of England to withdraw from the Declaration was strongly maintained.§ Much better would it be for a nation to withdraw, than to remain under a contract which binds no one. It would seem, however, that a party can neither withdraw at pleasure, nor violate this Declaration without danger of punishment. If any European nation should send out privateers, it would be the duty of the other nations to unite in punishing her, at least by excluding such vessels from their ports, and probably by treating them as pirates. England and France seemed to recognize their duty under the Declaration to treat privateers as pirates, even when, not the belligerent using them, but his enemy, should be a party; for when the United States, in 1861, wished to agree to the Declaration, England and France refused to consider such agreement as binding on them until after the present war, "because the provisions of the treaty, standing alone, might bind them to pursue and punish the privateers of the South as pirates." * To the first article of the Paris Declaration, these words then are added by implication: "We agree to treat as pirates all privateers used by or against any nation which is a party to this compact."

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* Messages and Documents, 1861 – 62, p. 34.

† Resolution Confederate Congress, Blue-Book, 1861, p. 107.

‡ Sumpter not a privateer; Messages and Documents, 1861 – 62, p. 368.

§ Annual Register, 1862 and 1863.

It might have been thought that, where so many were agreed as to principle, they would have used all peaceable means to enforce this provision during the late war, or at least allowed the United States to become a party. We have looked through all the proclamations of neutrality, and find that no distinction has been taken between the public and private war vessels of the belligerents by any nation except the Netherlands. Their proclamation had no provision against the public ships, but it ordered that "no privateer under any flag soever, or their prizes, shall be admitted into our havens or seaports unless in case of marine disaster." "Because the Netherlands government has acceded to the declaration upon maritime rights set forth by the Paris Conference of 1856, all who shall engage in or lend their aid in privateering to other people, will be considered as pirates, and prosecuted according to law in the Netherlands." † This conduct of the Netherlands might be shown to have been the duty of all neutrals.

When the United States shall be admitted to this compact,

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* Messages and Documents, 1861–62, pp. 146, 242.

† Message and Documents, 1861, p. 354.

privateering will be in reality abolished. Till then the privateers of nations, not parties, receive the same privileges as public vessels.

In time of peace each nation is sovereign in its own dominion, and has equal rights on the ocean, the common territory of the world. War, which gives so many rights to the belligerents over each other, places the neutral nation under certain restraints. Neutral and belligerent rights come in conflict with each other. In neutral waters neutral rights prevail, on the ocean they yield to the belligerents; while in belligerent waters the right of the stronger belligerent is supreme.

Formerly the practice of nations allowed a neutral to grant within his own waters any privilege to belligerents, provided he granted it to both alike. The practice of this rule came in conflict with the duty enjoined on neutrals, to permit no immediate or proximate act of hostility to take place or originate within their own territory. Men then went to war, not only to defend their state, but to battle for a principle, to make conquest. The thousands who fought in the Crusades fought, not for their country, but for their faith. The feudal influence was still felt. The lords and barons sent forces to fight for what they thought to be just or profitable. Still later we find Europe desolated by the conflicts between the Protestants and Catholics. In these wars men fought for their religion, and in many battles citizens fell by each other's hands; while their country was considered as neutral, because it permitted its citizens to fight for either side. Vessels of war were built, armed, and equipped by citizens of a neutral state, and sent to aid that party whose money they coveted or whose creed they were ready to defend.

Can a neutral nation now allow its citizens to send out armed vessels of war to cruise against a friendly nation, and yet preserve a strict neutrality?

Did we rely on the authority of Grotius, Bynkershoek, and Vattel, perhaps an affirmative answer might be given to the above question. But the authority of these writers is good only so far as it corresponds with the present practice of nations. To-day no nation can allow its citizens to equip and arm the war vessels of one belligerent, without becoming an enemy of the other. That such is the rule which governs nations now, may be seen from the claims put forth by England in 1793, and acknowledged to be just by the United States. England and France were at war. The people of the United States, not forgetting their recent enemy, and still remembering who had helped them, were able and willing to help the French by men or by vessels. Washington determined to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality.

At a meeting of the heads of departments at the President's, April 19,* it was determined that a proclamation should issue, forbidding United States citizens to take any part in any hostilities on the seas with or against any of the belligerent powers. The proclamation was published April 22. It concludes: "I have given instruction to those officers to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall within the cognizance of the courts of the United States violate the law of nations with respect to the powers at war or any of them." †

United States citizens, not regarding this proclamation, fitted out privateers from United States ports, and, while sailing under the French flag and with French commissions, made prizes of English merchantmen. On the 8th of May, Mr. Hammond, the British Minister to the United States, writes to Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, informing him that two such vessels have been fitted out from Charleston. In closing the letter he writes: "The undersigned does not deem it necessary to enter into any reasoning upon these facts, as he conceives them to be breaches of that neutrality which the United States profess to observe, and direct contraventions of the proclamation which the President issued upon the 22d of last month. Under this impression, he doubts not that the executive government of the United States will pursue such measures as to its wisdom may appear the best calculated for repressing such practices in future, and for restoring to their rightful owners any captures which these particular privateers may attempt to bring into any of the ports of the United States." ‡ It is well to remember that this letter was written before the passage of any act like the present Foreign Enlistment Acts.

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* Sparks's Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. X. p. 534.

† Annals of Congress, Vol. IV. p. 435.

‡ Wharton's State Trials of the United States, p. 50.

In accordance with information given in this letter, Gideon Henfield of Salem, Massachusetts, was arrested. The case excited the greatest interest. The Democratic party, who favored the French interest, desired to know under what law Henfield was to be tried. Was a citizen of the United States to be arrested, they said, because he had disobeyed a proclamation of the President, whose power was executive, and not legislative? M. Genet, the French Minister, claimed that Henfield was a French citizen.

To show what the judicial power thought to be the law, we quote from an opinion of John Jay, Chief Justice of the United States, delivered to the grand jury impanelled at Richmond to examine similar cases. After a long argument to show the jurisdiction of the United States courts, he says: "From the observations which have been made, this conclusion appears to result; viz. that the United States are in a state of neutrality relative to all the powers at war, and that it is their duty, their interest, and their disposition to maintain it; that, therefore, they who commit, aid, or abet hostilities against those powers, or either of them, offend against the laws of the United States, and ought to be punished, and consequently that it is your duty, gentlemen, to inquire into and present all such of those offences as you shall find to have been committed within this district." *

In the case of Henfield, Judge Wilson, with whom were Judges Iredell and Peters, charged the grand jury: "That a citizen who, in our state of neutrality, and without the authority of the nation, takes a hostile part with either of the belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty and the laws of his country, is a position so plain as to require no proof, and to be scarcely susceptible of a denial."

An indictment was returned against Henfield, charging him with committing an act of hostility against the subjects of a power with whom the United States were at peace. At the trial Judge Wilson instructed the jury: "It is the joint and

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* Wharton's State Trials of the United States, p. 56.

unanimous opinion of this court, that, the United States being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, the acts of hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are an offence against this country, and punishable by its laws. It has been asked by his counsel, in their address to you, 'Against what law has he offended?' The answer is, that, as a citizen of the United States, he was bound to act no part which could injure the nation. He was bound to keep the peace in regard to all nations with whom we are at peace. This is the law of nations: not an *ex post facto* law, but a law that was in existence long before Gideon Henfield existed."

It appeared on evidence that Henfield was an American citizen, and that he had acted as prize-master on board a French privateer. The jury, either, as Chief-Justice Marshall thought, influenced by party zeal, or by sympathy and doubt of Henfield's guilty intent, as thought Mr. Jefferson, acquitted the prisoner. Washington thought this verdict of so much importance, as tending to disturb the peace of the country, that he gave it as one reason for desiring to call an extra session of Congress. This trial took place in July.

August 3d, the Cabinet returned an answer to some questions proposed to them by the President. "The original arming and equipping of vessels in the ports of the United States by any of the belligerent parties, for military service, offensive or defensive, is deemed unlawful. Equipment of vessels in the ports of the United States which are of a nature solely adapted for war, is deemed unlawful." The next day, Mr. Hamilton sent instructions to the collectors of customs, directing them what course to take in order to prevent and punish such unlawful equipments.

From these facts we see that the United States judicial and executive departments considered that Mr. Hammond's letter claimed nothing more than was England's right. That the other departments of the government might be able to enforce international duties upon United States citizens, and might no longer be thwarted by jurors who took no law from judges, and exercised all the pardoning power of the President, in 1794 Congress passed a law which forbade, under certain penalties, the fitting out or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel should cruise or commit hostilities with any state at peace with the United States. In this statute the legislature embodied what the judicial power had before declared to be a principle of both common and international law.

A similar law, known as the Foreign Enlistment Act, was enacted by the British Parliament in 1819. How English statesmen looked at their duty internationally without the law will appear from the debates that took place. Spain was endeavoring to put down the rebellion of her colonies in South America. The sympathies of the liberals in England were with the colonies. Something was needed to enable the government to preserve its neutrality.

The Attorney-General, Sir Samuel Shepherd, moving to bring in the bill, said: "The second provision of the bill" (in regard to the equipping and arming of vessels) "was rendered necessary by the consideration that assistance might be rendered to foreign states through the means of the subjects of this country, not only by their enlisting in warfare, but also by their fitting out ships for the purpose of war. It is extremely important for the preservation of neutrality that the subjects of this country be prevented from fitting out any equipments to be employed in foreign service."

Lord Castlereagh said: "It is a duty we owe to Spain and to our honor, while we profess to be at peace with her, not to allow ships of war to be equipped in our ports, or armaments to sail from them against her."

There was considerable opposition to the bill, and a long debate in the House of Commons at each reading. The opposition, headed by Sir James Mackintosh, maintained that it was not inconsistent with neutrality to allow soldiers to enlist, or war vessels to be equipped, in a neutral port. Mr. Canning, Sir William Scott, Doctor Phillimore, and others, supported the bill. They met the issue presented by its opponents with arguments from principle and authority. The bill passed by a majority of sixty-one.

In 1823 France was threatening Spain. Lord Althorp moved a repeal of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, on the ground that it was not necessary to a strict neutrality. Lord Folk-stone seconded the motion, because he thought that there would then be opportunity for Englishmen to fight for the liberties of Spain. Two thirds of the House considered that a repeal of the bill would be a breach of neutrality, and so the bill remained.

In closing a speech against the repeal, Mr. Canning said: "If war must come, let it come in the shape of satisfaction to be demanded for injuries, of rights to be asserted, of interests to be protected, of treaties to be fulfilled. But, in God's name, let it not come in the paltry, pettifogging way of fitting out ships in our harbors to cruise for gain."

The opinions of Grotius and Bynkershoek were used to support each side of this question; but a question which those authors left doubtful the English House of Commons settled, voting that their duty to other nations and to themselves forbade English subjects from fitting out armed vessels to cruise against nations with which England was at peace.

In 1854, when Great Britain and France were at war with Russia, they demanded that the United States should maintain a strict neutrality. In reply to these demands, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, writes: "Considerations of interest and the obligations of duty alike give assurance that the citizens of the United States will in no way compromise the neutrality of this country, by participating in the contest in which the principal powers of Europe are now unhappily engaged." *

Thus we have England, France, and the United States declaring that, if a government would remain neutral, its citizens must be neutral. With this idea of a true neutrality, we are ready to examine those questions that have recently arisen under the Foreign Enlistment Act.

The Queen of England, in her proclamation of May 13th, 1861, after announcing her intention to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, and commanding her loving subjects to abstain from violating the laws of the realm and of nations, recites the Act, which provides that, "If any subject shall equip, furnish, fit out, or arm, or endeavor to equip, furnish, fit out, or arm, or procure to be equipped, &c., or shall knowingly aid or

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* Executive Documents, 1853-54, Doc. 103, p. 5.

assist or be concerned in the equipping, &c., with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign government as a transport or store ship, or with intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any state with whom her Majesty shall not then be at war, the person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the ship or vessel with the tackle shall be forfeited." There is a similar provision against adding to the number of guns, or changing those on board, or increasing or augmenting the force of any belligerent war vessel.

France and Spain in their proclamations enjoined a like duty on their subjects.

The Alabama was built at Liverpool. Evidence of her illegal equipment was sent to the English government by Mr. Adams. Earl Russell and the law advisers of her Majesty examined the matter, but did not consider the evidence as trustworthy, or sufficient to ground legal action upon. Nevertheless, they placed spies over her, whose duty it was to report all suspicious circumstances. Having at length determined to seize her, the necessary orders were sent, but arrived too late; she had escaped. Sailing out on a pretended pleasure trip, she was off for the Azores. Orders were then given to stop her at Queenstown or Nassau, where it was expected she would go.* Touching at no English port, she went to a port of the Azores, where she received her armament from a vessel coming like herself from British waters. Captain Semmes came on board, read his commission, and started on his cruise against the commercial marine of the United States.

Regarding the Alabama as really equipped and armed in England, the United States have continually presented claims to the English government for vessels and cargoes destroyed by Captain Semmes. The English have refused to satisfy any such demands. The correspondence between Mr. Adams and Earl Russell, published in 1864, will best explain the claims of each party.

September 14th, 1863, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Adams, who had just sent him a list of vessels burned by the Alabama: "I have only in conclusion to express the hope, that you may not be again instructed to put forward claims which her Majesty's government cannot admit to be founded on any grounds of law or justice."* Mr. Adams, having written home for advice, replies, October 23d: "The government of the United States finds itself wholly unable to abandon the position heretofore taken on that subject."† In his recapitulation of the position of the United States, he says: "From a review of all these subjects essential to a right judgment of this question, the government of the United States understand that the purpose of the building, armament, equipment, and expedition of this vessel carried with it one single criminal intent, running equally through all the portions of the preparation, fully completed and executed when the gunboat 'No. 290' assumed the name of the Alabama, and that this intent brought the whole transaction, in all its several parts here recited, within the lawful jurisdiction of Great Britain, where the main portion of the crime was planned and executed." The United States assumed "that they gave due and sufficient previous notice of this criminal enterprise, and that England was then bound by treaty obligations and by the law of nations to prevent the execution of it." England did not act "with the promptness and energy required by the emergency." "Valuable time was lost in delays, and the effort when attempted was too soon abandoned." And further: "There is no fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference to which they will not be willing to submit."

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* Executive Documents, 1862 – 63, Part I. p. 200.

Earl Russell, two days later, answers: "Her Majesty's government may well be content to wait the time when a calm and candid examination of the facts and principles" may be "usefully taken." "In the mean time I must request you to believe that the principle contended for by her Majesty's government is not that of commissioning, equipping, or manning vessels in our ports to cruise against either of the belligerent parties." But the British government decline to be responsible for the acts of parties who fit out a seeming merchant-ship, send her to a port or to waters far from the jurisdiction of

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* Message and Documents, 1863-64, Part I. p. 431.

† Supplement, Message and Documents, 1863-64, Part I. p. xxix.

British courts, and there commission, equip, and man her as a vessel of war.

The study of two precedents will help to discover how strong are the claims of each party to this controversy, which at some future time must be settled by one of the three methods known to the law of nations, — by concession, by arbitration, or by war.

After Washington and his Cabinet had decided what acts were unlawful, Mr. Hamilton sent the instructions before cited to the collectors of customs. A few selections will explain: "Repeated contraventions of our neutrality having taken place in the ports of the United States, without having been discovered in time for prevention or remedy," — "have a vigilant eye," — "give immediate notice." * No armed vessel which has been, or shall be, originally fitted out in any part of the United States by either of the parties at war is henceforth to have an asylum in any district of the United States. The letters of Washington show the zeal and activity with which the government acted. Mr. Jefferson told M. Genet, who was very active in fitting out these French privateers, that the Little Sarah will be claimed because she "is reported to be armed with guns acquired here." Washington writes, "Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the acts of this government at defiance with impunity?" † "Vigilance, care, and impartiality," were the orders to deputies; but even then vessels escaped, so that on September 8th Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Hammond, "The President contemplates restitution for all prizes brought into our ports after a certain date," and for "particular reasons" he will give compensation for those brought in before that date. What these particular reasons were, we learn from the President's message to Congress: "Rather than employ force for the restitution of certain vessels I deemed the United States bound to restore, I thought it more advisable to satisfy the parties by avowing it to be my opinion that it would be incumbent on the United States to make compensation." ‡

Mr. Jefferson writes to M. Genet, August 7th, informing him of the determination of the President, and adds: "It is con-

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* Annals of Congress, Vol. IV. p. 1283.

† Sparks's Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. X.

‡ Annals of Congress, Vol. IV. p. 15.

sequently expected that you will cause restitution to be made of all prizes taken and brought into our ports subsequent to the above-mentioned day by such privateers, in defect of which the President considers it as incumbent upon the United States to indemnify the owners of those prizes, the indemnification to be reimbursed by the French nation. . . . . It would have been but proper respect to the authority of the country had that been consulted before these armaments were undertaken. It would have been satisfactory, however, if their sense of them when declared had been duly acquiesced in. Reparation of the injury to which the United States have been so involuntarily instrumental is all which now remains, and in this your compliance cannot but be expected." *

In the seventh article of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, in 1794, it was agreed that "In all cases where restitution shall not have been made agreeably to the tenor of the letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, the complaints shall be referred to commissioners." †

Another precedent is taken from claims made on the United States by Portugal. Artigas, a leader of some small bands gathered from the discontented inhabitants of Spanish America, had made war upon Brazil and the Portuguese about the year 1814. Several vessels were fitted out in Baltimore, and, sailing under the flag of Artigas, captured Portuguese merchantmen. Portugal first presented her claims in 1816, again in 1822, and finally in 1851.

Mr. John Q. Adams, Secretary of State, writes to General Dearborn, Minister to Portugal, in 1822: "To these complaints every attention compatible with the rights of the citizens of the United States and with the law of nations was paid by this government. The laws for securing the faithful performance of the duties of neutrality were revived and enforced. Decrees of restitution were pronounced by the judicial tribunals in all cases of Portuguese captured vessels brought within the jurisdiction of the United States, and all the measures within the competency of the Executive were taken by that department of the government for repressing the fitting out of

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* Jefferson's Complete Works, Vol. IV. p. 27. State Papers, Vol. I. p. 167.

† Elliott's Diplomatic Code, Vol. I. p. 249.

privateers from our ports and the enlistment of our citizens in them."* This shows what was done.

Report No. 290, June 10th, 1818, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, will show the sentiments of the United States. "The fitting out of vessels for privateering, &c., if not checked by all the means in the power of the government, would have authorized claims from the subjects of foreign governments for indemnification at the expense of this nation for captures made by our people, by vessels fitted out in our ports, and, as could not fail to be alleged, countenanced by the very neglect of the necessary means of suppressing them." †

The letter of Mr. Adams to the Portuguese Minister, of March 14th, 1818, is the one which the English wish us now to explain, before we put forward our claims for damages done by the Alabama. It reads: "The government of the United States, having used all the means in its power to prevent the fitting out and arming of vessels in their ports to cruise against any nation with whom they are at peace, and having faithfully carried into execution the laws enacted to preserve inviolate the neutral and pacific obligations of this Union, cannot consider itself bound to indemnify individual foreigners for losses by capture over which the United States have neither control nor jurisdiction. For such events no nation can in principle, nor does in practice, hold itself responsible. A decisive reason for this, if there were no other, is the inability to provide a tribunal before which the facts can be proved. . . . . Should the parties come within the jurisdiction of the United States, there are courts of admiralty competent to ascertain the facts upon litigation between them, to punish the outrages which may be duly proved, and to restore the property to its rightful owners should it also be brought within our jurisdiction, and found upon judicial inquiry to have been taken in the manner represented by your letter." ‡

The United States refused to refer their claims to an arbiter, and we cannot trace them further. It is probable that they were given up by Portugal; for when, in 1851, other claims between the two governments were settled, no mention was made of these.*

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* Senate Documents, 1823 and 1824, Vol. III. p. 77.

† American State Papers, Vol. IV. p. 133.

‡ Ex. Doc. 1851 – 52, Vol. VI. Doc. 53.

From these examples we learn, first, it is the duty of a neutral to use all the means in its power to prevent belligerents from building and equipping vessels of war within neutral waters; secondly, if such vessels are built, and escape without "having been discovered in time for prevention or remedy," the neutral nation is bound in some way to punish the offending vessel, either by refusing to grant her asylum, or by restoring her prizes brought within neutral jurisdiction, and even by using force; thirdly, a belligerent cannot claim compensation from a neutral who has taken all legal measures to prevent, end, and punish the wrong done both to the neutral and belligerent.

England, then, must satisfy an arbiter or the United States that she used the proper care, vigilance, and activity to prevent the violation of her Foreign Enlistment Act. Some English writers, regarding the Foreign Enlistment Act as a domestic law, have contended that the United States have nothing to do with its enforcement. They confound the manner of enforcement with the enforcement itself. The manner is England's own business, but that the law should be enforced is the right of every belligerent. The United States have a right to demand that the subjects of her Majesty be not at war with us when the Queen has declared a strict neutrality; though we cannot claim that the offender shall be fined, imprisoned, or hung. The acts forbidden are unlawful against belligerents. The offenders are neutral subjects. Let the neutral nation punish them as it pleases, but prevent such acts, or else the belligerent may consider the neutral as a real enemy.

"Historicus," perhaps the most candid, learned, and influential author who has written on the international questions of the last four years, says: "It is admitted on all hands, that it is the right, and in some sense the duty, of a neutral state to prevent its soil from being made the base of hostile operations against either belligerent."

If I am neutral, says Bynkershoek, "alteri non possum prodesse ut alteri noceam." What could be more advantageous to a belligerent who has no navy, than to allow him to build one in neutral waters, or what could be more injurious to the other, whose strength and hopes of success in the contest are in his supposed superiority on the sea? The neutral might with as much propriety sell its own war vessels. True, there is a distinction to be made between a neutral government and its citizens. On the government the rule of Bynkershoek is absolute, while there is an exception in favor of the citizens. All commercial transactions of neutral with belligerent citizens, and perhaps with the belligerent state, are allowable, provided that opportunity is given to one belligerent to seize on the high seas aid intended for the other before such aid can be of any advantage to him. Equipping of vessels comes under the rule, carrying of contraband under the exception. Under any other rule, a belligerent might build war vessels in a neutral port more safely than in his own; for in his own port he would be liable to be molested by his enemy, while the waters of a neutral would give him full protection.

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* U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. X. p. 911.

Judge Story, in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, says: "There is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure, which no nation is bound to prohibit."* On this authority, it has been claimed that English citizens had a right to build and sell Alabamas.

This claim has been answered by showing what the same court held in other cases; but we need not go out of this case to show that Judge Story meant no such thing as claimed. If the decision is read to the end, it will be found that the cargoes of the Santissima Trinidad and St. Ander were restored to their owners, because one of the captors, the Independencia, received "an illegal augmentation of her force" at Baltimore, and because the other, the Altravida, had taken on board part of her armament and a crew of about twenty-five men at the same port. Did the learned Judge decide that a belligerent war vessel can be wholly equipped and armed in a neutral port without the fault of the neutral, and yet take away the prize of a regularly commissioned public vessel, because a few guns had been added to her armament, and a new crew had been shipped, in violation of United States neutrality? Such a proposition would be absurd. His opinion is made plain and consistent, if we consider the restrictive words "to foreign ports for sale."

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* 7 Wheaton, pp. 283, 340.

These words bring a case within the exception, for then there is an opportunity for one belligerent to make prize of the vessel before she can be of any use to the other. Judge Story's opinion would only justify England in allowing her citizens to build war vessels and send them to Charleston, or some other Confederate port, as a mere matter of speculation, as a man sends his horse to an auction-room for sale. The great opportunity there would be for fraud in such a transaction, the fact that such a vessel might be made of service as soon as she was on the ocean, and that, sailing under a neutral flag as a vessel of war, she would be wholly exempt from search and visitation, make it doubtful whether even such a commercial adventure should be allowed by a neutral.

To build within a neutral port, and there sell and deliver a war vessel to a belligerent, would be a still greater breach of neutrality. Says Earl Russell: "If the ship went, as some of the American judges have in certain cases found was the fact, merely with a crew sufficient to take the vessel into the port of a belligerent, that might be a case somewhat analogous to the carrying of cannon and muskets. But when the vessel and crew go forth already equipped from the coast of the neutral, and commit hostilities directly they get to sea against a state in amity with her Majesty, it is evident that that is quite a different proceeding from carrying muskets over from your own to a belligerent's coast." *

Contraband articles, as has been said, can be carried to a belligerent port for sale, or sold to a belligerent in a neutral port. The reason that has already been given for this exception does not exist when the contraband article is sold to an

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* **Message and Documents, 1864 – 65, Part II. p. 108.**

armed vessel in a neutral port. The guns, cannon, or ammunition supplied to the war vessel would be of direct use before they had run the danger of capture. If then, in a neutral port, you cannot increase the armament of a war vessel, most certainly you cannot sell one all armed and equipped.

If then the Alabama was equipped in violation of England's law and duty, did she do everything she could to prevent it? The fact that the arming did not actually take place within her jurisdiction cannot relieve England from her liability for any negligence, though it may excuse her, on the ground that it would require more diligence to discover and prevent a violation, which not only was begun in different ports, but completed in the waters of another nation. The opinions in the Alexandra case are thought to decide that arming is necessary to complete a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. Writing of the various trials on this case, Mr. Adams says, "There never was such a comedy performed on a grave subject in the whole history of law." * The highest judicial authority in Scotland have since held that the word "equip" might cover arming to a greater or less extent; and further, that the statutory offence might be committed without the ship being actually armed.†

That the English government think as the Scotch judges, appears from a letter of Earl Russell to Mr. Davis. He writes: "Nor can the frequent use of the word 'equip' in the sense of 'to furnish with everything necessary to a voyage,' be held for a moment to limit its significance to the furnishing of a war vessel with everything which it might be possible to put upon her, or the ultimately putting of which on her might be contemplated. Such a construction cannot be entertained for an instant. It is clear that a hundred-and-twenty-gun ship might be equipped for war purposes with any fraction of her armament on board, although she might not be so powerful or so efficient as she would be if she had the whole of it." ‡

Whether her Majesty's officers used all the means in their power to prevent the escape of the Alabama, is a matter of fact

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* Message and Documents, 1864 and 1865, Part I. p. 485.

† Ibid., p. 396.

‡ Appleton's Annual Encyclopædia, 1864, p. 557.

and evidence for the arbiters; for it is to be hoped that England will accept the proposition of our government to refer the claims. After so much knowledge of the facts as can be gathered from the correspondence, it seems that the charges against the English officials for conniving at the escape of the Alabama and Florida are unfounded. On the authority of Captain Semmes, "Earl Russell had been no willing agent." * The government waited too long before orders were given to seize the vessel. The commissioners of customs, who had been directed to inquire into the case, reported that it was perfectly evident that the ship was a ship of war, and that it was reported and believed she was built for the purpose of war; but that the builders could give no information as to her destination, and there was no other reliable source of information. The law advisers required legal evidence, such as would insure conviction, thus making themselves the jury instead of the prosecutor. They really required a verdict before they arrested the prisoner. † To perform her duty to a belligerent, England was bound to act on probable evidence, though she might justly demand trustworthy evidence before punishing her citizens. Some innocent men may suffer, but acting on probable evidence brings many a criminal to justice.

The official correspondence between England, France, and the United States, during the Russian war, is of interest on this point. Mr. Marcy writes to Mr. Crampton, that the President will not fail to use all the means in his power to enforce obedience to our laws. ‡ The facts in the case of the Maury show that the United States did not wait for legal evidence, but seized the vessel on suspicion, and held her until the British Consul was entirely satisfied that the suspicions were groundless.§

In the later case of the steam rams, the English acted on less evidence, thus condemning their former course. Says the Attorney-General, while justifying the seizure before the House of Commons: "It was not necessary in order to justify the

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* Our Cruise in the Sumpter and Alabama, Vol. I. p. 276.

† Message and Documents, 1863-64, Part I. p. 198.

‡ Executive Documents, 1853-54, Vol. XII. Doc. 103.

§ Neutral Relations of England and the United States, page 19.

seizure that the evidence should be sufficient to satisfy a jury; it was enough that the government had a *prima facie* case, such as would induce a magistrate to remand a prisoner."

Even if England can show that she used the proper care, vigilance, and activity to prevent the escape of the Alabama, can she show that she used all the means in her power to prevent and punish the injuries this vessel has done to our commerce?

The Florida was seized at Nassau, and after some judicial proceeding released. The Solicitor-General said in the House of Commons: "The circumstances of her departure and the contemporaneous representations of Mr. Adams to the government made it probable that it really was true that the vessel was intended for the service of the Confederate States. But it was by no means clear that there was evidence upon which a court of law would have held the fitting of the vessel to be a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act." * The evidence was not sufficient to satisfy the court. Afterwards the probable evidence became certain; but then the Florida was sailing under a Confederate commission, and so, it was said, out of English jurisdiction.

After Captain Semmes took possession of the Alabama, she was considered beyond the control of England, and so the Florida and the Alabama have been treated in no more unfriendly way than the United States war-steamer Niagara.

Having acknowledged that "the case of the Alabama and Oreto were a scandal, and in some degree a reproach to English laws,"† Earl Russell put no more restraints upon them than he did upon all other belligerent war vessels. Early in the war he had denied to each belligerent the privilege of bringing their prizes into neutral waters; and so he could not punish, as President Washington did the Genet cruisers in 1794; but yet the Alabama might have been seized whenever she came into an English port, or at least been refused an asylum. But her claims as a Confederate war vessel are thought to have prevented this seizure. The Solicitor-General, in a speech already quoted, says: "Although it may be lawful, if you can catch a ship which has been guilty of violating our Foreign

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* Message and Documents, 1863 – 64, p. 198.

† Blue Book, 1863, Russell to Lyons.

Enlistment Act in any British port, to confiscate her for that violation, yet it must be during the same cruise or voyage, because the offence was at an end, and for all purposes of action blotted out, when the particular voyage was completed." Now the Alabama never had any particular voyage. Her cruise could not end at each neutral port she entered. It commenced at Liverpool, and ended when she sank off Cherbourg. If she had during this time entered a Confederate port, there might be more reason to claim that her offence was blotted out.

It is urged, moreover, on the authority of the decision in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, that the commission deposited the offence. A careful reading of the whole opinion will convince us that such a deduction is incorrect. A decision reported by Wheaton helps us here.* The Irresistible was built at Baltimore, from which port she sailed with clearance for Teneriffe, having her armament entered as cargo in her hold. She went directly to Buenos Ayres, discharged her crew, reshipped them, and obtained a commission from the Brazilian government to cruise against Spain. On the second day after she had left port the first commission was sent back, and another was produced from General Artigas, chief of the Oriental Republic. Certainly this vessel went through all the changes that ever the Alabama has been subject to. Having captured several Portuguese vessels, and brought the money found on board to Baltimore, the Consul-General of Portugal made claims before the United States courts for the money, and it was restored.

Chief Justice Marshall, having decided that the intent with which she left Baltimore was a clear violation of our laws, said, in answer to the defence that the commission had deposited the fault: "If this were admitted in such a case as this, the laws for the preservation of our neutrality would be completely eluded, so far as this enforcement depends on the restitution of prizes made in violation of them. Vessels could be completely fitted in our ports for military operations, and then, after obtaining a commission, go through the ceremony of discharging and re-enlisting their crews to become perfectly legitimate cruisers, purified from every taint contracted at the place where all their real force and capacity for annoyance was acquired. This would be a fraudulent neutrality, disgraceful to our own government, and of which no nation would be the dupe."

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* 7 Wheaton, 471.

On this authority, the Alabama not only did not deposit her offence at the Azores, but would not have done so if she had gone into Charleston and there received her guns, shipped her crew, and obtained her commission. The opinion in the case of the Santissima Trinidad allows that the commission destroys the taint when the vessel was sent out as a commercial adventure. Judge Story, having decided that there was no taint in the beginning, had no need to say where it was deposited.

The fact that the Alabama was claimed as Confederate property can make no difference. She was liable to confiscation before sale, and the real or pretended sale was void. Chief Justice Taney decided that a contract to furnish arms to General Chambers of the Texan army was void. He says: "A citizen of the United States can do no act, nor enter into any agreement, to promote or encourage revolt or hostilities against the territories of a country with which our government is pledged to be at peace." If he does so, he cannot claim "the aid of a court of justice to enforce it." The Judge does not decide what would have been the law if the United States had recognized Texas as an independent state, but says: "It belongs exclusively to government to recognize new states in the revolutions which may occur in the world; and until such recognition, courts of justice are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered." *

Suppose now the Alabama had been seized in a British port, the defence would have been, "She is the property of the Confederate government, and England has no jurisdiction over her." The English might reply: "She was your property as long as she remained in your territory, or upon the ocean. We could not have enforced the contract against you; it would have been void as to our citizens; they had no rights under it. And now, when you have brought the vessel within our waters,

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* 14 Howard, 46.

we shall consider the sale void as to you. It is the same to our courts as if no contract had been made. You bought a vessel liable to seizure and confiscation ; the sale was illegal, and cannot be used as a defence in our courts. She is still English property, and as such is within our jurisdiction."

If the Alabama had been seized before her escape, it would have been no defence that she was then the property of the Confederate government, and not of Mr. Laird.

But, admitting that the Alabama was a Confederate war vessel from the time that her keel was laid by a member of her Majesty's House of Commons, an offence against neutral rights was committed, which England was bound to punish, either by direct acts, or by demands for compensation on the Confederate government.

The demand for compensation was not made, nor would it have been of avail. There was, therefore, all the more necessity that efforts should be made to seize the vessel. The United States act of 1818 provides, "that, in every case in which the process issuing out of any court of the United States shall be disobeyed or resisted by any person or persons having the custody of any vessel of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel of any foreign prince or state, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, or such other person as he shall have empowered for the purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, for the purpose of taking possession of and detaining any such ship or vessel, in order to the execution of the prohibition and penalties of this act, and for the preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise from the territories or jurisdiction of the United States." If, then, a vessel like the Alabama should be built in our ports, this law would give the Executive power to seize and detain her whenever she came in, even if she were "a war vessel of a foreign prince." One state has no jurisdiction over the public vessel of another state for the violation of any municipal law, but on the authority of Wheaton it does have jurisdiction for a violation of international law.*

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* Lawrence's Wheaton's International Law, 205 - 208, 735.

That the English Foreign Enlistment Law does not authorize force, is no excuse. England claimed and obtained compensation from us when we had no law. This fact shows that it is not the neutral's law, but his duty, which determines his liability. On the authority of her own action against the Portuguese expedition* fitted out in England and sent to Terceira, and of the decision in the case of the Marianna Flora,† her Majesty's fleet might have seized the Alabama anywhere on the high seas. Says Historicus: "I think that to deny the Florida and Alabama access to our ports would be the legitimate and dignified manner of expressing our disapproval of the fraud which has been practised upon our neutrality." ‡

From all the facts known, England seems to have done absolutely nothing to punish or prevent the depredations of the Alabama after Captain Semmes took command. Could she not have done something? When England can satisfy an impartial nation that the Alabama was built through no fault of hers, and that after her escape she employed all the means recognized by international law to punish such violations, and so put an end to them, then, perhaps, Earl Russell may, in reply to the claims presented by Mr. Adams, use the words of his father, who refused compensation to Portugal, because the United States, having employed all the means within the power of the Executive, had control neither over the capture nor the capturing vessels.

While belligerents claim that neutrals shall allow no act of hostility to originate in their waters, they admit that neutral authority is supreme within those waters, and that it is the right of the neutral state to fix the conditions on which they will admit and regulate the stay and departure of belligerent war vessels.

Three miles from shore has been fixed as the distance to which neutral waters extend. "Imperium finitur ubi finitur armorum potestas," says Bynkershoek. One object of this limitation being to prevent injury to the neutral territory, it would seem that the increasing projectile power of cannon would demand a proportionate increase of this distance. Recent official correspondence shows that such an extension of neutral jurisdiction is quite probable. Mr. Burnley writes to Mr. Seward: "In the present instance, shot fired from the Rhode Island appear to have reached the shore, notwithstanding that that vessel did not approach within four miles of the land; and it is obvious that the use of weapons of this description, when fired at that distance towards the shore, is calculated not only to infringe neutral jurisdiction by falling within neutral waters, but also seriously to endanger life and property on neutral territory itself." *

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* 3 Phill. International Law, p. 229.

† 11 Wheaton, 42.

‡ London Times, November 4, 1863.

Mr. Seward, replying, says, "that the subject may now be profitably discussed, and that the United States are not unwilling to come to an understanding upon this novel question thus raised." He adds: "It is manifestly proper and important that any such new construction of the maritime law as Great Britain suggests should be reduced to the form of a precise proposition, and then that it should receive, in some manner, by treaty or otherwise, reciprocal and obligatory acknowledgments from the principal maritime powers." †

Lord Russell's orders to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty will serve as an example of the restrictions put upon war vessels during the present war.‡ First: "No ships of war or privateers of either of the belligerents shall be permitted to enter or remain in the port of Nassau, or any other port of the Bahama Islands, except by special leave of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Bahama Islands, or in case of stress of weather." When such a vessel does enter, "the authorities of the place shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible, without permitting her to take in any supply beyond what may be absolutely necessary for her immediate use." If vessels are there at the time of reception of the orders, the Lieutenant-Governor shall fix the time of departure; but vessels of the two belligerents shall not leave sooner than "twenty-four hours after each other." Second: "All ships of war, &c. are prohibited from making use of any port or roadstead in the United Kingdom

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* Message and Documents, 1864-65, Part II. p. 705.

† Ibid., p. 709.

‡ Blue Book, 1862, p. 140. Message and Documents, 1864-65, Part II. p. 121.

of Great Britain and Ireland as a station or resort for any warlike purpose, or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment." Third: If any such vessel shall enter, "she shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions, or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs." After such repairs, &c., "she shall be required to put to sea as soon as possible." Fourth: "No ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted, while in any port, &c., to take in any supplies, &c., and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination; and no coal shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in the same or any other port, &c. of her Majesty, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her in British waters."

The orders of Spain and France* are very similar. The Netherlands admitted vessels of war for twenty-four hours, and furnished them with coal for "twenty-four hours' run." The proclamation of Portugal † prohibited the entrance of privateers and of the prizes made by privateers or armed vessels.

The last proclamation of President Lincoln ‡ demands that United States vessels shall no longer be subjected to these rules. This proclamation seems to have been issued, not because our government regards the rules as an unnecessary and illegal hardship upon belligerent vessels, but because we are no longer belligerent. It reads: "The United States, whatever claims may have existed heretofore, are now at least entitled to claim and concede an entire and friendly equality of right and hospitality with all maritime nations." This means, either that the United States are at peace, and so their vessels must not be treated as belligerents, or else that the Confederacy has no vessels and no port; and so, whatever the United States may still be on land, they are no longer belligerents at sea. In July last, all restrictions were removed from United States vessels in English ports, while entrance is refused to vessels bearing the Confederate flag.*

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* Message and Documents, 1861-62, p. 363. † Ibid., p. 379.

‡ Boston Daily Advertiser, April 12, 1865.

We come now to another point of interest. Formerly neutrals not only allowed prizes to be brought within their waters, but also allowed a prize court to sit in their territory. Afterwards, following the rule laid down by Lord Stowell, they denied the latter privilege, still permitting the former; and now, judging from the practice of nations, this too has gone. We shall find that the Confederate government have complained because their prizes have been excluded from neutral ports; but certainly neutrals have forbidden nothing but what their own interest and a strict neutrality require them to forbid. That neutrality will be found to be most impartial which grants only necessary favors to the belligerents, and so leaves them to contend with their own strength. Privileges allowed are commonly of more advantage to the weaker belligerent, and so in reality add to his strength, and they also tend to draw neutrals into the war. Their inability to send prizes into neutral ports prevented the Confederates from fitting out privateers; for, their own ports being blockaded, there was no opportunity to sell their prizes. Individuals could not afford to equip vessels, which, if they made prizes, must burn them.

The action of England in regard to the Tuscaloosa shows what action a nation may take to enforce this rule. The Alabama took her prize, the Tuscaloosa, into a British port, claiming to use her as her tender. Sir P. Woodehouse wrote home for instructions, but before they came the vessel had gone. November 14, 1863, the Duke of Newcastle answered: "I am instructed [by her Majesty's government] that the vessel did not lose the character of a prize merely because she was, at the time of being brought within British waters, armed with two small rifled guns, in charge of an officer, and used as a tender to the Alabama under the authority of Captain Semmes. The course most consistent with her Majesty's dignity, and most proper for the vindication of her territorial rights, would have been to prohibit the exercise of any further control over the Tuscaloosa by the captors, and to restrain that vessel under her Majesty's control and jurisdiction until properly reclaimed by her original owners." *

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* Boston Daily Advertiser, July 25 and 26, 1865.

When the Tuscaloosa came in again she was seized, but afterwards released, on the ground that, having been allowed to depart the first time, she might suppose that her entrance was legal, and so was not guilty in the second violation of the rule. The House of Commons declared the course of the English government in this case to be a violation of the principles of international law.

The government afterwards came to a more definite decision in regard to the treatment of prizes brought into their ports. The governors of colonies were instructed, — 1st. All prizes brought in should be immediately ordered out. 2d. A vessel *bonâ fide* changed into a vessel of war is not a prize. 3d. Prizes brought in on account of stress of weather may remain as long as the governor considers necessary. 4th. Any prize may be detained, if not removed when ordered. 5th. Prizes captured in neutral waters may be retained.† These rules contain, perhaps, the whole duty or right of a neutral over the prizes of war vessels, which have violated their neutrality in no other way; but the Tuscaloosa should have been retained on account of the illegal outfit of the Alabama.

The right of neutrals to furnish supplies of coal to belligerent war vessels has been much discussed during the present war. It is now settled that sufficient coal may be supplied for the belligerent vessel to reach home; but a neutral port cannot be made a base from which a belligerent vessel can regularly obtain food for its engines. Before this rule was settled, England refused to allow the United States to make a deposit of coal at Nassau.‡

A cargo of coal was deposited at Angra Pequena, "a desolate and uninhabited island outside of the sphere of civilized states," § for the purpose of supplying the wants of the Alabama. The captain of the Vanderbilt took the coal, on the ground that it was insurgent property. The English government demanded compensation of the United States. Lord Lyons writes Mr. Seward, August 3, 1864: "For a United States ship-of-war to take, without payment, British property on a neutral shore, merely because it was intended to be sold by its owners to a ship-of-war of the other belligerent, would be an act of simple trespass, without justification from the law of nations." Mr. Seward replies: "The claimants in the present case are regarded as having no more just claims upon the United States than the owners and crew of the Alabama have for indemnity for the losses they sustained in the destruction of that vessel in her combat with the United States ship-of-war Kearsarge."

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* Our Cruise in Sumpter, Appx., Vol. II. p. 401.

† Message and Documents, 1864 – 65, Part II. p. 125.

‡ Message and Documents, 1862 – 63, p. 59.

§ Message and Documents, 1864 – 65, Part II. pp. 560, 616, 640, 642, 692, 696.

Coal was held by the United States to be contraband. If the coal intended for the Alabama had been taken before it reached its destination, a neutral port, it may be doubted whether it would have been good prize. If the port of destination were uninhabited, the coal could be captured both before and after it was landed from a neutral vessel. Their being neither inhabitants nor owners of the island, no offence was committed against neutral rights. The island was but a store-ship anchored in the ocean. The coal either belonged to the Confederate government, or was sent there for its use, and in either case was good prize.

Only the repairs necessary for navigation can be allowed to war vessels in a neutral port. Mr. Adams, on intimation from Earl Russell, applied formally for permission for the Tuscarora to make the repairs "necessary to place that vessel in good order for service at sea," * thus admitting the right of her Majesty to refuse it.

The Florida was allowed to repair at Brest, and even the government dock was opened to her, as she needed calking and tarring.† While the Florida was at Brest, the time of service of many of her crew expired. Her captain asked permission to fill up her crew, and the French authorities unanimously granted him his request. Mr. Dayton thought this determination an error. The rule is certainly liable to much abuse. A vessel having lost a large part of her crew might repair the

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* Message and Documents, 1862 – 63, Part I. p. 138.

† Message and Documents, 1863 – 64, p. 766.

loss without going home. The Florida wanted men, not to navigate her, but to fire her guns and burn her prizes. Her crew was still double that of a merchant-ship of the same size. All the additional men she obtained at Brest were fighting men, and might as well have been sent into the Confederate army. Judge Story restored a prize because there had been a substantial increase of the crew of the captor in a port of the United States.* Even on the authority of Captain Semmes, Captain Maffitt had no right to expect what he asked and obtained. Semmes, writing to the Governor of Martinique, says: "A belligerent ship of war cannot increase her armament or her crew in a neutral port, nor supply herself with ammunition."† A neutral has no more right to allow such a vessel to obtain a new crew in her port, than to replace her guns which have been made useless.

Certain British subjects were reported to have been shipped on board the United States ship-of-war Kearsarge. Earl Russell, sending evidence of the shipment to Mr. Adams, says: "I need not point out to you the importance of these statements, as proving a deliberate violation of the laws of this country, within one of its harbors, by commissioned officers of the navy of the United States. Before I say more, I wait to learn what you can allege in extenuation of such culpable conduct on the part of the United States officers of the navy and the United States Consul at Queenstown." ‡ Mr. Adams is instructed from home: "If you find the charge sustained against the Consul, you will, without waiting further instruction, dismiss him from his office, and make a temporary appointment in his place. You will assure Earl Russell that, if the charge shall be sustained against the commander of the Kearsarge, he will be promptly relieved of his command, and other satisfactory amends will be offered to her Majesty's government." §

There were many conflicting statements in the evidence presented by the two governments. Our government held that the Consul, Mr. Eastman, and Captain Winslow had no part whatever in the matter.

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* 7 Wheaton, p. 342.

† Our Cruise in Sumpter, p. 127.

‡ Message and Documents, 1864 – 65, Part I. p. 9. § Ibid., p. 59.

The British sailors were indicted for having agreed to enter the service of the United States on board the Kearsarge, and, pleading guilty, escaped with an admonition.* No papers have been found to show that her Majesty's government took any measures to prevent her subjects from serving with Captain Semmes in the service of the Confederacy.

Mr. Adams writes to Mr. Seward: "Meanwhile the British subjects enlisted as seamen are permitted to remain with their families with impunity. It is only the poor Irishmen taken into the Kearsarge at Queenstown, who have been passed through the formality of a conviction in the courts for an offence against neutrality."

If neutrals give permission to belligerent war vessels to enter their ports, they must protect them while there. "The neutral is not voluntarily to allow either of the belligerent parties to commit upon its neutral territory, either continental or maritime, any hostile acts." † The first instruction to the United States naval officers ordered, that under "no circumstances will they seize any foreign vessel within the waters of a friendly nation." This rule has sometimes been violated. A commission was appointed by the President to fix on the compensation which should be paid to the owners of the Mont Blanc, which was seized on the Bahama Bank.‡ In the case of the Margaret and Jessie, Mr. Seward writes: "If it shall appear that any act of hostility, or of pursuit, was committed within the maritime jurisdiction of Great Britain, the act will be disavowed, and ample redress will be promptly given." § Captain Semmes's journal tells us that he spared vessels which were within a league of shore; and well he might, after the Captain-General of Cuba had set at liberty prizes captured within the jurisdiction of that island.‖ The United States have shown that the word "foreign" in their instructions applied also to Confederate vessels.

The seizure of the Florida in the bay of St. Salvador, Brazil, October 7, 1864, though in accordance with what might be supposed the wishes of the government, yet was unhesitatingly condemned. By the consent of the Brazilian government, the Florida was at anchor under the protection of her forts and navy. The United States Consul had given his word of honor that she should not be attacked. At night, while the crew of the Florida were on shore, the Wachusett attempted to sink her; but failing in this after firing a few guns, she took her in tow, went to sea, and escaped, bringing the Florida to the United States. December 12th, Mr. Barbosa, under instructions from his government, protested to Mr. Seward against an act "which involved a manifest violation of the territorial jurisdiction of the Empire, and an offence to its honor and sovereignty." * Mr. Seward replied, December 21st, that Captain Collins will be suspended, and ordered to appear before a court-martial, and that "the Consul, having incited the Captain, will therefore be dismissed." This answer was given because the capture "was an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exercise of the naval force of the United States within a foreign country, in defiance of its established and duly recognized government." The long list of English precedents, contained in a letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, was not sufficient to control the action of the United States, but is valuable as showing the changes in the law. The correspondence does not show that Brazil demanded either the vessel or damages. The sinking of the Florida "by some unforeseen accident" would have prevented restoration, but the United States, having admitted that the act was indefensible and unlawful, could not have refused compensation.

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* Message and Documents, 1864-65, Part I. p. 764.

† Kluber, sect. 284.

‡ Message and Documents, 1863-64, p. 589.

§ Ibid., p. 648.

‖ Message and Documents, 1861-62, p. 271.

"A capture made within neutral waters is as between enemies deemed to all intents and purposes rightful. It is only by the neutral sovereign that its legal validity can be called in question; as to him and him only is it to be considered void." † The injured belligerent can therefore demand that the neutral shall make compensation to him for the injury received. The General Armstrong, a United States privateer, was destroyed by the British frigate Plantagenet, September 27, 1814, in a port of the Azores. The claim of the United States on Portugal for compensation, made at the time, was

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* Boston Daily Advertiser, January 4, 1865.

† 3 Wheaton, 447.

renewed in 1818, as an offset to the Artigas claims. In 1849 it came up again. Mr. Clayton writes: "In considering the question as to the liability of Portugal, it may well be maintained that it is coextensive with the security guaranteed by the safeguard of a neutral port."* Portugal admitted that she would have been liable had she not used all the means in her power to protect the American vessel, but claimed that the defenceless position of these islands excused her in this instance; and she also contended that the General Armstrong fired the first shot, and so originated the violation. The United States for a long time refused to leave her claims with an arbiter. The American Minister left Lisbon. In 1850, Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, referred the case to the President of France. Louis Napoleon decided against the claims. After a review of the circumstances, he says: "Captain Read (U. S.), not having applied from the beginning for the intervention of the neutral sovereign, and having had recourse to arms in order to repel an unjust aggression of which he pretended to be the object, has thus failed to respect the neutrality of the territory of the foreign sovereign, and released that sovereign of the obligation in which he was to afford him protection by any other means than that of a pacific intervention. From which it follows, that the government of her most faithful Majesty cannot be held responsible for the result of the collision, which took place in violation of her right of sovereignty, in contempt of her neutrality, and without the local officer or lieutenants having been required in proper time, and enabled to grant aid and protection to those having a right to the same."† A neutral nation cannot then be held responsible unless the belligerent claims her protection before the attack, and then the neutral must use all the means at her disposal, not only to prevent, but to obtain redress or punish. If any capture is made in the port of my friend, says Bynkershoek, "amici illius est efficere, ut capta restituantur, vel sumptu suo, vel sumptu ejus, qui damnum passus est." Brazil, then, ought to have put forth all peaceful endeavors to obtain satisfaction from the United States.

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* Ex. Documents, 1851 – 52, Vol. VI. Doc. 53.

† Senate Documents, 1852 – 53, Vol. III. Doc. 24.

The United States, while making this strong precedent for the future, can hardly be supposed to apply the words "unauthorized, illegal, and indefensible" to all warlike measures in neutral waters; indeed, these words seem to imply that some such acts may be authorized, legal, and defensible. The correspondence in the case of the Caroline shows what the United States held then to be defensible. The Caroline was seized within our waters by the British. Five years after, Mr. Webster, writing to Lord Ashburton, says: "It will be for the English government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."* Lord Ashburton, maintaining, in reply, that respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent nations is the most essential foundation of civilization, shows that the case of the Caroline comes under the exception.

Bynkershoek gives another exception. What was begun without neutral waters may be finished within, "dum fervet opus." This exception is not generally regarded as a good one; and the United States have made an apology and given damages in cases where our cruisers have pursued vessels into neutral waters and there captured them.

Portugal seems to have made a new exception in regard to the Azores. These islands have for years been used and abused by belligerents. The Portuguese Minister of War, in conversation with Mr. Harvey, Minister of the United States, said that they were so exposed and unprotected, that our best plan would be to send a sufficient force there to protect American ships against threatened depredations, and to punish the criminal offenders.† The United States, with such permission to protect the neutrality of Portugal, might even attack and seize a Confederate vessel in a port of the Azores.

Several instances have arisen of the sale of an armed vessel in neutral waters. The Etta, a Confederate privateer, having been shut up at Nassau, was sold at auction to escape capture.‡ She was afterwards seized on the ocean, and brought before the United States District Court for New Jersey. The Judge held, on the authority of Lord Stowell * and of Judge Story,† that the vessel was lawful prize. The good faith of the purchaser it was unnecessary to inquire into.

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* Webster's Works, Vol. VI. p. 261.

† Message and Documents, 1862-63, p. 588.

‡ Law Register, November, 1864.

Earl Russell, writing to Sir F. Bruce, July 1, 1865, admits that the Etta was lawfully condemned, and adds: "This opinion involves the assent of her Majesty's government to the very important position of law, that the ship of an enemy which has been a commissioned ship of war cannot, during the continuance of the war, be relieved from the risk of capture and condemnation in the prize courts of the other belligerent by any sale or transfer to a neutral, although such neutral may purchase her with the *bonâ fide* intention of using her for his own benefit in lawful commerce, and may, to the utmost of his power, divest her of any warlike character, and convert her into, and use her as, a merchant vessel." ‡

Another case has occasioned a long discussion. The Sumpter having gone to Gibraltar, Captain Semmes writes: "It became necessary for me to abandon the Sumpter in consequence of my being penned in by the enemy in a place where it was impossible to put the necessary repairs upon her to make her fit to take to sea." She was therefore sold at auction, though Mr. Koerner, Consul at Madrid, protested.§ After the sale to a British subject, Mr. Adams telegraphs: "Captain Byrson must take her on the high sea if he can. He need not mind the twenty-four hour rule if out of the jurisdiction." The case was referred to the law officers of the crown. January 15, 1863, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Adams: "I have now the honor to inform you that her Majesty's naval officers at that port have received instructions not to give any protection to that vessel beyond the waters of Gibraltar; but it will of course be clearly understood that those instructions do not preclude the owners of the Sumpter, if that vessel should be taken by United States cruisers, from appealing, according to usage and practice of international law, to the prize court of the United States against the captors." The Sumpter escaped and came to Liverpool. Mr. Adams called the attention of Earl Russell to her Majesty's proclamation limiting the stay of belligerent vessels within her ports. Earl Russell answers: "Her Majesty's government, in the present state of their information on the subject, are unable to assume that the ship lately called the Sumpter has not been legally and *bonâ fide* sold to a British owner for commercial and peaceful purposes; and unless it were established that the sale was merely fictitious, her Majesty's proclamation cannot be deemed applicable to that vessel in the port of Liverpool." Again Earl Russell writes: "The authorities at Liverpool are instructed to continue to observe this vessel, and to report without delay any circumstance of an unusual character which may happen to take place in regard to her."

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* 6 Robinson, 396.

† 2 Wheaton, Appendix.

‡ Boston Daily Advertiser, July 26, 1865.

§ Message and Documents, 1863-64, p. 63.

March 14th, Mr. Adams claims that, during the late war with Russia, her Majesty's government steadily refused to recognize the transfer of any vessels of that nation in neutral ports. Earl Russell replies, that Mr. Adams has confounded the positions of a neutral and belligerent "in regard to the sale of ships belonging to another belligerent." He then declares the position of England: "The neutral and belligerent have distinct rights in the matter; the neutral has a right to acquire such property offered to him for purchase; but the belligerent may, in the particular circumstances in the case, not recognize the transfer of such property, as being that of his enemy, only parted with to the neutral in order to prevent it from capture on the high seas." This position seems to Mr. Adams "singularly at war as much with the first principles of justice as with the reciprocal obligations of international law." Earl Russell, closing the correspondence, says: "It is not the intention on the part of her Majesty's government to deviate in this case from any acknowledged principle of international law, or from the expression of those principles hitherto given in courts administering that law."

This instructive correspondence shows that each government admits that the sale of a belligerent war vessel to a neutral is invalid as to the other belligerent. Great Britain, while acknowledging that she is bound to see that the sale is *bonâ fide*, and to guard lest the armament of the vessel is increased, refuses to decide that the sale to an English citizen is void while the vessel is still within a neutral port.

The position of England on this new question seems to be the stronger. The claim of the United States is contrary to that principle of the law of nations which allows to neutrals all commercial adventures, even though they can afterwards be punished by capture and condemnation. If, on the authority of the decision in the case of the Santissima Trinidad, a neutral can send an armed vessel to a belligerent port for sale, why may not a neutral buy an armed vessel from a belligerent, subject to the same penalty of condemnation if the vessel is caught upon the ocean?

The same question arose in reference to the Japan, afterwards called the Georgia. Earl Russell writes to Mr. Adams: "With a view, however, to prevent the recurrence of any question such as that which has arisen in the case of the Georgia, her Majesty's government have given directions that in future no ship of war of either belligerent shall be allowed to be brought into any of her Majesty's ports for the purpose of being dismantled or sold." *

The Georgia was afterwards captured and sent to Boston. A letter of Earl Russell shows that the claims made in the case of the Sumpter are not given up: "Her Majesty's government of course expects that a vessel (the Georgia) seized under the British flag and claimed by British owners will be brought with as little delay as possible for adjudication into the proper prize courts." †

The Emily St. Pierre, a British vessel, having been captured on the ground that she was attempting to run the blockade, a prize crew of three officers and twelve men were put on board, with orders to proceed to Philadelphia. The captain, steward, and cook, who had been left on the prize, "by contriving a method of surprise and rescue," compelled the prize crew to navigate the vessel to Liverpool.

Mr. Adams asked Earl Russell "that directions might be given to restore the vessel, at an early day, to the authority from which it had been so violently taken." ‡ "Her Majesty's government are unable to comply with your request, inasmuch as they have no jurisdiction or legal power what-

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* Message and Documents, 1864-65, Part II. p. 278. † Ibid., p. 298.

‡ Message and Documents, 1862-63, p. 75 *et seq.*

ever to take or acquire possession of her, or to interfere with her owners in relation to their property in her," writes Earl Russell. May 9th, Mr. Adams regrets that "the absence of a just and necessary power in her Majesty's government" prevents the restoration. "The law of nations not only does not require, but does not even permit, neutral nations to carry out belligerent rights, but leaves to the belligerent alone the duty, and confers upon him the power, of vindicating such right, and of enforcing such law," is the answer of Earl Russell. July 9th, Mr. Adams finds that the English government made a similar demand on the United States in 1800, which he thinks "makes a very awkward record." Earl Russell puts this awkward record on the United States, when he transmits the answer of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to the English demand. Mr. Pickering writes: "No precedent is recollected, nor does any reason occur, which should require the neutral to exert its power in aid of the right of the belligerent nation in such captures and detentions." The correspondence ends January 20th, when Mr. Adams reminds Earl Russell of the English claims on Holland for a recapture in the late war with Russia.*

Without knowing how the question has been decided, the United States position may be doubted. A neutral vessel may use all the means in her power to prevent the cruiser from overtaking her; but if she offers forcible resistance to capture, or to search when captured, or to her prize crew while on her way to a belligerent port, such resistance will condemn vessel and cargo. As the captor's property in the prize is not fixed till the sentence of condemnation has passed, no reason occurs why the neutral may not have the same right to attempt an escape after capture as before, subject to the same penalty if he fails. No belligerent would demand from a neutral a vessel which had escaped through its speed, or had not stopped after the signal gun.

Prize crews, like sails, steam, and cannon, are but means employed to bring the vessel before the court; and if fifteen belligerents allow themselves to be overpowered by three neutrals, there can be no other remedy in a neutral port than if the vessel had escaped through some defect in the cruiser's boiler.

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* Message and Documents, 1863-64, p. 101.

"An interest acquired in war by possession is divested by the loss of possession," says Judge Story.* When the Emily St. Pierre was carried into Liverpool, our government had no more claim on her while she remained there, than before she started on her voyage for Charleston. The last instance cited by Mr. Adams sustains this view. The Dutch vessel seized for a breach of blockade was, in spite of the English prize crew, carried into a port of Holland by the Dutch captain. The English authorities afterwards obtained possession of her, and the case was brought into the admiralty courts, which finally decreed a restoration to the Dutch owners, though on what grounds does not appear. But if the Dutch vessel which had attempted to run the blockade, and was also liable to condemnation for the resistance after capture, could be released, it would seem that it could have been for no other reason than that the second possession of her was wrongful.

In the particular department of the neutral's duty considered in this essay, we have seen that there is really but one question left undecided. Did her Majesty's government perform its whole duty in reference to the Alabama and other vessels equipped in English ports for the use of the Confederacy? An attempt to settle this question by war would leave it still unsettled. If one party should concede to the other, the answer would hardly be decisive as to similar questions in the future. The interests of each party and of the world demand that this question should be answered with all the weight and authority that can come from the opinion of learned and impartial men, after a proper consideration of the law and the facts.

In the library of Harvard College is preserved with care the original order of President Washington appointing Mr. Gore and Mr. Pinckney as commissioners to settle all claims for damages done to England during her war with France by vessels built and equipped in ports of the United States. At some future time may there be preserved in England with equal care the evidence that her Majesty's government, having used means to prevent, were willing to give compensation for whatever acts an unprejudiced nation may think they should and could have stopped and finished.

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* 1 Wheaton, 125.

ART. VI. — 1. *On the Cam. Lectures on the University of Cambridge in England.* By WILLIAM EVERETT, A. M. Cambridge. 1865.

2. *Education in Oxford.* By JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, Tooke Professor of Economic Science in King's College, Sometime Public Examiner in Oxford, and one of the Delegates of the Oxford Local Examinations.

3. *The Students' Guide to the University of Cambridge.* Cambridge, England. 1862.

4. *National Review.* Vol. II. *University Reform, — Cambridge.*

5. *Pass and Class.* By MONTAGU BURROWS. Oxford and London. 1861.

THE book of Mr. Everett, whose title we have placed at the head of our article, contains a course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, in the winter of 1864 – 65, and gives the reader an account of his experiences as an undergraduate at the English University of Cambridge. It is a pleasant, though a slight performance. Mr. Everett disavows any intention of presenting a thorough treatise on English university education, and has published his lectures much as they were delivered to a popular audience. We are grateful for any account of a personal experience where American personal experience is so rare; but we cannot help regretting that the author did not employ his leisure in recasting his discourses. We could have exchanged his poetry and the two lectures on the great men who have studied at Cambridge, which, though well enough as lyceum lectures, contain little that is new or striking, for a more exact and minute account of the course of study there. In this particular his book is inferior to the only other American book of the kind, the very instructive and entertaining "Five Years at an English University" of Mr. Charles Astor Bristed. We could have wished more particularly for some account of the real working of those measures of reform which have been instituted as the result of the labors of the Parliamentary Commission appointed to investigate the state of the University in 1857, and for something more than what he gives us on the subject of that very important and interesting movement, the Oxford and Cambridge " Middle-Class Examinations." On these and kindred academical subjects authentic information is difficult to obtain, and American readers are obliged to rely almost entirely upon such articles as are contained in English periodicals.

We cannot felicitate Mr. Everett upon the style of his performance, and must be permitted to express our wonder that a young gentleman who has had the benefit of the instruction of both English and American Cambridge, should indulge in such flowers of rhetoric as those which adorn his pages. Are we to understand that they were gathered on the banks of the Cam? But it is with precisely such as these that our English brethren are wont to reproach our green and immature scholarship. Yet we feel quite sure that they were never grown under the fostering hand of the accomplished successor of him who, at Harvard, in our young days, so ruthlessly demolished all such ornaments of our juvenile efforts. What, for instance, are we to think of " our matchless Bond, seizing the fiery tresses of the trailing wanderers, and unbridling the oceanic ring of Saturn from the curb the ages had thrown over it " ? — proceedings which that worthy and lamented astronomer would have looked on, we think, with some astonishment. Cambridge in the character of an Amazon, on page 126, somewhat alarms us, and we think that our young orator underrated the taste of his Boston audience when he indulged in that peroration to his last lecture about the " Chattanooga of liberty " and " Aurora opening the gates of the morning." This is what we are accustomed to recognize now-a-days as the " spread-eagle style," and to look for from the westward rather than the eastward of our meridian. " When you think any passage in your writing particularly fine, *strike it out*," was the sensible advice of some teacher of rhetoric to a youthful pupil, and Mr. Everett is not yet too old to profit by it.

We must protest, on the other hand, against the slipshod use, in a volume on an academic subject, of the abbreviations *can't*, *would n't*, *must n't*, *did n't*, which are so frequent in Mr. Everett's pages, and to sundry colloquialisms here and there, which contrast awkwardly with his too ambitious rhetoric.

With these drawbacks, however, which the critic is bound to notice, the book is a pleasant and instructive one,—pleasantest where the author draws most directly from his personal experience, as in the account of the details of his college life, and the picturesque descriptions of the beautiful college buildings of Cambridge. With some of these details we had become familiar in the pages of college novels; others were new and somewhat surprising. We were struck with Mr. Everett's unpleasant account of a college-hall dinner. In our own recollections of the "commons" (long numbered with the things of the past) in old "University," with its brick-floored halls, and primitive benches, we remember no such rudeness at Harvard. We should think it would tell very unfavorably on the table manners of Cambridge graduates. Mr. Everett's remarks on college topics are often sensible and judicious; and we particularly commend the parallel he draws between the gentlemanly reception of college freshmen by the older students at our English sister, and our own brutal, ungentlemanly, and altogether abominable college "hazing." No son of Harvard or Yale can read this without a sense of shame at the contrast, and a feeling that he must do what in him lies to strengthen the hands of the college authorities in suppressing this disgraceful relic of barbarism.

Mr. Everett, as was to be expected from his training, is a warm, though not very discriminating, partisan of classical study. He gives us the usual commonplaces on the subject, but makes no attempt to estimate the real value of the classics in comparison with other subjects of liberal study, or the place the two great English Universities now hold in the English machinery of education. With the help of the other authorities mentioned at the head of our article, we desire to say a few words on these subjects.

Of the complicated university system of Oxford and Cambridge something may be learned from Mr. Everett's first lecture, and more from the work of Professor Thorold Rogers. That system, like most English institutions, has remained outwardly unchanged almost from the time of its foundation, though great internal changes have taken place in its working. Originally the *university* was the educating body, the teaching organ, prescribing a regular curriculum of study, and enforcing its observance with pains and penalties, much in the fashion of our own colleges. But in course of time, and chiefly in consequence of changes of which Laud was the originator, the *colleges* have usurped the place of the university proper, and from an educating, the latter has become merely a prize-giving and degree-conferring body.* This change has led to a total change in the style and manner of instruction, by introduing the fashion of competitive examinations, and the whole system of "honors"; a system which, though supposed by many to be coeval with the founding of the universities, is really of comparatively very recent origin. The first mathematical honor list was published in 1746 or 1747, and the so-called "classical tripos" was not established till 1824. Not only did this system transfer the real teaching from the university professors to the college tutors, but a still further change has been worked by it; for, such has been the eagerness of competition for college honors, and the more substantial prize of a fellowship, that the instruction of private tutors (otherwise "coaches") has to a great degree taken the place of that of the regular college tutors. So that the college study of Oxford and Cambridge has degenerated into little more than a headlong race, a high-pressure system of cramming, for the purpose of gaining some extrinsic object in the shape of a prize or a "living." This would describe the life of the studying (we cannot quite say studious) minority; the majority of the young men at both universities are of that class described by Blackstone, who consider the university a place "to while away the awkward interval from childhood to twenty-one, in a calm middle state of mental and moral inactivity."

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* "The Professors of Chemistry and Anatomy," says Sir Charles Lyell, in an interesting chapter on University Education in his first Travels in America, "who had formerly considerable classes, have only mustered six or seven pupils, although still compelled to give courses of fifty lectures each. The chairs of Modern History and of the Application of Machinery to the Arts, once numbering audiences of several hundred, have been in like manner deserted." (Vol. I. p. 240.) See the accumulation of evidence in the Report of the Oxford Commission, Evidence, p. 268 *et seq.* "A vast majority of the University," says Mr. Senior, "do not attend the lectures on Experimental Philosophy. Many leave the University *without knowing that such lectures are given.*" On the general subject the reader may consult with profit the learned little work of Professor Malden, "On the Origin of Universities"; the well-known Essay by Sir William Hamilton, "On the State of the English Universities"; and the excellent paper in the National Review whose title we have placed at the head of our article.

We do not know how to explain it, save by the thoroughly materialistic turn of thought of our English brethren, their habit of estimating all things by the amount of solid pudding they will bring, that they show such a fondness for this system of competition. Everything in England now-a-days is decided by a "competitive examination." Not a tide-waiter can get a place in the customs, not a young clerk can enter a public office, not a cadet can be sent to India, without first submitting himself to a cramming process, and running a neck-and-neck race with five hundred others, through what is meant to be a literary examination. The preposterous absurdity of some of these is almost incredible,* and the disastrous effects of the system on real learning need hardly be pointed out. Cram takes the place of real study; an extraneous object becomes the motive of exertion, in place of a genuine love of learning; and a body of so-called teachers springs up, whose object is, not to show their pupils how really to learn, but how most cleverly to pass an examination. The memory is overtaxed by feverish efforts,† while all the higher faculties of the mind are held in abeyance. Thus real learning is degraded, and true scholarship is driven from what should be the very home of the Muses. To be forever under the pressure of examinations is not the normal state of the true student, and we cannot but regret to see a tendency in some of our own colleges to substitute the English system for the more laborious but far more thorough one of class teaching.*

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* The following are some of the questions set for candidates for a £90 clerkship in the public offices:— 1. State concisely Ricardo's theory of rent. 2. What do you consider to be the chief merits and defects, as philosophers, of Aristotle and Plato respectively? 3. Describe the daily life of a citizen of Athens in the time of Pericles, and of Rome in the time of Augustus. 4. What were the distinctive opinions of the old, middle, and new academies? We do not wonder at finding a bluff old Surveyor-General reporting, "Persons who have stood high in the estimation of the Civil Service Commissioners have been found of little value here. . . . . They are fond of argumentative displays, and have exhibited towards their principals and the public a degree of presumption and self-sufficiency which could not be tolerated." Our English brethren boast themselves to be peculiarly a *practical* nation, but really the evidences of their practicality are sometimes not a little amusing.

† The transient and worthless character of the knowledge acquired under this high-pressure system (to say nothing of its destructive influence upon the bodily health of the student) has often been pointed out by physiologists and metaphysicians. "The system of *cramming*," says Mr. Bain in his recent work, "The Senses and the Intellect," "is a scheme for making temporary acquisitions, regardless of the endurance of them. Excitable brains, that can command a very great concentration of force upon a subject, will be proportionably impressed for the time being. By drawing upon the strength of the future we are able to fix temporarily a great variety of impressions during the exaltation of cerebral power that the excitement

That this system has worked an unfortunate change in the style and standard of English scholarship, there is abundant evidence to prove. "However much it may be regretted," says the able writer in the National Review, "there can be no sort of doubt that the prospect of obtaining a fellowship is the power by which the whole education of the university is worked." It need hardly be pointed out in how many ways the operation of such a system is injurious. In the first place, it acts very partially. While it stimulates to undue effort a small minority of the best minds, it leaves the great mass of

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gives. The occasion past, the brain must lie idle for a corresponding length of time, while a large portion of the excited impressions will gradually perish away. This system is extremely unfavorable to permanent acquisitions; for these the force of the brain should be carefully husbanded and temperately drawn upon. Every period of undue excitement and feverish susceptibility is a time of great waste for the plastic energy of the mind as a whole." (p. 450.) Whatever may be thought of the writer's materialistic philosophy, there can be no doubt of the truth of his practical conclusions. See also the remarks on Memory in Sir Henry Holland's interesting "Chapters in Mental Physiology."

* The evidence of Dr. Whewell on this point, the head of the only College in Cambridge where the system is not tolerated, is very emphatic. "I may add," he says, "my very decided opinion, that no system of education which is governed entirely, or even mainly, by examinations occupying short times with long intervening intervals, can ever be otherwise than a bad mental discipline. Intellectual education requires that the mind should be habitually employed in the acquisition of knowledge, with a certain considerable degree of clear insight and independent activity. This is universally promoted by the daily teaching of the lecture-room, with the sympathy and interest that the mutual action of various minds produces; it is not necessarily or greatly promoted by the prospect of an examination. . . . The influence of an English university education would be utterly degraded if examinations and their consequences were to supersede the influence of the college lecture-rooms; or if college lecture-rooms were to make their claim to respect and regard depend solely upon their being the successful rivals of private tutors in preparing students for university examinations." Report of the Cambridge University Commission, Evidence, p. 417. See also a striking passage in Father Newman's "Office and Work of a University" (p. 112 *et seq.*), on the deadness and want of all sympathy between teacher and pupil at Oxford in his time.

students entirely unaffected. Hopeless of success, they decline the competition altogether, and drift through their college life in a state of contented ignorance, carrying from their academic halls minds as uncultivated as they brought to them, if they have not meantime been swept away to destruction by the strong current of vice and dissipation. Yet, strange to say, it is from the ignorant, and even from the vicious *πολλοί*, that the ranks of the clergy of the Church of England are chiefly recruited, by means of the system of presentation to livings. We can no longer wonder at the rejection of Mr. Gladstone as member for Oxford, when we learn that it was chiefly effected by the votes of the country clergy, who are the product of this sort of education.*

The system works unfortunately in another way, inasmuch as it establishes as the leading studies, not those which would be really most useful and improving, but those which will tell best upon a competitive examination. There is a very general impression that the predominance of classical studies at English and American universities has been brought about in consequence of profound investigations into the nature of the human mind and the best methods of training it. Nothing can be more erroneous. Such profound investigations, we are sorry to say, have never been entered into, and educational psychology is a science yet to be created. This predominance of classical study is, we had almost said, an accident; rather let us say, it is the result of well-known events in history, which for a time gave the rediscovered classical writers an altogether exceptional value to the mind of Europe. Their predominant sway has been continued, not through their intrinsic value being greater than that of any other educational instrumentalities, but simply through the force of old prescription, nowhere so strong as in England, and by the influence of the English system upon the founders of our older colleges. To this may be added the reason with which we are more immediately concerned, that such studies, pursued as they are in England, are suited above all others, not to produce real expansion and enlargement of the intellect, but to serve the purposes of a cram examination. Accordingly, we find everything giving place, at Oxford and Cambridge, not even to an enlarged and liberal, but to a narrow and technical study of a few classical writers, and to the unfruitful study of the most useless parts of abstract mathematics. So strong is this influence, and so little considered are any studies save those that bring " marks," and, with marks enough, a fellowship, that the attempt made, in accordance with the recommendations of the University Commission of 1857, to establish natural and moral science " triposes " seems, thus far, to have proved a total failure. The profoundest knowledge of principles avails nothing in an examination when tricks and intellectual *tours de force* count for so much. Physical science, law, and the philosophy of history necessitate real knowledge, and cannot be broken up into convenient parcels to suit the precise wants of an examiner. And accordingly we find Professor Rogers reporting the average number of first-class men in these " optional schools " at only five or six per annum.

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* The account which Mr. Everett gives (p. 340) of the character and behavior of a large class of English candidates for holy orders is very surprising. We are glad to believe that it has no parallel on this side of the water.

When we speak thus of the failure of university reform, we speak subject to correction. Information respecting it is difficult to obtain; and we know how often it is the case that great changes may be taking place in institutions whose outward framework may give no sign of the internal revolution proceeding within them. We cannot but wish that some one of our academic *friends* across the water — and we are happy to believe that under that term we can include nearly all the best of England's true scholars — would give us more light on the subject. As at present advised, we cannot help believing that classical studies, and those of a very barren kind, and mathematical studies of not much greater value, still retain their mischievous monopoly at both universities.

We say mischievous *monopoly*. We wish to be counted among the friends of true classical learning; but no true friend will wish to see it retain the usurped place it now holds in modern higher education. The argument with which an attempt is made to build up a theory by which Greek and Latin shall forever remain the basis of education, upon their accidental and exceptional importance at the time of the revival of learning, seems to be sufficiently refuted by the manifest failure of the system to meet the wants of a totally different period; yet it is surprising how tenaciously its adherents refuse to recognize the demands of the new times. Mr. Everett, as a young student fresh from his Homer and Thucydides, may be pardoned his fulsome eulogy of classical study, (surely his classics never taught him such rhetoric,) and his slur at men whose arguments and opinions he shows clearly he has never studied. But it is surprising to find in such scholars as Mr. Froude, the historian,* and Mr. Clark, the accomplished editor of Shakespeare,† such a want of apprehension of the absolute necessity in these modern times of widening the curriculum of university study and giving their just rights to modern science. Sneers at the "utilitarianism" of Gower Street come with an ill grace from a scholar, when the London University has become such a power in the English academic world. It is unfortunate that it is so difficult for either party in the controversy to do justice to the merits of the other; that the friends of reform will insist upon attempting to prove classical study worthless, while the adherents of the classics can see nothing in the study of science but an attempt at a "diluted omniscience." The problem must be approached in a far different spirit before it will receive its true solution.

Happily there are some who do approach it in a different spirit. Dr. Whewell, in a learned and interesting lecture ‡ on education, has pointed out clearly "how," to use his own words, "every great advance in intellectual education has been the effect of some considerable scientific discovery or group of discoveries. Every improvement of the mental discipline of those who stand in the forefront of humanity has followed some signal victory of their leaders; every addition to the means of intellectual culture has been the result of some extraordinary harvest, some more than ordinary bounty of the intellectual soil bestowed on the preceding years." We should give a very wide meaning to the word "scientific" in this passage; but unquestionably Dr. Whewell has here laid down an important principle in educational philosophy, this, namely, that every important intellectual revolution must of necessity be accompanied by a corresponding revolution in methods of education. Such a revolution the revival of learning caused by dethroning scholasticism in favor of classical learning. Such a revolution modern physical science is now making, by depriving classical study of its monopoly, and relegating it to its true place, as merely an important branch of the study of philosophy and literature. How it can any longer be maintained that there is some mysterious power in the study of Greek and Latin grammar, not possessed by any similar, or any other studies; how intelligent men can argue as though these were the only studies in which thoroughness is possible, while every other pursuit must be marked by superficiality and sciolism; how any one can maintain that the mere study of classics and mathematics forms a complete mental organon, when the narrowing influence of their exclusive study is patent in the character of so many of their votaries,* — passes our comprehension. It is utterly impossible for the bigoted adherents of classical study to withstand the current of opinion; but it is unfortunate that so many English scholars, whose influence has heretofore been so great in this country, should be so narrow in their views of what constitutes a liberal education. That influence, however, is not likely to be so great as it has been.

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* Oxford Essays for 1855.

† Cambridge Essays for 1855.

‡ "On the Influence of the History of Science upon Intellectual Education," delivered at the Royal Institution in 1854.

It is surprising that the modern advocates of classical studies do not see that what they call classical learning is something entirely different from the classical learning of the period of the revival of letters, and that the latter really approaches much nearer to the system of the advocates of an enlargement of the course of liberal study than to their own. This point has been so admirably brought out by Professor Goldwin Smith, in his Lectures on History, that we cannot refrain from quoting the passage.

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* On the effect of the omission of the study of inductive science from modern education in leaving so-called educated men a prey to superstition and delusion, see the striking evidence of Dr. Carpenter and Professor Faraday, reprinted from the Report of the Public School Commission, in the Appendix to the recently-published pamphlet of Mr. W. P. Atkinson, entitled "Classical and Scientific Studies, and the Great Schools of England."

"The nobility and gentry as a class," says Professor Smith, "seem to have been certainly more highly educated in the period of the late Tudors and the earlier Stuarts than in any other period of our history. Their education was classical; but classical learning meant then, not a gymnastic exercise of the mind in philology, but a deep draught from what was the great and almost the only spring of philosophy, science, history, and poetry at that time. It is not to philological exercises that our earliest Latin grammar exhorts the student, nor is it a mere sharpening of the faculties that it promises as his reward. It calls to the study of the language wherein is contained a great treasure of wisdom and knowledge; and, the student's labor done, wisdom and knowledge were to be his meed. It was to open that treasure, not for the sake of philological niceties or beauties, not to shine as the inventor of a canon, or the emendator of a corrupt passage, that the early scholars undertook the ardent, lifelong, and truly romantic toils which their massy volumes bespeak to our days, — our days which are not degenerate from theirs in labor, but in which the most ardent intellectual labor is directed to a new prize. Besides, Latin was still the language of literary, ecclesiastic, diplomatic, legal, academic Europe; familiarity with it was the first and most indispensable accomplishment, not only of the gentlemen, but of the high-born and royal ladies of the time.* We must take all this into account when we set the claims of classical against those of modern culture, and balance the relative amount of motive power we have to rely on for securing industry in either case. In choosing the subjects of a boy's studies, you may use your own discretion; in choosing the subjects of a man's studies, if you desire any worthy and fruitful effort, you must choose such as the world values, and such as may win the allegiance of a manly mind. It has been said, that six months' study of the language of Schiller and Goethe will now open to the student more high enjoyment than six years' study of the languages of Greece and Rome. It is certain that six months' study of French will now open to the student more of Europe than six years' study of that which was once the European tongue. These are changes in the circumstances and conditions of education which cannot be left out of sight in dealing with the generality of minds. Great discoveries have been made by accident; but it is an accidental discovery, and must be noted as such, if the studies which were first pursued as the sole key to wisdom and knowledge, now that they have ceased not only to be the sole, but the best key to wisdom and knowledge, are still the best instruments of education." *

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* [It might be added, that so much was Latin considered the vernacular language of scholars and educated persons, that it is not till of late years that a *professorship* of Latin has existed at Oxford. See the Inaugural Lecture of Professor Conington, the present incumbent.]

Even if classical studies were the best of all educations for the English aristocracy and clergy, it is clear that, at best, they are but a *class* education, and thus peculiarly unfitted to form the basis of a republican system. And as England advances nearer and nearer to the establishment of republican institutions, the perception of this fact is gradually dethroning Oxford and Cambridge from their old supremacy even in English education. The evidence is clear that they no longer hold the place they once did in popular estimation in England.

"With a population greatly increased," says Professor Thorold Rogers, who is a graduate of, and was for many years a tutor at Oxford,† "and with national wealth almost if not actually doubled, with general and special education still more extensively enlarged within the last twenty years, the number of undergraduates in the universities has absolutely declined within that period, and the sympathies of the nation with its ancient academies have grown weaker and weaker. Men care less and less for academic distinction, know less and less of academic learning, feel less and less the immediate influence of an academic training; and the connection between the universities and the Church bids fair to be the sole remaining link between the country and its noblest corporations. . . . . Without the exaction of a degree by the bishops from those who present themselves for holy orders, there would not remain one fifth of the present number of students." ‡

We cannot wonder at this when we read of the deadness, the narrowness, and enormous abuses at these universities. "The school of Law and Modern History," says Professor Rogers, "is a sham, and withal a superficial sham. Scholarship, philosophy, and history are borrowed from French and German authors. Very little has been added to the general stock of human learning out of the vast endowments of university and college income, — endowments equalling the incomes of many states." The aids and rewards of study at Oxford are estimated at half a million sterling per annum. Some idea of their distribution is given when we read that the Craven Scholarship, the most valuable at the University, by being limited to founder's kin, has often been held by passmen; that the Vinerian Scholarships, founded expressly for the promotion of the study of law, "are bestowed without any reference to knowledge of law, or any pledge to study it"; that at Cambridge King's College, with a revenue of £25,000 a year, admits annually from *five* to *twelve* undergraduates; that the noble foundation of All Souls, at Oxford, is a mere burrow for a few indolent, monkish celibates.

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* Lectures on History, I. 21.

† Mr. Rogers in 1862 was elected Professor of Political Economy at Oxford.

‡ See, on the decline of the universities, the remarkable speeches of Mr. Horsman in the House of Commons, and of the late Ex-Chancellor Lyndhurst in the House of Lords, in the debate on University Reform. Hansard's Debates, Vols. for 1854 and 1855.

But we cannot believe that these magnificent institutions, with all their time-hallowed memories, dear to us as well as to Englishmen, dear to all who speak the English tongue the world over, are destined to decay and perish. The Englishman is no revolutionist, but there is a wonderful power of recuperation, as well as tenacity of life, in English institutions. We cannot believe that University Reform is to be a failure. We rather look to see this odious monopoly of the colleges destroyed, which seems to have crushed the life out of professorial teaching; to see this disgraceful scramble for mere college prizes and emoluments replaced by a real pursuit of learning. When we remember that in Professors' chairs at Oxford are now such men as Goldwin Smith, and Jowett, and Müller, and Conington, and Arnold, — at Cambridge, such men as Kingsley and Thompson, — we cannot believe that their teaching can remain barren and unheeded. Surely it cannot but be one of the first wishes in the heart of every American scholar to see these venerable seats of learning in his mother country flourishing in renewed youth, and restored to more than their former glory.*

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* The true education of Oxford and Cambridge consists at present not so much in the studies pursued as in the life led there by the better class of students. There is abundant evidence to show that the eager struggle for places and honors, however evil its effects may be otherwise, does not lead to petty jealousies and rivalries; but that the intercourse of the students with one another is free, generous, and manly. We wish that space allowed us to quote the truly beautiful and eloquent passage in praise of his Alma Mater, with which, after all his sharp criticism, the writer in the National Review concludes his article.

Art. VII. — 1. *General Orders of the Freedmen's Bureau.* Nos. 1 – 11. Washington. 1865.

2. *First, Second, and Third Annual Reports of the New England Freedmen's Aid Society (Educational Commission).* Boston. 1863, 1864, 1865.
3. *Freedmen's Record.* A Monthly Journal, published by the same Society. 1865.
4. *First, Second, and Third Annual Reports of the National Freedmen's Relief Association.* New York. 1863, 1864, 1865.
5. *The National Freedman.* A Monthly Journal of the same Society. 1865.
6. *Annual Report of the Western Freedmen's Association.* Cincinnati. August, 1865.
7. *Pennsylvania Freedmen's Bulletin.* A Monthly Journal, published by the Pennsylvania Freedmen's Association. 1865.
8. *Chicago Freedmen's Bulletin.* A Monthly Journal, published by the Northwestern Freedmen's Aid Commission.
9. *Reports of the Superintendents of Freedmen for Eastern Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and of the Board of Education for Freedmen, Department of the Gulf.* 1864, 1865.

John Adams's axiom, that civil society must be built up on the four corner-stones of the church, the school-house, the militia, and the town-meeting, receives new illustration, of the most distinct kind, as we work out the great problem of to-day. Whichever panacea is presented to us in the great work of the admission of the four million negroes into our civil society, and the establishment of their social rights, fails to pass test till we have so extended the proposed arrangements that, in its work of blessing, all four of the essential rights of religion, education, self-defence, and self-government are provided for. Thus, it is of little use to give the negro a vote, unless he can read it; nor, if he can read it, unless he can defend himself from being shot down like a dog as he offers it; while, again, voting and defence both suppose a conscience fitly trained for their right exercise.

Or, if we begin at the other end, as was the old fashion of the Southern sentimentalists, and teach our negro to sing hymns of glory and to pray in unintelligible rhapsodies, — claiming indeed, as was often done, that he had the start of the rest of us in the affairs of the future world, — if thus sedulously we contrive his church for him, it proves wholly unfit to train him for his relations to this world, unless he have the wit to read, the arms to fight, and the right to vote. In all our experiments thus far, it has proved in vain to work at one of the four corners of our structure, unless, under the same impulse, we kept at work on the other three.

We shall not be able, therefore, to give any history or general statement regarding the progress made in the intellectual education of the blacks, without constant reference to the contemporaneous work on the other parts of the one great enterprise in hand. In the exertions so steadfastly pressed since the beginning of 1862, by the Northern friends of the slaves, the indissoluble connection of all their social privileges has never been forgotten. The Freedmen's Aid Societies have never been in the hands of people who supposed that they were going to save this nation or redeem an eighth part of its people from barbarism by primers and spelling-books. The instructions given to their agents in the field, and the diligent work of those agents, have been founded on the understanding that their work was the construction of civil society on a true basis; that there was no magic in books or slates, in reading or arithmetic, by which alone a race not fit for civil government could be made fit. The "teachers" have been taught, and have understood, that the work of education proposed was the education of savages into self-governing men; that books and alphabets and figures were of use so far as they tended to this aim; but that they were to keep this aim in sight all along, and in no way to make the means appear of more importance than the great object. In the first instructions given to Messrs. Rich and Boynton, the first teachers sent out by the New England Commission — the first of the societies in the field — to Hilton Head, this object was distinctly explained; and in all the work of the several societies, of which there are now six of considerable importance, besides several smaller local organizations, the end of the whole work has been kept in sight all along.

The efforts of the various organizations, which, in this spirit, have attempted the education of the freedmen, began in the spring of 1862, on a suggestion made by Mr. Edward L. Pierce, then engaged as a special Treasury agent at the Sea Islands, which had been restored to the nation by the brilliant naval operations of Admirals Dupont and Davis. Mr. Pierce saw the necessity for some system of education for the negroes, who had been deserted by their masters there; and, in response to a suggestion made by him, the "Educational Commission" was formed in the city of Boston. The name was unfortunate, first, because there is properly no such word as "educational" in the language; second, because nobody but the members of the society had given it any "commission." The name "Freedmen's Aid Society," which this organization afterwards took and now bears, is much more appropriate. Other societies, with the same general object, sprang into being, one in New York, one in Pennsylvania, one in Cincinnati, one in Chicago, one in Baltimore, and one in Indiana being, perhaps, among the most prominent. The American Missionary Society, an organization in existence many years before the war, founded for the purpose of pressing Christian instruction everywhere, with special reference, however, to the emancipation of the slave, had from the first availed itself of the opportunities which the war offered. Various confederations or unions between these societies have been formed, for the purpose of avoiding inconvenient rivalry in the canvassing for funds; and it is to the great credit of their teachers and other agents engaged in the active work proposed, that, with some unfortunate exceptions, there has been in general a very cordial feeling among them, and that no considerable inconvenience has been experienced from their being commissioned by so many different authorities. The United States government has, from the beginning, extended, at the hands of its officers, very hearty assistance in the enterprise in hand. The teachers, till the present time, have generally received transportation, quarters, and rations from the government. The military commanders have generally appointed Superintendents of Education, to whom all the teachers in a district have been obliged to report; so that a little approach has been made to statistical information regarding the results. In the establishment by act of Congress of the Freedmen's Bureau at Washington, and the admirable appointment at its head of General Howard, a great step has been taken, one of the results of which will be yet more of system in the arrangements governing the schools.

In the State of Louisiana, under General Banks's much abused, but really humane and intelligent arrangements, the military government assessed a school tax and established a system of education for the State. The Board of Education established under this order went steadily to work, and extended its operations with the extension of national domain in Louisiana. So steady and comprehensive was its work, and so well sustained by the authorities, that the State of Louisiana, in the number of schools and in the number of scholars, has been, and probably still is, in advance of all the States lately in rebellion. It is to be hoped that no changes of administration may make any material change in a system which has thus far worked so well.

From the various reports made by order of the several organizations named, we can make some approach to a statement of the number of schools for blacks, of teachers engaged, and of pupils, all under the protection of the nation, in the several Southern States, during the winter past. The figures in the following table comprise statements on official authority, nearly complete for the States named, at periods near the closing of the schools at the beginning of the last summer: —

		No. of Schools.	No. of Teachers.	No. of Scholars.
VIRGINIA,	Alexandria	2	4	289
	Richmond	6		1,500
	Eastern Virginia		74	3,224
NORTH CAROLINA		19	36	3,000
SOUTH CAROLINA,	Charleston	9	90	3,996
	Sea Islands		65	8,471
FLORIDA, Fernandina		33	11	471
MISSISSIPPI		31	50	3,396
TENNESSEE [WESTERN]			56	4,095
ARKANSAS		10	19	1,393
LOUISIANA,	Board of Education	121	216	13,462
	Vidalia and De Soto	5	6	646
		236	627	43,943

We do not include in this table any of the enterprises attempted in Maryland, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, or Missouri. Our immediate purpose is to show the present state of education in the States which were in rebellion.

Some beginnings have been made in Savannah and in Mobile, not mentioned above. We have no adequate returns of work in East Tennessee. In North Alabama there are two schools, with 449 scholars. We do not know that any of the societies have yet established schools in Texas.

These statements, incomplete though they are, are enough to show that a beginning has been made in this great enterprise, quite sufficient to be a basis for calculation and other inference as to its methods and success. It is only on the very edges or frontiers of these States that it has been possible to make this beginning. It has been made without the slightest assistance from the old governing class. It has been enthusiastically welcomed by the freedmen; it has been prosecuted by the vigor and faith of their Northern friends. Under such auspices more than forty-four thousand children and young persons were under instruction when the vacations came last summer. In these returns we make no enumeration of the evening schools for adults, or the regimental schools for soldiers, in which, probably, half as many more persons were under instruction of very considerable value. The schools which we do enumerate are regular daily schools, kept by competent teachers, with an established system of classification and registry, admitting of a distinct knowledge of the studies attempted and the progress made.

The first, and perhaps the most important observation to be made regarding this table is, that, with all the difficulties in the way of the enterprise, so much has been accomplished in so short a time. The number of slaves in the States named was, in 1860, rather less than two millions. Now the highest registry or census of children from four to sixteen years of age, made in those of our New England States which have pressed school attendance most firmly, is but one quarter of the population. If, then, the black population of these eight States named above were as large now as it was in 1860, — and this is doubtful, — they could, at the utmost, offer only

500,000 children between four and sixteen years of age for school instruction. That there are under instruction more than forty-four thousand children, besides those who are in the night schools, is a very encouraging result. It is nearly a tenth part of the work already established for those States, under circumstances the most difficult and depressing. It is a result which shows what reliance may be placed on the spirit of the freedmen and the courage of the North for the work, about twenty times as extensive, which is required to supply properly with schools the whole region lately in rebellion. For eight States one tenth of the work is already in operation. In Georgia, Alabama, and Texas, most of it is still to be set going. But nowhere are there any obstacles, if the present condition of things continues, to hinder its very rapid development, — as rapid, indeed, as the determination of the North shall demand.

The second point of special interest is the enthusiastic readiness of the freedmen to learn. In the first occupancy of the Sea Islands, there was many a man found, ignorant enough, or timid enough, or politic enough, to say he did not know whether he wanted to be free. Freedom was an abstract word, and the abstract idea had not often been made concrete for the black race. But men, women, and children knew that there was power in letters. They had seen the magic of a scrap of writing sent from a master to an overseer, and they were eager to share such power if there were any chance. No one, therefore, ever said that he did not wish to read. Had the teachers sent from the North no use to make of the alphabet but as a talisman to win the confidence of a people whom the army was not using well, and whom their old masters had used so ill, for that use only would the machinery of the schools have been invaluable.

As to the ease with which the blacks learn, no observations have been more accurate than those made on the Sea Islands, among a race somewhat inferior, whose insular position had been, on the whole, a disadvantage to them. Of the results there, we spoke at length in our last issue; and what we said of them will apply, with fit changes, to the observations made in other quarters. It must be remembered that very diverse original races are represented among the slaves. In Southern

Alabama and Mississippi will be found, we might almost say, tribes, with whom the traditions of Africa are fresh, — individuals whose memories run back to days of freedom there. In the small plantations of Tennessee, on the other hand, will be found men who have associated much more freely with whites, men used to act very much on their individual responsibility, many of whom will prove a fair match in shrewdness for any Scot or any Yankee. The house servant of Savannah, of Charleston, of Richmond, or of New Orleans has had, of course, wholly different training from either of these classes. The negro of the turpentine region of North Carolina proves to be different again. No general inferences, therefore, are to be received with very great confidence.

But it may be asserted, certainly, that the younger scholars, at the first, attack the problems of learning with a sort of zeal which brings them fully up to white children of their age. Enthusiastic teachers — and all new teachers of blacks thus far are enthusiastic — invariably say the black children go in advance of the white. After this beginning, as we infer from the great body of the reports, the result depends so largely upon the teacher, that we have as yet no very certain estimate as to the reliance to be placed on the native disposition of the scholar. A really good teacher will keep his school in hand, and keep it up to the work, and makes no complaint of difficulties of race. The difficulties are more apt to be those of the competition of other employments, and the unsettled condition of most of the slaves themselves.

On this point of the fitness of the race for school education, the testimony of the late Miss Myrtilla Miner, the pioneer in the whole business of the higher instruction of the blacks, seems to us of more value than any of the reports thus far obtained from the new schools. For many years Miss Miner kept a normal school in Washington, for the purpose of training black girls to be the teachers of their race. For many years before, she had kept a school for the training of white girls. This remarkable woman always insisted that no general conclusions could be drawn as to the superior ability of the one race or the other in such rudimentary studies as are followed in schools. One girl succeeded in one thing, one in another.

She was not fond of any of the popular generalizations about the blacks being an imitative race, or fond of music, or having tropical tastes. She insisted that, whatever were the native disposition, the surroundings of childhood were of much more import; and on the whole, she was as ready to make good teachers out of black girls as out of white, — no more, no less, — if the home influences were the same.

This fact may be relied upon, as appearing in reams of correspondence from teachers, that the blacks will learn fast enough under the stimulus which is now applied, if the fair chance to learn can be given.

All intelligent teachers among them, and all the boards of management, know that the occasional reports of transient visitors at the schools cannot be relied upon. People know what they see, but do not rightly estimate its relation to the mass of ignorance behind. Rev. Mr. Zachos, himself a teacher among the Sea Island negroes, who combined philosophical judgment with enthusiasm, has said very pertinently, that a visitor seeing a school full of children reading from a primer with a certain degree of accuracy and intelligence is enraptured with the idea that these children have learned to read, while in truth they have only learned to know by sight the words in that primer. Most of us have forgotten it, but this is the way most of us learned to read in childhood. We have learned by stress of memory, in a long pull at various dame schools, how several thousand words look when we see them. When we read, we rely on recollection of their appearance. We do not, except in rare instances, analyze the word into its constituent letters. We know the look of the word "analyze," and the look of the word "letters." Now it is no very hard task to teach children newly roused to the business the looks of two or three hundred words in a primer. It can be done in a fortnight or less; and those children will read with great effect the easy lessons at the end of that primer. But they will, as yet, have made but little advance towards reading the newspaper or the Bible, in which are six thousand words. To make more easy the process of reading by the letters, so that, when these are once mastered, the pupil may analyze his words or combine his letters far more readily than he now does, Mr. Zachos has set on foot that system of primers which has met such immediate approval among the highest authorities, and which, as we believe, is destined to relieve very greatly the labors of freedmen and their teachers.

The readiness with which the freedmen themselves engage in the efforts which are made for their education, relieves the problem as to the method of carrying it forward in the future of many of its embarrassments. They see intuitively, as well as we see, that for them knowledge is power, and that much of this knowledge must be book knowledge. Whether the suffrage is or is not limited to those who can read and write, it is just as clear that the black man who has those arts is the superior of the clay-eating white who cannot. And this is as clear to the black man as it is to his old master. It is to be observed then, first, that wherever they have been permitted, the free blacks, under the old *régime*, have not been backward in arranging for the schooling of their children. The plans of Miss Miner, of whom we have spoken, were based upon the certainty that there were nearly one hundred thousand free blacks in the District of Columbia and the adjacent States who would gladly send their children to school, if schools could be maintained. With this view, she established her normal school at Washington, to which this class of people did send their daughters to fit them to be the teachers of their own race. They paid the charges of instruction, and the school was always full. But such schools were maintained with the greatest difficulty in the condition of public opinion at the South. In Louisiana the statement of the new Board of Education is this: —

> "The children of the free colored people who were in good circumstances, known as Creoles, generally of French or Spanish extraction, when not educated abroad or at the North, or, from fairness of complexion, by occasional admission to the white schools, were quietly instructed at home, or in a very few private schools of their class. Even these, although not contrary to law (in Louisiana), were really under the ban of opinion, but were tolerated because of the freedom, wealth, respectability, and light color of the parents, — many of whom were nearly white, and by blood, sympathy, association, slaveholding, and other interests, were allied to the white rather than to the black. For the poor of the free colored people there was no school.

"To teach a slave the dangerous arts of reading and writing was a heinous offence, having, in the language of the statute, 'a tendency to excite insubordination among the servile class,' and punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not more than twenty-one years, *or by death*, at the discretion of the court."

In face of such a statute, Mrs. Mary D. Brice of Ohio came to New Orleans as early as December, 1858, "under a sense of duty, to teach colored people." She was not able to open her school until September, 1860, when she opened it for "colored children and adults." The outcry of June, 1861, when the Southern heart was well fired, compelled her to close it then; but in November, 1861, having received a Divine intimation that she should be sustained, she re-opened it, and subsequently enlarged it. This school continued to thrive through the whole *régime* of the Confederacy, and is now under the charge of the Board of Education. With the arrival of the Federal army, the increased confidence among the blacks themselves showed itself at once in their establishing private schools in New Orleans for the education of those of their children whose parents could pay for their instruction.

We enter into these details, to show the readiness of the free blacks, wherever there has been an opportunity in Slave States to strengthen themselves and their position by the education of their children. We have spoken of the enthusiasm with which the newly emancipated slaves have welcomed their teachers. In some instances the welcome has not been restricted to words. The school at Mitchellville in South Carolina was established in response to the call of Lymas Andus, a black man who had served in the army in Florida, and chose to use his bounty money and wages in building a church and providing for a school in the village which he had selected for his home. It must be understood, through all our observations on the subject, that we have no reports or statistics as to the free schools established in Washington, Alexandria, or New Orleans by those who were ranked as "free blacks," before the war, as "pay-schools," for their own children. Several of these schools are still in operation. But our subject is the education of the blacks now set free by the operation of the war.

The unwavering and increasing interest taken by the negroes in the schools for their children, and the heartiness with which adults themselves repair to the evening schools opened for them at almost all the stations, are a warrant that, as their *status* shall be more and more definitely secured, the expense of the maintenance of such schools may be left very largely to them. Eventually, as we must believe, now that these States are to be republics, as they never have been, they will provide for the school-training of all races at the public expense, as, under General Banks's order, is now done in Louisiana. But while waiting for the successive steps which shall bring about this result, we may expect the people whom we educate to tax themselves cordially to bear a part or the whole of the expense of their education. For two or three years the charge of the schools may fall on the benevolence of the North and on the general government, — the cost of a year of schooling for all the blacks being, as has been well said, not so much as the cost of three days of war. But the policy of the Freedmen's Aid Societies has not been to make these people beggars. "*Aide-toi et Dieu t'aidera*," is their motto. The black people know they must support themselves, as they always have done. Except in the cases of immediate suffering, when a herd of refugees rushes into a station, they are taught to earn and pay for their clothes, their seeds, their hoes, and their horses. They know that they must build and repair their churches. They look forward to the time when they shall build and repair their school-houses and bear the general charges of instruction. That time, according to the best observers, is not distant more than two or three years. This is so evident in the district of Tennessee and Arkansas that Colonel Eaton, the General Superintendent of Freedmen there, has issued an order requiring that tuition-fees shall be paid for each scholar, ranging from twenty-five cents a month to one dollar and twenty-five cents, according to the parents' ability; that free admission shall be furnished only in case of inability of the parents. The money thus collected is to be used for the incidental expenses of the schools and the wages of the teachers; and Colonel Eaton believes that after a little time there will be sufficient for all purposes.

As to that wider effect of education which, as we said in the outset, has been steadily kept in view by the Freedmen's Aid Societies, and, we may add, by the officers of the government, there can be no doubt as to the efficiency of freedom in teaching men how to be free. Of the government reports named at the head of this article, that of Colonel Eaton, of the Department of the Tennessee and State of Arkansas, for last year, is the most full, and treats of the most extensive system of superintendence. Under countless difficulties, in face of varying systems of administering abandoned plantations on the river, — with lessees of these plantations rushing in, wild to make their fortunes in a year, — with military operations perplexing and varying the new systems in various ways quite unforeseen, — he has had the oversight, more or less direct, of the interest of 770,000 slaves set free by the war. He is careful enough in his report to give us not so much his own observations as those of several different classes of observers. Almost all these observers confirm the remark which he makes in the following terms: —

> "It is the testimony of nearly all planters, whether Southern or Northern, that they could not have expected any set of laborers to work better than theirs. They have, in some cases, returned to their work after being repeatedly driven away by guerillas, and when no white dared to go near. There are a few instances, where they have been furnished arms, of their repulsing these marauders. It is to be remarked, too, very creditably to the negro, that those who have cared most for the interest of their laborers have been rewarded by the greatest cheerfulness and the heartiest good-will. The sullenness of the old *régime* has disappeared. A wonderfully keen scent for the direction of their interests already characterizes this once stolid race. They have discovered an alacrity, a faithfulness, and an honor, not by any means to a degree that is to be hoped for, yet sufficient to compel the acknowledgment of those who declared that freedom would make this people nothing but thieving and licentious vagabonds."

With regard to the charitable support needed for them, Colonel Eaton says distinctly: —

> "Under the guardianship of this supervision, the freedmen are far less dependent upon charity than is supposed by the good people of the North. Where their rights are secured, necessaries furnished at reasonable prices, and they are directed to employment and sources of

gain, there is no doubt of the ability of the great majority to support themselves and educate their children. The new-comers require temporary assistance, and those helpless through age or misfortune are necessarily dependent; but these, by organization and prudent management, are already self-supporting. If a fair crop had been obtained this year, not only rations and labor could have been paid for by the Freedmen Department, but the needed hospitals, orphan asylums, schools, and clothing for the indigent could have been furnished without assistance. They are, therefore, in temporary need of help; and most urgently, in the building and furniture of hospitals and school-houses. In clothing, when that purchased by the funds of the Freedmen Department shall have reached the different parts of the State, as it has already Helena, it will be found that far more was called for and provided than was actually needed to make all comfortable. As has been intimated, the greatest charity is protection and guardianship; and if the government furnishes this, they will soon rise beyond the need of any. The more efficient, the more temporarily it will be required. The hands, from which the President's Proclamation has released them, are still clutching after them. Though the fury of the beast, which has had its appetite sharpened by a taste of blood, and been deprived of its prey, be subdued into cajolery and deceit, it still keeps its eye on its victim. A swift and strong arm only can restrain the passions of these diverse races and castes, until unity of interests shall be developed and respect for the law secured. The struggle for impartial freedom in the South would otherwise be long and violent. Only by this can the freed people be protected from the corruption and lawlessness of the worst of our armies, as well as the rapacity of speculators. A protection merely advisory would be emasculated and powerless. Civil agents, not empowered with military authority, would be absurd. In the condition of the South, and in the midst of armies, only military authority in friendly hands will avail."

The experience of all the agents agrees that the welfare of the negro is promoted, and the difficulties of the labor-market are solved, by assigning homesteads to the black men which they can cultivate for themselves, if they are not satisfied with the wages paid them by others. As always, landed property, however small in amount, proves to be a civilizer. The cotton crop on the Mississippi was last year almost a failure, such were the ravages of the "army-worm." About forty thousand acres of abandoned land were fully cultivated by a hundred and fifteen white lessees in the district of Tennessee and Arkansas, including a part of Mississippi. Forty thousand bales of cotton were fully expected, but not more than eight thousand bales were made after the incursion of the army-worm. In the same valley fifty-six black men had small tracts of land. One of these made forty bales from eighty acres, — the best crop, in reality, made by white or black planter. Several of them sold their crops before the worm appeared, realizing various prices, from $8,000 to $4,000. Of the fifty-six black planters, those who cultivated ten-acre farms averaged a gain of $500 each, besides their support, while the larger farmers obtained better returns in proportion to their land. The agent intrusted with the sale of the freedmen's cotton says, in general, that the balances paid to individuals, after the crop was sold, ranged from $100 to $ 2,000. This with a crop, it will be observed, not one fourth of the usual product.

The experience of the Sea Islands on the coast of Georgia and South Carolina is that of a body of negroes deserted by their masters, left to the chances of army occupation, who are now virtually a self-supporting community. Their purchases of manufactures, their sales of their own products, the arrangements of their churches and of their schools, show that any fear that a race of paupers was to be made by the liberation of the slave is in their case wholly idle.

Similar results appear in North Carolina. Here Captain James, formerly Chaplain James, has the oversight of freedmen's affairs. His report is a very valuable paper. In the midst of it is the new history of Roanoke Island, where Walter Raleigh and Ralph Lane began the history of the United States in 1584. The colony of Raleigh failed. Its end is one of the mysteries still. In 1863, General Foster assigned the island as a home for refugee blacks. It is by nature, perhaps, one of the most unpromising regions of the coast. The land is not rich enough for profitable farming, and the dependence of the people is upon such provisions as they may raise for their own use, upon their little gardens, upon possible success in the culture of grapes and other fruits, and upon neighboring fisheries. Homestead lots, therefore, of one acre each, were all that were assigned, — soldiers' wives, aged people, and invalids being the inhabitants. Such a forlorn crew as these have built 591 houses on the lots assigned to them; although, in a population of 3,091 living in these houses, 1,297 are children, and only 217 are men of the age for military duty, and many of them invalids. These houses, and the improvements on the lots, are estimated as worth seventy-five dollars each. "The whole, then," says Captain James, "of this village erected on abandoned land, may be estimated as now worth forty-four thousand dollars, — a sum which three years ago would have purchased all the improvements of two hundred years under the rule and culture of its white inhabitants."

We copy these statements because there is a peculiar interest attached to such first steps in a new social career. But to readers at the North, the question whether free negroes will work is not a question which excites much doubt. At New York, at Boston, at Newport, at Cincinnati, all through the Free States, indeed, most of us have had occasion to see that the negro knows how to work, knows how to make bargains for wages, and knows how to take care of his money. We have not observed any difference in these regards between the negro who has just freed himself by the simple process of running away, and the negro born among us, or the Celt or the Teuton who came to us from far. Demand and supply have taken care of the whole.

In the constant anxiety which we hear expressed to-day as to the effect of new arrangements at the South, and the probable need of police and supervision, we apprehend there is a general forgetfulness of the operation of the law of supply and demand under the *régime* of freedom. Freedom is not bread and butter, it is not comfort, it is not house and clothes, it is not a happy life, it is not a certain heaven. Some enthusiasts, seeing that the newly freed slaves do not yet possess these blessings, seem disturbed, as if freedom were not secure. But freedom is simply the way to get these blessings. It is the right of choice by which the freeman selects one or another course, which he thinks best adapted to secure them. That is what the proclamation of freedom secured. What if it proves, then, that the planter in Central Georgia cannot understand the new *status*, and will not make fair wages with his people? Freedom does not compel him to do so; but it does enable his people to go away. It is not far from Central Georgia to East Tennessee, where there is good chance of wages. It is not far from Central Georgia to Hilton Head. At Hilton Head there are good wages. Many a man and many a woman, when the Confederate army reigned supreme on the mainland of South Carolina and Georgia, made the perilous journey to freedom on foot and at night. It is much easier made now; or, if wages do not please at Hilton Head, women are earning a dollar a day in New England, and men are coming, too, with no questions asked as to color. Just what has been given to the black man is the freedom to go and find the place that pleases him. If the land-owner does not want to pay him what others pay, so much the worse for the land-owner. When has any combination of land-owners long kept free labor down?

In the adjustment of these relations there will of course be suffering. Where is there not suffering in this world? We have never said that the black man's life should be raised above suffering. We have said that he should be free to choose between inevitable hardships. This promise we perform.

The position of affairs has been such, that there has been, of course, but little opportunity to test the negro in the "town-meeting," in that administration of civil order which is a necessary part of his education, and not merely one of the results of it. Where there has been such opportunity, the results have not been generally unfavorable. At Roanoke, Captain James reports that his black councillors did not know enough for their duties, and the system of local government at their hands broke down. But on the island of St. Simon's, on the Georgia coast, the negroes, who are the only inhabitants, arranged their own system of civil order and maintain their own defence of it. At Davis's Bend, where were formerly the plantations of Jefferson Davis and of his brother, a system has been adopted for the government of the colony of blacks, in which they take a considerable part. The Bend is divided into districts, each of which has a sheriff and a judge appointed from the more reliable men. The shrewdness and intelligence of the colored judges are highly spoken of; their findings hardly ever err on the side of leniency.* A very satisfactory illustration of their recognition of law and amenability to it, in Tennessee and Arkansas, is in the following passage in Colonel Eaton's Report: —

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* An illustration, which ought not to be lost from history, of what the domestic

> "A singular fact occurred in connection with the collection of the tax temporarily required by Order 63, on the wages of the able-bodied, for the support of the sick and otherwise dependent. It was thought, at first, that the negroes would submit to its collection with reluctance. Instead of this, however, being a tax on wages, it compelled the employer and employee to appear, one or both, before the officer charged with its collection, who allowed no wages to go unpaid; and the negro soon saw in it his first recognition by government, and, although it appeared in the form of a burden, responded to it with alacrity, thousands finding in it the first assurance of any power protecting their right to make a bargain and hold the white man to its fulfilment. It was most interesting to watch the moral effect of taxing them. They freely acknowledged that they ought to assist in bearing the burden of the poor. They felt ennobled when they found that the government was calling upon them, as men, to assist in the process by which their natural rights were to be secured. Thousands thus saw, for the first time, any money reward for their services. The places where this tax was least rigidly collected are now farthest behind in paying the colored man for his services."

It will be understood, of course, that those cases where the negroes have themselves become civil or administrative officers have been, almost of necessity, those where they were gathered in settlements apart from the whites. General Grant set aside the Davis Bend for such a purpose, — a peninsula easily held against guerillas, of nine thousand acres. He was busy with the siege of Vicksburg, but he foresaw the future, and directed that, if possible, this place should "become a negro paradise." This is another of the compensations, involving pure poetical justice, of the war. Jefferson Davis's home a negro paradise, — Walter Raleigh's unsuccessful colony replaced by the

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life was at Davis's Bend, appears in the following passage from Colonel Eaton's Report. It must be remembered that this is an official report to government of an officer writing under the highest responsibility. "Still further to illustrate the miserable corruption to which slavery exposed its victims, (and, for that matter, the oppressors too,) there was a colored woman at Davis's Bend, when our forces took possession of that place, afterward sent to Cincinnati, who can be proved, by the testimony of hundreds, to have been the kept mistress of Jefferson Davis; and she is universally reputed to be the daughter of Joe Davis, the Rebel insurgent leader's brother."

successful negro plantation, — and Governor Wise's house occupied for a negro school! As Dr. Watts said, in the spirit of prophecy: —

> "Vain are the hopes that Rebels place
> Upon their Birth and Blood;
> Descended from a pious race,
> Their Fathers now with God.
>
> He from the Caves of Earth and Hell
> Can take the hardest Stones,
> And fill the *house of Abraham* well
> With new-created Sons."

It is hardly necessary, in the examination of the four corner-stones of our new edifice, to inquire as to the willingness of the negro to enter into arrangements of church order. If he has the other privileges of a freeman, he will not be backward in his ecclesiastical relations. His religious expression is so extravagant, that it will undergo constant taming down as he advances in civilization, but it will be long before he is found indifferent to his religious rights or duties. The general testimony on this point accords with that of Mr. James.

> "*The colored people will rise up and support their own preachers.* They are a religious people. On Sundays, arrayed in their best, they statedly frequent the sanctuary to sing, and praise, and pray. There is no lack of ministers among them. Their preparation to preach is small, but their fluency great, and their use of language remarkable. The St. Andrew's Methodist Church in New Berne has raised a thousand dollars for church purposes the past year. The colored people fear God, are free from profanity, and highly prize worship. Almost the only comfort they enjoyed under slavery was derived from this source."

All their privileges, however, if they are to be admitted as citizens in a republic, depend on their ability to defend them. The musket in every house makes every man's house his castle. Because every man is a soldier in a republic, every man is a voter, and there is no tenable theory of universal suffrage which does not recognize the arming of every man in the defence of the state. One of the first amendments now necessary in our system is the universal omission of the word "white" in the clauses regulating the militia. The negro has shown in the war that he has the courage and intelligence to fight, and, in future, we shall hear little more of cowardly murders of freedmen by their old masters' daughters, when it is known that in every cabin there is a fowling-piece or a rifle, to keep hawks or bears or other beasts of prey from the door.

In service with the army the blacks have been officered by whites. But there are sufficient instances to show that, for the simple warfare of self-defence, they are quite competent to their own arrangements. Colonel Higginson gives us the following interesting narrative.

"On St. Simon's Island, made famous by Mrs. Kemble's description, there were then five hundred colored people and not a single white." General Saxton sent there a company of Colonel Higginson's regiment.

"The black soldiers were sent down on the 'Ben De Ford,' Captain Hallett. On arriving, Captain Trowbridge was at once informed by Commodore Goldsborough, naval commander at that station, that there was a party of Rebel guerillas on the island, and was asked whether he would trust his soldiers in pursuit of them. Trowbridge gladly assented; and the Commodore added, 'If you should capture them, it will be a great thing for you.'

"They accordingly went on shore, and found that the colored men of the island had already undertaken the enterprise. Twenty-five of them had armed themselves, under the command of a man whose name, by a remarkable coincidence, was John Brown. The second in command was Edward Gould, who was afterwards a corporal in Company E of my own regiment. The Rebel party retreated before these men, and drew them into a swamp. There was but one path, and the negroes entered single file. The Rebels lay behind a great log, and fired upon them. John Brown, the leader, fell dead within six feet of the log; several others were wounded, and the band of raw recruits retreated; as did also the Rebels, in the opposite direction. This was the first armed encounter, so far as I know, between the Rebels and their former slaves; and it is worth noticing, that the attempt was a spontaneous thing, and not accompanied by any white man. The men were not soldiers, nor in uniform, though some of them afterwards enlisted in Trowbridge's company.

"The father of this John Brown was afterwards a soldier in my regiment; and, after his discharge for old age, was, for a time, my servant. 'Uncle York,' as we called him, was as good a specimen of a saint as I have ever met, and was quite the equal of Mrs. Stowe's 'Uncle Tom.' He was a fine-looking old man, with dignified and courtly manners; and his gray head was a perfect benediction, as he sat with us on the platform at our Sunday meetings. He fully believes, to this day, that the 'John Brown Song,' which all the soldiers sing, relates to his son, and to him only."

The people at Davis's Bend are under military organization for their own defence. Rev. Mr. Zachos held his own island in the Port Royal group with the military force which he himself raised and disciplined among the Freedmen. And these are only instances of what has been done everywhere under similar circumstances. Under General Butler's order No. 46, celebrated for its wisdom and foresight among the students of these matters, a number of freedmen were planted in the neighborhood of Norfolk. Their "loyal" white neighbors were notified that, if the black men's pig-sties or hen-roosts were molested, the black men had the means, right, and permission to defend themselves. Perfect good behavior on both sides followed of course.

Our space only permits this brief sketch of a few of the results already attained, in a period of war and of great attendant confusion and difficulty, in the work, for which a century would seem small, of levelling up a race of slaves into the position of self-governing freemen. The results are indeed extraordinary. They are full of encouragement. They all show conclusively that the best way to educate a man for freedom is to make him free. Such results have been obtained without one hateful outbreak of license in the midst of new-found liberty. The schools and the churches, even the military arm and the civil establishment, all testify of the steady and rapid improvement in the intelligence, good order, seriousness, and steadiness of bearing of men and women who at the very first showed vastly more of these qualities than even their best friends had claimed for them. This is more than the most sanguine would have hoped at the beginning.

In this work of civilization, it is gratifying to say that, first of all, the national government has distinguished itself in the magnitude of its contributions, in the steadiness and zeal of its higher officers and the agents appointed by them, and in its ready encouragement given to the charitable societies who have taken special interest in the education of the negro. The sagacity and true benevolence of the general orders issued by General Butler, by Generals Hunter and Saxton, by General Banks, and by General Thomas, who have had, perhaps, most to do with the practical features of this problem, will always be recognized by the student of the improvement of the black race. The Secretaries of War and of the Treasury have never failed to render the hearty assistance of their departments in enterprises so hard and difficult. And at last the appointment of General Oliver O. Howard to the head of the Freedmen's Bureau, and the wisdom and energy of his initial arrangements, give the happiest promise for the future.

Second to this, the steady work of the societies which we have named, and of other organizations, especially the Western Sanitary Commission, which have rendered efficient help, has been, on the whole, wise, has been always in the best spirit, and, as we think is here shown, has had wonderful results. The larger societies have contributed in the last year the following sums to the purpose they have in hand: —

Western Freedmen's Association	$ 36,225
National " "	229,587
Northwestern " "	116,166
Pennsylvania " "	26,226
New England " "	44,828
American Missionary Society, (perhaps)	100,000
	$ 553,032

This total of more than half a million has, as we have shown, discharged a work about one twentieth of that which should be at once undertaken, in the way of schools. But for that work, large assistance, as we have said, will be received in the States themselves where it is to be done, from the people who are the subjects of endeavor. As the government withdraws the army, and as teachers go to posts where there are no garrisons, the assistance given in rations and quarters heretofore can no longer be expected. But this loss will be compensated by the advantages to be acquired in a more calm state of civil order. The employment of Southern teachers is recommended by the best judges, in all cases where competent persons, of either color, can be engaged. We believe this to be a good policy, and that it will largely contribute to the favor with which the schools will be regarded at the South.

Side by side with the education of the children, we look for extensive adult schools, and for that wider education which comes where men are trained to arms and to vote. Given also the improving institutions of religion for the negro, we believe we see in all these omens the certain prosperity of his future state.

For the superintendence of such enterprises, for their consolidation and best order, we believe the government of the nation has taken the best steps in the organization of the Freedmen's Bureau. We take it for granted, that General Howard will send in to the War Department, for the advice of Congress, his estimates for the expenses of that Bureau, when the next session begins. We trust that these expenses will be estimated on a generous scale, and that, till the State governments are thoroughly established, and established on a truly republican basis, the government of the nation will keep its watch and ward on its new-made citizens. Congress, we are sure, will be disposed to vote the largest sums asked for, for the expenses of such watch and ward, including such work as the Bureau is willing to undertake in the line of education. For the details of that work, under the supervision of the Freedmen's Bureau, it is probable that the Freedmen's Aid Societies may still have to provide. We have shown already that it is not an incalculable work, or an alarming one. The New England Society has already appealed to the freedmen to assume the charges of quarters and rations for teachers, which the nation heretofore has borne. In the Western Department, as we have seen, Colonel Eaton has called on them for a money contribution, which they have largely paid. For the rest the liberality of the North must provide. Half a million dollars in New England, as much more in New York, as much more in the Middle States, including Ohio, and half as much in the Northwest, will make up a sum sufficient for the complete carrying out of a system of elementary education of all the blacks in the whole South. We have no fears but it can be collected and wisely used.

ART. VIII. — AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS.

THE American Republic is an unprecedented political organization. It has no parallel or exemplar in history. It is a new growth. It resembles, indeed, in numerous respects, former political organizations, but the resemblances are only or mainly in form, while the differences are in essence. Historically and externally it may be classed with other federal governments, with the Achaian League, with the Swiss and the Dutch Republics. But its genuine characteristics are omitted in any such comparison. It derives its peculiar quality, not from its Federal relations, not from its Republican form, but from what underlies and vivifies alike its Federalism and its Republicanism. It is not to be understood by the study of other states; in order to understand it, it must be studied from within and in itself.

It differs moreover from the intentions and expectations of those who have been called its founders. Neither Winthrop and his band of Pilgrim companions foresaw in their farthest vision the real nature of the commonwealth of which they planted the seed, nor did the framers of the Constitution of the United States fully comprehend the spirit which was to give vital energy and perpetuity to their work. Their wisdom did not devise the Republic as it existed or as it exists. They builded better than they knew; for their work was controlled by supreme forces of which they had imperfect cognizance, and their highest praise is that they wrought unconsciously in harmony with these forces, whose irresistible power would ere this have rent asunder any fabric not thus constructed.

Our commonwealth was never, in truth, founded; it is not the result of pre-eminently wise forecast, or the product of any ordaining will. It was not made by man; it is no discovery or invention, but a natural growth, the slow, undiscerned, unimagined result of the instincts, desires, and efforts of individuals united in a society under novel conditions, and controlled by laws which mastered the thoughts and actions of men.

The Republic has therefore naturally been a puzzle and a surprise to foreigners, and in some degree to ourselves. It has continually baffled expectation, and turned prophecy to folly. In its progress it has seemed to be too good to be true, and to offer fairer promises than could be fulfilled; but every year has taught us — and no years have taught us with more assurance than these late years of war — that its best promise was not beyond fulfilment; that nothing was too good not to be expected from it; that the best hopes of man for men might here find their accomplishment; that there was neither failure nor disappointment in it; that a perfect commonwealth might here become a reality.

Every year has taught us — these last five years more than any others — that the crimes, the wrongs, the miseries which deface the ideal of our state, — the inherited errors of the past, the selfishness of materialism, the mass of ignorance, the corruption of politics, the atrocities of slavery, — that these and all else of evil in their train were capable of removal, were not natural and inherent results of our system, were excrescences upon it which might be, which in time would be, got rid of, so that the actual commonwealth should assume slowly, imperfectly always, but ever more and more nearly, the image of the ideal. From the height of our Pisgah we have beheld the promised land, not as in dream, but in actual vision, and the cloud of the Lord by day and His pillar of fire by night have led us on our way.

In spite of the evils which the United States share with all other political communities, in spite of mistakes and defects which have seemed to superficial or faithless observers indications of radical unsoundness and approaching decay, yet the rational convictions of more competent and deeper thinkers have continually come into closer accordance with the instinctive confidence of the people — a confidence springing from experience of blessings — in the perpetual beneficent progress of the principles on which American institutions of government and of society are based, and in the excellence of the ideas which form the foundation of the commonwealth.

What, then, are these ideas and principles which have had the power, and still have it, to shape the political action of the American people? What is this new thing in practical politics which the American Republic exhibits? What constitutes its difference from all preceding political organizations? This is the problem of our history, and that history will not be correctly interpreted unless the problem be satisfactorily solved.

The investigation of the political ideas original in America, so far at least as their practical embodiment in institutions of government is concerned, is an inquiry of the highest interest and importance. The true nature and legitimate operation of these ideas is the greatest question in the art and science of government; for the progress of democracy in America is a fact at once so great and so new, so far-reaching in its influences, so revolutionary not only of old theories, but of old systems, and the tendency of political communities throughout the civilized world is so plainly toward democracy in one form or another, that to understand what it is that has given to American institutions their specific character and excellence becomes more and more important, not only to the student and to the statesman, but also to the lover of mankind, to every one laboring for the advance of man.

The great distinction between the new political world and the old political world begins with the first serious attempts of our ancestors to colonize America, and especially with the religious, industrial colonies that landed at Plymouth and founded Boston. The dawn of modern political civilization first lighted up Massachusetts Bay. The colonies that settled the shores of New England were of a new kind, and they established the validity of an order of ideas in practical politics which had hitherto in the history of the world been relegated to the domain of theory, and which in their application have not yet been fully expounded, have not yet been completely expressed in any political creed, but have from 1620 to 1865 been operative, whether recognized or not, in all the political movements of the American people. It was the force of conditions over which these Pilgrim colonists had little control, combined with the tendency of those beliefs and instincts which animated their souls and impelled them to their hard undertaking, that led to this advance in the art of politics. Hitherto, in the history of colonizing enterprise, the colonists had gone out as a swarm of bees from the hive, carrying with them unchanged the institutions and the relations of the parent state. The Greek colonies were in form and system, in government and domestic and social order, but copies, as literal as was possible, of the cities of Greece from which they had come out. The military colonies of the Romans carried with them the military rule of Rome, acquiring no independence, but remaining Roman in thought and in deed, alike in Thrace, Illyria, or Britain. Rome was impressed on the soil by every step of the colonist's foot. Rome, her mark, was written over every land of which her children took possession.

Not so with the colonies of New England. The colonists still professed themselves and believed themselves to be good subjects of Old England; but they had left her of their own accord. They had come over the ocean and settled the wilderness under no direction from the authorities of England, with no aid from them, — at most with their God-speed, thankful as they may have been to get rid of so troublesome a crew. The expedition was of individuals united for conscience' sake. The colony had a moral rather than a political foundation, and out of this fact sprang the first historical application of the truth, that politics are a branch of ethics, and are subject to its laws. The fact that these New England colonies were colonies of individuals united for conscience' sake, had consequences that were wholly unanticipated. The colonists had really cut themselves off from all vital connection with the Old World, although they still remained in formal connection with it. They had left feudalism, or the right of might, embodied in institutions whose essence was the doctrine of privilege, — they had left Roman Catholicism, or the right of authority in matters of opinion, — behind them. They had cut loose from the two great stays of modern European civilization; they had swung off from the old moorings mossy with antiquated superstitions, — from the old moorings of priest and king and noble, — and they started in ignorant faith on a voyage of discovery. The guidance of Providence did not fail them. It led them to that New World which they were to make new indeed. Much of their work was unconsciously performed. They knew not fully the force of their own principles. For the right of might they substituted the right of man, for the right of authority they substituted the right of independence, for king and priest and noble they substituted *the People.*

This was the natural, the necessary conclusion from the fact of deriving political arrangements and systems from moral principles. In morals man is man, never less and never more, independent, equal, just. It is only in politics divorced from morals that man becomes more or less than man, — baron or serf, lord or villein, — dependent, privileged, unjust.

The *people* of the American religious industrial colonies was a new thing, — there had been no *people* of the kind before. The world had seen a Roman *plebs*, mediæval burgesses and villeins, — it had never yet seen *a people.* It behooves us to find an intelligible definition of this people, and to understand what we as Americans mean by the phrase; for it is on this that our idea of the state and of government in great part depends.

Not merely the notion of this people, but the thing itself, has been of slow but regular growth. It did not spring fully developed on the landing of the Pilgrims, but it grew with the growth of the Colonies, acquiring strength, consistency, and conscious force during the long period of Colonial dependency, nurtured alike by the internal struggles of the nascent state and by its contentions with those who claimed to exercise authority over it from abroad. The circumstances of Colonial life, — the border hardships, the perils of war with civilized and savage foes, the scattered settlements, each with its local government and institutions, the popular form and methods of most of the Colonial governments, the Church contests, the disputes between neighboring Colonies, — all tended to promote the development not only of strong individualism, but also of the habit of combined action in the community. The quality, moreover, of the early settlers, marked as it was by their general intelligence, their attention to education, their deep moral sense, impressed itself upon their descendants, and upon the mass of the inferior emigrants of the later periods of Colonial history. A community grew up here, original not only in its modes of life, but in its composition. New England was throughout the whole Colonial period the typical portion of the English dominion in America. She was the mother of ideas and of states. But similar influences to those which gave her her leading position were at work in the other Colonies. The Revolution welded the Colonies together. It taught them their strength when united in a common cause. It revealed them to themselves. The Confederation showed them their weakness. And the Constitution which gave to the States a national unity, which changed the Colonies into the United States, which raised them to a power in the world, was the embodiment of the long lessons of Colonial experience, and the expression not only of a new system of government, but of those new political ideas which had sprung up and were flourishing on American soil. Its opening words are the grand declaration of the existence of a state such as the world had not known, — a state not imposed upon a people, but having its existence and authority solely from them. "We, the people of the United States, ... do ordain." *We, the people,* — and this people means a civilized community spontaneously organized to promote the general welfare, and actuated by the moral forces which civilization has ingrained in the habits of a race, and which are derived from the Divine order of the universe. We, the people of the United States, means not a political body forming a state, and organizing itself simply for the sake of establishing a frame of government, but a moral community, already organized and governed by moral principles. We unite primarily not to govern or to be governed, but we the people frame a government as an expedient by which to confirm the already established moral order and the general welfare of the community, and thus to secure the progress of civilization. Neither the geographical limits of the United States nor the government of the United States make us a nation; but we, the people constituting a nation, make the United States and frame a government for them.

Hitherto, in political speculation, the state has been regarded as something apart from the people, or as embracing the people as one only of its elements. It has been considered as an abstract of the governmental institutions and political organization of any given country. But in this democracy of the New World the people constitute the state, its limits are defined by those of their moral co-operation; and the American idea of the state includes potential independence of institutions of government. These institutions are inseparable accidents, not essential features in the body politic. Theoretically, at least, the people are not merely capable of self-government, but are self-governing. Such institutions of government as they frame for themselves are in the nature of conveniences, aids, and appliances, — are to promote their welfare, to advance civilization, — and have no inherent power, validity, or right in themselves, and no virtue but in so far as they are adapted to the ends for which they are established.

The idea of sovereignty, as derived from ancient and mediæval times, has no moral weight in America, and no practical relation to our politics. The use of the word in our political debates has been a fertile source of fallacies, and has led to confusion and obscurity of thought in regard to the true character of our government. The government is in no proper sense sovereign in its relation to the people. Its laws are imposed, its penalties are exacted, not in virtue of any original sovereignty existing in it, but purely in virtue of a derived authority. The States of the Union have no rights of sovereignty over the general government of the United States, and none in their domestic relations. The States are mere conveniences. They represent no moral entity; they are political contrivances; their local governments are ingenious expedients for facilitating the interests of the people; they have no rights inherent in themselves. The rights they possess are rights derived, not from any transmitted powers, not from any inherited privileges, not from any original title, but from the consentaneous action of the people. They are in themselves simply geographical divisions of the country, with limits arbitrarily fixed, and with institutions not independent of, but wholly dependent on, the will of their inhabitants, and of the nation of which those inhabitants form a part.

The idea of sovereignty as it exists in our American politics, the idea that has been so fertile of evil, and is still so powerful in its capacity for harm, is derived from prerevolutionary sanctions and opinions, — from royal colonial charters, — from the instincts of feudalism, not yet wholly extinguished in the New World. The notion of sovereignty residing in the States can be maintained only by an appeal to an historical authority, against which the American Revolution was a successful conflict, and of which the American Constitution was the express denial.

So, too, the general government of the United States derives no rights from the past; it has no authority by inheritance. It is the fruit of revolution. In constituting it the people surrendered no natural rights; they had no power to surrender these if they would, nor to inspire it with any inherent sovereignty. They constituted it as an agency, as the guardian of specified interests, as the means by which they might secure certain definite ends. The government of the United States, and that of each separate State, is valid only by reason of a popular sanction. There is in the nature of society, philosophically considered, no right to govern residing in any person or class. Strictly speaking, there exists outside of the individual no right to govern him. All government is an expedient, and it is founded, not upon right, but upon the consideration of the interests of the community. The divine right of kings is the expression only of the doctrine of a right inherent in power, whether the power of brute force or of superior intelligence. In politics there is no such thing as a natural right. Natural rights exist only in morals, and inhere in the individual as a moral being. As a moral being every man has rights, which may be called divine, as inseparable from the spiritual nature implanted in him by the Creator. It is the fundamental principle of American politics that rights inhere only in man as man. There is no better statement of these rights than that in the Declaration of Independence: "All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Powers, then, belong to governments, not rights, except such secondary rights as have their origin in these powers. And these powers are not natural, but derived; powers the exercise of which is authorized by the consent of the governed. No natural sovereignty inheres in a government. The sovereignty of the Union means the powers given to the government by the people. We, the people of the United States, in adopting a Constitution as the symbol and expression of our national unity, gave to the government which that Constitution defined the powers necessary to secure its own existence and perpetuity, — powers of control over all inferior and subordinate governments, powers over communities and individuals, — but neither did nor could implant in it any natural right of sovereignty.

This statement of the American idea of government needs to be carefully guarded, lest paradoxical conclusions be drawn from it. Such conclusions have, indeed, been drawn from it. We have had, for example, the theory of *no* government advanced and strenuously maintained by a school of imperfect thinkers, who have professed to derive it from the principle of the unlimited freedom of the individual. But, as we have said, institutions of government, though not essential features, are inseparable accidents of the body politic. However self-governed the individuals of a community may be, yet, owing to the diverse wills and the variety of interests of individuals, the community requires, and must always require, an external government to control those wills, and to regulate the pursuit of those interests in such a manner as to preserve the moral order, to secure the general welfare. The more highly moral and intelligent individuals become, the less will be the need of this external government; but it is impossible that man, constituted as he is, should always, even with the highest moral and intellectual cultivation, subject his will, his passions, and his desires to the interests of the community of which he is a part.

Under the American system, a main feature of which is the constant potential improvement of the individual, the functions of external government are reduced to their lowest point, and under this system the way is open for the realization of the most inspiring and most promising idea of modern Christian civilization, — the true brotherhood of man, in which man shall feel himself no longer an isolated individual, but shall find his completeness and perfection, his worth and his happiness, in the recognized relations of mutual dependence existing between himself and the community of which he forms an integral and essential part. Without the rest of mankind he is poor, bare, solitary; and his own nature is incomplete. With them he is rich, completed, and capable of a spiritual development of which our present civilization affords but a faint and partial type.

The principles thus recognized as essentially American, the principles, namely, that politics are a subordinate branch of morals, — that the people are, properly speaking, the whole community united in moral relations, — that the state, politically speaking, derives its existence from the people, — and that the government is but a device, determined by considerations of expediency, for the attainment of certain ends, — are illustrated by a remarkable feature in our political system, which has not been hitherto sufficiently considered, although it is embodied in the actual functions and operations of our American commonwealth.

No discovery more fertile in the most important results was ever made in political science than that which the early settlers of New England slowly wrought out. They found out by long and varied experience, that in a moral community civilized order may exist without governmental institutions, — an order proceeding from spontaneous moral and industrial co-operation, the result of a sense of mutual dependence, from which is developed an intelligent respect for mutual rights and interests. In a country of scattered settlements, often wide apart, and in which there are no long-established institutions of government, the share of any regularly constituted government in the preservation of social order must of necessity be very small. It was so in the early days of the Colonies; it has remained so in portions of the United States to the present day. And this fact leads to the recognition of the truth, that a state founded, as ours is, on natural rights, and deriving its existence from the people, includes two controlling agencies, consisting on the one hand of a government instituted with forms and powers, and operating through organized legal and military authority, and on the other hand in the devices and arrangements adopted by the people, or growing up among them, for the preservation of the inherent good order of a well-disposed and intelligent community.

In such a community, moreover, the latter organization is more essential and important than the former, as it is also the earlier in its exhibition. In European feudal politics the reverse is the case, what may be called the natural arrangements of men to preserve order in society being regarded as dependent on the government for their support and efficiency. The tendency to centralization in European countries at the present time is one of the marked indications and evidences of this view of the relations of these two agencies in the state. In American politics, on the contrary, the opposite view prevails, for the most part, both in theory and practice. The government is subordinate to the arrangements for preserving good order which can and do exist independently of it. It is made, supported, and changed by proceedings outside of its own limits, save in so far as the forms of those proceedings may be regulated by it; and, instead of originating the good order of the community, itself originates from that good order.

If this statement should appear extravagant, because in some degree the result of a novel analysis of the conditions of our society, its seeming extravagance may be removed by some further considerations. For it is, indeed, no merely vividly conceived, but unreal and Utopian, theory with which we are dealing, but a real fact, however as yet vaguely conceived, the nature of which is illustrated, not merely by historic proof and by the actual structure of American society, but also by the whole course of political action in America.

Our common notions of government and of the state are so much derived from the past, so much the offspring of a political philosophy drawn from the historic precedents of the Old World, or based upon fanciful speculations concerning the nature and origin of civil society, that it is difficult for us to understand the true conditions, relations, and meanings of American society and institutions. The governments of Europe are historic inheritances, with the moral supports of tradition, succession, and force. The government of the United States, on the contrary, is not an historic product, has not the sanction of transmitted authority or inherited forms. It is severed from the past, is the product of the fresh efforts of men striving to do the best for themselves, unimpeded by traditionary forms and authority. Cut off from historic succession, the ultimate source of the authority that resides in it is, as we have said, in the people themselves, who establish it to supply the needs of a civilized community, and to secure what is expedient for it. And this community, this people, does not become, in establishing the government for itself, merely a part of the governmental organization, acting solely thereafter through legalized modes and forms, whether of popular election, of court of justice, of assemblies of legislation or other, but remains what it was before the government was established, an organization outside of, superior to, and potentially independent of it. It is the crowning and consummate merit of our system, indeed, that the government so admirably meets the wants which it was designed to supply, is so natural a product of our conditions and needs, that the fact of this double element in the state is very rarely recognized in actual experience. The governmental organization and the extra-governmental organization of the people work together generally with the most perfect harmony. And thus, though this extra-governmental organization is constantly in action, it has failed to receive the attention it deserves as a most important and characteristic portion of our political system.

Upon analysis it will be found to have two main functions; — one, the conservation of civil order in cases over which the authority of the regularly constituted government does not extend, or which it is incapable of dealing with by reason either of the absence or inefficiency of its ministers; the other, the conservation of the government itself through agencies and expedients fitted to set it in motion and keep it in action. Vigilance committees and lynch courts, names of ill-regard because of the abuses to which they are liable, but in fact significative of the rude processes by which justice is administered, however imperfectly, in what may be called a border community, are perhaps the most striking instances of the first of these two functions. These courts and committees are empowered by an authority which is no other than the moral sense of the community, and their work is to carry this moral sense or opinion into effect. The most obvious illustration of the second of these two functions — the conservation of the government itself — is afforded by primary meetings in our towns and by party caucuses and conventions. As the end of vigilance committees is to carry public opinion into effect, so the end of these meetings and conventions is to give form and direction to public opinion, is to combine that opinion so as to make it efficient and the basis of action. In all this work the government has no part; it is wholly extra-governmental, or, so to speak, preliminary to government, and is effected without interfering with, or, even in the most extreme cases, permanently impairing, such governmental authority as may have been truly instituted and established in the moral regard of the community. The difference between a mob and a vigilance committee is the difference between an assemblage for the purpose of overthrowing government and disturbing established order, and an assemblage for the purpose of supplying the need of government and of maintaining order. Where the government is fully established, the action of vigilance committees ceases; but even where government is best and most completely constituted, the extra-governmental organization of the community still exists, ready, if need be, to supply deficiencies, or to maintain the regular procedures of the government. Like the government itself, the modes of its action are mere expedients, often clumsy and poor enough, but nevertheless it forms a most valuable part of our political system, as has been proved by many striking instances during the war, in which its operation has been constant, and in the highest degree important and beneficent.

The constant interaction of the moral order of society and of the governmental order maintains our whole political system constantly ductile and pliable. It is thus enabled to fit itself to every new exigency, it is not averse to necessary change, it unites in itself the two elements of consistency and mutability. It is essentially a system of adaptation. No new condition arises which it has not the power to meet, and no progress is made in which it does not take part.

A government thus subject to change in accordance with the needs and progress of the community, instead of being, as some political theorists have supposed, contrary to established order and opposed to a true conservatism, is directly the reverse. A government founded on this idea is the most favorable to the preservation of order, and, beyond all others, conservative alike of essential principles and of the institutions conformed to them. In devising better and better governmental expedients, the real object of the American is to bring the government into truer conformity to its principles. He never loses sight of the fact that government is only a device founded on expediency ; and he keeps in mind that it possesses no intrinsic right to exist, and that it is always subject to the arbitration of the popular right of revolution.

The most vital fact of American politics, the great, and, historically considered, the new result that we have reached, is the establishment of a political system in which the government is subordinate to the moral order of a civilized community, — an order which rests on the acknowledgment of the rights of man, as expressed by the terms liberty, justice, and equality, and which is manifested and maintained by the regular operation and continuous development of these principles. It was because of their sense that these principles of moral order were called in question, and their predominance in our system endangered, that the loyal portion of the American people was roused to the great efforts and sacrifices of the late war of the Rebellion. In defence of these principles they felt that no effort could be too great, no sacrifice could be extreme. Without them life was little worth having. On their preservation depended all that was desirable or honorable in our political system, all that had been gained by its establishment for the nation and for mankind. The war waged for their preservation has given us a new sense of their worth, and a better understanding of the system of which they form the undisturbed and enduring foundation.

The excellence of that system, and its adaptation to the wants of a progressive community, spring from the fact that the ideas which it embodies are primarily moral ideas, and as such incapable of being improved upon, though capable of continually improved application in institutions, forms, and methods, according to the advance of mankind in moral culture and intelligence.

A moral idea never changes. It is the same yesterday, today, and forever, and in every region of the providence of

God. The application of the moral idea changes with every new condition of human life. Political and social institutions founded upon moral ideas, so far as they are conformed to the ideal from which they spring, partake of its eternity; they are human devices vivified by the Divine breath, human expedients drawing their strength from the principles on which the universe itself stands sure.

In America politics are a nobler pursuit than elsewhere, because here alone is their moral origin so established, that the science of practical politics becomes the study of the application of ideal politics to human affairs.

The investigation in which we have been engaged, though of an abstract nature, has a very direct bearing upon the questions in practical politics which are now before the country, — questions remaining after the sharp decisions of war, to try our virtue, our courage, and our faith in our own principles, with new tests. The conflict is not yet over. It cannot be repeated too often, that this war was a war of ideas, and that, until one idea or the other has secured a settled triumph, there can be no real peace between the parties to the war. What the true American idea was, we have endeavored to show; the opposite to this idea in every particular is that for which the South contended. And though the South has sullenly laid down its arms, beaten and dispirited, it has not laid down its hate. Its spirit is still set desperately against us. It still clings to and maintains the idea for which it fought so strenuously in the field. We have secured a territorial Union, we have secured a geographical unity of the States, but we have not secured as yet a moral Union, a civil unity; we have the harder part of our task before us.

Having faith in the American system, knowing that it is the means by which civil order is best secured and advanced, — knowing it to be based upon moral principles of universal application, — we must not shrink from the conclusions to which our faith and knowledge lead us. In the struggle between this system and one vitally opposed to it at every point, we must use whatever means are necessary, not merely to subdue, but to destroy and utterly root out the hostile system. There is neither cruelty nor vindictiveness, neither malice nor passion, in this. It is not only the conclusion of the calm reason, but the dictate of conscience. It is the claim of humanity upon us. Future generations appeal to us, not to desert the cause which is theirs even more than ours. Let no weariness prevail with us, and no cry of magnanimity deceive us. There is no need to urge us to magnanimity; for in maintaining our cause, we are in truth consulting the interests of our enemies, and in winning its triumph we are winning a victory in which they also shall hereafter rejoice.

The North is civilized, the South is uncivilized. One must take the likeness of the other. The interests of the strong civilized community must prevail; and in this case the interests, being those of general moral order, carry a pre-eminent right with them. The community possesses the right over an individual, or over any number of individuals, to do whatever is necessary to protect or maintain its moral organization. The moral order of society, its general welfare, is the object of the Constitution of our government, and its inspiring principle Principles, not forms, are the true guides of nations; but happy it is when, as in our case, principles and forms are in harmony with each other.

Having power, we have also the right — and having the right, the duty lies upon us — to impose those conditions on the Southern people which are requisite for the preservation, continuance, and progress of the moral order of that community of which they and we form parts. And the conditions which we have to impose are not conditions of tyranny, but of liberty; not of injustice, but of justice. We have to insist on the establishment of freedom, — freedom from servitude for the slaves, freedom of thought, conscience, speech, and the press for the whole community. We have to insist on justice under the law, on the controlled and regular processes of moral and legal organizations, on the subjection of the passions of individuals, on the steady administration of equal laws. We have to insist on political equality for all men, on the removal of all arbitrary distinctions in defining the political privileges of individuals, on a perfect equality of men in their relation to the community as members of its political organization. We have to insist on the right of every man to be equal to any other man. Strange it is to see conquerors compelling the conquered to take blessings at their hands! Strange, to behold victors claiming no right over the vanquished but to secure to them equal rights with themselves! Strange and happy sight, prophetic of far-reaching good and far-shining glory, to behold the masters of dominion consulting no selfish interests, knowing, indeed, no selfish interests, but in all arrangements, in all schemes, proposing only to extend the limits of the principles from which they have derived their power, and which are to them the sources of perennial happiness and strength! This is the subjugation of the South, — to reduce her from slavery to liberty, from injustice to justice, from oppressive privileges to equal rights and privileges, from barbarism to civilization. This is the restoration of the Union, — to restore the people of every section to peace that shall be inviolable, because founded on the principles which support the pillars of the universe, and to progress that shall be as continuous as the life of mankind.

Art. IX. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Speeches of* Andrew Johnson, *President of the United States. With a Biographical Introduction, by* Frank Moore. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1865.

This book will not want for readers. It is announced as being "published with the sanction and consent of the President," and as containing "full reports of all the important speeches made by him since his entrance into public life." It contains, also, a "Biographical Introduction" by the editor, — of which the best that we can say is, that it is a tolerably good performance; any authentic account, however, of this sort, is interesting now, and we get from this one a pretty fair acquaintance with the main facts of the President's life. Some valuable extracts from speeches which are not printed in the body of the book are given in this part of it; and, best of all, the report and full account of that remarkable address to the colored people of Nashville, in which the speaker rose to such a noble height of feeling, and dilated with such a genuine apprehension of the sentiment of human brotherhood as neither his countrymen nor he himself can ever well forget. "Looking," said he, "at this vast crowd of colored people, and reflecting through what a storm of persecution and obloquy they are compelled to pass, I am almost induced to wish that, as in the days of old, a Moses might arise who should lead them safely to their promised land of freedom and happiness."

"You are our Moses," shouted several voices; and the exclamation was caught up and cheered until the Capitol rang again.

"God, no doubt, has prepared somewhere an instrument for the great work he designs to perform in behalf of this outraged people; and in due time your leader will come forth, your Moses will be revealed to you."

"We want no Moses but you," again shouted the crowd.

"Well, then, humble and unworthy as I am, if no other better shall be found, I will indeed be your Moses, and lead you through the Red Sea of war and bondage to a fairer future of liberty and peace. I speak now as one who feels the world his country, and all who love equal rights his friends. I speak, too, as a citizen of Tennessee. . . . . Loyal men, whether white or black, shall alone control her destinies; and when this strife in which we are all engaged is past, I trust, I know, we shall have a better state of things, and shall all rejoice that honest labor reaps the fruit of its own industry, and that every man has a fair chance in the race of life."

These memorable words were spoken on October 24th, 1864, — hardly more than a fortnight before Governor Johnson was elected to be the Vice-President of the United States, and in full view of the certainty of that result. If we find little in these collected "Speeches" which may be cited as indicating the same tone and purpose that mark the address at Nashville, there is also little that indicates a sentiment at variance with it; while, on the other hand, the characteristic and the marked quality of all the speeches is in harmony with it.

Mr. Johnson, by birth and the force of circumstances and by his deepest convictions and instincts, is a man of the people. He has chosen, all his life, to be their spokesman and advocate, and has borne, not seldom, the reproach of being accounted a demagogue. The candid reader, however, that follows him in his successive speeches, cannot doubt the sincerity of the convictions that carry him always in favor of the people's cause. With this best of all groundworks for statesmanship, the President mingles plain, practical sagacity, and a strong adherence to a few simple principles of political faith that sank into him in early life from the example of Andrew Jackson. It has been with him as Wordsworth said of the Tyrolese, —

"A few strong instincts and a few plain rules,
Among the herdsmen of the Alps, have wrought
More for mankind at this unhappy day
Than all the pride of intellect and thought."

In 1848, when complaint was made of the exercise of the veto power, as if that power were only a despotic instrumentality for thwarting the wishes of the people, Mr. Johnson stood up in the House of Representatives, and defended the exercise of the power with the simplest good sense. "The veto," he said, "as exercised by the Executives, is conservative, and enables the people through their tribunitial officer, the President, to arrest or suspend for the time being unconstitutional, hasty, and improvident legislation, until the people, the sovereigns in this country, have time and opportunity to consider of its propriety."

And so again, in 1860 and 1861, he held strenuously out against the specious demagogues of his section and his party, — "faithful among the faithless found," — in favor of the national authority.

We have said that Mr. Johnson is a man of the people. Mr. Lincoln also was a man of the people. Both were born in a Slave State; but Lincoln was reared in a Free State, and Johnson in a Slave State. It is common to say that the struggles of a poor white in a Slave State are likely to breed in him a hatred of that aristocratic class by whom power is there monopolized and labor held in contempt. But this may well be doubted. There is a subtle, flattering power in the working of slavery which is apt to corrupt even the very class which should hate it, and even the champions of that class. It is a common matter of remark among such plain, unlettered poor men of the South as may happen to have visited the North, that they find here tenfold as much of aristocratic feeling and contempt of the poor as they have ever seen at the South. Any one, on the other hand, who has travelled at the South, must have noticed, especially in the rural parts of it, the great familiarity of intercourse that prevails there between the poor whites and the rich; it is far greater than anything we generally see at the North. This is partly owing, no doubt, to that general want of education at the South which assimilates all classes to each other, and partly, also, to the natural influences of secluded agricultural life; but the chief reason of it lies in the fact that the poor white *is white*, and so belongs to the superior caste. He may be poor, ignorant, immoral, and uncleanly, but he is nevertheless one of the nobles. In the presence of that other element of a degraded black race, all differences between white men disappear; they really become brethren, and a true democratic feeling springs up, — one which is far more thoroughgoing, *as among the whites*, than can easily be found in any Northern community. But what a grave qualification of the democratic principle is that which is indicated by the words *as among the whites!* Here lurks the whole deadly poison of caste and aristocracy, fatal to the real brotherhood of men, fatal to democracy, fatal, as we have lately so clearly seen from the monstrous utterances and the shameful and desperate endeavors of the slave-owning Rebels, when they had once grown confident and full-fed, to the life of all forms of free institutions.

It was the felicity of Mr. Lincoln's life that he grew up free of this influence. The lot of Mr. Johnson has been less happy. But now all things in this country have become new; slavery has gone down under the weight of blows which the President himself has vigorously helped to give; this ugly enemy has been discovered and expelled, and there is nothing among us henceforth to check the free scope of popular ideas. If the instincts and life-long beliefs of the President fail now to extend themselves so as to cover the case of black men as well as white men, we have misjudged his character and have misread these Speeches.

2.— *Speeches of* JOHN BRIGHT, M. P., *on the American Question. With an Introduction by* FRANK MOORE. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1865.

THE event of the war in this country has set Mr. Bright in a position more enviable than that of any other statesman in England. He has had no part or lot in any of those unfriendly acts which have come upon this country, in her great need, with such a chilling influence. He has never, like Mr. Gladstone, been deluded by the temporary, phenomenal successes of the Southern Rebels into the entertaining or the utterance of a belief in their success; nor has he ever, like Earl Russell, failed to discern the true nature of the effort made on either side in the recent contest. Never once has he doubted our cause, or hesitated to go out to meet and succor us, alike in victory and disaster, with the sympathy of a passionate and manly heart. More than this, with a sagacity worthy of the best statesmanship, he has discerned and made manifest to the world the links that bound the glory and the interests of England to the cause for which we fought. Long before the war began, he warned his countrymen that the prosperity of England was unstable so long as it rested upon the production of cotton by slave labor, and urged them to see to it in season that the field of cotton cultivation was widened. In 1847, in the House of Commons, he moved the appointment of a commission to inquire into the whole question of the cultivation of cotton in India, and in his speech on that occasion said: —

> "We ought not to forget that the whole of the cotton grown in America is produced by slave labor; and this, I think, all will admit, — that, no matter as to the period in which slavery may have existed, abolished it will ultimately be, either by peaceable means or by violent means. Whether it comes to an end by peaceable means or otherwise, there will in all probability be an interruption to the production of cotton, and the calamity which must in consequence fall upon a part of the American Union will be felt throughout the manufacturing districts of this country."

Again, in 1850, in making a similar motion, Mr. Bright said: —

> "Whilst the production of cotton in the United States results from slave labor, whether we approve of any particular mode of abolishing slavery in any country or not, we are all convinced that it will be impossible in any country, and most of all in America, to keep between two and three millions of the population permanently in a state of bondage. By whatever means that system is to be abolished, whether by insurrection — which I would deplore — or by some great measure of justice from the government, one thing is certain, that the production of cotton must be interfered with for a considerable time after such an event has taken place; and it may happen that the greatest measure of freedom that has ever been conceded may be a measure the consequence of which will inflict mischief upon the greatest industrial pursuit that engages the labor of the operative population of this country."

In December, 1862, Mr. Bright, at Birmingham, with honest pride recalled these statements to the memory of the English people. They were the prophetic utterances of a statesman whose genius took hold upon eternal laws, who felt and responded to the movement of that main current in human affairs which sweeps onward towards the elevation of all men; it could not be that any prosperity should be permanent which was founded on the oppression of millions of the human race.

The day which Mr. Bright foresaw came at last. England had slighted his admonitions, and her chief manufacturing interest was prostrated; "the rains descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell." "Nearly five hundred thousand persons — men, women, and children — at this moment," said Mr. Bright, in December, 1862, "are saved from the utmost extremes of famine, not a few of them from death, by the contributions which they are receiving from all parts of the country." The shock was felt with especial severity by Mr. Bright himself; his business was that of a spinner and manufacturer of cotton; and no less than six mills, as he publicly stated, belonging to the firm of which he was a member, were compelled to stop. "Much the largest portion," he says, "of anything I have in the world depends upon it" (the cotton interest).

Well, the leading men in England fancied that the slaveholders would succeed in their Rebellion, and made haste to prepare the way before them. They were appalled at the prospect of a short supply of cotton; and seeing no way to a speedy supply of it save in the speedy success of the Rebels, they straightway forgot the awful crime in which these people were engaged, and began to pray and labor for the success of this effort to establish a nation upon the rotten stubble of slavery.

Not so with Mr. Bright.

> "I have been asked," he said, in that noble speech at Birmingham above referred to, "twenty, fifty times during the last twelve months, 'Why can't you tell us something in this time of our great need?' 'Well,' I reply, 'I told you something when telling was of use; all I can say now is this, or nearly all, that a hundred years of crime against the negro in America, and a hundred years of crime against the docile natives of our Indian empire, are not to be washed away by the penitence and the suffering of an hour.'"

But he did say more than this: he told the English people that slavery must die by the war; that now, as always, it was for their interest that it should die; that the supply of cotton always had been and always would be insufficient, so long as it depended upon slave labor; there was land enough; the demand for cotton and the profit upon it were enormous; it was the laborers that were wanting; the natural increase of the blacks was insufficient; white labor turned aside from the South, and the blacks could not be imported into America from abroad. Of course it would not do to establish the Rebel government, and then allow the unfettered importation of negroes from Africa. The English people must, then, desire and strive to set the cotton interest upon that rock of free labor which nothing could shake. In that event "the whole of the country [America] will be open to the enterprise and to the industry of all." "In ten years there will be a rapid increase in the growth of cotton; and not only will its growth be rapid, but its permanent increase will be secure."

He reminded the workingmen that, in fifteen years past, two and a half millions of their countrymen had found a home in the United States, and that this was the country where "there has been an open door for every man, and millions have entered into it and have found rest." With most moving eloquence he called his country and mankind to witness that the sole object of "this accursed insurrection" was the perpetuation of "that most odious and most intolerable offence against man and against Heaven, the slavery of the South"; and, on the other hand, he called them to witness that the United States "affords the remarkable example — offered for the first time in the history of the world — of a great government coming forward as the organized defender of law, freedom, and equality." And finally, with a reverent submission of the event to the Almighty, "in whose hands are alike the breath of man and the life of states," he added, "But I implore of Him, and I beseech this House, that my country may lift nor hand nor voice in aid of the most stupendous act of guilt that history has recorded in the annals of mankind."

These noble words have already found their way throughout our country, and have called forth the homage of every loyal heart; they will continue, so long as this nation lives, to be read with a glow of admiration and gratitude. And, indeed, it is no mean reward, even for the noble labors of Mr. Bright, that he should live forever in the grateful memory of a vast, intelligent people, whose cause and whose government he loves.

The Speeches and "Extracts from Speeches" printed in this volume were delivered at various dates from August 1, 1861, to March 23, 1865. They purport, we believe, to be all Mr. Bright's speeches upon the "American Question." One is surprised, at first, that there are not more of them, while he considers how powerful an influence Mr. Bright has seemed to exert throughout the war. But the virtue that goes out from a champion of the people is silent and continuous, not adequately to be measured by the number of words that he utters, — an influence which upholds and cheers alike while he speaks and while he is still.

Mr. Bright's eloquence consists mainly in the expression of generous sentiments with the directness, plainness, and energy of one who feels them deeply. There is no set effort to adorn his simple and solid speech by means of literary or historical allusion, or to heighten the effect of it by the coloring or special ornaments of rhetoric. Mr. Bright's nature is a fervid one, but it finds its true expression in action or in words which go straight to their mark and "drive at practice."

It was a happy thought to collect and print these speeches here. It would be ungracious to complain that we have them in so beautiful a form; and yet there is room for regret that the speeches of Mr. Bright should not have been offered in a shape that should make them more generally accessible to that great mass of the people for whose elevation he so ardently labors.

The editor's introductory memoir is too short.

3. — *Congregationalism: What it is; Whence it is; How it works; Why it is better than any other Form of Church Government; and its consequent Demands.* By HENRY M. DEXTER, Pastor of the Berkeley Street Congregational Church, Boston, &c. Boston: Nichols and Noyes. 1865. 8vo. pp. 306.

WITHIN the bounds of that large portion of the Congregational Churches which is represented by the author of this volume, a new interest has of late been visible in the study of the distinctive principles of this form of church polity, and a new zeal for its maintenance and propagation. For many years there had been a seeming indifference to this question of polity among the descendants of the Puritans, even while they retained their connection with churches of their ancestral order; and on removal to other sections of the country they showed themselves ready to ignore all distinctions of this kind, and to coalesce unhesitatingly with churches of antagonistic ecclesiastical usages, provided only these churches were upholders of the same theological views with their own. This course, although it affords evidence of a manly freedom from bigoted attachment to mere forms, has, however, tended to depreciate Congregationalism in the view of the community at large. And one consequence has been, as is claimed by the advocates of this polity, that the work of Christianity in our land has been defrauded, in a measure, of an element of superior efficiency; and Congregationalism, as such, has failed to take that forward position to which it was entitled.

The work before us is an able presentation of the grounds on which the claims of the polity rest, as a system in accordance with Scripture and with the methods of the earliest churches, and as the one best adapted to meet the demands of human nature, and the varying exigencies of a religion whose only hope of permanence and vitality lies in the cultivation of a deep sense of individual responsibility.

In the first chapter, the author defines the term "Congregationalism," representing it as the counterpart, in church government, of democracy in civil affairs. He then gives a brief summary of the essential principles of the system, and adds a statement showing the comparative numerical strength of Congregationalism.

It will, perhaps, surprise some persons to learn, that "Congregationalism, as a distinctive form of church order, leads all others in this country in the number of its adherents"; and that, "instead of being, as has often been alleged, a merely provincial and peculiarly New England idea, . . . it is substantially held and practised by more than one half of the entire professing Christianity of the land." The author concludes, from these statistics, and from the remarkable evenness with which these churches are distributed over all the different sections of the country, "that, as a system, Congregationalism has been found to be equally adapted to every latitude and phase of society among us."

It will be understood that the term "Congregational," in this connection, is not used as belonging exclusively to a particular system of doctrinal belief, but as describing simply a form of church order and government. The author allows that the name is rightly claimed by all those churches, of whatever faith, which agree in the adoption of these principles of ecclesiastical polity. Whether the term, in its unqualified use, as applied to the oldest portion of the Congregational churches, is a sufficiently distinctive designation of those churches, is, at least outside of Massachusetts, not so much an etymological or an ecclesiastical question, as one of popular usage and denominational comity.

The second chapter is devoted mainly to an exposition of the grounds on which the principles of the order are held to be in harmony with Scripture and with the design of Christianity itself, in opposition to the claims of Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. The discussion is marked in general by thoroughness and logical consistency. The uncompromising spirit of the author has also led him, here and in other parts of the work, to take strong ground in regard to certain points in which there seems to him to exist, among the churches, a tendency to swerve from the line of strict Congregational principles. He animadverts severely, for example, on the very general readiness among the churches in certain districts to content themselves with the services of what are called "stated supplies" for the pulpit, instead of the more responsible and permanent pastorship. And in this connection he argues with much earnestness against the idea of a "standing order" of the clergy. Those who, having been once ordained, have now ceased to be pastors, he maintains, are not to be regarded as in any sense *ministers*. In his view, it is only the pastoral relation to a particular church which gives a man the character of a minister. "Ordination" invests a man with no official dignity that is to be recognized, except by courtesy, outside the bounds of that body which alone possesses the right to ordain, that is, outside of his own particular church.

The third chapter affords a complete view of the system in actual operation, with minute and plain directions in regard to the proper manner of transacting all ecclesiastical affairs, from the organizing of a church to the getting rid of a refractory pastor. Few questions could arise, in the history of a church or of a community of churches, which would not find here a definite and helpful answer. On some points, doubtless, the views presented will not command a unanimous assent; but the clearness with which these points are treated will do much toward facilitating their settlement.

The fourth chapter sets forth the peculiar advantages of Congregationalism above other systems, as meeting more successfully the religious demands of individuals and of society generally. Here the author takes occasion to dwell upon the special adaptedness of this form of polity to our own country, by reason of its close resemblance, in some of the principal features, to the republican system in civil government.

The fifth chapter concludes the volume with an earnest appeal to Congregationalists themselves to recognize the value of their distinctive polity, and to show that they appreciate its worth by using all honorable means to secure its prevalence.

In this closing portion, we see the great object of the book itself. That object is practical, not polemical. He writes thus, in the Preface: "I have no apology to offer to fellow-Christians of other denominations for anything said herein. I have not intended to speak in bitterness or censoriousness, nor otherwise than I would have them speak of my own faith, did facts warrant it, in reversed circumstances. I hold that the most peaceable and useful Christian union is that which is effected by the kindly co-working of denominational bodies, each thoroughly persuaded that it is better than all others, and stimulated to the utmost *esprit de corps.*"

This we believe to be the prevailing disposition among the foremost advocates of Congregationalism. The present earnestness for the propagation of this polity in the Western States, and the desire for a termination of the long-continued union between Congregationalists and Presbyterians in that part of the country, have sprung, not from a disposition to do injury to churches of a different order, but from an honest conviction of the responsibility which rests on Congregationalists to make full use of the special facilities and opportunities which their own polity affords.

It is a good service which Dr. Dexter has done, in this work, for the interests of ecclesiastical literature generally, in setting forth with so great clearness the radical distinction between Congregationalism and the other forms of church polity.

And one is struck by the fact that, while a truly distinctive character is established for Congregationalism, as a well-defined system of church polity, there is yet an entire absence of the spirit of *ecclesiasticism.* The principles of the system are traced, with great simplicity and directness, to the teachings of Scripture and of common sense. We hear little of the decrees of councils, or other edicts of human authority. The

Church, in connection with this polity, is not magnified for its own sake, but always with a direct view to the high purpose for which such an organization is established. So, too, in the administrative offices of the Church. The officer is simply one of the brotherhood, and is to be held in honor, not because of any official dignity, but simply for his work's sake, — a work in which the whole membership have a common interest.

The inquiry will naturally arise, whether, in avoiding the evils of the hierarchal and consolidated church systems, Congregationalists may not have surrendered something of that efficiency which is the result of a concentration of energies, and which is so dependent on the principle of union. Will those churches which acknowledge no common head but Christ, even though one in faith and purpose, recognize any bond of union strong enough to make them, in feeling or influence, fairly representative of the spiritual union between all true Christian disciples? For an answer to this inquiry, one might be directed to compare the practical results of the different systems in their various fields of missionary labor. Have the Congregationalists lagged behind their brethren? And in regard to the question of harmony between sister churches, there is an opportunity every day to observe whether the more independent churches are any the less truly one in spirit than those which make a boast of their unity.

Most of our writers on Congregationalism, however, including Dr. Dexter, would meet this inquiry, first, by pointing to the principle of the "fellowship of the churches," as an essential principle of the system. This, they maintain, meets the necessity for sympathy and co-operation, and distinguishes the Congregational churches from those which are properly called "Independent"; while at the same time it is no encroachment on the freedom of the local church, and is easily distinguished from the organized unity which characterizes other ecclesiastical systems. It is simply the carrying out, between church and church, of the same interchange of social offices which is fitting between individual Christians. And it no more militates against the independence of the local church, than the usages of friendship and good neighborhood militate against the personal independence of friends and neighbors.

But although the Congregational writers consistently and strenuously deny any *authority* to inhere in councils or in the whole community of churches, have they not, under a sense of the advantages of fraternal communion, been led unconsciously into a manner of treating the subject which indicates an excessive anxiety to avoid certain supposed evils of "Independency"? Their error, if it is such, does not consist in laying too much stress on the duty of a real fellowship between the churches, but in the assumption that this is the characteristic of Congregationalism as distinguished from pure Independency; and consequently in assigning too prominent a place to it as an integral part of the system, and in making its methods and forms more fixed and artificial than is suited to the genius of a free polity.

Such writers as Dr. Dexter and Dr. Bacon — though it is to be said with great diffidence — seem to do some injustice to the Congregational churches in England, when they charge those churches with having ignored an essential principle of Congregationalism, because they have not adopted in form the same *method* of intercourse between sister churches which is in vogue here. The truth appears to be, that this is not to be considered an "essential principle" of the system at all, except in a very general sense. A degree of regard for the good opinion of one another, some interchange of friendly offices, is a matter of course among churches of like faith and order. It is a Christian necessity. Even Browne himself, whose name is a synonyme for pure "Independency," recognized the propriety of a certain measure of intercourse and consultation between churches through their "elders." But it is not desirable that this should be a constrained fellowship; or that any one church of commanding influence, or a majority of the churches, or a "National Council," should dictate its terms and methods. Let these be left to the free preference of individual churches. Let not the principle of Fellowship be set over against that of Independence, as if in this system there were antagonism between them. The latter is, at least, quite as essential as the former to the integrity of the system. Is there not some danger of laying an extra-Scriptural burden on the conscience of the churches? The *true* fellowship of Congregational churches is to be carried out rather by the exercise of a spirit of mutual good-will and trust, and by cordial co-operation in Christian enterprises, than by an over-anxious habit of inspection and criticism in regard to each other's private affairs, or by any enginery devised for the purpose of bringing to bear on a single church the influence of combined authority, though it be only the authority of so-called *advice*. But it should, in justice to Dr. Dexter, be added, that if, in common with the other chief authorities on the subject, his work betrays an unconscious tendency toward the error to which we have adverted, an effective antidote is provided at the same time in the general spirit and tone of the book as a noble advocacy of human rights, and of the safety of *trusting the people.*

As a man peculiarly of the "living present," the author has written in a spirit of wakeful and intense practicalness. Hence the work is marked by much freshness, both in its general tenor and style, and in the illustrations, which have been gathered even from the very latest pages of current ecclesiastical history. This feature of freshness in illustration is one which much enhances the interest and value of the work; although, of course, some risk is thereby incurred of doing injustice in individual cases, where the verdict of the day is liable to be reversed or modified by the calmer judgment of the future and in the light of additional information.

The style of the volume is correct, clear, and forcible, though an occasional blemish may be pointed out in the use of expressions which a little more severity of revision would have rejected. Such colloquialisms as "dillidallied" and "shillishallied," "being nowhere," "handy," "muddling of its clear stream," "meet them half-way in interest," are hardly to be approved in a treatise of this character. We observe also, now and then, a slight inaccuracy, such as "a church that is *few* in numbers," "equally as well," "vitalest."

The very copious Index makes the book peculiarly serviceable as a work of reference. We confess ourselves, however, a little disappointed in consulting the Index, at not being able to find the words "Communion" and "Fellowship"; although the "Folly" of a venerated father in the Church is duly noted, and the maker of the Index has established his own anti-liturgical character by giving a prominence to "Calomel" and "Quinine" which we should hardly have looked for in an ecclesiastical treatise.

We were tempted to venture upon a little criticism of the "Dedication," as being too much in the manner of a studied eulogium; but it is a tribute so hearty, and withal is a testimony so well deserved, that we feel more inclined to congratulate both the author and his friend.

4.—*Classical and Scientific Studies, and the great Schools of England: a Lecture read before the Society of Arts of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April* 6, 1865. By WILLIAM P. ATKINSON. *With Additions and an Appendix.* Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. 8vo pamphlet. pp. 117.

THE much-debated question of the comparative value of classical and of scientific studies as means of mental training, Mr. Atkinson does not decide absolutely in favor of either. Both are needed, he thinks, but at different times. Their functions are distinct, and neither can replace the other; but the study of outward things should come first, following the hint that Nature gives in developing the observing faculties before she develops the reflective. The phenomena of the material world — the divinely appointed instruments for the cultivation of the observing faculties — first attract the young mind, and the study of them ought to be the earliest in the school course; whilst the study of the mind, including the study of language as the instrument of thought, being the chief agent in the development of the reflective faculties, ought to come later. "I should not, perhaps," he says, "have been tempted into so old a controversy, if there had not fallen in my way a document which seems to me to throw a new and most extraordinary light upon the whole subject." This is the Report of the Parliamentary Commission appointed in 1861 to investigate the condition of Eton and of eight other of the great public schools of England. The Report, from Mr. Atkinson's account of it, certainly shows a very surprising state of things at Eton; and what is true of Eton seems to be true to some extent of the great English public schools in general.

There was a common impression that an undue importance was given in England to the niceties of classical learning, especially to the mechanism of Greek versification. But it seems that not only are other studies neglected, but even Latin and Greek are not well taught, — at Eton very badly taught; that "the boys go up to Oxford, not only not proficient, but in a lamentable state of deficiency with respect to the classics"; and that even the great majority of those who take a degree in Oxford, after having spent ten or twelve years of their life in the all but exclusive study of Latin and Greek, are unable to construe offhand the easiest passages in either language, if they have never seen them before. This is certainly a very curious result. It is not at once obvious, however, what light it throws upon the question at issue. What Mr. Atkinson alleges is, that physical science is a better means of early mental training than Latin and Greek. What he proves is, that Latin and Greek are very imperfectly taught in England, and natural science hardly at all. This does not prove that Latin and Greek well taught may not be a good means of training, nor that natural science is a better. The effect of the evidence, indeed, is rather to make us distrust unqualified statements about the merits of any particular course of study. Certain it is that many Englishmen somehow contrive to get a very good mental training. Were evidence of this fact wanting, perhaps the very existence of this Commission and its Report would be enough to furnish it. If the training is got from their schooling, the schooling cannot be so very bad. If it is got from something else, then the effect of one course or another is of less importance.

More directly to the point are the opinions of various eminent scientific men, such as Faraday, Owen, Lyell, and Carpenter, given in their testimony before the Commission. Dr. Carpenter, for instance, says: "I think that a lad of from ten to twelve years of age is better fitted to be led to observe and reason upon what he observes in objective phenomena, than he is to reason upon abstractions." But what is an objective phenomenon, as contradistinguished from an abstraction? Is a stone, for instance, more truly an objective phenomenon than a word? And does its objectivity mean merely that it is something outside of the mind, with which the mind has of itself nothing to do? If so, it is precisely its objectivity that must be got rid of before it can be known or reasoned upon. There is a notion somewhat prevalent, that from outward nature the mind receives knowledge directly and ready made, and that it gets thus a result unvitiated by the effects of its own action; whilst in dealing with mental phenomena it is only working over its old stock, recombining and arranging, but not adding to its ideas. But the stone does not become an objective phenomenon until the mind has classified and named it, that is, reduced it to an abstraction. On the other hand, the abstract word denoting the class to which the mind has assigned the thing is not a *mere abstraction*, in the sense of having lost any part of the reality that belonged to the perception of the thing by the senses. What it stands for has no existence or meaning for us without the name, — no more than the name has without the thing. Nothing, in short, is known to us but ideas; the only difference is, that in some ideas we perceive more clearly that it is thought we are dealing with, whilst in others the thought is more obscured, dim, and perceived only as feeling, sensation, &c.

But were the antithesis between observation and reflection real and thorough-going, so far from strengthening the claims of physical studies, it would go far towards annulling them altogether. Were it possible to observe *without* reflecting, or to cultivate observation without at the same time cultivating reflection, would not this be so far to turn the observer into a brute? Do not all tenable distinctions between man and the brutes come at last to this, that they *know*, but he knows and *reflects* upon his knowledge? Why is it, for instance, that, with all their acuteness of sense, the race of dogs makes no progress, but stands just where it did two thousand years ago? Is it not that the dog is unable to detach his perception from himself, from the immediate use or occasion, and see it as something independent and impersonal, — in other words to reflect upon it, — and so, of course, cannot communicate his experience, or most imperfectly, to another? What Mr. Atkinson undoubtedly means is, not that the study of the material world develops the observing faculties and not the reflective, but that the reflective faculties are in certain cases easiest reached through the observation of external nature. Allowing this to be true, it is reason enough, no doubt, for the preference of scientific studies in these cases; but then it is not because a different effect is produced, but because the same effect is more readily produced by these than by classical studies. Both alike aim, of course, at something beyond the information immediately conveyed, which in the one as much as in the other is only the vehicle of instruction, not the instruction itself. The end proposed is in all cases alike, — training of the mind, not of the senses. It is this that makes the accurate observer, quite as much as it makes the profound thinker. The practised microscopist, for instance, — what change has taken place in him? No doubt there is corresponding physical development; but the main point is the training of the judgment. He does not see, perhaps, more than another, — perhaps less; but he understands what he sees and knows what it proves. The sportsman or naturalist who hears the cry of a bird or animal unnoticed by his companion, does not necessarily hear better, does not even hear *that sound* better, i. e. it does not seem louder to him, but he knows its meaning. The sound exists only for him in whom it awakens reflection. The argument in favor of scientific studies, then, is, not that they proceed upon facts, while classical studies proceed upon abstractions, but that with certain persons or at a certain time of life they are more apt to lead the student to make his abstractions for himself, that is, to think, whilst the classical course is more apt to lead him to accept other people's abstractions, that is, to repeat, without thinking. But this ought to be shown in detail and by experiment; the question is only obscured by attracting attention to the nature of various kinds of knowledge, or of the various faculties of the mind, or their comparative values or utilities. What we want to know is the comparative effect of different studies upon the same faculty, or rather upon the mind, as the unity of all the faculties.

Mr. Atkinson would be the first to declare that education implies development of all the mental powers. He remarks that "the advocates of science have been too prone to confound education with information"; and he cites as eminently true Mr. Pattison's saying that the issue between the classics and science ought to be placed on "the comparative fitness of the two subjects to expand the powers, to qualify for philosophical and comprehensive views." But he does not show precisely how the study of scientific facts is likely to lead to this result. It does so in *some* cases, no doubt. But then the same may be said of almost any occupation. The business of a carpenter, for instance, or a sailor, might give occasion for all that is essential in character. But the question is, rather, what will produce the desired result with the least friction and waste of power, and thus favor success where, as is usually the case, there is no power to spare. If you propose natural history for the average boy, without special gift or inclination, the anxious parent, if he be a layman in science, finds a difficulty in discerning the connection between a minute acquaintance with beetles and that mental training which he desires; and his embarrassment is increased by finding that proficients in science very often show no due appreciation of training, and seem to think it signifies only an acquaintance with certain classes of facts, as if the mind's *capacity* meant only its distensibility to contain more and more facts. Even so considerable a man as Faraday, in the evidence quoted by Mr. Atkinson, declares that the phrase "training of the mind" has to him a very indefinite meaning, and gives as an instance of the defect left untouched by a literary education, that highly educated persons cannot remember what water is composed of, though he has told them over and over again. The chemical elements, the geological strata, or other like particulars, may serve the turn of such men as Faraday or Humboldt, but it does not follow that they will have the same value to another, nor that these eminent persons are the best judges of their value to ordinary mortals. It is they that give these things their value; in their minds the facts seem necessarily associated with thoughts, but the association is not necessary or universal. Mr. Atkinson has much to say about classical pedants; but the scientific pedant is quite as bad, and perhaps more likely to become troublesome in this country.

The Rev. George Moberly, Head-Master of Winchester School, says in the course of his evidence: "Every man of liberal education is the better for not being ignorant of anything; but compared with other things, a scientific fact, either as conveyed by a lecturer or as reproduced in examination, is a fact which produces nothing in a boy's mind. It is simply a barren fact, which he remembers or does not remember for a time, and which after a few years becomes confounded with other facts and is forgotten. It leads to nothing, it does not germinate, ... these things give no power." Many persons will sympathize with Mr. Moberly, and will find in what he says much that is confirmed by their own experience, — indeed, a pretty fair account of what might be expected if elementary physics and natural history were substituted at once for Latin and Greek in our schools. The present course may be barren, but would this be more fruitful? These are the doubts of the ignorant. Mr. Atkinson has full faith that, taught as they might and ought to be taught, these things would assume a very different aspect from the dry bead-roll of facts they too often seem. His experience may give him ample warrant for his belief. A little actual experience, on a basis wide enough to include a considerable variety of natural gifts and dispositions, is worth a great deal of *a priori* speculation. One thing is clear, the decision cannot depend on the abstract nature of the study, but on the effect it actually has in the individual case. Where there is talent or decided set in the nature in a particular direction, this is doubtless the safest guide. In the absence of positive indications of this sort, negative signs may be useful, for example, less repugnance to one kind of studies than to the rest, where none are liked. But this is an equivocal test, for the preference may be due to the greater opportunity afforded of escaping any real exercise of mind, while keeping up the feeling and the appearance of it. Children and uncultivated persons generally, provided they are not wanting in intelligence, have an appetite for unconnected facts, for incident and novelty for its own sake, which indicates a mind awakened but not developed, and equally averse to total stagnation and to continuous exertion. The youthful "collections" of birds' eggs and the like, the curiosity about workshops, or apparatus, or to see work done, are natural and healthful; but they are due in great measure to the desire to get out of doors, to escape regular tasks, and to get the sensation of stir and movement without paying the price. The part of education is not to perpetuate this stage of growth, but to use the means it affords for a further advance. To supply the pupil with occupation that would tend to keep his mind at this point, would not be to educate his intellect, but the reverse.

Such are some of the scruples that so general a statement as Mr. Atkinson's naturally suggests. It is for him to show, as he is most competent to do, how his plan may be made in practice to secure the advantages and avoid the disadvantages upon which all are pretty well agreed. The utmost that teachers or systems can do is in any case mostly negative, and consists in removing obstacles and in preventing force from being wasted by too much diffusion, or by the confounding of incidental advantages with the main end. This office, however, is far from unimportant, and its importance is the greater, the less pronounced the set of the mental current in him who is to be taught. It is vigor of flow that is wanted, and that direction is best which most favors this. The danger most to be dreaded in England may very likely come from the influence of class prejudice and routine, tending to make education merely a conventional distinction, the badge of social rank. In this country there is little danger in this direction; the danger is rather that extraneous advantages of another kind, the general utility or the tangible, practical nature of the information acquired, will be confounded with the training of the mind itself. If it is really this that we seek, everything that does not contribute to it is irrelevant, and the more irrelevant, the more palpable the usefulness for other purposes.

To praise the Parthenon as an excellent lime-quarry, would be as much as to say that it is good for nothing better.

It is sometimes asked, Why may not the same advantages that are claimed for the study of Latin and Greek be afforded by the study of French and German? So probably they may; it is only a question of fact, how they are used. If the study of either of these languages be pursued chiefly with a view to some external advantage that may happen to attach to the possession of them, it is this that will chiefly appear in the result. But to the mind all advantages are external except its own growth and culture. Whatever of the mental coin of thought is paid for any commodity, is so much of the mind's capital diverted from other uses. If French and German are studied rather than Latin and Greek, simply because of the greater likelihood that they will be used in after life, this prospect no more gives them an educational value than the prospect of a fellowship or a bishopric, which Mr. Atkinson thinks the chief stimulus in the English classical system, gives an educational value to Latin and Greek. It is true we often get more than we bargained for. The prospect of personal advantage of any sort may serve as incitement to exertions whose benefit is far beyond what was intended, just as the peg-top or the jack-knife serves as incitement to the unwilling school-boy. These bribes are of all degrees of fineness, and perhaps never to be quite dispensed with. But in comparing different courses of study we must take care not to confound the accidental inducements that one may offer by way of bribe to undertake it, with its proper effect as training. Both are highly important; but one is general and the other purely personal, to be settled only by the idiosyncrasies of the particular individual. Speaking generally, the more abstract the study, if by abstract we mean remote from all other aims except to exercise the mind, the better.

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5. — *Affixes in their Origin and Application, exhibiting the Etymologic Structure of English Words.* By S. S. Haldeman, A. M. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. 271.

This very correctly and elegantly printed book is, as no one can doubt who examines it, the fruit of not a little patient investigation and serious thought. Curious inquirers into the "etymologic structure" of our mother tongue will find it a valuable aid, and will have reason to thank its author for the rich body of materials which it presents, as well as for its numerous acute suggestions and apt and striking comments. It addresses itself rather to persons of special taste for word-analysis, and some practice therein, than to a more general public. That it should be made available as a school manual of etymological study, as Professor Haldeman seems to expect, or should admit of use by classes except under a teacher of considerable linguistic culture and independent critical judgment, does not seem to us possible. For such a service it is too dry in style and unorderly in arrangement, too wanting in proportion in the working out of details, and too fanciful, venturesome, and idiosyncratic in its analyses and explanations.

A book of affixes which should attract the young student to the study of English word-structure, and guide him to a correct understanding of the subject, would have to be more distinctly historical in its method. It must take up with most particularity those prefixes and suffixes which are plainly such to the apprehension of the English speaker, and trace them directly back to their older forms in the languages from which the English is descended, pointing out the modifications of shape and meaning which they have undergone, — back, if possible, to their ultimate origin, — in such wise as to offer a clear and apprehensible exhibition of the whole growth and sphere of usefulness of each element. It would not need to restrict its attention to these most easily recognizable formative elements; but the obscurer ones, whose formative value lies outside of English word-formation, would call for a different kind of treatment, and might be more or less briefly disposed of, in proportion to their remoter consequence as active constituent parts of our language. Comparison with the affixes of kindred tongues would all along be in place, if cautiously made, and so set forth as to show, and not confuse and conceal, the kind and degree of relationship in every case. To carry the process back, by the aid of all the resources which Indo-European philology now places within reach of the student, to the ultimate roots out of which the whole structure has grown, would indeed be a most valuable work, but also one of gigantic difficulty, requiring for its execution the most profound and varied learning, penetrating acuteness, and rare judgment; it would give us such an *etymologicum* of our English tongue as no one has yet dared to attempt, or hardly to dream of. How far toward this distant goal each investigator shall try to push forward, each must for himself determine, according to his special objects and his felt powers and acquirements. But we are of opinion that Professor Haldeman has endeavored beyond his strength, and would fain lead his readers where he can walk with no certain step, and whither they will be unwilling to follow him. He strives to be minutely exhaustive in certain directions, at the expense of fulness in others much more important. He divides into separate constituent parts affixes, and even roots, with which no prudent scholar would venture to meddle; and many of his processes of analysis are strangely at variance with sound etymology. These faults we can best illustrate by reference to examples. Among the specimens of analysis given by him at the end of his work, as models for the learner, are found the two words *climate* (p. 246) and *constitutional* (p. 247.) The former, than which no derivative word could well be more simple, (it represents the Greek theme *kli-mat*, root *kli* in κλίνω, and suffix *mat*, of which the final *t*, by one of the commonest phonetic rules in the language, is lost in the nominative,) he divides thus: *c-li-ma-te*. The syllable *li* is allowed to be the root, to which *c* is an intensive prefix, as is set forth elsewhere (p. 51), in a paragraph which is throughout a model of baseless theorizing and valueless combination; the main suffix is *ma*, and *t* is a farther suffix of declension, a genitive-case sign! This last is a blunder for which any sophomore would merit degradation to the class below; but it is repeated many times, in various forms, in the work. So, for instance, in the other word we have quoted, which is written and explained *con-st-it-u-t-io-n-al*. Here the radical syllable is deprived of its weakened vowel (*sti* for *stâ*); the suffix *tu*, forming the base of the derivative verb, is torn apart for no conceivable reason; and, worst of all, *tion* is broken into three pieces, its *t* being pronounced "participial," and its *n*, like the *t* of *mat*, "declensional." No cautious etymologist will think of regarding *tion*, in Latin any more than in English, as aught but a single integral suffix; although the agreement of its initial with that of the participial ending, and their variation to *s* in the same verbs, are noteworthy circumstances, they by no means prove its derivation from the participle. But to our author nearly every initial *t* of a primitive suffix is "participial"; every final consonant of a suffix, if lost in the nominative singular, is "declensional"; and most of the initial and final consonants of the roots themselves figure in his lists of prefixes and suffixes as "intensive," or something of the sort. Thus, on p. 55, the *d*, *l*, and *r* of *dico*, *loquor*, and *rogo* are declared intensive prefixes, and the three radicals are thus impliedly rolled into one, identical with the simpler root of *echo;* on p. 88, *sp-eak* is by decapitation reduced to the same condition; and if *talk* escapes a like fate, it has reason to congratulate itself upon its good fortune, for *t*, too, is (p. 91) both "intensive" and "repetitive."

These are not exceptional cases, captiously chosen for the purpose of misrepresenting the work under discussion; on the contrary, they are fairly characteristic of its general style and method. Its author has not had the training needed to make a safe and reliable teacher in matters of this nature, or he lacks the sober and cautious judgment which should restrain him from the vagaries into which the etymologists of all ages have been notoriously apt to run, — many heads, wise and strong in other departments of study, showing themselves most lamentably weak in treating of words and their history. The same want of sound erudition appears not less in Professor Haldeman's comparisons from related languages, than in his style of analysis. Outside the tongues from which our own is immediately descended, his most frequent references are to the Sanskrit and the Celtic, especially the Welsh. As is wont to be the case with those who use the former freely in etymologizing while knowing little or nothing of it as a language, his Sanskrit analogies are in great part false and valueless. And we are fully persuaded that the case is yet worse with the Celtic; if every particle of Welsh and Irish — excepting, of course, the originals adduced for words which we have directly derived from those languages — were stricken from the book, it would doubtless be by just so much the gainer. As for the introductory and prefatory matter, though containing, like the rest, some shrewd remark and valuable observation, it is curiously deficient in method, coherency, and point.

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6. — *Method of Philological Study of the English Language.* By Francis A. March, Professor of the English Language, and Lecturer on Comparative Philology, in Lafayette College, Easton, Pa. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. 118.

The study of English, with us Americans, commonly means the learning and application of the trivial, arbitrary, and superficial rules of some one of those Comprehensive Grammars which so frightfully abound. The kind of knowledge supplied is of the most unfruitful or the most doubtful. The only exercise of thought is in parsing. To parse Paradise Lost is the supreme test of scholarship! None but the very young can be forced through such a labor, and these, however glibly they deliver themselves, rarely, we believe, have a clear notion of the nomenclature they employ. Something better than this is beginning to be done: a little is taught of the history of the language, and in some of the best high schools several of the masterpieces of English poets are carefully studied in a literary way; the life of the author, and the history of the work, with its topics and allusions, being well looked up. In a few of our colleges Anglo-Saxon is sufficiently taught to give an idea of the primitive structure of our language. But *can* the study of English, the study of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton, say, be made a serious discipline, like the study of Plautus, Lucretius, and Horace? To question this seems to us all but imbecility; and yet we know not that the experiment has been made anywhere except at Lafayette College, which counts in its corps the very able Professor who has put forth the book which we have under notice. The reason for not undertaking such a course, so far as colleges are concerned, may with some truth be said to be a want of time; but as to high schools, where there is time enough, it has been rather the incapability to devise a good system. This difficulty no longer exists.

In this little book of scarcely more than a hundred pages, Professor March shows how to apply to English authors the searching method of philological study which is now employed in the most enlightened classic schools. Giving out to the pupil short passages from the Pilgrim's Progress, Paradise Lost, Julius Cæsar, the Fairy Queen, and the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, he plies him with multifarious questions of grammar, etymology, history, rhetoric, and criticism; questions from so many points of view, so varied and repeated, so suggestive both of knowledge and of ignorance, so stimulating to curiosity, that it seems almost a necessity, supposing due fidelity on the part of the instructor, that even the careless and slow should learn the *omne scibile* of the matter before them, while the intelligent cannot fail to be led to reflection and incited to research. Not all the questions are answered either by the author or by the books he refers to; not all are satisfactorily answerable, even by a clever and well-informed man. That is a good point, of course; for if we are to ask only such questions as we can answer, what progress will knowledge make? The plan wisely includes, as an essential part, the writing of essays covering the ground of the whole series of questions and investigations. As Professor March well says, "the habit of investigating and writing out results makes the full and exact man at once."

That this Method will be as efficient in the hands of an ordinary man as in those of the accomplished and enthusiastic author, it would be absurd to expect. Nevertheless, it gives just the help which an ordinary man most needs; shows him what questions he should ask of himself, as well as of his pupils. There are references to such sources of information as exist. We could wish that there had been a better English grammar than Fowler's for this purpose; but we know of none. When shall we have an English grammar, ay, and an English dictionary, worthy to form part of the apparatus for such a method?

If we have anything to object to in this book, it is the number of the questions in what is vulgarly called Grammar; but we are conscious of a prejudice here which makes us slow to censure.

7. — *Thoughts on the Future Civil Policy of America.* By JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M. D., LL. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 317.

THE object of this book is to show the application to America of the principles set forth by the author in his work on "The Intellectual Development of Europe," in which he endeavored to show "that the historical progress of the nations of that continent illustrates the fact that social advancement is as completely under the control of natural law as is the bodily growth of an individual." The present work is founded on four lectures delivered before the New York Historical Society for the purpose of showing this application.

Encouraged by the popularity of his principal work, the author deems it advisable to give these lectures a more permanent form. This appears the more desirable, since "at the present moment, when the Republic has reached one of those epochs at which it must experience important transformations, it may not be inopportune to direct attention to the effects of physical agents and laws on the advancement of nations." "We are too prone," he adds, "to depreciate their influence."

Dr. Draper more than atones, however, for the neglect which the workings of physical agents have suffered at the hands of the philosophical historian, at least in his appreciation of them. The possibility of historical foresight from a knowledge of physical science is much insisted on; but if ever the movements of society come to be traced scientifically to the workings of physical agencies, the merit of the discovery will hardly be Dr. Draper's. Like two other recent and popular writers, Mr. Buckle and Mr. Spencer, he begins at the end of this possible future science, asserting roundly and in most unqualified terms conclusions of which the demonstration would require a knowledge amounting almost to omniscience, as compared with any conceivable attainments of science. These conclusions may be correct, at any rate they cannot be refuted; but the practical importance of insisting on them does not consist in any use that can be made of them so long as the science exists in the undeveloped state in which Dr. Draper leaves it. For he contributes little or nothing to filling up the void which exists between the problem and its solution. The historian who deals with the more particular and proximate causes and the empirical laws of historical events will be more successful, we think, and of much greater service to the statesman.

The connection between remote physical causes and their effects on the character and movements of society and the individual will, though we may be easily persuaded of its reality, is one which we can hardly hope to bring within the compass of exact science, or to employ for the practical purposes of historical foresight; and the only motive we can conceive for insisting on its reality is a polemical desire to dogmatize in opposition to those who ignore or deny its existence.

To avoid the imputation of such a motive, Dr. Draper affects a practical object. He proposes to offer principles for the guidance of the American statesman. The only practical lesson of the book occupies, however, but little space for its development. The author advises American statesmen to prevent the division of the country into separate nationalities, and to counteract the modifying effects of climate by encouraging constant emigration and intercommunication.

> "It is not enough," he says, "that there should be free movement for thought; free movement for the people themselves is of equal importance. That is the true method for combating climate effects, — preventing communities from falling into Asiatic torpor, and contracting senseless antipathies against each other. Had the Southern States for the last ten years been pervaded by an unceasing stream of Northern travel in every direction, the civil war would not have occurred."

Three pages back the author exempts the great empire of China from this description of "Asiatic torpor," and recommends it as an example for us. To the question, "Can we not neutralize those climate differences, which, if unchecked, must transmute us into different nations?" he says: —

> "In two words, I think, we find an answer, — Education and Intercommunication. Nor is this the suggestion of mere theorists. Under that formula four hundred millions of men — one third of the human race — have found stability for their institutions in China. By their public school system they have organized their national intellect; by their canal system they have made themselves, though living in a climate as diversified as ours, essentially one people. The principle on which their political system is thus founded has for many thousand years confronted successfully all human variations, and has outlived all revolutions."

The practical statesman might object, however, that restrictions on "free movement for thought" in the Southern States have been for the last ten years among the most serious obstacles to that "unceasing stream of Northern travel" which the author thinks so desirable.

It is doubtless true, that commerce and free intercommunication are among the most valuable means of maintaining civilizations and nationalities, whether by counteracting climate effects, or by those obvious utilities which will more readily occur to the unscientific observer of human nature. But our Professor of Physiology is haunted with the idea that there is a peculiar fatality in climates. These can change the color of the skin, the habitual employments, and the objects of familiar contemplation, and hence the habits of thought; hence the mental character; hence the development of the brain, and, finally, the shape of the skull; and lo! we have a new race of men, no longer fitted to live with each other in peace and amity! The fatal, inevitable character of these changes so fills his imagination, that he appears to ascribe to them a celerity equal to their certainty, apparently forgetting that throughout the whole length of recorded history, and during the rise and fall of all known nations and empires, the physical features of the human races have undergone very slight, if any, material modifications. But our author builds national differences on very slight physical changes due to climate. Speaking of the zone of the Northern States, he says: —

> "Follow that zone with a prophetic eye, as it becomes peopled to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and tell me, as those busy hordes extend over the vast sandy desert, climb up the threatening ridges of the mountain chains, descend through the moaning forests of enormous pines beyond, how many are the vicissitudes through which life must be maintained, and I will tell you how many distinct families of men there must be."

The view which is most acceptable to philosophical naturalists of the present day represents race-variation as the effect, primarily, of geographical separation and isolation, and the cumulative effects of many and obscure causes, most of which are as likely to be of a very special character as to be dependent on general conditions such as climates. But the immense sweep of the causes which our author delights to contemplate — their simple and irresistible character, their fatality — obscure his vision of all those intermediate proximate causes to which men ordinarily ascribe the actions and peculiarities of their species. Hence we have such specimens of aphoristical wisdom as this: "The absence of summer is the absence of taste and genius; where there is no winter, loyalty is unknown." Again, we are told that "without the Gulf Stream Newton would never have written his Principia, nor Milton Paradise Lost." What a comprehensive view of causation we have in these facts! It impresses "the control of universal law" very forcibly upon our author. Those so-called Special Providences, long trains of trivial events and apparent accidents, on which the lives of the poet and philosopher depended, which are the fittest to excite surprise in the unsophisticated heart, are as nothing compared with the long reach of the causes through which the productions of genius are made to depend on the facts of physical geography and meteorology, and astronomical events to work out their own science.

A fatalistic view of causation is presented throughout the book, — not dogmatically, but rather in the rhetorical figures in which the author's imagination delights to revel. He is most profoundly impressed with "the existence of controlling law." He discovers that animals and plants change "helplessly" under physical influences, and he therefore regards them as illustrations of "the control of universal law." The empirical laws, disclosed in the statistics of crime, are quoted from the same motives, "for the purpose of bringing into clearer relief the cardinal doctrine that in individual life, in social life, in national life, everything is influenced by physical agents, and is therefore under the control of law. Far from denying," he adds, "the operation of man's free will, I give to that great truth all the weight that can be desired; but then I affirm there is something that overrides, that forever keeps it in check." Then follows this curious illustration of his meaning: —

> "If the reader will try a very simple physiological experiment upon himself, he will probably come to a clearer understanding of what is here meant. Let him execute with his right hand the motion he would resort to in winding a thread upon a reel. Then let him do the same thing with his left hand, only winding the opposite way. Are not these two contrary motions which he thus consecutively accomplishes thoroughly under his control? He wills to do either, and forthwith either is done. Both illustrate his voluntary power. But next let him try to do both, not successively, but simultaneously. Let him put forth all the strength of his determination. A free-will actor, he has now the opportunity of giving an illustration of his power. In the failure of repeated trials, he may discern what his voluntary determinations come to, and what they are really worth. He may learn from this simple experiment that there is something that over-controls him, and puts a limit to his power."

Certain important considerations are overlooked in this remarkable example, which materially affect its value. The compound motion which, according to the author, baffles the free will of man, is something more than the sum of the other two. To perform either simple act of which it is apparently composed requires the guidance of the sight or the imagination. Now, although men have two hands, they have only one imagination, and the difficulty of this double motion is in the action of this guiding faculty. It is a difficulty, however, which is not insurmountable. A little practice will overcome this "something that overrides" the free will, "that forever keeps it in check." More familiar though less imposing illustrations might have shown our author's meaning more clearly. Indeed, examples of the limitations of human agency, whether free or otherwise, are not infrequent in human experience.

But our author's salvo in favor of the "great truth" of free agency is not exempt from more weighty objections. If we can correctly interpret his meaning independently of his illustration, his doctrine of free agency does not rise in dignity a whit above the barbaric fatalism which pervades the volume. This free will is one of the "resistances" to the "force" of universal law; "overridden," it is true, and "forever kept in check." Thus, if climate induce a man to fan himself or seek the shade, it is his free will that is coerced, not his indolence. The idea comports well with the doctrine that plants and animals are "compelled" to change their forms and habits to meet the variations of climate and other circumstances; that they "yield helplessly" to physical influences. Writers like Dr. Draper and Mr. Spencer, who closely resembles him both in style and doctrine, though they disclaim alike the dogmas of Free Agency and Necessity, or any hostility to either, yet present in their philosophies what is far more prejudicial to a clear scientific philosophy or a healthy moral nature. It is not the dogma that hurts. It is in its influence on the imagination, and, through this, on our scientific conceptions and moral feelings, that fatalism is mischievous; and in this manner the language and conceptions of fatalism are quite as efficacious as the dogma itself. We have said, that the author does not present his fatalistic views dogmatically. It is difficult, however, to distinguish, in a style luxuriant in vague paradoxical illustrations, what is meant to impress the reader and what to instruct him, but the moral tendency of the figure or doctrine is illustrated in the following passage: —

> "And here I cannot help making the remark, that whoever accepts these principles as true, and bears in mind how physical circumstances control the deeds of men, as it may be said, in spite of themselves, will have a disposition to look with generosity on the acts of political enemies. Even when in madness they have rushed to the dread arbitrament of civil war, — a crime in the face of which all other crimes are as nothing, — and brought upon their country immeasurable woes, he will distinguish the instrument from the cause, and, when he has overpowered, will forgive."

There may be good reasons why our moral feelings, in view of the crimes of the late Rebellion, should yield to higher motives; but the reason Dr. Draper gives would, if logically insisted on, suppress moral feeling altogether. He distinguishes only by the names between a crime and a physical evil. Men of sense punish the one, and prevent or overcome the other, if they can; and if they do not punish crimes, it is not because physical circumstances have produced them, but only because punishment will not prevent them.

The real search of science is for the laws of physical and other forces; but the lesson our author and similar writers seek to draw from the facts of science is the doctrine that there is force in physical laws. Between these two aims there is all the difference of the most enlightened modern philosophy of science from the Manicheism of a barbarous theology. Under the formulas of matter and force, power and resistance, agent and patient, nature and circumstance, we still preserve the old duality of principles. Science still finds these phrases convenient; but scientific philosophy has at length emancipated itself from their doctrinal import and their influence on the imagination. They have degenerated into merely technical, abstract terms, expressive of nothing specifically real, though still useful in representing phenomena. The dogmas implied in these terms are like the old doctrine of Optimism, the doctrine that the world was created the best, the simplest, the most perfect which devising skill could make. The conception of a potential obstacle or hindrance to creative power, some hostile power or an intractable material, lurked under the doctrine, since otherwise there could be no question of better or worse, more or less perfect. In the same manner, the dominion of law, the control of physical forces, "the existence of controlling law," plants and animals and the human will "yielding helplessly" to physical influences, suggest that there might be something to hinder, some lawlessness or some perverseness in the nature of things and in the human will which required to be overcome.

The law of causation, the highest principle of positive science, which teaches that law or regularity is everywhere to be found even in the determinations of the human will, is guilty of no such fatalism as this. True scientific philosophy finds no compulsion in the laws it investigates, because it finds no opposition to them. Opposing laws and opposing forces are not found in real nature. The notions are used in the abstract scientific analyses and representations of nature, but only where no ambiguity or misconception can arise. They are concretely propounded only in such barbarous philosophies as this we are noticing, and in similar popular works. The fascination of such crudities constitutes one of the chief attractions of these books to the general reader, whose imagination is pleased to drive the round of the sciences with a tight rein, all the forces under control and well in the traces.

Another secret of their popularity is in their frequent resort to entertainments of really valuable and interesting scientific and historical facts, ostensibly given to furnish illustrations of the dreary platitudes which they really serve to relieve. Many digressions of this sort adorn Dr. Draper's pages. His scientific facts are, however, too frequently obscured by paradox, and his historical facts by doubtful theories. Well-ascertained facts and scientific guesses are given with equal positiveness. Facts, irrelevant to the illustrations in which they occur, find place in his pages, if they are only interesting and connected with the others. But the reader will not complain of this, nor ought we to find fault with it. Abstracts of physiology and physical geography, historical monographs, facts of social and industrial science, biblical history and criticism, are scattered through the book. A complete treatise on the physical sciences is sketched, to "illustrate" man's conquest of nature, the great idea which will hereafter compete with the climates of North America in the development of our nation. This treatise gives us information on gases, meteorology, acoustics, the sea, the steam-engine, electricity, magnetism, and the wonders of science. "But," he concludes, "it is vain to go on. I remarked a few pages back that the facts of science exceed the capacity of any book."

This principal digression is intended "to give emphasis to the proposition that a nation which is preparing itself for sovereignty among the powers of the earth, must shake off the traditions of obsolete policy, and stand forth the defender and protector of free thought."

The following is, perhaps, the most impressive passage in this "illustration": —

> "Who could have believed that the twitching of a frog's leg, in the experiments of Galvani, would give rise in a very few years to the establishment beyond all question of the compound nature of water, separating its constituents from one another, — would lead to the deflagration and dissipation in a vapor of metals that can hardly be melted in a furnace, — would show that the solid earth we tread upon is an oxide, — yield new metals, light enough to swim upon water, and even seem to set it on fire, — produce the most brilliant of all artificial lights, rivalling, if not excelling, in its intolerable splendor the noontide sun, — would occasion a complete revolution in chemistry, compelling that science to accept new ideas and even a new nomenclature, — that it would give us the power of making magnets capable of lifting more than a ton, cast a light on that riddle of ages, the pointing of the mariner's compass north and south, and explain the mutual attraction or repulsion of magnetic needles, — that it would enable us to form exquisitely in metal casts of all kinds of objects of art, and give workmen a means of performing gilding and silvering without risk to their health, — that it would suggest to the evil-disposed the forging of bank-notes, the sophisticating of jewelry, and be invaluable in the uttering of false coinage, — that it would carry the messages of commerce and friendship instantaneously across continents, or under oceans, and 'waft a sigh from Indus to the Pole'!"

It is indeed surprising that the twitching of a frog's leg should have given rise to all this, and were it not that many other causes conspired with it, we should be disposed to regard the occurrence as little less than miraculous.

Two historical "illustrations" are intended to show the political force of ideas, for the agency of which there is still opportunity in spite of climate. Two ideas, a sane and a crazy one, coming into the disturbed brain of Mohammed, produce from our author the sketch of a treatise on the "causes of mental delusions," and other consequences as numerous and important as those to which the twitchings of Galvani's frog gave rise. Arabian history is made to give "a most striking instance of the *impelling* power of an idea." Jewish history, on the other hand, is made to furnish an example of the *resisting* power of an idea, and many interesting facts and discussions are elicited in connection with the history, though they have nothing to do with the idea illustrated by it. Indeed, the general reader will be much impressed by the author's great and various learning, though it consists for the most part of information which the press has already disseminated in encyclopedias, gazetteers, and elementary works on science and history.

No work of this sort could be complete, without basing itself on the two great cardinal doctrines of modern science, — the imperishable nature of matter and force, and the order of organic development. These are presented in the vague, paradoxical terms which fit them for the "illustrative" uses they are made to serve. In place of the precise physical facts which these doctrines express, we have vague analogical extensions of them to phenomena of which our knowledge is as unprecise as possible. One of these doctrines is incorrectly illustrated, even within the sphere of its proper and well-ascertained application. We are told that plants are nothing more than condensations of the air, extracts from an invisible and noxious gas, "their parts being held together by force that has been derived from the sun, — force that, as it were, is imprisoned in them, but ever ready to reappear." But really only a small part of the force which the sun expends in vegetation is represented by the forces that hold the parts of an organism together and in their organic order. This force is chiefly expended in separating the main elements of organic compounds from oxygen; and it is represented by the conditions which keep them sundered from this element, for which they have so powerful an attraction. This attraction represents the intense heat of combustion, and a much greater quantity of force than is developed by the chemical separation of the parts of the plant. Poetical imagery comes in place when the facts of the case are not obscured by it. It might be poetically correct to describe the power of an avalanche as bound, Prometheus-like, to the mountain-side; but to present unfamiliar scientific facts in such images is neither poetically nor scientifically correct. This is, however, of little consequence to the use which our author makes of the abstract ideas and general laws of science. He hastens, like Mr. Spencer, to apply them not so much to a clear elucidation of known phenomena as to a vague description of what he fancies certain phenomena ought to be, but which exact science is still very far from having adequately investigated.

In spite of the serious defects of thought and style with which this book is marred, it will generally be well received. Dr. Draper, like Mr. Spencer, is a popular writer, and interests us by nearly the same means which have heretofore entertained us in treatises on Natural Theology. The pious or the impressive applications which serve as convenient transitions to new topics of a scientific character, rest the understanding from its pleasant rambles among the wonders of science. The interest is nearly the same, whether the lesson be on Divine Providence or on the force of an inscrutable and irresistible fate. The main interest is in the facts of science and the narratives of history.

8.—*Letters to Various Persons.* By HENRY D. THOREAU. Boston: Ticknor and Fields.

WHAT contemporary, if he was in the fighting period of his life, (since Nature sets limits about her conscription for spiritual fields, as the state does in physical warfare,) will ever forget what was somewhat vaguely called the "Transcendental Movement" of thirty years ago? Apparently set astirring by Carlyle's essays on the "Signs of the Times," and on "History," the final and more immediate impulse seemed to be given by "Sartor Resartus." At least the republication in Boston of that wonderful Abraham à Sancta Clara sermon on Lear's text of the miserable forked radish gave the signal for a sudden mental and moral mutiny. *Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile!* was shouted on all hands with every variety of emphasis, and by voices of every conceivable pitch, representing the three sexes of men, women, and Lady Mary Wortley Montagues. The nameless eagle of the tree Ygdrasil was about to sit at last, and wild-eyed enthusiasts rushed from all sides, each eager to thrust under the mystic bird that chalk egg from which the new and fairer Creation was to be hatched in due time. *Redeunt Saturnia regna,*—so far was certain, though in what shape, or by what methods, was still a matter of debate. Every possible form of intellectual and physical dyspepsia brought forth its gospel. Bran had its prophets, and the presartorial simplicity of Adam its martyrs, tailored impromptu from the tar-pot by incensed neighbors, and sent forth to illustrate the "feathered Mercury," as defined by Webster and Worcester. Plainness of speech was carried to a pitch that would have taken away the breath of George Fox; and even swearing had its evangelists, who answered a simple inquiry after their health with an elaborate ingenuity of imprecation that might have been honorably mentioned by Marlborough in general orders. Everybody had a mission (with a capital M) to attend to everybody-else's business. No brain but had its private maggot, which must have found pitiably short commons sometimes. Not a few impecunious zealots abjured the use of money (unless earned by other people), professing to live on the internal revenues of the spirit. Some had an assurance of instant millennium so soon as hooks and eyes should be substituted for buttons. Communities were established where everything was to be common but common sense. Men renounced their old gods, and hesitated only whether to bestow their furloughed allegiance on Thor or Budh. Conventions were held for every hitherto inconceivable purpose. The belated gift of tongues, as among the Fifth Monarchy men, spread like a contagion, rendering its victims incomprehensible to all Christian men; whether equally so to the most distant possible heathen or not, was unexperimented, though many would have subscribed liberally that a fair trial might be made. It was the pentecost of Shinar. The day of utterances reproduced the day of rebuses and anagrams, and there was nothing so simple that uncial letters and the style of Diphilus the Labyrinth could not make into a riddle. Many foreign revolutionists out of work added to the general misunderstanding their contribution of broken English in every most ingenious form of fracture. All stood ready at a moment's notice to reform everything but themselves. The general motto was:

"And we 'll *talk* with them, too,
And take upon 's the mystery of things
As if we were God's spies."

Nature is always kind enough to give even her clouds a humorous lining. We have barely hinted at the comic side of the affair, for the material was endless. This was the whistle and trailing fuse of the shell, but there was a very solid and serious kernel, full of the most deadly explosiveness. Thoughtful men divined it, but the generality suspected nothing. The word "transcendental" then was the maid of all work for those who could not think, as "pre-Raphaelite" has been more recently for people of the same limited housekeeping. The truth is, that there was a much nearer metaphysical relation and a much more distant æsthetic and literary relation between Carlyle and the Apostles of the Newness, as they were called in New England, than has commonly been supposed. Both represented the reaction and revolt against *Philisterei*, a renewal of the old battle begun in modern times by Erasmus and Reuchlin, and continued by Lessing, Goethe, and, in a far narrower sense, by Heine in Germany, and of which

Fielding, Sterne, and Wordsworth in different ways have been the leaders in England. It was simply a struggle for fresh air, in which, if the windows could not be opened, there was danger that panes would be broken, though painted with images of saints and martyrs. Light colored by these reverend effigies was none the more respirable for being picturesque. There is only one thing better than tradition, and that is the original and eternal life out of which all tradition takes its rise. It was this life which the reformers demanded, with more or less clearness of consciousness and expression, life in politics, life in literature, life in religion. Of what use to import a gospel from Judæa, if we leave behind the soul that made it possible, the God who keeps it forever real and present? Surely Abana and Pharpar *are* better than Jordan, if a living faith be mixed with those waters and none with these.

Scotch Presbyterianism as a motive of spiritual progress was dead; New England Puritanism was in like manner dead; in other words, Protestantism had made its fortune and no longer protested; but till Carlyle spoke out in the Old World and Emerson in the New, no one had dared to proclaim, *Le roi est mort: vive le roi!* The meaning of which proclamation was essentially this: the vital spirit has long since departed out of this form once so kingly, and the great seal has been in commission long enough; but meanwhile the soul of man, from which all power emanates and to which it reverts, still survives in undiminished royalty; God still survives, little as you gentlemen of the Commission seem to be aware of it, — nay, may possibly outlive the whole of you, incredible as it may appear. The truth is, that both Scotch Presbyterianism and New England Puritanism made their new avatar in Carlyle and Emerson, the heralds of their formal decease, and the tendency of the one toward Authority and of the other toward Independency might have been prophesied by whoever had studied history. The necessity was not so much in the men as in the principles they represented and the traditions which overruled them. The Puritanism of the past found its unwilling poet in Hawthorne, the rarest creative imagination of the century, the rarest in some ideal respects since Shakespeare; but the Puritanism that cannot die, the Puritanism that made New England what it is, and is destined to make America what it should be, found its voice in Emerson. Though holding himself aloof from all active partnership in movements of reform, he has been the sleeping partner who has supplied a great part of their capital.

The artistic range of Emerson is narrow, as every well-read critic must feel at once; and so is that of Æschylus, so is that of Dante, so is that of Montaigne, so is that of Schiller, so is that of nearly every one except Shakespeare; but there is a gauge of height no less than of breadth, of individuality as well as of comprehensiveness, and, above all, there is the standard of genetic power, the test of the masculine as distinguished from the receptive minds. There are staminate plants in literature, that make no fine show of fruit, but without whose pollen, the quintessence of fructifying gold, the garden had been barren. Emerson's mind is emphatically one of these, and there is no man to whom our æsthetic culture owes so much. The Puritan revolt had made us ecclesiastically, and the Revolution politically independent, but we were still socially and intellectually moored to English thought, till Emerson cut the cable and gave us a chance at the dangers and the glories of blue water. No man young enough to have felt it can forget, or cease to be grateful for, the mental and moral *nudge* which he received from the writings of his high-minded and brave-spirited countryman. That we agree with him, or that he always agrees with himself, is aside from the question; but that he arouses in us something that we are the better for having awakened, whether that something be of opposition or assent, that he speaks always to what is highest and least selfish in us, few Americans of the generation younger than his own would be disposed to deny. His oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge, some thirty years ago, was an event without any former parallel in our literary annals, a scene to be always treasured in the memory for its picturesqueness and its inspiration. What crowded and breathless aisles, what windows clustering with eager heads, what enthusiasm of approval, what grim silence of foregone dissent! It was our Yankee version of a lecture by Abelard, our Harvard parallel to the last public appearances of Fichte.

We said that the "Transcendental Movement" was the protestant spirit of Puritanism seeking a new outlet and an escape from forms and creeds which compressed rather than expressed it. In its motives, its preaching, and its results, it differed radically from the doctrine of Carlyle. The Scotchman, with all his genius, and his humor gigantesque as that of Rabelais, has grown shriller and shriller with years, degenerating sometimes into a common scold, and emptying very unsavory vials of wrath on the head of the sturdy British Socrates of worldly common sense. The teaching of Emerson tended much more exclusively to self-culture and the independent development of the individual man. It seemed to many almost Pythagorean in its voluntary seclusion from commonwealth affairs. Both Carlyle and Emerson were disciples of Goethe, but Emerson in a far truer sense; and while the one, from his bias toward the eccentric, has degenerated more and more into mannerism, the other has clarified steadily toward perfection of style, — exquisite fineness of material, unobtrusive lowness of tone and simplicity of fashion, the most high-bred garb of expression. Whatever may be said of his thought, nothing can be finer than the delicious limpidness of his phrase. If it was ever questionable whether democracy could develop a gentleman, the problem has been affirmatively solved at last. Carlyle, in his cynicism and his admiration of force as such, has become at last positively inhuman; Emerson, reverencing strength, seeking the highest outcome of the individual, has found that society and politics are also main elements in the attainment of the desired end, and has drawn steadily manward and worldward. The two men represent respectively those grand personifications in the drama of Æschylus, Βία and Κράτος.

Among the pistillate plants kindled to fruitage by the Emersonian pollen, Thoreau is thus far the most remarkable; and it is something eminently fitting that his posthumous works should be offered us by Emerson, for they are strawberries from his own garden. A singular mixture of varieties, indeed, there is; — alpine, some of them, with the flavor of rare mountain air; others wood, tasting of sunny roadside banks or shy openings in the forest; and not a few seedlings swollen hugely by culture, but lacking the fine natural aroma of the more modest kinds. Strange books these are of his, and interesting in many ways, — instructive chiefly as showing how considerable a crop may be raised on a comparatively narrow close of mind, and how much a man may make of his life if he will assiduously follow it, though perhaps never truly finding it at last.

We have just been renewing our recollection of Mr. Thoreau's writings, and have read through his six volumes in the order of their production. We shall try to give an adequate report of their impression upon us both as critic and as mere reader. He seems to us to have been a man with so high a conceit of himself that he accepted without questioning, and insisted on our accepting, his defects and weaknesses of character as virtues and powers peculiar to himself. Was he indolent, he finds none of the activities which attract or employ the rest of mankind worthy of him. Was he wanting in the qualities that make success, it is success that is contemptible, and not himself that lacks persistency and purpose. Was he poor, money was an unmixed evil. Did his life seem a selfish one, he condemns doing good as one of the weakest of superstitions. To be of use was with him the most killing bait of the wily tempter Uselessness. He had no faculty of generalization from outside of himself, or at least no experience which would supply the material of such, and he makes his own whim the law, his own range the horizon of the universe. He condemns a world, the hollowness of whose satisfactions he had never had the means of testing, and we recognize Apemantus behind the mask of Timon. He had little active imagination; of the receptive he had much. His appreciation is of the highest quality; his critical power, from want of continuity of mind, very limited and inadequate. He somewhere cites a simile from Ossian, as an example of the superiority of the old poetry to the new, though, even were the historic evidence less convincing, the sentimental melancholy of those poems should be conclusive of their modernness. He had no artistic power such as controls a great work to the serene balance of completeness, but exquisite mechanical skill in the shaping of sentences and paragraphs, or (more rarely) short bits of verse for the expression of a detached thought, sentiment, or image. His works give one the feeling of a sky full of stars, — something impressive and exhilarating certainly, something high overhead and freckled thickly with spots of isolated brightness; but whether these have any mutual relation with each other, or have any concern with our mundane matters, is for the most part matter of conjecture, — astrology as yet, and not astronomy.

It is curious, considering what Thoreau afterwards became, that he was not by nature an observer. He only saw the things he looked for, and was less poet than naturalist. Till he built his Walden shanty, he did not know that the hickory grew in Concord. Till he went to Maine, he had never seen phosphorescent wood, a phenomenon early familiar to most country boys. At forty he speaks of the seeding of the pine as a new discovery, though one should have thought that its gold-dust of blowing pollen might have earlier drawn his eye. Neither his attention nor his genius was of the spontaneous kind. He discovered nothing. He thought everything a discovery of his own, from moonlight to the planting of acorns and nuts by squirrels. This is a defect in his character, but one of his chief charms as a writer. Everything grows fresh under his hand. He delved in his mind and nature; he planted them with all manner of native and foreign seeds, and reaped assiduously. He was not merely solitary, he would be isolated, and succeeded at last in almost persuading himself that he was autochthonous. He valued everything in proportion as he fancied it to be exclusively his own. He complains in "Walden," that there is no one in Concord with whom he could talk of Oriental literature, though the man was living within two miles of his hut who had introduced him to it. This intellectual selfishness becomes sometimes almost painful in reading him. He lacked that generosity of "communication" which Johnson admired in Burke. De Quincey tells us that Wordsworth was impatient when any one else spoke of mountains, as if he had a peculiar property in them. And we can readily understand why it should be so: no one is satisfied with another's appreciation of his mistress. But Thoreau seems to have prized a lofty way of thinking (often we should be inclined to call it a remote one) not so much because it was good in itself as because he wished few to share it with him. It seems now and then as if he did not seek to lure others up "above our lower region of turmoil," but to leave his own name cut on the mountain peak as the first climber. This itch of originality infects his thought and style. To be misty is not to be mystic. He turns commonplaces end for end, and fancies it makes something new of them. As we walk down Park Street, our eye is caught by Dr. Windship's dumb-bells, one of which bears an inscription testifying that it is the heaviest ever put up at arm's length by any athlete; and in reading Mr. Thoreau's books we cannot help feeling as if he sometimes invited our attention to a particular sophism or paradox as the biggest yet maintained by any single writer. He seeks, at all risks, for perversity of thought, and revives the age of *concetti* while he fancies himself going back to a pre-classical nature. "A day," he says, "passed in the society of those Greek sages, such as described in the Banquet of Xenophon, would not be comparable with the dry wit of decayed cranberry-vines and the fresh Attic salt of the moss-beds." It is not so much the True that he loves as the Out-of-the-Way. As the Brazen Age shows itself in other men by exaggeration of phrase, so in him by extravagance of statement. He wishes always to trump your suit and to *ruff* when you least expect it. Do you love Nature because she is beautiful? He will find a better argument in her ugliness. Are you tired of the artificial man? He instantly dresses you up an ideal in a Penobscot Indian, and attributes to this creature of his otherwise-mindedness as peculiarities things that are common to all woodsmen, white or red, and this simply because he has not studied the pale-faced variety.

This notion of an absolute originality, as if one could have a patent-right in it, is an absurdity. A man cannot escape in thought, any more than he can in language, from the past and the present. As no one ever invents a word, and yet language somehow grows by general contribution and necessity, so it is with thought. Mr. Thoreau seems to us to insist in public on going back to flint and steel, when there is a match-box in his pocket which he knows very well how to use at a pinch. Originality consists in power of digesting and assimilating thought, so that they become part of our life and substance. Montaigne, for example, is one of the most original of authors, though he helped himself to ideas in every direction. But they turn to blood and coloring in his style, and give a freshness of complexion that is forever charming. In

Thoreau much seems yet to be foreign and unassimilated, showing itself in symptoms of indigestion. A preacher up of Nature, we now and then detect under the surly and stoic garb something of the sophist and the sentimentalizer. We are far from implying that this was conscious on his part. But it is much easier for a man to impose on himself when he measures only with himself. A greater familiarity with ordinary men would have done Thoreau good, by showing him how many fine qualities are common to the race. The radical vice of his theory of life was, that he confounded physical with spiritual remoteness from men. One is far enough withdrawn from his fellows if he keep himself clear of their weaknesses. He is not so truly withdrawn as exiled, if he refuse to share in their strength. It is a morbid self-consciousness that pronounces the world of men empty and worthless before trying it, the instinctive evasion of one who is sensible of some innate weakness, and retorts the accusation of it before any has made it but himself. To a healthy mind, the world is a constant challenge of opportunity. Mr. Thoreau had not a healthy mind, or he would not have been so fond of prescribing. His whole life was a search for the doctor. The old mystics had a wiser sense of what the world was worth. They ordained a severe apprenticeship to law and even ceremonial, in order to the gaining of freedom and mastery over these. Seven years of service for Rachel were to be rewarded at last with Leah. Seven other years of faithfulness with her were to win them at last the true bride of their souls. Active Life was with them the only path to the Contemplative.

Thoreau had no humor, and this implies that he was a sorry logician. Himself an artist in rhetoric, he confounds thought with style when he undertakes to speak of the latter. He was forever talking of getting away from the world, but he must be always near enough to it, nay, to the Concord corner of it, to feel the impression he makes there. He verifies the shrewd remark of Sainte-Beuve, "On touche encore à son temps et très-fort, même quand on le repousse." This egotism of his is a Stylites pillar after all, a seclusion which keeps him in the public eye. The dignity of man is an excellent thing, but therefore to hold one's self too sacred and precious is the reverse of excellent. There is something delightfully absurd in six volumes addressed to a world of such "vulgar fellows" as Thoreau affirmed his fellow-men to be. We once had a glimpse of a genuine solitary who spent his winters one hundred and fifty miles beyond all human communication, and there dwelt with his rifle as his only confidant. Compared with this, the shanty on Walden Pond has something the air, it must be confessed, of the Hermitage of La Chevrette. We do not believe that the way to a true cosmopolitanism carries one into the woods or the society of musquashes. Perhaps the narrowest provincialism is that of Self; that of Kleinwinkel is nothing to it. The natural man, like the singing birds, comes out of the forest as inevitably as the natural bear and the wildcat stick there. To seek to be natural implies a consciousness that forbids all naturalness forever. It is as easy — and no easier — to be natural in a *salon* as in a swamp, if one do not aim at it, for what we call unnaturalness always has its spring in a man's thinking too much about himself. "It is impossible," said Turgot, "for a vulgar man to be simple."

We look upon a great deal of the modern sentimentalism about Nature as a mark of disease. It is one more symptom of the general liver-complaint. In a man of wholesome constitution the wilderness is well enough for a mood or a vacation, but not for a habit of life. Those who have most loudly advertised their passion for seclusion and their intimacy with nature, from Petrarch down, have been mostly sentimentalists, unreal men, misanthropes on the spindle side, solacing an uneasy suspicion of themselves by professing contempt for their kind. They make demands on the world in advance proportioned to their inward measure of their own merit, and are angry that the world pays only by the visible measure of performance. It is true of Rousseau, the modern founder of the sect, true of St. Pierre, his intellectual child, and of Chateaubriand, his grandchild, the inventor of what we may call the primitive forest cure, and who first was touched by the solemn falling of a tree from natural decay in the windless silence of the woods. It is a very shallow view that affirms trees and rocks to be healthy, and cannot see that men in communities are just as true to the laws of their organization and destiny; that can tolerate the puffin and the fox, but not the fool and the knave; that would shun politics because of its demagogues, and snuff up the stench of the obscene fungus. The divine life of Nature is more wonderful, more various, more sublime in man than in any other of her works, and the wisdom that is gained by commerce with men, as Montaigne and Shakespeare gained it, or with one's own soul among men, as Dante, is the most delightful, as it is the most precious, of all. In outward nature it is still man that interests us, and we care far less for the things seen than the way in which poetic eyes like Wordsworth's or Thoreau's see them, and the reflections they cast there. To hear the to-do that is often made over the simple fact that a man sees the image of himself in the outward world, one is reminded of a savage when he for the first time catches a glimpse of himself in a looking-glass. "Venerable child of Nature," we are tempted to say, "to whose science in the invention of the tobacco-pipe, to whose art in the tattooing of thine undegenerate hide not yet enslaved by tailors, we are slowly striving to climb back, the miracle thou beholdest is sold in my unhappy country for a shilling!" If matters go on as they have done, and everybody must needs blab of all the favors that have been done him by roadside and river-brink and woodland walk, as if to kiss and tell were no longer treachery, it will be a positive refreshment to meet a man who is as superbly indifferent to Nature as she is to him. By and by we shall have John Smith, of No. –12, –12th Street, advertising that he is not the J. S. who saw a cow-lily on Thursday last, as he never saw one in his life, would not see one if he could, and is prepared to prove an alibi on the day in question.

Solitary communion with Nature does not seem to have been sanitary or sweetening in its influence on Thoreau's character. On the contrary, his letters show him more cynical as he grew older. While he studied with respectful attention the minks and woodchucks, his neighbors, he looked with utter contempt on the august drama of destiny of which his country was the scene, and on which the curtain had already risen. He was converting us back to a state of nature "so eloquently," as Voltaire said of Rousseau, "that he almost persuaded us to go on all fours," while the wiser fates were making it possible for us to walk erect for the first time. Had he conversed more with his fellows, his sympathies would have widened with the assurance that his peculiar genius had more appreciation, and his writings a larger circle of readers, or at least a warmer one, than he dreamed of. We have the highest testimony * to the natural sweetness, sincerity, and nobleness of his temper, and in his books an equally irrefragable one to the rare quality of his mind. He was not a strong thinker, but a sensitive feeler. Yet his mind strikes us as cold and wintry in its purity. A light snow has fallen everywhere where he seems to come on the track of the shier sensations that would elsewhere leave no trace. We think greater compression would have done more for his fame. A feeling of sameness comes over us as we read so much. Trifles are recorded with an overminute punctuality and conscientiousness of detail. We cannot help thinking sometimes of the man who

> "watches, starves, freezes, and sweats
> To learn but catechisms and alphabets
> Of unconcerning things, matters of fact,"

and sometimes of the saying of the Persian poet, that "when the owl would boast, he boasts of catching mice at the edge of a hole." We could readily part with some of his affectations. It was well enough for

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* Mr. Emerson, in the Biographical Sketch prefixed to the "Excursions."

Pythagoras to say, once for all, "When I was Euphorbus at the siege of Troy"; not so well for Thoreau to travesty it into "When I was a shepherd on the plains of Assyria." A naive thing said over again is anything but naive. But with every exception, there is no writing comparable with Thoreau's in kind, that is comparable with it in degree where it is best; where it disengages itself, that is, from the tangled roots and dead leaves of a second-hand Orientalism, and runs limpid and smooth and broadening as it runs, a mirror for whatever is grand and lovely in both worlds.

George Sand says neatly, that "Art is not a study of positive reality," (*actuality* were the fitter word,) "but a seeking after ideal truth." It would be doing very inadequate justice to Thoreau if we left it to be inferred that this ideal element did not exist in him, and that too in larger proportion, if less obtrusive, than his nature-worship. He took nature as the mountain-path to an ideal world. If the path wind a good deal, if he record too faithfully every trip over a root, if he botanize somewhat wearisomely, he gives us now and then superb outlooks from some jutting crag, and brings us out at last into an illimitable ether, where the breathing is not difficult for those who have any true touch of the climbing spirit. His shanty-life was a mere impossibility, so far as his own conception of it goes, as an entire independency of mankind. The tub of Diogenes had a sounder bottom. Thoreau's experiment actually presupposed all that complicated civilization which it theoretically abjured. He squatted on another man's land; he borrows an axe; his boards, his nails, his bricks, his mortar, his books, his lamp, his fish-hooks, his plough, his hoe, all turn state's evidence against him as an accomplice in the sin of that artificial civilization which rendered it possible that such a person as Henry D. Thoreau should exist at all. *Magnis tamen excidit ausis.* His aim was a noble and a useful one, in the direction of "plain living and high thinking." It was a practical sermon on Emerson's text that "things are in the saddle and ride mankind," an attempt to solve Carlyle's problem of "lessening your denominator." His whole life was a rebuke of the waste and aimlessness of our American luxury, which is an abject enslavement to tawdry upholstery. He had "fine translunary things" in him. His better style as a writer is in keeping with the simplicity and purity of his life. We have said that his range was narrow, but to be a master is to be a master. He had caught his English at its living source, among the poets and prose-writers of its best days; his literature was extensive and recondite; his quotations are always nuggets of the purest ore; there are sentences of his as perfect as anything in the language, and thoughts as clearly crystallized; his metaphors and images are always fresh from the soil; he had watched Nature like a detective who is to go upon the stand; as we read him, it seems as if all-out-of-doors had kept a diary and become its own Montaigne; we look at the landscape as in a Claude Lorraine glass; compared with his, all other books of similar aim, even White's Selborne, seem dry as a country clergyman's meteorological journal in an old almanac. He belongs with Donne and Browne and Novalis; if not with the originally creative men, with the scarcely smaller class who are peculiar, and whose leaves shed their invisible thought-seed like ferns.

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9. — *The Conversion of the Roman Empire. The Boyle Lectures for the Year* 1864, *delivered at the Chapel Royal, Whitehall.* By Charles Merivale, B. D., Rector of Lawford; Chaplain to the Speaker of the House of Commons; Author of "A History of the Romans under the Empire." New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1865. Cr. 8vo. pp. 267.

In the eight lectures which, with a long appendix of notes, form the present volume, Mr. Merivale has not undertaken to give a formal historical treatise on the Conversion of the Roman Empire. He has indicated a few of the salient points of this great revolution of opinion, sketched some of its most striking aspects, and sought to exhibit its main conditions and methods.

His work is, therefore, rather a summary of history than the history itself. If executed in a philosophic spirit, such a work would be of great value; but it is the misfortune of Mr. Merivale's position, as well as the result of the natural temper of his mind, that these lectures show more of the spirit of the ecclesiastic, the pulpit orator, and the adherent to an established church, than of the philosophic historian.

To treat this subject well — to write a true history, or to give a correct view of any of the great changes of religious faith and opinion — requires a man not only free from the common religious prejudices and superstitions, but of large and liberal mind. His faith should be strong and clear enough to acknowledge God in the world always and under all forms of belief. The truth in Paganism should be as sacred to him as the truth of Christianity. He should recognize the Christian revelation, not as an irregular, extra-historical event, but as lying within the compass of natural and historic law as purely as the development of the Platonic philosophy or the rise and spread of Mohammedanism.

Mr. Merivale seems to comprehend this necessity, but to hold the idea of it so feebly as to be unable fully to divest himself of preconceptions and prepossessions derived from ecclesiastical traditions and education, which interfere with his allegiance to it. He consequently fails to attain for himself, and much more to give to his reader, a clear conception of what he means by the conversion of the Roman Empire. He hesitates and shifts, and confuses himself between two views of it; regarding it at times as a change wrought under the general laws which, in the providence of God, control and direct the course of human opinion and progress, at others as effected under a special Divine impulse, and as an exceptional exhibition of the special grace of God. This confusion between the miraculous and the non-miraculous interpretation of the nature of the conversion of the Empire leads to a similar confusion as to its specific character, as a political and spiritual revolution. In the main, he assumes that the conversion of the Empire was a true moral and religious conversion of the Roman people from Paganism to Christianity; though the facts with which he has to deal compel him to recognize that it was in great part a merely nominal and political change. He thus in one place speaks of "the *coup d'état* of the first Christian Emperor"; and in another he says, speaking of "this splendid conversion": "The decision of mankind was trembling in the balance. Then came the last touching appeal to the court of final resort, the heart, to the source of all spiritual faith. God was in it; the world believed; the Roman Empire was converted."

The so-called conversion of the Roman Empire, though a great step in the progress of Christianity, was in fact but a nominal conversion. Christianity was heathenized, not Rome Christianized; and the result of the process to which it was forced to submit is still apparent in the doctrines which prevail through a great part of Christendom, which are commonly accepted as a portion of Christian truth, which are embodied in the creeds of Christian churches, but which have neither their origin nor their support in the teachings of Christ.

The lectures throughout show how far Mr. Merivale is from possessing a just conception of this fundamental historic fact. The Council of Nicæa, which exhibited alike in its debates, in the passions of its leaders, and in the dogmas which it promulgated, the corruption and degradation of the Christian doctrine, is to him the highest authority in spiritual matters. He seems to give its decrees pre-eminence over all other teachings; he speaks of it (p. 29) as met together to "settle the faith of men on an everlasting foundation"; as (p. 30) "the first launching of a vast spiritual engine on its career of conquest and dominion"; as solving (p. 33) "the most awful questions which the human mind can encounter"; as (p. 167) replying "to the most urgent questions of the heathen on spiritual matters, and offering to them assurance and repose from intellectual perplexity." If it offered this repose to the heathen, it surely did not succeed in securing it to the Christian. And again, with still more striking apparent neglect of respect for the previous teachings of Christianity, and in the true spirit of a Churchman, Mr. Merivale says (p. 153): "The Creed of Nicæa threw boldly into the world this first fundamental conception of a true divinity."

The limits of Mr. Merivale's ability to treat his subject in a truly critical and historical method are indicated in numerous passages. But perhaps there is no more curious illustration of the superstitious tendency of his thought, and of his unfitness for the task he has assumed, than occurs in his second lecture, where, speaking of the establishment of the Macedonian empire, he says: "It was the work of God; not merely in the ordinary sense in which we reverently and justly ascribe to Providence every movement among men on the face of his earth, and the more confidently so, the wider and more permanent it is; but God himself has claimed this work as his own by the indication he gave of it in the records of his Word by the mouth of his prophet Daniel." Mr. Merivale refers in support of this wonderful assertion to Daniel ii. 39: "And after thee shall arise another kingdom inferior to thee, and another third kingdom of brass, which shall bear rule over all the earth." Nothing could more completely exhibit the spirit in which history ought not to be written, or show more painfully the low condition of critical and religious thought among a large body of the scholars of the Church of England of whom Mr. Merivale is the representative, than such a passage as this.

Mr. Merivale's style in these lectures is inferior to the style of his History of the Romans. It is often slovenly and inaccurate. The book is full of that sort of rhetoric too often characteristic of pulpit oratory, in which a display of words is made to conceal a lack of substantial thought; and of that sort of reasoning in which assertion is made to take the place of argument.

But with all these faults, this book is not without merits. Even when we most dissent from the author's opinions, and most disapprove of his methods of supporting them, we do not question the integrity of his purpose or the sincerity of his convictions. There are passages in which he skilfully uses a considerable scholarship in presenting in new and striking lights the relations of the Christian doctrine to heathen belief, and exhibiting the moral conditions which prevailed throughout the Roman world. His notes form a body of useful and interesting illustrations of his main subject. But the book is not one that will hold a place on the shelves of the scholars of a coming generation.

10. — *History of the United States Cavalry, from the Formation of the Federal Government to the 1st of June,* 1863. *To which is added a List of all the Cavalry Regiments, with the Names of their Commanders, which have been in the United States Service since the breaking out of the Rebellion.* By ALBERT G. BRACKETT, Major First United States Cavalry; Colonel Ninth Illinois Volunteer Cavalry; Late Chief of Cavalry of the Department of Missouri; Special Inspector of Cavalry, Department of the Cumberland. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. 337.

A HISTORY of the cavalry arm of our service is much needed. Since the brilliant operations of Sheridan, Stoneman, Kilpatrick, and Grierson have proved the value of mounted troops in American armies, the study of the introduction and development of cavalry has become one of great interest to military men. It is probable that the cause commonly assigned for the superior importance attached by the government, during the early days of the Rebellion, to infantry, is the correct one. General Scott, as well as the civil authorities, thought that the suppression of the insurrection was to be the work of a few months, and considered that time would be wasted in collecting and drilling bodies of men which, from the almost proverbial length of time requisite to make horsemen effective, could not be of practical use. Their mistake was soon evident, and, wisely profiting by it, battalions of horse were equipped which before long roamed at will throughout the rich plantations of the Southwest, routed the enemy in the natural strongholds of Eastern Virginia, and were finally the immediate means of the surrender of Lee's army. To trace the progress of our cavalry from the spring of 1792, when Congress gave the President power to raise at his discretion *one squadron* to serve for three years, to the time when the regiments were counted by fifties and their battles by scores, — to show how and by what commanders the service has been perfected, where it has been best used, how it can best be combined with artillery and foot, what should be its proportions, equipment, and drill, — this is a task well worthy the ambition of a military author. Scarcely any one, indeed, who lacks a military education is fitted for it.

It is to be regretted that Colonel Brackett, while writing his book, being in active service against the Rebels at Atlanta and elsewhere, was unable to procure the necessary books and papers to make as thorough and complete a treatise as he desired. It is a very modest and apparently careful digest of the materials at the author's command, and in the absence of a fuller work will be of interest to the general reader. We hope, now that the war is over, and such an attempt is likely to meet with fewer obstructions than during its continuance, Colonel Brackett will, for the sake of the profession, write another "History of the United States Cavalry," which shall be more purely military in its nature, and for which his opportunities of observation as Colonel, Chief, and Inspector would eminently qualify him.

11. — *History of Federal Government, from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States.* By Edward A. Freeman, M. A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. Vol. I. *General Introduction. History of the Greek Federations.* London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1863. 8vo. pp. xl., 721.

Cordially recognizing the excellences of the federal form of government, Mr. Freeman has undertaken a survey of all the experiments in this kind from the earliest recorded times to our own day. His book is alike conspicuous for learning and for candor, for critical skill and historic discernment. Entering upon a field interesting in itself and hitherto untrodden, it deserves to be ranked in that class of truly original works to which its author justly assigns Mr. Finlay's histories of Greece under foreign domination.

We must be allowed to take exception to a single phrase on Mr. Freeman's title-page. It was, however, in no spirit of unkindness or of exultation that the words "to the disruption of the United States" were written. We doubt not that Mr. Freeman sincerely rejoices that he was mistaken in the anticipations which, as it appears from several passages in his book, he entertained of the success of the Southern insurgents.* For the book itself, as friends of the federal system to which we are indebted for so much of our greatness in the past, and which has just surmounted so triumphantly the extremest perils by which the strength of any form of government was ever tested, we cannot but be grateful.

An introductory chapter on the "Characteristics of Federal Government as compared with other Political Systems" will be read with interest by political students in this country. We must, in passing, allude to an error into which all theorists, not Americans born and bred, are prone to fall. We give it in our author's words: "The federal tie is weak because it is artificial. It is hardly possible that a man can feel the same love for an ingenious political creation as he may feel either for a single great nation or for a single city-commonwealth. The Achaian League or the American Union can hardly call forth either that feeling of hereditary loyalty which attaches to kings descended from Alfred or Saint Lewis, or that burning patriotism which the Athenian or the Florentine felt for the city in which his whole political and personal being found its home. A federal union, in short, must depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment, but on the reason of its citizens." (pp. 113, 114.) The fallacy lies in assuming that a federal union is necessarily a league between really distinct communities, of different history and modes of thinking, and forgetting that it may exist in a country whose people, like those of the United States, are substantially one in origin, traditions, interests, and feeling. The relations between the national government and the different States, and the powers of each, are defined in our Constitution with consummate wisdom; but the tie which binds the States together, so far from being "artificial," exists from the very nature of things. That it is not "weak," the world has just had evidence. The relation in feeling between old and long independent communities, like Argos, Corinth, and Sicyon, and the Achaian League, is vastly less close and intimate than that between the American States and the national government. We may be proud of our citizenship in Massachusetts, or Kentucky, or New York, just as a man might pride himself on his citizenship of London, or membership of the venerable academic community of Oxford; but as the pride of the London citizen or the Oxford scholar is subordinate to his pride as an Englishman, so is our local pride, however intense, lost in our larger pride as Americans. No majority of the people of this country was ever tainted with the heresy which asserts that one's allegiance to his State is paramount to his allegiance to the nation; and the war has silenced that heresy forever. Nearly two thirds of our States have no traditions behind the Union. American ideas, American institutions, the glory of American triumphs in peace and war, the bright hopes of American greatness in the future, occupy the hearts of our citizens in every quarter of the land, and, rising immeasurably above local attachments and prejudices, unite us in patriotic devotion to our country, as single, as definite, as intense as any with which ever Briton or Frenchman was fired.

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* We quote one of these passages: "It is dangerous to try to prophesy, but one cannot help thinking that the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged ambassadors before the year 1941, or even before the year 1869." (p. 118.) The dates were suggested by the duration of the struggles for Dutch and for American independence respectively.

Mr. Freeman devotes the larger part of his first volume to the Achaian League, having selected it as one of the "four federal commonwealths, in four different ages of the world," which "command, above all others, the attention of students of political history." The three others are the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons, the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands, and the United States of America, — an illustrious list, which the name of Achaia is not unworthy to begin.

Greece, for all ages the instructress of the world, rehearsed all the forms of government which were destined to be exhibited on the broader stage of after history. Even our own Federal Constitution, the most original and the most masterly political invention of modern times, finds its prototype in Achaia. Not that the features of our scheme were borrowed or imitated from the Greek original. On the contrary, they were the natural outgrowth of our inherited political principles, our colonial history, and our united struggle for independence, enforced by geographical position, and defined by the various necessities of our situation as understood and interpreted by men of rare insight, sagacity, and wisdom. Of the details of the Achaian constitution, the fathers of our republic had but scanty and imperfect knowledge; and it is amusing to see the inaccuracy of the accounts of it given by the standard historical authorities of that day. In the eighteenth number of the Federalist, Hamilton says, in words which Mr. Freeman aptly cites on his title-page, "Could the interior structure and regular operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted"; and recent scholarship, in giving us the full picture of the Greek federation, and in exhibiting its many points of likeness to the American Republic, has but confirmed the sagacity of the founders of each commonwealth by the example of the other. We shall briefly describe, under our author's sure and able guidance, the form and character of that Achaian government which for one hundred and forty years, from B. C. 280, to B. C. 146, gave to a large portion of Greece "a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government, which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old Athenian democracy," leaving it for our readers to observe the points of likeness and of contrast between it and our own.

And first, the confederation was really a nation, and not a mere league. While the subordinate states of which it was composed had their separate existence and powers, it was itself a unit. Each city had its own local assemblies and magistrates, regulated its domestic concerns without interference, and was sovereign for all purposes not inconsistent with the higher sovereignty of the confederation. But no single city could make peace or war, or enter into any negotiation with foreign states; all power for these purposes was vested in the general assembly, in whose hands the federal sovereignty was placed.

The national officers of government consisted of a Stratēgos, or President and Commander-in-Chief, a Secretary of State (γραμματεύς), and an executive council of ten members (δαμιουργοί). There were also an Under-General and a General of Cavalry, probably merely military officers. In conjunction with his ministers, the damiurgi, the Stratēgos had the power to summon extraordinary meetings of the popular assembly, and, like an English prime-minister, he could defend his views before the assembly. Though his title was a military one, the only outward symbol of his authority was the national seal, which, on entering upon or retiring from office, he was said to "accept" or "lay down." As military commander, he was supreme, holding undivided command of the armies, and subject only to the criticism of the assembly after the fact. Mr. Freeman suggests that "it may have been the remembrance of the evils inflicted upon Greece" by the "hireling banditti" who formed the armies of Athens in the century after the age of Pericles, "which induced both the Achaian League and the other later Greek commonwealths to fall back upon the old system, and insist upon the union of military and civil powers in the chief of the state"; but this union was certainly an unwise arrangement, as was manifested signally in the case of Aratos, who was almost as bad a general as he was unrivalled in diplomacy. Another defect in the system was the short period for which the Stratēgos held his office, — a single year, — with the prohibition of re-election until after the interval of another year. This latter prohibition was, however, in at least one instance disregarded. If the Stratēgos died in office, his immediate predecessor assumed the post.

The damiurgi seem to have been the federal magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state, and their powers must have been "thrown somewhat in the shade" on the institution of the office of General. Thirlwall has remarked that their number, ten, corresponds to that of the Achaian townships, as reduced by the loss of Helice and Olenos. This number remained unaltered when the League had widely extended its borders; but the damiurgi, as Mr. Freeman satisfactorily shows, were no longer taken exclusively from the old Achaian towns. They were chosen at the same time with the General, and by the same electors. With them rested the presidency of the assembly, and the duty of putting questions to the vote. Their advice, like that of an executive council, was doubtless taken by the General in all important civil business. Aratos was accompanied by his ten councillors when he went to meet King Antigonos, in the negotiations which prepared the way for his coming into Peloponnesos.

Between the administration and the popular assembly stood the great council or senate. It consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid members, who were not improbably appointed, together with the other magistrates, at the spring meeting of the assembly. Theirs were the usual functions of a Greek senate. They were essentially a committee of the assembly, and a meeting of the larger body probably always involved a previous meeting of the smaller. The government brought their proposals before this great council, to be discussed, and perhaps amended, before they were submitted to the final decision of the assembly. Ambassadors were introduced to it before their audience by the assembled nation, and perhaps in some cases they transacted business with it alone. It might often happen, that a summons to an assembly was answered by few besides those citizens who happened to be senators.

The constitution of the assembly was extremely democratic. Every free citizen of any of the cities belonging to the League, if he had attained the age of thirty years, could attend, speak, and vote at its meetings. Yet mob-tyranny was effectually guarded against by the provision which gave to each city but one vote, whether few or many of its citizens were present; moreover, from the more distant towns of the confederacy but a small number of members would be likely to attend, and they of the wealthier class, — an approach in practice to the representative system. To give each city one vote was very well in the little communities of Achaia proper, but certainly unfair to such large cities as Sicyon, Argos, Megalopolis, and Corinth. The assembly held the valuable prerogatives of electing the Stratēgos and other magistrates, contracting alliances, and making war or peace. But further than this, its powers were greatly circumscribed. Its sessions — which were held twice a year, in the spring and autumn — were limited to three days. In so short sessions, the initiative of measures must have remained practically in the hands of the government. The course of action was chiefly determined by the President and his cabinet, perhaps with the advice of the senate. At extraordinary meetings of the assembly, — which could be summoned by the government on occasions of special urgency, — that particular business only could be entertained which the assembly had been summoned to decide. Thus, while the assembly was democratic in theory, it was aristocratic in its practical working. Its meetings, too, were chiefly attended by those citizens who were "at once rich enough to bear the cost of the journey, and zealous enough to bear the trouble of it." This practically aristocratic character attaches to the whole Achaian government. It does not appear that any of the great officers of state were paid for their services; and hence, although there was no property qualification, they must, as the rule, have been rich men. But, while aristocratic, the government was not illiberal or oligarchical.

For the greater part of the history of the League, the regular meetings of the assembly were held at Aigion, the most important of the old Achaian towns, but insignificant in size when compared with the larger Peloponnesian cities. Mr. Freeman remarks that Aigion was a more suitable capital than any of these, for the same reason that Washington is to be preferred as the seat of government to New York, — it being important, in a federal government, to avoid all liability to undue local influence. In the latter days of the League, Philopoimen carried a measure by which the assembly met in different cities by rotation. It was always the rule that extraordinary meetings could be called at whatever place seemed to the General most suitable in the exigency.

Of the federal courts of justice we know little, except that there were such tribunals, and that the wealthier citizens, of the class which served in the cavalry, were the judges. As regards national taxation, it would seem that requisitions were made upon the separate cities, which raised the sum prescribed, each in its own way. Finally, as regards the military administration, the assembly sometimes required particular cities to furnish particular contingents, and sometimes invested the General with power to summon the whole military force of the nation. Besides the citizen soldiers, mercenaries were employed, who must have been paid by the federal treasury. Out of these two classes the League maintained a small standing army, enough at least to keep federal garrisons in a few important places.

Such are the principal features in the constitution of this renowned League. For a brief period, — but Greece teaches her lessons within narrow limits both of space and of time, — its members, in the language of Polybios, were not only united in friendly alliance, "but also had the same laws, weights, measures, and coins, and moreover the same magistrates, senators, and judges; in short, nearly the whole of Peloponnesos differed in character from a single city in this respect alone, that its inhabitants were not surrounded by the same wall."

The chief interest of Grecian history clusters around the name of Athens; and the superior fascination of the story of that wondrous city often tempts us to pass by other portions of the old Greek annals with undeserved neglect. Mr. Freeman justly praises Thirlwall, because to him, unlike Grote, "Aratos and Kleomenes are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themistokles and Perikles." To use the often-quoted simile of Pausanias, in the old age of Hellas, Achaia sprang up like a new shoot from a dying trunk; and the fresh growth was worthy of its noble stock. Again, in Mr. Freeman's words: —

> "It is surely something, to put it on no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone, she was still important, — no longer politically dominant, but intellectually more supreme than ever. The Greek history of this time is more like the history of modern times; it is less fresh than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no longer merely the history of single cities; it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and federations all play their part, just as they do in the European history of later times. It is a time of deeper policy, of more complicated intrigue; an age in which men had lost the vigor and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss by the gain of a far more enlarged experience." — pp. 225, 226.

The staple of the history of federal Greece, says our author, is formed by "the varying relations between the great Greek monarchy," Macedonia, "and the great Greek confederation," Achaia, "diversified by the strange phenomenon of Ætolia, at once a democratic confederation and an aggressive tyranny, and by the brief but splendid revival of Sparta's greatness." The aim of the Antigonid kings was to reduce Greece under their immediate sovereignty or their indirect influence; that of the Achaian federation to unite the greatest number of Greek cities in the bonds of a free and equal League. We cannot enter into the details of this history, nor trace the fortunes of this first great federation.

> "For a hundred and forty years," says Mr. Freeman, "no short space in any nation's life, and a very long space among the few centuries which we call ancient history, the League had given to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age had seen a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old Athenian democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so many cities into a union which strengthened them against foreign kings and senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal independence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind. It was no slight achievement to keep so many cities for so long a time free alike from foreign garrisons, from domestic mobs, domestic tyrants, and domestic oligarchs. How practically efficient the federal principle was in maintaining the strength and freedom of the nation, is best shown by the bitter hatred which it aroused, first in the Macedonian kings, and then in the Roman Senate. It was no contemptible political system against which so many kings and consuls successively conspired; it was no weak bond which the subtlest of all diplomatic senates expended so many intrigues and stratagems to unloose. . . . . The League did its work in its own age by giving Peloponnesos wellnigh a century and a half of freedom; it does its work still by living in the pages of its own great historian as the first attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with national strength." — pp. 709, 710.

Upon examining and comparing the original authorities, we have been struck alike with the extent of our author's research, his keen historic insight, the thoroughness of his scholarship, and the trustworthiness of his conclusions. The book is worthy of the high place which Mr. Freeman holds in the estimation of English scholars. He is an examiner in the School of Modern History and Law at Oxford, and, by his writings on various topics of Grecian, Roman, and mediæval history, has given proof of great study and of conscientious handling of facts. His style is clear and forcible, and not wanting in picturesqueness, whenever he is willing to depart from what is necessarily his usual function, — that of a calm, impartial critic of constitutions and laws. Let him complete his great task in the same spirit in which he has begun it, and he will have enriched historical literature with one of its most original works and most valuable treasures.

12. — *The Gayworthys: a Story of Threads and Thrums.* By the Author of "Faith Gartney's Girlhood." Boston: Loring, Publisher. 1865. pp. 399.

This book appears to have been suggested by a fanciful theory of life, which the author embodies in a somewhat over-figurative preface, and which recurs throughout the story at intervals, like a species of refrain. The theory in question amounts to neither more nor less than this: that life is largely made up of broken threads, of plans arrested in their development, of hopes untimely crushed. This idea is neither very new nor very profound; but the novel formula under which it is shadowed forth on the title-page will probably cause it to strike many well-disposed minds as for the first time. In a story written in the interest of a theory two excellent things are almost certain to be spoiled. It might seem, indeed, that it would be a very small figure of a story that could be injured by a theory like the present one; but when once an author has his dogma at heart, unless he is very much of an artist, it is sure to become obtrusive at the capital moment, and to remind the reader that he is, after all, learning a moral lesson. The slightly ingenious and very superficial figure in which the author embodies her philosophy recurs with a frequency which is truly impertinent.

Our story is organized upon three main threads, which, considering the apparent force of the author's conviction, are on the whole very tenderly handled; inasmuch as, although two of them are at moments drawn so tight that we are fully prepared for the final snap and the quiet triumph of the author's "I told you so," yet only one of them is really severed past all repair. This catastrophe symbolizes the fate of Miss Rebecca Gayworthy, who cherishes a secret flame for her pastor, the Rev. Jordan King. Mr. King, in turn, entertains a passion for another young lady, whom he marries, but who is not all for him that Miss Gayworthy would have been. The broken thread here is Miss Gayworthy's slighted regard for Mr. King.

There are two other pairs of lovers whose much shifting relations fill up the rest of the book. Miss Joanna Gayworthy is gifted, for her misfortune, with a lively tongue and an impetuous temper. She is kept for a number of years the subject of one of those gratuitous misconceptions in which lady novelists delight. To our mind there is quite as much of the comical as of the pathetic in her misunderstanding with Gabriel Hartshorne. Both she and her lover seem bent on fixing the *minimum* of words with which a courtship can be conducted, and the utmost possible impertinence of those words. They fall the natural victims to their own ingenuity. The fault, however, is more with him than with her. If she was a little too much of a coquette, he was far too little of an enthusiast. Women have a prescriptive right to answer indirectly at serious moments; but men labor under a prescriptive obligation at these moments to speak and act to the point. We cannot but think that Gabriel obtained his mistress quite as soon as he had won her.

Of the parties yet mentioned, however, neither is to be taken for the hero and heroine proper; for in the presence of the inevitable, the orthodox little girl, — this time, fortunately, matched not with a condescending man of the world, but with a lad of her own age, — in the presence, we say, of these heroic figures, who shall dare to claim that distinction? Sarah Gair and Gershom Vorse are brought up together in the fields, like another Daphnis and Chloe. Gershom is sent to sea by the machinations of Sarah's mother, who has a quasi-prophetic insight into what may be. Sarah blossoms into young ladyhood, and Gershom obtains command of a vessel. In the course of time he comes home, but, we regret to say, with little of the breezy gallantry of his profession. For long years his old playmate has worn his image upon her heart of hearts. He utterly fails to take cognizance of her attachment, and in fact snubs her most unmercifully. Thrums again, as you see. It is perhaps hard to overstate the possibilities of man's insensibility as opposed to woman's cunning devotion. But the whole picture of Gershom Vorse strikes us as ill-conceived; and yet those who remember Tom Tulliver in "The Mill on the Floss" will acknowledge that much can be made in a dramatic way of the figure of the rational, practical, honest, prejudiced youth whose responsibilities begin early. It is perhaps natural that Gershom Vorse's contempt for the mother should have predisposed him against the daughter; but why should he nurse so unmannerly an intolerance of all her little woman's graces? If Sarah was really a perfect young lady, she was too good for this grim and precocious Puritan. He despises her because, being a young lady, she looks and dresses like one, because she wears "puffed muslin and dainty boots." Out upon him! What should he care about such things? That this trait is not manly, we need not affirm; but it is the reverse of masculine.

It is hardly worth while, however, to criticise details in an episode which is so radically defective as this one. Its radical defect is the degradation of sentiment by making children responsible for it. This practice is becoming the bane of our novels. It signifies little where it began, or what authority it claims: it is, in our opinion, as fatal to the dignity of serious feeling and to the grandeur of strong passions as the most flagrant immoralities of French fiction. Heaven defend us from the puerile! If we desire to read about children, we shall not be at loss: the repertory of juvenile works is vast. But if we desire to learn the various circumstances under which love-making may be conducted, let us not repair to the nursery and the school-room. A man's childhood and his manhood can never, without a violation of truth, be made the same story; much less may the youth and maturity of a woman. In "The Gayworthys" the loves of the two young people are far too exclusively projected from their infancy. The age for Daphnis and Chloe has passed. Passion and sentiment must always be more or less intelligent not to shock the public taste. There are, of course, few things so charming as the innocence of childhood, just as there are few things so interesting as the experience of manhood. But they cannot in a love-story be successfully combined. Thackeray's great genius was insufficient to prevent the fruition of Henry Esmond's boyish devotion from seeming very disagreeable. Every reader feels that, if he had had the story to write, *that* should not have been its consummation. There is in the experience of every man and woman a certain proportion of sensations which are interesting only to themselves. To this class of feelings we would refer the childish reminiscences held in common by two persons who at the age of discretion unite their destinies. A man seldom falls in love with the young girl who has grown up at his side; he either likes or dislikes her too much. But when he does, it is from quite a new stand-point and with a new range of feelings. He does not woo her in the name of their juvenile *escapades*. These are pretty only in after years, when there is no other poetry to be had. And they are, therefore, quite apart from the purposes of the serious novelist.

So much for the faults of "The Gayworthys." Let us now pay the tribute of an explicit recognition to its very great cleverness. Without this quality no novel in these days can hope to succeed. But "The Gayworthys" has even more of it than is needed for success. How many accomplishments the would-be successful novel demands! and how many are here displayed! When we count them over, indeed, we are half amazed at our temerity in offering these prosy strictures. The observation, the memory, the invention, the fancy, the humor, the love of human nature, lavished upon these four hundred pages are the results almost of an education. Let us, we repeat, make them a very low bow. They contain much that is admirable and much that is powerful. It is for this reason that, when we see them misused, as it seems to us, conjoined with what is vulgar and false, we make a respectful protest. We know not whether in this case their union makes a total which we may properly call genius; but it at all events makes a force sufficiently like genius not to be able with impunity to work in ignorance of principle. We do not claim to have laid down any principles. They are already laid down in a thousand consummate works of art. All we wish to do here — all we have space to do — is to remind the author of "The Gayworthys" that they exist.

13.— *What I saw on the West Coast of South and North America and at the Hawaiian Islands.* By H. Willis Baxley, M. D. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1865. 8vo. pp. 632.

This volume consists of an indifferent guide-book of the cities and their neighborhood on the west coast of America, with some personal experiences, never amounting to adventure, connected by a narrative upon which the picturesqueness or majesty of the wonderful scenes of nature amongst which it leads have left not a trace. We have never met with a traveller who had seen less of the things which passed before his eyes, or who was more thoroughly disqualified by preconceived notions from seeing in general than Dr. Baxley. His virtuous soul was possessed with one dazzling, blinding idea. Whatever he saw while travelling in South America and the Sandwich Islands, and whatever he did not see, alike nourished his confidence in the superiority of the Caucasian race, the intensity of his "loathing" of all mongrelism, and his sense of the loveliness, naturalness, and even the divinity of that subordination of the inferior races to the superior, for which, on one or two occasions, he finds a word which expresses his idea exactly, and that word is slavery. In the absence of the refreshing prospect afforded by that institution, he suffers his gaze to wander a few thousand miles away to the home where he had left it flourishing like the bay-tree and happily overspreading the land. In short, wherever he goes, his darling theory and its distant illustration intervene between our travelling commissioner and those objects close at hand which in the case of ordinary men present the strongest claims to attention.

No doubt this was an excellent way to keep the most agreeable of all views constantly before one's own eyes, but it is not indicative of the best condition of mind for a traveller, and above all an author of travels. Just at this time there are a great many things concerning the population, society, and intermixture of blood in the South American states, which it would be highly desirable for us to know. In so many different conditions, with such variety of climate, laws, and labor, as well as of descent, there must be an abundance of interesting and diversified facts to be gathered in that great continent by any real inquirer into its social condition. Upon all these points we find nothing satisfactory, or which bears the marks of being trustworthy in the present work. At his first glimpse on the Isthmus of the mixed population of Panama, our author's theory makes its appearance full-fledged, and his conclusions are announced, which are not to be varied to the last chapter. We dispute neither the one nor the other; at the same time it is evident that neither has been drawn from facts existing in South America. Any clear-sighted observer who will put his finger upon the cause of South American degradation will be doing a real service. Meanwhile it is ridiculous, even if the time were not past, to talk of slavery as the cure of evils which were engendered under its sway. Neither freedom nor universal suffrage made these people a population of half-breeds. It is to the Caucasian race itself that they owe this obligation, as well as that of the destruction, according to our author, of a state of happiness under the Incas, surpassing anything that noble race ever accomplished for themselves.

The statements of the work are associated with such a sidelong glance at home affairs, that its appearance at this time may well be supposed to be connected with certain questions at present uppermost. The main argument of the volume is this, that the inferior races ought not to be admitted to political privileges, because political equality leads to social equality, and this to corruption, amalgamation, &c., &c. Surely this is not the case with political and social relations among ourselves, nor do we see the least evidence adduced in support of this view from the experience of the Spanish republics. According to the present, as well as all other accounts, the corruption of blood had already, before the independence of these states, proceeded to such an extent as to leave no question concerning the franchise; if not given to the mixed races, there was really next to nobody else to hold it. And as to the results, miserable as the condition of these countries is allowed to be, we should be glad to have the time pointed out since their conquest when it was better. The colonial era was a horrible, and, to any but the most submissive of people, an intolerable compound of robbery, venality, and oppression in every shape. That *régime* alone was sufficient to wear out the public virtue of Spain, as it wore out the life of the colonies. Between two and three hundred years of this torment, as well as fifty years of republicanism, are now bearing their fruits; and if there is any lesson in this quarter to profit by, it seems quite as likely to be a knowledge of the effect of injury and oppression, even when, as in the case of the Indians, it has not been carried to the extent of personal slavery, as of the result of too much laxity in political arrangements.

The publication of this book at this day keenly reminds us of the depth to which our government had fallen; but it brings with it, at the same time, an exquisite sense of relief, as an incident of the great victory, that we are not to be henceforth so misrepresented. Perhaps we shall find the point of agreement with our author in our mutual satisfaction that he is the last of that breed of diplomatists who used to be sent abroad to belie the principles of our institutions. By what Nemesis is it that, while those who plainly cling to slavery for its barefaced use and profit occasionally exhibit in speech and writing something of the point and vigor belonging to a creation of mere force, its theoretical admirers and defenders are abandoned to the puerile, the sentimental, the namby-pamby in literature? Now that slavery is gone, is all the affected elegance, all the thin scholarship, to pass away with it? That is too good to hope. But in that case this book might remain a sample of the product of an extinct state of mind and a perfect treasury of everything in a literary performance that we do not care to characterize.

14.— *The Works of the Right Honorable* EDMUND BURKE. Revised Edition. Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1865. Cr. 8vo. pp. xx., 537.

THIS is the first volume of an edition of Burke's Works, in twelve volumes. One volume is to appear each month till the series is completed. In convenience of size and in excellence of typography it surpasses all previous editions, English or American, of the works of the great orator. It is, as we understand, a reprint of the authorized collection of Mr. Burke's writings, which was published in London, in sixteen octavo volumes, at intervals from 1801 to 1827. There is reason for regret that no competent editor has as yet undertaken to prepare an edition of Burke, with such biographical, historical, and literary notes as are required to give to the general reader a knowledge of the circumstances under which his various writings appeared, of their relations to his life, and of their contemporary effect. Such information must now be collected from the biographies of the author, and from various other sources. The debt of England, and we may add of America, to the most eloquent of English orators and the most philosophic of English statesmen, will not be discharged till this due honor has been paid to the masterpieces in which the ample stores of his political wisdom are contained, and in which his marvellous fertility of imagination, powers of thought, and mastery of expression are displayed.

But we need not pronounce the eulogium of Burke, nor recommend the study of his works. They will remain the delight of the lover of noble thought delivered in noble language; and every student of the science of politics will turn to them for much of his best instruction.

15.— *France and England in North America. A Series of Historical Narratives.* By FRANCIS PARKMAN, Author of "History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac," "Prairie and Rocky Mountain Life," &c. Part First. *Pioneers of France in the New World.* Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1865. 8vo. pp. xxii., 420.

The choice of so insignificant a thing as a title has sometimes had no small influence on the good or evil fortunes of a book. The selection of a subject has often a yet more immediate bearing on the fate of an author. A happy judgment in this particular is a very considerable argument of his aptness for his task, and a by no means unimportant part of that innate outfit of ability which insures as well as justifies prosperity. To know his own aptitudes and limitations, to obey instinctively the natural magnetism of his talents and temperament, proves a writer to be gifted with that taste, which, if not itself genius, is at least the unerring counsellor that makes it available for service and success. No force of mind will overcome the uncouthness and repugnancy of a churlish theme. There are blocks which have not in them any Mercury, winged messenger of the gods, the guide of dreams. The avenues of fame show many an unsightly monument of misadventurous powers.

Mr. Parkman has shown a singular felicity in his selection of topics. There is a part of history which we call, somewhat indefinitely, perhaps, its romance, as if all history, rightly understood, were not the highest poetry, "accommodating the shows of things to the desires of the mind." There are bits of story here and there, however, as there are corners of the landscape, that are more especially picturesque, like the death of Sir John Chandos and the feat of John Seaton in Froissart. There are also slender currents of life, adventure, and heroic achievement, which seem rather to be swallowed in the main stream of events than to be tributary to it, but which, if explored, lead us among scenery all the more charming for its untrodden seclusion and its miniature completeness. There are inconsequential achievements, or even failures, like that of De Soto, which have a singular fascination. They gratify that interest in personal doing and suffering which is stronger, perhaps, than what is excited in us by the fate of empires, as the majority of mankind are more eager for gossip than for a knowledge of great events. It is for this picturesque side of history, as of nature, these adventurous sallies of character, that Mr. Parkman has a natural predilection, and therefore a lucky eye, for it is our own temperaments that we see most vividly in men and things. This intellectual idiosyncrasy, while it gives vividness to his narrative, tinges his style, and sometimes, as it appears to us, his judgment. There is a little too much, we will not say floweriness, but botany, in the earlier half of the book, which makes the tragic grimness of the facts contrast somewhat unpleasantly with the sentimentalism of their setting. For example: "Here the rich gordonia, never out of bloom, sends down its thirsty roots to drink at the stealing brook. Here the halesia hangs out its silvery bells, the purple clusters of the wistaria droop from the supporting bough, and the coral blossoms of the erythrina glow in the shade beneath," &c. (p. 58.) All very well in Bartram's Journal, or in its proper place in Mr. Parkman's book; but here it is æsthetically wrong. It is to mingle flower with historical painting, distracting the eye, with bits of bright color, from the heroic figures. The French on such an errand as here described would not have noticed them, and the reader, who only sees with their eyes, feels the incongruity. The form seems sometimes to make our author forget the spirit, though it is here, after all, that we are to look for that moral picturesque which is more profoundly impressive than any gayety of costume. Mr. Parkman, we think, loses sight of the distinction, when in his Introduction, making an antithesis of New France and New England, he says that the latter "has not been fruitful in those salient and striking forms of character which often give a dramatic life to the annals of nations far less prosperous." Winthrop is to us a figure more attractive, even to the imagination, than Champlain or Cartier. Jonathan Edwards among the

Housatonic Indians, adapting Calvinism to the demands of logic, is as romantic as the best Jesuit of them all. And in what we may call the physically picturesque, the Canadian expedition of Arnold may vie with any passage in the history of French enterprise in the New World. Any comparison between the early French and English colonizations which would account for diversity of results from original differences of character, without allowing for variety of circumstance, is entirely fallacious. The French were invited to adventurous exploration by their great river with its numerous affluents, and by the chains of larger and lesser lakes that stretched westward and southward. They pushed no permanent settlements inland away from these watery highways, which even in winter were still guides, as well as smooth and solid roads. Their habit of memoir-writing gives them an advantage with posterity; but that a spirit of daring enterprise should have been wanting to that less communicative race which wrestled with and threw the shaggy Pan of the wilderness, and urged into untravelled seas the dangerous chase after whales, is hardly conceivable.

Mr. Parkman, shut out from active adventure by infirmities of body, and wellnigh debarred from reading and writing by a weakness of eyesight only short of total blindness, has consoled himself for the one misfortune by tracing and celebrating the achievements of others, and has conquered the other by a cheerful constancy equal to that of any of the brave spirits whose exploits he so enthusiastically records. In his present volume he first sketches the attempts of the French at colonizing the coasts of Carolina and Florida, ending with the wild vengeance of Dominique de Gourgues, that last *derringdo* which shows in full lineaments the fierce and hardy features of the age of chivalry, and then with more fulness of detail and abundance of narrative sets before us the works and days of Champlain, which naturally involve the history of French discovery and settlement in the northern parts of the continent. It is by far the most complete and interesting narrative of these events we have ever read. If it lack something of the simple grace and attractive quaintness of the story as told by the original actors in it, a kind of charm due to a certain bluntness of thinking and consequent *naïveté* of language no longer possible, it has the advantage in clearness, directness, and unity of purpose, and in a compression which is now more sadly demanded than ever by that most impatient of men, the general reader. Clearness and accuracy are also much enhanced by Mr. Parkman's own familiarity with the country which is the scene of his story, and especially with the red men, who are such important actors in it. By a thorough study of authorities, and by personal investigation among existing tribes, he has perhaps a better right to speak with authority as to the moral and intellectual qualities of those too-often idealized savages than any other writer. His conclusions are hardly more flattering than those of Dr. Palfrey. Mr. Parkman has that prime merit of an historian, the conscientious study and comparison of original documents. He does not write history at second hand. He has that hearty enthusiasm which gives warmth and life alike to subject and reader, making his books wholesome reading for both old and young. To the latter such a volume as this is an especial godsend, offering them an ideal of generous hardihood. We have many examples of books, written down to the assumed level of boys, which we should suppose to be idiocy, did we not know that idiots are divinely protected from such reading. A book like this is precisely what we would put into the hands of a healthy boy along with the Arabian Nights, that the balance might not incline too much either on the side of adventure or fancy.

The volume gives Mr. Parkman a rank with the best of our historians, and we regret his infirmity of vision the more, that it will delay the completion of his projected work, and keep us hungry for those parts of it which will be the freshest and most interesting, — the story of the Jesuit missions and of the final surrender of French colonization to a force morally superior to its own. Unless it be the contest between France and England in Hindostan, there is nothing in history more vividly picturesque than the battle-ground of arms and ideas in the trackless wilderness of our Western world, and we know of none so fit, both by natural inclination and study, to be its historian as Mr. Parkman.

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16. — *Voyage de Jaques Cartier au Canada en* 1534. *Nouvelle Edition, publiée d'après l'édition de* 1598 *et d'après Ramusio.* Par M. H. Michelant. Avec deux Cartes. — Documents inédits sur Jaques Cartier et le Canada, communiqués par M. Alfred Ramé. Paris: Librairie Tross. 1865. pp. vii., 71, 53.

The fresh interest which Mr. Parkman's admirable account of early French adventure in North America is awakening in American readers leads us to call attention to this reprint of the Journal of the first voyage to Canada of Cartier, the bold Breton seaman, the explorer of the St. Lawrence, and the namer of Montreal. A similar reprint of the narrative of his second voyage, in 1535, was made a year or two since. Both of these volumes are carefully edited and beautifully printed, and the edition consists of but a small number of copies. The opportunity of securing these volumes should not be lost by the collectors of books on American history.

17. — *A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening, adapted to North America, etc., etc., with Remarks on Rural Architecture.* By the late A. J. DOWNING, ESQ. Seventh Edition, enlarged, revised, and newly illustrated. With a Supplement. By HENRY WINTHROP SARGENT. New York: Orange Judd. 1865. 8vo. pp. xv., 576.

MR. DOWNING'S work on Landscape Gardening, with the very valuable Supplement by Mr. Sargent, still holds its place in spite of the vast and rapid improvement of taste and knowledge during the twenty-five years since it was written, as the best popular and easily obtainable treatise upon the subjects which it embraces. There is great need either of a wholly new work on these subjects, adapted to the present needs of our public, and brought up to the times, or of a revised and improved edition of Mr. Downing's book.

From the title-page of the volume before us we inferred that this need was to be supplied. But the statement that this seventh edition, or this edition of 1865, is enlarged, revised, and newly illustrated, has, so far as we can discover, no foundation. The volume appears to be merely a reissue, without alteration, of the sixth edition of the work, issued under Mr. Sargent's editorship in 1859. Mr. Sargent is of course in no way responsible for the misstatement of the publisher.

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18. — *The Works of* WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, *the Plays edited from the Folio of* MDCXXIII., *with various Readings from all the Editions and all the Commentators, Notes, Introductory Remarks, a Historical Sketch of the Text, an Account of the Rise and Progress of the English Drama, a Memoir of the Poet, and an Essay upon his Genius.* By RICHARD GRANT WHITE. Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1865. 8vo. pp. ccxcvi., 260.

WITH this ripe contribution to Shakespearian literature, Mr. White brings to a close his edition of the poet begun eight years ago. A gap of four years divides the publication of the last volume of the Plays from this at once preliminary and concluding volume. Mr. White is the first American editor in any adequate sense, the first, that is, whose labors may be properly called original, and who has brought to his task that critical sagacity, that conscientious observance of the laws which should guide and limit editorship, and that taste founded in knowledge, which justly place an editor in the front rank of his department. Nor is it only among the American editors of the great poet that we would assign him this position. After an examination more minute and a comparison more exhaustive than critics are often in the habit of bestowing on the subject of their animadversions, — an examination, we may literally say, of every reading and of every note, and a comparison of all the modern editions except the so-called "Cambridge Shakespeare," published since his own, — we feel that we have a right, as we are sure we are under the obligation, to pronounce his edition the best in all essential particulars that has yet been made. A work so faithful and so thorough deserves not only the thanks of all lovers of Shakespeare, but especially of all Americans who believe, as we do, that Mr. White's labors are an honor to the scholarship of his country, and of more true service to her good repute than all the demonstrations of her material prosperity and power, and all the Fourth-of-Julyisms of her panegyrists put together. There is an Americanism in Mr. White of the sterling kind which assumes our equal right in the noble language and the rich literary inheritance of our ancestors, and justifies it by his mastery over the one and the scholarly use he knows how to make of the other. There are some trifling points concerning which we should be inclined to disagree with him, though in doing so we should acknowledge, at the same time, that where his judgment loses its wonted coolness it is because of an ardor of mind which is one of the most needful as well as highest qualifications for his task. But our present office is by no means controversial. We feel that gratitude is more in place here than verbal criticism, and that whoever would grumble over a gift like this would look Eclipse in the mouth. It is far more grateful to our feelings, as it is more just, simply to add our thanks to the rest for what is truly a national benefaction.

If we needed to justify our high estimation of Mr. White as a critic, and of precisely that kind most fitted for an undertaking like his, we should recall to the memory of our readers his animadversions upon the famous Collier folio of 1632. With no other weapons than were furnished by Mr. Collier's own specimens, he succeeded in demolishing any claim of the book to what we may call synchronous authority. With a single exception (in Blackwood's Magazine for August, 1853) he was the first adverse critic of this unhappy volume, and nothing in the way of demonstration has been since added in England to the results he arrived at, except what could be supplied by access to original documents, and by chemic and microscopic tests, which were, of course, out of the question in his case. In that field Mr. White fairly won his spurs as a critic. Nor was the temper of his animadversions less admirable than their learning and acuteness, thus putting him in very graceful contrast with the principal combatants on the other side of the water.

The same tone characterizes Mr. White's remarks on this matter in his sketch of the history of the text in the volume before us. The question may now be considered as settled by Mr. Hamilton's monograph; and Mr. White speaks of Mr. Collier with the tenderness due to a fallen antagonist, who, however criminal in this case, deserves thanks for other important services.

The four years that have passed since the appearance of Mr. White's twelfth volume have been such as amply to account for the delay of the first. The mind occupied with the varying fortunes of a conflict like that which has just happily ended, could hardly be in a condition to compare texts or estimate authorities; and the eye that must continually be running over the lists of killed and wounded, dreading the stab of some dear name, was not the one on which misplaced letters and travestied words would make their due impression. But Mr. White has not been idle. If we may trust to internal evidence, he is the author of certain letters in the London "Spectator," which must have done much toward enlightening and rectifying public opinion in England with regard to this country, and rumor attributes to him that remarkably clever satire, "The New Gospel of Peace," which did equally good service at home. The volume before us contains, beside the Poems, a Life of Shakespeare, an Essay on his Genius, a history of the text, and of the English Drama, all of them characterized by the same clearness of judgment, acuteness of criticism, precision of statement, and acquaintance with the subject, which our previous knowledge of Mr. White gave us a right to expect.

LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated. By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast; Author of "The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral." New and revised Edition. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. xii., 448.

2. The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1864. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 8vo. pp. 838.

3. The Story of the Great March. From the Diary of a Staff Officer By Brevet Major George Ward Nichols, Aid-de-Camp to General Sherman. With a Map and Illustrations. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. 394.

4. Recollections of Seventy Years. By Mrs. John Farrar. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 331.

5. Camps and Prisons. Twenty Months in the Department of the Gulf. By A. J. H. Duganne. New York: J. P. Robens. 1865. 12mo. pp. 424.

6. Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb. By William W. Goodwin, Ph. D., Eliot Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University. Second Edition, revised. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. 12mo. pp. xv., 264.

7. Harper's Hand-Book for Travellers in Europe and the East. By W. Pembroke Fetridge. Fourth Year. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. xxiv., 612. [A book so full of inaccuracies, errors, and absurdities, that no traveller should buy it. We regret to see that it has had "remarkable success."]

8. The Great West: Travellers', Miners', and Emigrants' Guide and Hand-Book to the Western, Northwestern, and Pacific States and Territories. With a Map of the best Routes to the Gold and Silver Mines, and complete Tables of Distances; also the United States Homestead Law, Mining Laws of the respective States, etc., etc. By Edward H. Hall. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 12mo. pp. 198.

9. The Oil Regions of Pennsylvania. Showing where Petroleum is found; how it is obtained, and at what Cost. Hints for whom it may concern. By William Wright. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. 275.

10. Can You Forgive Her? By Anthony Trollope. With Illustrations by H. K. Browne. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 8vo. pp. 334.

11. Natural History. A Manual of Zoölogy for Schools, Colleges, and the General Reader. By Sanborn Tenney, A. M. Illustrated with over Five Hundred Engravings. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. xii., 540.

NOTE.

The Index to Vol. CI. will be given in the next Number.

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